2013-03-16

PART II Confrontations, Conflicts and their Management in Postmodern era


still under editing

Original writing was published in Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/2011 http://www.upseeriliitto.fi/the_finnish_officers_union_in_english


4. Resolving conflicts with leadership and management in the post-modern world


Sun Tzu: The Book of Army Management says: 

"On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.”1
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.”2

4.1 Political leadership


Political level is the source of power and decision. It is at the political level where decisions are made to wage a war or secede from it. At strategical level power is transformed to organizations, flows of assets and, as result, their effects. It is necessary for both political and strategical level to interact (continuous re-evaluation and collaboration) intensely during conflict since estimates at political level are foundations of strategy and changes at either level may effect to other.

The political leadership must understand consequences and end states of conflict in order to justify assets, casualties and outcomes to members of their own society and also to global public opinion. There are always such irregularities and uncertainties in conflicts, that presumed end state may not appear. GUANZI states that ”if you don´t understand the politics your enemy is practising, you are not able to struggle with him. If you don´t understand the nature of your enemy, you can´t anticipate his actions. If you don´t know the general of your enemy, you shall not attack first.”3

War is not an end by itself, but a tool i.e. a part of bigger ensemble. Clausewitz said war is using power to persuade opponent to bend on ones will. Mao said, when the development at political level seizes, war is to blast all obstacles and enable politics to proceed.4 WUZI says there are five reasons to mobilize one´s army:
  • First is struggle for political status,
  • second is achieving an advantage,
  • third is extended confrontation with hostilities,
  • fourth is anxiety within state and
  • fifth is famine.5
In post-modern world the end state of an operation is not necessary defeat of the enemy, but attain peace, retain order or stabilize affairs.

There is a tendency with soldiers to think war is a meaning itself or defeating enemy is the end state, because war changes soldiers understanding of world, values and priorities6. To prevent military to wage their own war, the supreme commander of nation must have intense interaction with other stake holders of confrontation and keep the nations interest7 at first in his thinking.8 General Airo (Chief of Operations in Finland during most of the WW II) states, that Marshal Mannerheim was leading the war and he was leading operations in war zone. There are many political stake holders, dependencies and motivations in war, which the supreme commander must understand and consider.9

To become a political leader of democratic society generally happens through election. In the election of supreme commander, it is not necessarily advantage for candidate to stand out arguing on radical idealism or clash of classes. More secure lines might be emphasizing the common history of society, candidates own experiences of the nations history (president Mauno Koivisto in 1981 – 1982 campaign) or emphasizing the need to secure nations future (prime minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979 campaign). The human nature in the other hand is more prone to judge the face and appearance of the candidate in television debate, than the rationality of issues candidate is addressing.10

The leader of nation is to prepare society to hardship and sacrifices during the conflict and appear as a firm and trustworthy leader, who takes care of the society and its members. In the post-modern era, with plentitude of information competing to get attention of people, the challenge is to get message through this mass of information, to gross the threshold of attention, to deliver the message with logic dressed in stories and to appear as calm and trustworthy. All this when global media is telling different stories, people are tempted to follow other stories and potential opponent is attacking with information operations. The story has to be emotionally strong, understandable to average people and delivered with right pathos as for example George W. Bush, who spoke in Orlando 3 days before his re-election offering no facts but the story of new world, which was so perfect, logical, comprehensive and as such secured against all real world issues.11

The leader of nation has to keep the whole political front as unanimous and stable as possible to prevent either the aggressors information operations, opinions from own society or global opinion will brake the integrity of political leadership thus braking one leg of the Clausewitzian power tripod: people – leadership – usable assets. For example in Lenin-Stalin era party leaders kept very strict party discipline to prevent dangerous dispersion. Other communist parties were using same “centralized democracy” -method as the Soviet Communist Party.12

One of the difficulties tasks for the supreme commander is to create a willingness for individual soldier to give one´s life in pursuit after more valuable goals of one´s society. That can be done by fear, higher moral or with offering a possibility gain rewards. Marshal Mannerheim appealed to the sacrifices of previous generation in his speech 1918 in the lines of: may the patriotic spirit of the freedom war rise to the heights, that everyone is competing, how to more support the nation in crises!13 Ernest Renan has stated that the core of an nation is in the things that its members share and in the things they have together forgotten.14 Napoleon used the strength of patriotism15 and emphasized that by introducing the signs of national bravery i.e. decorations. Promotion is another vehicle to encourage soldier to higher achievements. The state may also offer a possibility to gain better economical start and other rewards to its soldiers like donating property, trade rights, taxation rights or pensions. As for punishment there have been measures like fines, dismissing or lowering in rank. More serious penalties have been measures like execution of soldier (Stalin), execution of soldier and his family (Hitler)16 or execution of soldier, his family, kin and all his supporters (Rome on 200-400 centuries). In the post-modern society the political leadership must tap values, motives and moral issues that makes post-modern individual to sacrifice for society´s higher demands.

4.2 Strategic leadership

A strategic leader is drawing assets from society´s sources of superiority and using them with a recipient of success, whilst surpassing weaknesses and friction to accomplish the end state defined by political level.

At strategic level one analyses both own and opponents centres of gravity and weaknesses, as well as possible goals of opponent, alternative lines of operation and courses of action to achieve those goals. One plans, how to deny optional courses of action from opponents as much as possible and then how to counter remaining at operational level in order to reach desired end state with own assets. Resources are being allocated at strategic level commander of operation is delegated their use with necessary freedom of decision.

If strategic situation is more rational, less complex or more contained, it is possible to make a plan that anticipates opponents intentions, changes of environment and friction within own forces. When situation is managed with rational approach, there is only few changes in battle order and environment is stable, strategical leader may remain at management level. If there is a need to alter procedures, force structure or situation has strategic importance, leader must walk through his troops and subordinates to create a spirit of change, empower people with information and show example.(Napoleon ride through all his troop during the night before major attack. Wellesley stated that the presence of Napoleon at battlefield was worth of force of an additional division at least)17.

Usually in post-modern, multidimensional and open situation with several levels of interaction, there might be possible to define only general lines or intentions as a course of action to the end state18. It might be a denote of the will of commander, which efficiently communicated and in perceivable form, will establish an operational guideline for every level of interaction. I some situations even at the level of soldier, worker or salesman interaction with stakeholder, the effect may gain a nature of strategy. In those situations every person, who may face situation of interaction, should understand their doing in the frame created by the denote of commanders will.

A post-modern organization is relatively flat in hierarchy with many interaction interfaces at different directions (practically all coalition operations within last 20 years have been networked organizations (CJTF) with one nation as a hub). People at those interaction interfaces make changes with their behaviour and deeds. Strategy should be guiding every situation of influence. Strategy is best embraced, when it is a part of organizational culture and individual values, thus being resilient against feelings of stress, fear or harsh conditions.

Confrontations, where situations, stakeholders, rules of engagement and relationships are varying swiftly, call for agility and sensitivity of strategy. Agile strategy needs still foresight, but foreseeing is difficult because of the amount of variables and their relations19. Strategic scenarios include more decisive points where future may take another path. Technically dominant may not necessarily win20, but the one who can change the behaviour of opponent, neutrals or other stakeholders within space of operation. YI ZHOU SHU says that one can attack to a state in six different situations: 1. when one has parted rulers from ministers, 2. when one has dispel all suspicions of attack, 3. when one has outmanoeuvred opponent to position with few alternatives, 4. when one has supported opponent in weakness, 5. when one has increased opponents decay of spirit, power or government or 6. when one has consumed and engaged opponents force and will.21

There is a need for strategic insight together with foresight. In order to create strategic insight one has to collect information, analyse it and process understanding to be able to understand opponent´s intentions as situations folds. Strategic insight helps to maintain initiative and competitiveness over other stake holders. Information must be obtained from different levels and domains to utilize innovations or observations to be able to alter strategy. The process of strategy should be open to external influences. It should have many interfaces for interaction and information exchange with outside stake holders.22 Strategist should foster contacts with different factors to obtain information of weak signals or breaking innovations. This strategy network is difficult to build because human being tends to gravitate with colleagues, to confer anything else but strategical issues or to emphasize information that support existing plans or beliefs.23

A Strategic leader creates an intention on how to proceed to end state. This intention, delivered with effective communications, will simultaneously influence on people to be protected, people within protective force, people who are neutral and people who are on the opposing side. Implementation of strategy requires people to step out from their areas of comfort. Effective strategy will always disturb legacy, create roiling within organization and might start argumentation both inside and outside of area of operation, which again adds pressure on decision makers.24

4.3 Operational leadership

The results of every institution exists only outside of its boundaries. Operational leadership exists only for outcome of the institution. For the first thing operational leader must define is the outcome of ones task and secondly organize available assets to gain the results. Operational leadership is enabling organization to deliver its outcome and ad value among stake holders outside of its organization.25

The changes in space of operation cannot be controlled, but one might try to remain ahead of them or to be agile enough to cease the initiative and gain a critical mass for effect on time of opportunity. A Commander, who is change oriented, sees them as possibilities, seeks them actively, finds alternative courses of action and implements them effectively both inside and outside of his organization. This ability requires features as follows26:
  1. Operational procedures and understanding to be able to surf the first wave of opportunity
  2. Organized methods at all levels and interfaces of the organization to seek changes that open possibilities.
  3. Cultural, procedural and leadership readiness to be able to execute changes faster than opponent both inside and outside of organization.
  4. A balance between changes and continuity within organization to keep it in the edge but not sliding into chaos.


The commander of operation must not act before he understands entirety of the space of operation and has foresight of possible future scenarios. In every case commander must know his own organization, both strengths and weaknesses. Commander must not forget either the space where operation is to be put into practise, the nature of opposing society, the forces opponent may be able to yield nor the personalities of opposing commanders. Besides above mentioned general information commander requires specific information on decisive points, where his assumptions may be challenged and new possibilities may be opened.

The size of the space of operation, amount of events and complexity of their interrelations has increased to a level, that no man alone can master all information or unfolding opportunities. Alexander the Great was great tactician, but when leading his troops to strike the weakest point of opponents formation by personal example, he lost his capability to see other changes of battlefield. Hitler tried to understand situation and command his generals far from behind the lines and lost opportunities because the delays of his communications. The Duke of Wellington riding endlessly amongst his troops, General Grant using telegraphing and General Guderian using radios were able, besides creating the awareness of entirety, to collect information directly from battlefield, to change their operations accordingly and see the results of their decisions as events unfolded. Understanding based on good information is key to operational success. Often organizations, forcing information to follow deep hierarchical structure, have failed to gain understanding of situation or to project their force with effect.

Commander of operation possesses firm basic information about the space of operations to be able to understand situation, to have insight of interrelations and to have foresight possible scenarios of future. The picture of current operations provides information to follow if chosen scenario and course of action are still realizable. If commander is mislead to follow only current picture and act upon that understanding, he will lose the foresight, revert to reactive agent and miss the initiative. In the other hand, if commander is not able to make decision upon his insight, foresight and intuition, he will lose as well.27

A successful deception at operative level requires a comprehensive process, that calls both social, political and economical measures to effect through physical, information and cognitive layers to be able to distract opponent´s understanding from real world. If conflict escalates the effect of these measures is reinforced with other soft power28 components and surprising usage of hard power that may rise fog over events and support indecisiveness on opposing side. Operational leadership must create non-linearity of operations, discrete chain of events, anomalies to expected situations and different approaches to best practice methods. A success follows commander, who executes unorthodox operation to direct his force in unforeseeable way to gain effect in the weakness of the opponent. In this process the control over beliefs of men is important.

One must be able to divert opinions and beliefs of opposing side from the real world and create a story that is perfect, self-evident, comprehensive and evades all criticism.29 To gain ground for this kind of story, one must foremost destroy all other structures of trust between opponents forces, society´s and government´s interaction30. When one is attacking, the target is the opponent´s unity of will. When one is defending, he defends his force´s, people´s and leaders willingness to fight, to face hardship and to be adamant.31

In order to be able to project right combination of force on time and in sufficient amount to achieve results, it is mandatory to delegate authority as low as possible. This is to tailor each projection of force according to situation, stakeholders and their interrelations. For example in a quest to separate local population from guerillas one tries to find exact needs of population and full fill them with tailored combination of force in each village to gain trust and social stability.32 A comprehensive operation33 surfaces the profound problem – everybody wants to have power over all other silos, but no one wants to be a subordinate.

4.4 Tactical leadership


At tactical level methods for direct impact are: fire, movement, protection, use of reserve forces, keeping contact, utilization of gained success, continuous activity, purchases and sales, interactions and deeds that improve your brand (or ethos). These methods are used with varying tempo, direction and target to be able to utilize the indirect effects in conjunction to direct. When one is advancing there is no withdrawal. But when forced to withdraw, one executes sudden attack. One must be active and maintain the initiative. When opponent is forcing you to react, then gain initiative in other level or direction of struggle. One must be swift in execution, but when friction slows you down, one must gain speed in other areas of impact.34

At tactical level one can achieve a skill of sensing the event or feeling of the battlefield. The tactical leader must understand his opponents organization, procedures, strengths and weaknesses. Leader must observe constantly his opponents spirits, formations, qualities, weaknesses, strengths, opening possibilities and possible intentions. When tactical leader senses his opponents forces battle technics, changes of tempo and timing of execution, he attacks in abrupt way, time or combination of force. Opponent must be attacked, when he himself is preparing to attack or when he is not prepared to counter the attack. 35

When situation feels complicated or one cannot understand his opponent intentions, it is better to pretend to be attacking, but execute it with restricted force. When opponent reacts, his intentions and forces may be revealed and one can utilize unfolding possibilities. Destabilize your opponent with danger, surprise or ailment. Attack without warning at target and on time your opponent is not able to foresee. When you sense that your opponent is indecisive, use the moment, seize initiative and strike him.36

Tactical leader must possess courage to partition a given task and to make complicated tasks simple. Simple task is fast to learn, execute, improve – and discard when time comes.37 During Finnish Winter War 1939 in Suomussalmi and other battles a tactic called pincer attack was used. The advance of opposing force was stopped at advantageous position for defence using only small amount of infantry but very effective indirect fire. The majority of forces were directed flanking opponents advancing column, using the advantage of terrain familiarity. Fire attacks were launched from sides of enemy with timely and locally superior force. Tempo of battle was changed and initiative was captured from opponent, who reacted retaining to defend in isolated pockets. The initiative was maintained by fighting deep amongst opposing forces and preventing isolated troops to get into contact with each other. Those pockets were later managed one by one not able to support each others with their superior direct fire weapon systems. This tactic was called also as “motti”-tactics.38


4.5 Leadership of battle technical level


At battle technical level both individuals, troops and weapon systems are trained to be able to act according subconscious habit, motoric memory or preset programming. In stressful situations and times of fear a part in human brains, amygdala, takes control and it prefers automatic habits or reactions like reflex.39 To be able to behave effectively under stress requires both individuals and troops to exercise as part of bigger battle system, obtain skill level of automation and to be able to sense cues40 of enemy action and execute ones task routinely with conjunction of indirect methods. In this context the following principles of battle technique are from a famous samurai and multi gifted person Miyamoto Musashi. He developed the art of battle while winning over 60 duels between ages 13 – 29 years and defined his understanding at 60 years old.41

While using direct impact one must possess the skill to use his force (weapon) in all its efficiency and variation. Mushasi says that is not worth to die keeping other sword in scabbard and when griping the weapon, one must focus to strike opponent. Mushashi emphasises the concentration of will and power to strike. He warns to became too familiar with one type of weapon, movement or method. If opponent studies your habits, preferences or dislikes, he might use those against you. So even at technical level one has to seem to be unpredictable.

Musashi emphasises training of battle technique to gain level of subconscious habit and reflex. Musashi says that in battle you have to move like you move normally, whether that be fast or slow or with short or long steps. This is adhered in many sports activities specially team sports where proximity helps click with other people42 and training movements to deep habit level gives team edge over other teams in competition43.

One has to maintain contact with opponent either by fight or reconnoitre to observe how opponent is reacting, to seek open possibilities and to gain understanding of his behaviour. Musashi says that every time you defy the strike of your opponent, you must use the same movement to harm him.

At battle technical level one must utilize direct impact accompanied with indirect methods for multiplied effect. To be able to do so, a leader must understand his opponents force, feel battle rhythm and strike against centres of opponents spiritual and physical stability. To find those centres, one must align with opponent. Think like he thinks to understand his avenues of approach, his restrictions, his possibilities and spirit of will. Human mind has tendency to imagine opponent as powerful and unbeatable and thus manoeuvre too slowly into contact. If one thinks opponent is formidable, he has already lost in spirit (at cognitive level) and will face loss at physical level as well. If one thinks opponent is as strong as his own forces with similar methods of fighting, then he has to abandon his normal routines and strike with surprising method to multiply direct impact with indirect effect.

Everything can be changed, when the normal rhythm of fighting is disturbed. You have to feel that moment in order to utilize it. A sudden thrust of force or strike by reserve unit may start collapse like an avalanche. When collapse starts one must keep pressure on opponent not to let him recover.

If opponent possess better ability of far ranging fire, one has to penetrate into opponent´s formation in order to deny that capability. While penetrating into opponent´s formation and clinging into his troops one has to maintain ability to strike using strengths like in Suomussalmi operation. Denying opponents strengths and striking into his weaknesses has been called asymmetric fighting. It includes indirect effects of fear, unawareness of situation or physical hardness.

4.6 Management of organization

Managing is typical and necessary task in every organization.

Organization is a tool to help people and machines to work together for better productivity.
Productive organization allows people and machines work together safely, enhances collaboration between people to create innovation, allows people to participate in decision making concerning their own tasks and fulfils specific needs of men. In every organization there is one person, who has the final decision and responsibility. He may also expect others to follow his decisions. Besides this one mandatory position, the other parts of organizations structure are various and parallel. There may be line, matrix, composite, department, branch, service, project, process, supply chain, network or consortium type of organizations. Because organization product is measured outside of its boundaries, every interface to client, subcontractor or other stake holder is important. Every interaction with outside makes the individual at the interface a leader, who “commands” other parts of organization to provide services and “controls” the delivery of the service measuring also feed back from customer. Organization learns from every transaction or interaction taking place through any interface along its structure.44

People must know and understand the structure of organization and its procedures to be able to work effectively as a part of bigger system. The levels of hierarchy must be kept as minimal as possible to maintain agility, to keep communication lines shorter and to foster visibility through the structure. In post-modern world individual must be able to work within multidimensional organization. Especially in knowledge work one may be a part of a team for one task, whilst doing same time admin tasks for line organization, browsing report from latest project meeting, chatting to solve a problem given to one´s adviser group and waiting a call from customer. His line manager may be a co-operation partner in consortium, key account manager of a supply chain or mentor to strategy team.

People, experts or knowledge workers are no commanded but mentored and piloted towards more productive and fruitful results

Both skilful and knowledgeable people are organized in roles in which they add value to organization´s products. With their roles people understand responsibilities and expectations of their task. Human has a tendency to judge other people by the roles he has experience of i.e. stereotyping. Organization is not functioning if people misunderstand roles of other people or due lack of communication create false expectations. Human has also a tendency to fulfil expectations of the role(halo effect). Normally human also takes responsibility and even grows to meet the size of trust. Besides job descriptions, quota and task lists, the role one is working in is affected by one´s reputation or ethos. When people are interacting in organizational roles, the outcome is affected by pathos. Pathos is being communicated mostly with body language, which is the reason for some to avoid collaboration with technical means.45

The best results comes out from a team, group or patrol constituted people with different skill sets and knowledge. People who know themselves and each others. Each person has particular personality and temperament. If the team understands these differences and combines them, they will get better outcome from each interaction with stake holders. The leader of organization starts building his structures and processes by building up small core teams, teaming them with needed additional competence, opening processes to have teams work together towards common goals, maintaining teams cohesion and interfaces by increasing self-conscious. When the team reaches the end of its life cycle, members can be used as cores for new teams or as mentors of other teams.

The outcome of every organization is only outside of its structure46

The leadership area of influence is not any more defined by political, juridical or organizational bounds. A leader must influence to every individual, group or system within the space of operations and through all lines of support. A leader extends his will, intent and self-assurance through all processes, courses of action and chain of supply to have this complex system working towards unified objectives.47 Taking care of ones subordinates is not enough, because in post-modern conflicts no organization is independent, but supported by multitude of other units and facilities. A good leader is taking care also of those organizations and specially of the process interfaces between organizations to have the whole network to work towards defined end state.48

One can rarely master changes, but always try to be ahead of them

Tomorrow cannot be created, if yesterday is not abandoned. A leader must free organizational assets from tasks that don´t add value, are weak in revenue or which opponent has faced already twice. These assets leader should invest to create something new. Everything organization is doing either inside or outside, should be improved systematically (Kaizen49 principle) or else organization will gain ineffective mass into its structure and interfaces. Particularly public sector organizations tend to evolve into thin functional silos and cover every process with excess layers of administration. Organization, that concentrates only solving current problems or uses always the familiar method or denies that environment and stake holders are changing, is not able to seize initiative or gain results.50

4.7 How to lead individuals, groups or societies and maintain their trust


Organizations, that are planned to act in conflicts or in hard conditions, should build up esprit de corps - a spirit of integrity and self-confidence, which is created by sharing hardnesses, winning challenges or succeeding in overcoming fearful situations. A Chinese tradition says: officers do not sit, if troops are not able to sit also and officers do not eat before troops. Proximity creates trust. Frost and heat carves individuals to troops that may be able to face fear and death of battlefield with coherent esprit de corps.51

A human being is the strongest but same time the weakest link of defence system. To be able to make hard decisions, project force or stand hard times depends on human hearts and minds. All humans must be treated with respect and just in the whole space of operations, whether people belonged in defended societies, own military units, neutral societies or opponents units. The justness and authority support troops spirit to face death. People will follow eagerly and leave their areas of comfort, if they have someone they trust to lead them.52 WEILIAOZI says that when a leader is awarding as clear as sun in the sky, when a leader is trustworthy like four seasons, when a leader is adamant in his orders like battle axe, the army with all soldiers and officers will follow putting their life into stake.53


At the moment, when the profound motives of leader is being questioned, everything he does becomes unreliable. 54

Without confidence and trust there is no open society, because policing everyone is impossible. There is no global economy, because trust lowers tolls, opens commerce and creates transactions across borders. There is no shared communications, electricity distribution network, loans or just on time deliveries.55

Trust between people is founded with prolonged interaction, but it can be lost in one day. According to David Halperns study 24% of USA citizens trusts to each others, South-Americans and Africans only 23% whereas 68% of Scandinavians trust their fellow citizen. Trust is a value of social system and it can support long chains of supply. In the subscriber – provider -network trust is more efficient when it is based on co-operation rather than contracted sanctions. If society lacks trust, one can maintain organization only with authoritarian leadership and tight controlled hierarchical line organization.

Man assesses himself according his intentions and others according their behaviour


The most effective method to build network of trust is to behave as agreed both to oneself and to others. Trust building is a process, where personality and competence both count. The favourable components of personality are morale, honesty, base of motivation and intentions towards other people. The favourable components of competence are skills, knowledge, performance, learnability and track record. With these features and shared experiences of successes a trust can be built to last opponent´s endeavours to brake alliances with disinformation and harshness.56 On the basis of trusted relations a feeling of safety is being build. A human activity at cognitive level requires feeling of safety from both superiors and colleagues. Security supports concentration, when individual is stressed, urges to seek alternatives, takes risks or faces new challenges. A leader should be able to build a feeling of safety and positive support amongst his subordinates.57

Every organization tends to get fat in favourable times. Organizations tend to augment administration, controls and sanctions, because they bring feeling of safety, feeling of risk management and administrators want to do their job well. In the other hand overly grown administration methods implicates lack of trust, clear procedures or safety in organization - sometimes even immature culture.58 In some organizations – especially public safety organizations – controls and administration gradually tend to gain value on itself. In deeply functional organization silos sometime forget supporting the core business thus increasing marginal costs, gnawing motivation of people or immobilizing organization. The signs of high-class trust in organization are as follows:
  • information is shared openly,
  • mistakes are tolerated,
  • risk taking is adhered as a method of learning,
  • culture supports innovation and discrete opinions,
  • people are loyal to colleagues on leave,
  • people are talking openly and direct,
  • interaction is filled with real world matters and facts,
  • after official meetings there are less unofficial gatherings and finally
  • organization is transparent to employees.59

Post-modern confrontations and their conflicts requires different leadership and managerial skills at each level of management. Conflicts may have changed to fighting amongst people and leadership is still working with people, amongst them and in front of them. The complexity of operation requires understanding and decision making at every level of interaction with stake-holders, neutrals or opponents. Very few people can handle the big picture alone. A team of leaders should be created reinforced with various experts as situation requires in order to analyse, understand, foresee and execute operation with success. Organizations that are co-operating along supply chain are different in their culture and maturity, thus a leader must project his vision and will over the borders of organizations. Leader must become a coach that gets different players to function as a team.


References:
1 The english translation by Lionel Giles first published in 1910. Online http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar.php#sthash.SbkjdsJv.dpuf
2 The english translation by Lionel Giles first published in 1910. Online http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar.php#sthash.SbkjdsJv.dpuf
3Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.83 translated into English by Juha Mattila
4Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.28 translated into English be Juha Mattila
5Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.95 translated into English by Juha Mattila
6As commander of air operation Tommy Franks in II operation of Persian Gulf 2003 emphasized the end state of quick operational success in expense of longer term political goals. To General Franks massing systems and men was key to the victory. Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä.
7Clausewitz: ”Että kuninkaan ja hallituksen kunnia käy yksiin kansan kunnian kanssa ja on sen hyvinvoinnin ainoa turva. Että kansa joka urheasti taistelee vapautensa puolesta on voittamaton. Että vapauden tuhoutuminenkin verisen ja kunniakkaan taistelun myötä varmistaa kansan uudelleensynnyn. Se on elämän siemen, josta jonakin päivänä itää uusi vankasti juurtunut puu.” Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä
8John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
9Martti Turtola; A.F. Airo - Taipumaton kenraali. Otava 1979 ISBN -10:951-1-19918-8 s.168
10Todorov, A et al: Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict Election Outcomes. Science vol. 308 10.6.2005
11Arno Gruen: Tahdon maailman ilman sotaa. Otava 2008 ISBN 978-952-01-0104-6
12Jukka Seppinen: Neuvostotiedustelu Suomessa 1917 – 1991 Strategia ja toiminta. Gummerus 2006 s.193
13Martti Turtola: AF Airo – Taipumaton kenraali. Translated into english by Juha Mattila
14Daniel Chirot, Clark McCauley: Miksei tapeta niitä kaikkia? Poliittisen joukkomurhan logiikka ja ehkäisy. Suom. Perti Stenman. Like 2008. ISBN 978-952-01-0064-3
15Scanhorst ranskalaisesta sotilaasta 1795 jälkeen: ”He uskoivat, että vain he olivat valistuneita, älykkäitä, vapaita ja onnekkaita ja että kaikki muut kansat olivat takaperoisia, nautamaisen typeriä ja huono-onnisia. He uskoivat, etteivät he taistelleet vain oman tulevan olemassa olonsa ja kohtalonsa, vaan myös koko ihmiskunnan puolesta.” Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä
16John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
17John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
18Pauli Juuti, Mikko Luoma: Strateginen johtaminen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23639-9 s.37
19Yves Doz, Mikko Kosonen: Fast Strategy. Wharton School publishing 2008
20Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
21Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.85
22Richard P. Rumelt: Good Strategy Bad Strategy. Profile Books Ltd London 2012
23Lev Trotski said whilst building up the Red Army: ”We have to resist all attempts to build absolute Revolutionary strategy, that would be based on our limited experiences of three years Civil War. During this time units were fighting in special conditions not necessarily like faced in National Defence. “ Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä.
24Jari Sarasvuo: Huomiotalous. Otava 2005 ISBN 951-1-20566-8
25Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000
26Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000
27John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
28Joseph S. Nye Jr: Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership. A Seminar at Harvard Kennedy School 2006
29Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.65
30This is to apart the integrity of Clausewitzian tripod which is most often the center of gravity.
31Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.115
32General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1
33Nato´s Chicago Summit Declaration 2012: ”Our operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach. In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and reconstruction is ongoing.”
34Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.149
35Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
36Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
37Jari Sarasvuo: huomiotalous. Otava 2005. ISBN 951-20566-8
38Y.A. Järvinen: Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka Talvisodassa. WSOY 1948 s.193
39Daniel Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0
40Charles Duhigg: The Power of Habit. Randon House Books. London 2013
41Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
42Ori Brafman & Rom Brafman: CLICK The forces behind how we fully engage with people, work, and everything we do. 2010 Crown Publishing Group. When people click, there are five accelerators – ingredients – factors that are involved: Vulnerability, proximity, resonance, similarity and a safe place
43Charles Duhigg: The Power of Habit. Randon House Books. London 2013.
44Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 22
45Charles Handy: Understanding Organizations. Penguin Books 1999 s. 76
46Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 49
47Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 49
48Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 54
49Kaizen is a system of continuous improvement in quality, technology, processes, company culture, productivity, safety and leadership by Steve Hudgik
50Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 89
51Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.201
52Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.203
53Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.225
54Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8. Fused from the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi.
55Thomas L. Friedman: The World is Flat. The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century. Penguin Books 2006
56Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8
57Daniel Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0
58Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8
59Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8

2013-03-01

Lessons identified from IDEX 2013 Abu Dhabi

February 2013 International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) was held in Abu Dhabi. While walking through the labyrinth of stands and booths three thoughts occurred to me.

  1. Currently the hype of cyber defense is in every talks and writings. Are we able to build C4ISR -systems rationally when threat scenarios are pressing decision makers?
  2. Programmable electronics proliferate weapons, sensors, fighter gear, unmanned vehicles, C2 -systems, surveillance and reconnaissance. Who is able to maintain and support all these applications in the battle field? After sales business is booming. Recall Leylands business model a long time ago: Sell lousy car cheaply today and repair it expensively tomorrow.
  3. As paper industry has enhanced their productivity with automation, machines, processors and programs, the military is doing now. All subsystems must come together creating a system of systems in order to be more effective. Integrator business is booming and work is never ending. Just when you have all subsystems integrated to each other, something changes and work starts from the beginning.


Industry is selling their services by threat pictures and wild stories beyond STUXNET, FLAME and RED OCTOBER. Scared military is buying throughout surveys of their security, never ending series of patches to mend found weaknesses and loads of programs and widgets to spy undisciplined end users. One can see a growing market there, because military and particularly governmental agencies don´t tolerate well the stress caused by cyber threats. Urgency develops at higher levels to achieve something and solutions are offered. Is there a leader who can stand the stress and resist temptation of easy patching and invests more assets to hard work of information assurance, security and requires reasonable development of C4ISR -systems? We are living in a complex world where events and especially systems interweaves together. No programmable system is fault free and integrated with other malfunctioning systems, a potential disaster may take us all by surprise. Knowing that nothing is 100% reliable one plans his system of systems so that there is continuity if some of the parts won´t work. This requires the highest understanding of military technology.

Programmable electronic proliferate the space of operations. Within some weapon systems over 60 % of their capability and price is programming and applications. IC -technology is spreading through battle field many times more than assault rifles after the end of WW II. Electronics and devices are disposable but programs are being repaired, updated and reconfigured. Machines of war must understand human information and ontology. They must adapt to sudden changes of battle field. Where is the army of programmers that makes all these changes at the pace of operations. This programmable capability requests logistics and signals to change their support. One has to adopt ITIL to understand software maintenance procedures. One has to adapt more agile ways to develop software based capabilities. One has to create a common understanding between man and machine and machine to machine. Who is defining one datamodel to rule all other datamodels? Who is struggling with unforeseen changes in federative approach? Who is using the next generation web technology and defining resiliently their core tactics and operations?

All these sources of information is to be integrated so that propietary subsystems can tell their information to battle management systems, firing systems of surveillance systems with no standard to define interoperability. There are only couple default information exchange models like JC3IEDM, NFFI, Family of US LINKS. Some more dedicated information exchange methods are even secret because they present major capability over potential enemy. By integrating propietary information models to be able to function as a system of systems you should either:

  • choose one integrator to be responsible of the whole system of systems or 
  • use one message model like VMF to cover all subsystems or 
  • build your semantics to understand every dialect of information sources.

and maintain for the whole lifecycle of your fighting capability about 10 - 20 years and with conscript army even longer.

Strategic advantage is not a thing one can buy or copy, it is based on one´s strengths and on continuous work to improve one´s skills.