2023-08-26

Modelling Military as an Open, Socio-technical System

 1. Introduction

The first step in military socio-technical system evolution (Trist, 1981) was the creation of the Wehrmacht Panzer Division in cooperation with the Luftwaffe's air-to-ground support. (Guderian, 2001) The available industrial machinery, tank crew training based on professional warrant officers, and gradually challenging training matured a coherent team of men and machines who were aware of their strengths and weaknesses and trusted the support from other actors (e.g., commanders, artillery, engineers, signals, air support, logistics) of their combat power system. 

After the blitzkrieg, the military has been trying to generate combined arms, Joint operations, and Combined operations capabilities with varyingly sourced force elements. (Vego, 2009) Figure 1 presents a hypothesis for the evolution of the military socio-technical system. Before digitisation, military organisations used weapons as tools, managed information manually on paper, and emphasised commander-centric decision-making. As weapons turned into platforms, the human operator merged with the machine. Information was digitised, and computers became interfaces to communications and knowledge. In the future, large platforms will turn into swarming, autonomous systems; data will be processed by learning computer algorithms; and commanders will be supported by their machine Companions in decision-making. Will this be the military socio-technical system in the future?

Figure 1: An evolutionary view of the military socio-technical system

The military has a history of adopting technologies and methods from other domains of society. The values, education, and culture the society provides to its citizens also reflect on military socio-technical features:

  • Russia aims to mass fire from automated weapon platforms (Mittal, 2022) without concern for collateral damage in operations (Lavrov, 2018).  
  • China installs autopilots on old fighter aircraft to create swarms of targets and educates its commanders in computer-simulated battlefields . 
  • The USA has a long history of remote-controlled Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). It currently operates unmanned systems    in all five domains. 

Technology is transforming governments (eGovernment) , industrial manufacturing and logistics (4th Industrial Revolution)  (Schwab, 2017), retail (Amazon ) (Hagberg, et al., 2016), transportation (Uber and Green Deal) , social life (cogni-tech) (ESPAS, 2018), working (gig economy)  and creative production (ChatGPT) . There are opinions (Oliviero, 2021) (Biddle, 2006) that technology has been the servant of military ideas: ideas create concepts, concepts create intellectual structures, and intellectual structures drive technological change in military organisation. So, despite the revolutions in surrounding societies, the military has to invent emerging technology rather than adapt to changes in their environment. The complex, adaptive system theory opens other views to military evolution. (Jackson, 2019) A combination of determined and complex ideas produces three paths for socio-technical system development (Mattila, 2020) 

  1. Preadaptation is driven by the need to develop a new System of Systems. It includes research, experimenting, or learning new knowledge with other means. Several optional solutions may be produced and explored to find the best fit. Gained knowledge and prototypes are used to design a new system to fulfil the requirements of the new function.
  2. Adaptation happens when the System of Systems is co-opted gradually for different uses without a broader comprehension of the evolution.
  3. Exaptation occurs when a component from another system is co-opted as part of a new System of Systems, making it more efficient or fitting for the purpose.

The article aims to create a tactical engagement model to answer the question -What may be the military future with artificial cognition as part of their socio-technical system? The building of the model starts by reviewing man-machine interface evolution, then extends to the man-machine cooperation as part of a more extensive system, uses network theory to define other dimensions of the military socio-technical system, introduces an army confrontation model at a tactical level, and, finally, composes a simplified model for the tactical engagement as an open, complex, adaptive socio-technical system.  

2. Evolution of Man-machine Interface 

The model creation starts from the interface of how a man and his machine communicate. The paper combines three evolutionary interface paths: industrial terminals, cockpits in aircraft and computers in an office. The evolution of the industrial operator terminal interface (Papcun et al., 2018) indicates the tendency for symbolic and manual communication when man-machine cooperation is not continuous. Still, the operator roams between different terminals on the factory floor. (Buxbaum-Conradi, et al., 2016)

A different situation is in the cockpit of an aircraft. The pilot faces the aircraft interface throughout the flight and monitors it even when the craft is on autopilot. In the cockpit, the tendency has been to present information fitting to the constraints of human sensors in stressful situations while keeping the pilot's visual view as clear as possible to surrounding airspace.   Naturally, radars and infrared sensors have widened the spectrum of optical sight and introduced synthetic vision.

Again, a different story is with the interface of office computing. The interface of screen, keyboard, and mouse since the late 1980s has seen minimal changes for an ordinary knowledge worker.    For engineers and graphic designers, the workstation interface appears more applied.  Naturally, the ongoing expansion of mobile devices has replaced keyboard and mouse with audio, video, and touch as the content has also evolved from text to multimedia.  On the other hand, digital content creation accelerated the evolution of the personal computer as a portal to a wide variety of business, governmental, social, financial, and other everyday related content and transactions.   Figure 2 provides a combined view of interface evolution in different environments.

Figure 2: Samples of man-machine interface evolution from three environments: factory, aerospace, and knowledge work (CC-BY-ND Juha Kai Mattila)

Conclusions from the interface evolution model: 

  • The tendency seems to lead to a more human-friendly interface between humans and machines. Interaction through touch, audio, synthetic video, and hand movements in virtual or augmented reality may be the next step the military may adopt from elsewhere in society.
  • More cognitive, non-intrusive or intrusive links between human thinking and artificial intelligence may emerge.
  • A stressful environment narrows the human ability to receive and comprehend information. Hence, artificial cognition-enhanced situational awareness, process automation, and autonomous action may be appreciated on the battlefield.


3. A Model for a Man-machine Cooperation as Part of a Larger System

The socio-technical system theory (Trist, 1981) provides a broader framework to study man-machine cooperation. The socio-technical system comprises two subsystems (social and technical) in interaction with the environment, as illustrated in Figure 3. The social system includes individuals or teams that constitute an organisation. The organisational members deliver the relationships, values, structure, work-related elements, and associations. (Pasmore, 1995) The technical system includes the physical, material, and information flows required in the value creation process and tasks, controls, and maintenance functions. In the organisational setting, the technical system also includes the tools, techniques, skills, and devices that people require to fulfil enterprise purposes and tasks. (Trist, 1981) The environment is the context, surroundings, and conditions in which the open socio-technical system resides, operates, and interacts. (Abbas & Michael, 2023)

The model presents a human-oriented social system following different principles than the machine-oriented technical system but promoting a joint optimisation or equilibrium, which is a degree of fit or balance between the subsystems. Cybernetics (Wiener, 1954) introduce organisational entropy and information-based evolution of complex systems. These two theories explain transformation challenges when new technology and existing human competency do not fit each other, organisational change does not align with existing informal social connections, or the current system is profoundly stabilised, resisting all transformation initiatives.

Figure 3: A model of a socio-technical system

Conclusions from the socio-technical model:

  • The process is a critical subsystem which interrelates with the organisation, people and technical systems. 
  • The social system will be exposed to cognitive artificial entities and social relations created between these entities and men. The fast surge of ChatGPT and video game popularity indicates that men may be keen to communicate with reactive chatbots. Will this interest overcome the suspicions in alien encounters, and how much training will it take for men to trust artificial entities for their survivability on the battlefield?
  • The joint optimisation between the subsystems seems essential for the digital transformations of the military enterprise. Technology-driven change fails if soldiers' competencies and social behaviour are not transferred simultaneously. Conversely, a lack of technology drives people to use other available means of communication, establish unofficial networks, and accomplish tasks.
  • The organisation has been structuring the social networks between people. With artificial intelligence, the organisational structure may experience significant changes when new cognition finds ways of working beyond human imagination.


4. Network Models for Large Systems

The theory of Actor-Network, ANT (Latour, 2005) introduces a broader model to study man-machine systems. The ANT does not differentiate humans from machines or processes in a network. The ANT defines three network layers: real world, symbolic and imaginary, as illustrated in Figure 4. The real-world network presents human–machine–machine–process links between actors whose activity is required to deliver the intended outcome. The symbol network reflects the real-world network topology. Still, it presents the different symbols in which actors understand the situation and task. For example, as the organisation is a social network, this level reflects both the official and unofficial networks using different symbols between people and their attitude to the task ahead. (Kadushin, 2012) The third layer illustrates the imaginary view of the event, where humans and artificial intelligence-enabled machines may perceive the situation differently in the future.

Figure 4: A simple representation of close air support delivery on ANT layers (CC-BY-ND Juha Kai Mattila)

Conclusions from the model:

  • The ANT layers illustrate the interdependencies and interoperability challenges between actors to achieve a task. No actor can accomplish the job alone but depends on others' coordinated contribution. Every link between actors has three different information transfer levels. 
  • The symbol network illustrates that understanding differs from one system to another. Humans understand events differently than machines, so symbols and meanings alter while passing the man-machine interface. Moreover, devices use different logic and may understand the same event contrarily from humans. With artificial intelligence, socio-technical system integration becomes more critical when militarily trained humans are not translating information from one machine to another.
  • While daydreaming is human and their misperceptions create errors, artificial intelligence also hallucinates and may promote failed resolutions. How these two species with different imaginary features can cooperate in stressful situations?


5. Modelling Military Engagement at the Tactical Level

Traditionally, the engagement at the tactical level has been a contest between two commanders  (Oliviero, 2021).  Both commanders use combat power, defined as the ability to manoeuvre, mass effects, fire, and maintain tempo orchestrated through all five domains (space, air, cyber/electromagnetic, land and maritime) on the battlefield. (Friedman, 2017) Besides the physical destruction, both sides use their combat power to deceive, surprise, confuse, or shock the other side's cognitive level and aim to disintegrate social and moral cohesion. The operational level may use information and psychological operations to weaken adversaries at social and mental levels in support of tactical combat. (Vego, 2009) Figure 5 illustrates the engagement model.

Figure 5: Modelling tactical actors, tenets, and their relationships in confrontation (CC-BY-ND Juha Kai Mattila)

Conclusions from the model:

  • Machine intelligence will increase cognitive vulnerabilities in deception, confusion, and shock when they face an event beyond their training data. Is there a human on the loop to detect this and configure a machine to adapt to unseen situations?
  • The Man-machine interface has often been the breaking point of the cohesion of military units. A crew abandon their vehicle when they are afraid of their survivability. How do humans trust algorithms in tight situations?
  • Engagement in five domains and projecting effect to adversary systems through tactical tenets become complex for humans to control. A commander requires an artificial enabler (Companion) to understand the situation, choose cost-effective targets, and optimise effectors used on the battlefield.


6. A Composed Model for the Research

From the above frameworks, the paper chooses to compose a simplified model in Figure 6 to study the opportunities and challenges of introducing artificial intelligence in military systems at a tactical level. The composition of the Blue and Red units is assumed to be the same. Still, the differences in adopting artificial intelligence may produce different outcomes on the battlefield. The model reduces all information and communications technology to computational power. Artificial intelligence is in algorithms and includes both preprogramming and self-learning. Data indicates the symbolic layer in the technical system and cognition in a social system. The process is an essential socio-technical system including interfaces, tools, skills, procedures, and doctrines that make the military system cooperate. Social structures include both man-to-man, machine-to-machine and man-to-machine relationships. Culture is in the background, impacting everything from algorithms to social structures. A simplified tactical engagement between the systems will provide a testing ground for the outcome of the confrontation.

Figure 6: The core actors, interfaces, and dependencies of a jointly optimised socio-technical and networked system in a tactical confrontation (CC-BY-ND Juha Kai Mattila)

Further research will use the above model to study what possible effects improved algorithms may introduce in military enterprises, especially in tactical engagement.


2023-08-25

Information and Data Management in a Military Enterprise

 1. Transformation Journey Towards Data-driven Military

The Military has been following their societies in digitisation, digitalisation, digital transformation and, recently, the "datization"  of reality. As the world's biggest companies (MAMAA)  are creating revenues from data, the military also creates value from increasing amounts of data. The old wisdom of "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles" (Sun Tzu) is still valid. The journey has taken longer for military enterprises because of their size and cultures, but, for example, open-source data has revolutionised the transparency of the battlefield in Ukraine.  Therefore, data has become capital  even for the Military.

Figure 1 illustrates a view of a military roadmap  towards data-driven affairs and operations. Here are some snapshots along the journey:

  • - 1990:  The Commander was briefed in the afternoon, and situational review was provided in the morning. Briefings used paper maps hanging from walls with graphs and symbols on transparent plastic sheets. All documentation was managed on paper, although it was written with computers but printed for distribution and presentation.
  • 1990 – 2000: The Commander was briefed twice daily on the situation. Branches provided their part of the awareness, each with their specific information system. Some were graphical presentations, but most information was summarised in presentations, consuming staff time. There were hardly any inter-branch estimations, and the Commander composed the bigger picture himself. Plans and orders were stored as files and transferred over email.
  • 2000 – 2025 Commander has a real-time battlefield model through his battle management system. Intelligence provides him with an estimated deployment of the adversary, and logistics provides their estimation of friendly forces' sustainment if the combat continues at the current rate. He reflects on his thoughts with the planning staff. They draft the Commander's intent and share it in a planning collaboration platform to initiate parallel planning among the subordinate commands.
  • 2025 - Immersive user interface and visual effects created by Military Companion (artificial intelligence bot) hosts the Commander in digital twin Enterprise or Battlespace, where she is constantly aware of the situation, gains insights from vast amounts of data prepared by the Companion, runs war games to estimate outcomes from options, or ask her Companion to create possible courses of action analysed from structured data, unstructured information, history records, doctrinal knowledgebase, and real-time data flows.

Figure 1: A View to roadmap towards Data-driven Military enterprise

The timely sequence does not apply linearly as some militaries have all the above behaviour within their large enterprise, some forerunners are already in immersive reality, and others are journeying somewhere on the roads of evolution. There is a difference in outcome when the military governs data usage and development (preadaptation) compared to the technology driven floating along the stream (adaptation).  The following sections provide a framework for data governance and describe arrangements for data management.

2. Data Governance Approaches in Military Organizations

2.1 Common Data Governance Model

While the value the Military can gain from available data is increasing, the information and data assets become resources that need governance, management, and operation to enable the optimum outcome. The data are different assets to manage compared to paper documents. Hence, the previous material item-based management culture  needs to be transformed. Figure 2 provides a common Data Governance structure for line command and an example of arranging the data governance transformation program.

 

Figure 2: A General Data Governance Framework

2.2. Benchmarking some Military Organizations

Table 1 provides a view of various military organisations' ways of governing their data and transforming towards data-driven enterprise. The following tendencies emerge from comparison:

  • Defence Forces of Finland data governance follows their line command because of their readiness requirements. Emphasis is on capability owner, their ownership of data and their responsibility to develop new capabilities. ICT is an enabler, and X6s act as data stewards in their area/organisation of responsibility.
  • US DoD also follows the line command as their Services are independent and strong. DoD level focuses on policies, strategies, and compliance measuring but extends their governance deep towards the defence industry and partners. 
  • UK MoD has data governance similar to Finland; only their titles differ. The capability owner is the data policy owner, and an organisation has an executive data steward.
  • Australian Defence Forces also follow line command in their data governance. Still, their strategic level board focuses beyond the borders of the organisation (partners and providers) and nation (5 eyes).

Table 1: Benchmarking some military ways of data governance

Level/Country

FIN

USA[1]

UK[2]

AUS[3]

Strategic

Chief Digital Officer reports to Chief of Strategy; Defence Board resolves issues over the extended FINDEF enterprise.

Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, CDAO/DoD[4] reports to the Deputy Secretary and governs efforts over the DoD, sets the policy and oversees the implementation of DoD data strategy.

Defence CIO reports to the Secretary and has a subordinate Director of Digital Enablement who chairs the data governance board (main customers represented) overseeing the implementation of strategy and policy compliance.

Chief Data Integration Officer reports to the Chief of Force Integration[5] and develops and releases policies and guidance. CDIO chairs the Defence Data Management Board, which oversees the extended enterprise data governance.

Joint

J6 coordinates over capability owners.

Capability owners own their data. Process owners as Stewards develop data usage.

Chief Information Officer/DoD ensures data integration and development. JADC2 cross-functional team, Joint artificial intelligence centre and CIO for C3 provides the coordination. DoD Comptroller/CMO empowers the application of business intelligence.

Data policy owners are setting priorities and developing policies in each business area.

Appointed Data Custodians implement the strategy within their fields of responsibility.

Service

X6 of each force/command is the Steward of the data in use.

CIO/X6 of each service act as Data Stewards of their organisation. Roles of Stewards and responsibilities for Custodians are assigned to line organisation.[6]

Executive data stewards are responsible for improvements.

Domain data stewards improve business processes.

Appointed Data Custodians implement strategy and comply with policies in their areas of responsibility.

Transformation

CDO coordinates transformation with the data governance office, impacting each capability development program and measuring annual performance indicators.

CDO Council identifies and prioritises data challenges, develops solutions, and oversees compliance with policy and standards. The council uses working groups to create plans and implement them.[7]

The CIO's arm of the Data Centre of Expertise maintains the data catalogue. It accelerates transformation and strategy implementation through data domain working groups.

Data Management Body of Knowledge supports transformation.



[1] https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF

[2] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/877705/Defence_Data_Management_Strategy_2020_FINAL_FINAL.pdf

[3] https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/defence-data-strategy-2021-2023

[4] https://www.ai.mil/index.html

[5] https://www.defence.gov.au/about/who-we-are/organisation-structure/australian-defence-force-headquarters

[6] https://www.dcma.mil/Portals/31/Documents/Policy/MAN_4502-15_(20220401).pdf

[7] https://www.ai.mil/blog_04_30_20-jaic-leaders-establish-data-governance-council.html

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Benchmarks define the following good practices:

  1. Line of command is followed to enforce ownership and responsibilities like in other resources (people, finance, facilities, platforms, and systems)
  2. Data governance must reach outside the military organisation as more data resides in other government entities, the defence industry and alliances.
  3. Data is nothing by itself but an essential component in platforms and processes. Moreover, the use of data for decision-making needs an innovative and empowering incubator, a Centre of Excellence, where data science, architecture, and engineering meet and create knowledge tools for commanders.

The following Section describes a concept that combines the governance framework with flavours from the good practices.

3. A Concept for Data Governance in a Military Enterprise 

In a military enterprise, the usual information/data management-related roles are as follows:

  • Capability Owner  is accountable for the life cycle, combat readiness, sustainability force structure, and performance of a military capability. Since the information is a valuable asset within any military capability, the owner needs at least to govern the data.  Typical Capability Owners are, for example, Commander Land Forces, who owns Land Combat capabilities; J2, who owns Joint Intelligence capabilities; J6, who owns Joint C5I capabilities; and J4, who owns Joint Logistics capabilities. The capability Owner is usually the Data Owner of the information assets.
  • The process Owner is responsible for designing an effective and efficient process, using the right people and financial and technical resources to run the process, and delivering quality outcomes as required within the organisation.  The process owner reports to the Capability Owner, develops how the process utilises information and data for performance and output, governs the end-to-end processes, and is usually a Data Steward.
  • Organisational Data Steward governs the creation, utilisation, processing and storing of data and information in particular organisations.  Usually, the Chief Information Officer , CIO, is the Data Steward in military organisations .
  • Operation centres, Centres of Excellence and process development hubs act as process managers, are responsible for the end-to-end execution of processes, have operational control, facilitate daily activities, and provide insight into where improvement is needed to enhance performance. 
  • Users and information creators are the customers of the data. Data users can be individuals or other organisations. The chief responsibility of the data users is to ensure that they store, process, and securely handle the data and work to maintain integrity.  Users and creators are also Data Custodians.
  • ICT Service Providers produce ICT services by transmitting, storing, retrieving, or processing information using network and information systems.  Service Provider owns, operates, manages, or provides any ICT service.  Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as a Service (PaaS) Providers usually act as Data Custodians. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Provider may have some data backup-related responsibilities but is typically not a Data Custodian.