- Introduction to military history at tactical level
- Generations of warfare
- Tactical tenets and principles through the history
- Winning wars amongst people with the people
- Tactical level Command and Control in military history
- Contemporary warfare
- Future of combat reflected from the history
5. Command and Control in Military History
5.1 Leadership examples
|
Military leader |
Personality |
Competency |
Presence |
Achievements |
|
Mao Zedong 1893 - 1976  Mao during Long March (1934-35) with his closest second in commands |
Peasant by heart preferred simple life, disarmingly humorous, liked
stories from history, and did not lose his sleep over the numerous Chinese
losses.[1] |
Compiled a revolutionary guerrilla warfare from Sun Tzu and other
historical sources. Successfully established the Red Army, kept it together
through harsh times, proliferated the ideology and eventually won his
adversary. |
During II Sino-Japanese war (1937 – 1945) his Red Army countered the
Japanese manning and 1949 defeated the nationalist government forces who
withdrew to Taiwan. |
|
|
George S. Patton 1885 - 1945  Patton in Sicily 1943 |
Olympic level Pentathlon. Executed a philosophy of leading from the front.
He used to inspire troops with attention-getting, vulgarity-ridden speeches. His behaviour was met favourably by his troops, but much less so by a
sharply divided Allied high command. Sultan of Morocco in other hand expressed: “The lions in their dens
tremble at his approach.” |
Studied widely the writings of Guderian and Rommel, executed
mass-exercises for armoured troops 1940. He improved the command cycle of his
troops and improved their manoeuvrability. He was keen keeping the continuous
engagement with enemy. "Whenever you slow anything down, you waste human lives." |
“No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country.” “An army is a team. It lives, eats, sleeps, fights as a team. This individuality stuff is a bunch of bullshit.”[2] |
Commanded the Western Task Force in North African Campaign, Commanded
the 7th US Army in Sicily Campaign, and led 3rd Army in
Normandy breakout offensive and Battle of the Bulge. |
|
Edwin Rommel 1981 - 1944  Rommel with his staff 1942 near El Agheila |
He found that taking initiative and not allowing the enemy forces to
regroup led to victory. He took advantage of sandstorms and the dark of night to conceal the
movement of his forces. He was aggressive and often directed battle from the front or piloted
a reconnaissance aircraft over the lines to get a view of the situation. Preferred self-destructive Spartan lifestyle that made life harder
for his staff. |
Improver of infiltration tactics |
"the Desert Fox" "war without hate" “He personally grabbed a light machine gun to fight off a French
counterattack supported by tanks, and went into the water himself,
encouraging the sappers and helping lash together the pontoons” Rommel felt a commander should be physically more robust than the
troops he led and should always show them an example. Used heavy doses of Pervitin to keep up with the pace of war. |
Decorated battalion commander in WW I, Commanded 7th
Panzer Division in attack to France, and led the Deutsches Afrika Korps 1941
- 1943 |
|
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 1881 - 1938  Ataturk with other officers in Gallipoli 1915 |
He loved reading books, listening to music, dancing, horseback riding
and swimming. In his free times, he read books about history. "When I was a child, I was poor. When I received two pennies, I
would give one penny of it to the book. If it was not so, I would not have
done any of this."[3] He was always at the front-line wheeling guns, sending his troops to
battles which they had little chance of surviving. |
Got nickname Kemal (perfection) because of his excellent conduct of
studies in military academy.[4] Wrote 9 books, the latest 1937 for high school math. |
“The need for any person to be satisfied and happy to live is to work
not for himself but for the future. An insightful man can only act this way.”[5] He worked tirelessly in all assignments entrusted to him. As a result, he served successfully in every chain of command,
operation and defensive battle assigned to him.[6] |
In the Battle of Gallipoli, he became the front-line commander after
correctly anticipating where the Allies would attack and held his position until
they retreated. He rallied his troops and mounted a counteroffensive capturing two
cities back from Russians. Defended Ottoman interests in Palestinian against British forces and
never suffered a defeat. In Turkish war of independence 1919 – 1923, he stopped Greek invasion
and defeated them.[7] |
|
Challenges for military leader |
Definition |
Examples/Lessons |
|
Fog of war |
The term Fog of War (Nebel des Krieges, Clausewitz) seeks to capture
the uncertainty regarding one's own capability, adversary capability, and
adversary intent during an engagement, operation, or campaign. Military
forces try to reduce the fog of war through military intelligence and
friendly force tracking systems.[2] The term also applies to the experience of individual soldiers in
battle: often cited is the pure confusion of direction, location, and
perspective on a battlefield. Officers and soldiers become separated, orders
become confused and subject to revision with poor communication. Sounds and
vision are limited from the perspective of the individual and may not be
easily resolved, resulting in a continuing uncertainty, a perceptual "fog". "On the future battlefield, if you stay in one place longer than
two or three hours, you will be dead”.[3]
AI in battlefield may increase the fog of war: 1. New
technologies tend to make life harder for individuals, even as they add
capability. 2. AI
introduces new kinds of battlefield cognition. 3. Combining
AI, hypersonic weapons, and directed energy will accelerate decision-making
to machine speeds. 4. AI
enables military deception of both a new quality and quantity. |
The problem is that our brain fills the missing information that is not available; it is like connecting the points in a game, as if we were trying to find an image by completing the outline. The human mind continuously tries to establish patterns of rationality, identify similarities and reach conclusions, even if it is based on fragments. “Observers fear that top-ranking commanders far removed from the
battle will horn in to make split-second decisions that should be made by
those "smelling the gunpowder." Micromanagement is indeed an
intangible modern drawback of real-time imagery capabilities, which certainly
can add to today’s fog and friction. Cyberwar tactics, technologies, and capabilities that transcend the
traditional battlespace and into the global atmosphere also give a new
meaning to “armed” conflict, creating an entirely new and uncharted dimension
of fog and friction. The limits of our power and control in cyberspace, along
with the ambiguities of the attackers and their objectives, further add to
the uncertainties. [4] |
|
Decision-making is the process of identifying and choosing
alternatives based on the values, preferences, and beliefs of the
decision-maker. Every decision-making process produces a final choice, which
may or may not prompt action. Highly cohesive groups with strongly connected members may inhibit
the expression of (true) opinion; in such cases, group harmony and unanimity
may be privileged over effective decision-making. Group situations may reduce the motivation, level of effort and
skills employed in problem-solving compared with those that an individual
would deploy when working alone Humans cannot process all information necessary to make informed
decisions. Therefore, they rely on heuristics to “bound rationality”.[7] Cognitive tunnel vision: In operational planning process, mission
Analysis phase is first, and sets all hypotheses. Analysts and planners then
bias themselves towards maintaining courses of action rather than re-evaluate
analysis. Human and Machine decision making in war: “When a human player
withdrew forces to de-escalate, machines were likely to perceive a tactical
advantage to be pursued; when a human player moved forces forward in an
obvious (but not hostile) show of determination, machines tended to perceive
an imminent threat and engaged.” |
“Flying a fighter aircraft used to be an all-consuming task. As the
aircraft became easier to fly, operating additional sensors (radar) and
weapons (missiles) added to the cognitive load. As these sensor interfaces
became more intuitive, systems became more complex (guided weapons, stealth
and electronic attack). At each stage, expectations for individual
performance increased even as technological improvements made previously
difficult tasks more manageable.” In Iraq 2004, the reality outpaced the decision making of US troops.
“In the time it took us to move a plan from creation to approval, the
battlefield for which the plan had been devised would have changed.” “We
could not predict where the enemy would strike, and we could not respond fast
enough when they did.” |
|
|
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is
difficult. The difficulties accumulate in the end and produce a kind of
friction in all military action. |
The troublesome friction is rooted in the struggle to agree on the
nature of Cyber Warfare, who the key players are, and how we counter the
threat. The result is the inability to
develop governing doctrine, policies, and laws on cyberwar. Cyberwar is not just a government problem,
as the threat extends to the corporate/private sector.[10] During the Desert Storm operation: “Aircrews had to cope with
equipment malfunctions, inadequate mission-planning materials, lapses in
intelligence on both targets and enemy defenses, coordination problems
between strike and support aircraft, target and time-on-target (TOT) changes
after takeoff, unanticipated changes in prewar tactics, adverse weather, the
traditional lack of timely bomb damage assessment (BDA), and, in many wings,
minimal understanding of what higher headquarters was trying to accomplish
from one day to the next.” [11] |
5.2 Recovery from Surprise
|
Historical
examples |
Features of Flexibility |
|
Surprise: During
the II WW Germans deployed two-layer radar sensors to detect British bombers:
A broad surveillance radar that detected incoming fleets and targeting radar
that homed in the German fighters. In 1943, the British used chaff to conceal
their bombers, which zeroed the effectiveness of German fighter defence. Recovery: Germans
reacted in three ways: 1.
Radar using frequencies that were able to
penetrate through the chaff 2.
Change the mounting of the guns, so
interceptors were able to attack bombers beneath 3.
Within three weeks Luftwaffe deployed day-light
fighters above the cities and flying higher than enemy bombers were able to
hit them when illuminated by anti-aircraft projectors. |
Relatively
long wave radar was installed in night-fighters gave them a view from 6 kilometres
high. This was possible with close cooperation between Luftwaffe and war industry. Being
technically versatile, Germans attached 20 mm gun on top of their fighters
and attacked bombers below, their blind spot. Luftwaffe was
able to plan and deploy a quick change in their air defence tactics because
of their cognitive flexibility. |
|
In 1973 war
Egypt was using Soviet SAGGER anti-tank missiles massively in their defence
formations. Based on their Six-Day War experience, IDF doctrine included tanks
only formations and deep attacks penetrating the enemy formations. When Egypt
fired 3-5 SAGGERs to each IDF tank, their crew was unable to understand what
had hit them. |
At the tactical
level, IDF was able to react quickly because their junior officers had the initiative
and the training of crew on the battlefield was continuous: 1.
Tank commanders learned the effective range of
the missile and kept manoeuvring while inside their range. 2.
Within three days, the tank units learned to
deploy observation patrols to identify anti-tank squads and warn tanks when
they fire 3.
Infantry was combined with armoured troops,
and they took out the anti-tank squads supported by artillery fire. |
|
The Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan late 1979[1]
with troops trained for high-intensive combat in large formations against
European or Chinese forces[2].
They entered Afghanistan on a large scale (40.Army with > 100 000 soldiers)
operation with divisions landing airborne troops, capturing strategic facilities,
and mowing along main roads.[3]
Mujahideen, on the other hand, deployed small fighting cells, avoided
engaging the fighting forces but ambushed Red Army’s supply convoys and small
outposts to gain a local tactical advantage.[4] |
Red Army
doctrine emphasised the operational level action creating flexibility at that
level but left the tactical level with rigidity and predictability.[5]
For example, an infantry soldier was not to fight further than 200 m from his
vehicle. It took the Red Army more than five years to establish counter-guerrilla
tactics and train their troops.[6]
Mechanised troops remained in defence, and special infantry troops[7]
with combined arms (Spetsnaz supported by Mi-24 and heavier troops as fire
support) were deploying raids, blocks and searches, ambushes, and convoy
escorts against Mujahideen tactics. Unfortunately, the Soviets were not able
to change their centralised command culture, which inhibited the initiative and
emphasised the detailed planning. |
|
Around 2004,
the special operations force in Iraq were engaged in the highest performing,
centralised commanded operation in their history; they won all fights but
were losing the war. General McChrystal[8]
took over the command of JSOC 2003 and transformed the hierarchical,
centrally commanded task force into a team of teams, mission command[9]
organisation.[10] |
It took four
years from a Force Commander |
[9] https://learning.linkedin.com/blog/learning-tips/what-this-general-learned-about-leadership-in-the-iraq-war
[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WH8lMXBVjN8
____________________________________________________
5.3 Failures of Command
|
Failures |
Possible reasons |
Lessons |
|
In late 2008[1],
ten Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists launched 12 coordinated attacks in Mumbai,
killing over 190 and wounding more than 300 people.[2]
In the aftermath, the Mumbai authorities seemed to react improvised and uncoordinated
therefore being slow in their counteraction and causing more casualties. |
a.
Lack of coordination of forces as the
commissioner adopted a more tactical role in one of the scenes and was without
a full awareness of the situation. b.
Specialised units were distributed to each
unit, so there was no focused effort. c.
No de-briefing sessions were held to assess
what went wrong.[3] |
·
Unity of command is essential to create situational
awareness unless one has an overarching battle management system ·
Human tends to micro-manage in stressful situations.
This creates a crowd of commandership and confusion at a tactical level. ·
Hierarchical organisations may have
difficulties to learn from their failures. |
|
In 2003, the
US-led coalition invaded Iraq without goals beyond ending Saddam’s support to
terrorism and free the Iraqi people.[4]
During the post-war occupation, the US made mistakes in disbanding Iraq Army,
outlaw the local elections and denying the Ba’ath party. This opened
insurgents access to population and gaining power-base. Coalition troops
could control area only when physically present and they were too few to
extend their presence beyond main streets and day-light. |
a.
Without local authorities, people were at the
mercy of insurgents since Coalition presence was only partial and authority deniable. b.
Counterinsurgent is a visitor and working
against the clock. There is no continuity for the local population to build
their future, but the one that insurgent promotes. |
·
The counterinsurgent has to defend everywhere,
all the time, while the insurgent can choose his target and his time, always
slipping away from the fight if the conditions are not favourable. ·
Insurgent is winning if he is not losing. The
counterinsurgent is losing if he is not winning. |
|
In 1968, Lt.
Calley led his Platoon to the village of My Lai in Vietnam with a task to
search Vietcong. They did not find any insurgents, but they engaged in
raping, mutilating, and slaughtering all 347 occupants of the village.[5]
This ended isolating the South Vietnamese people even further from their
government and US troops. |
a.
There has been a legacy of occupying force to
kill civilians based on suspected support to insurgents. b.
The morale of US troops in Vietnam was low,
and they had to be rotated frequently to control the infection of low
culture. c.
Lt. Calley “a below-average, dull and inconspicuous
boy” was commissioned in lack of better officer candidates. |
·
The violence of war makes people effected even
more violent or indifferent to violence. ·
The morale of troops is profound when fighting
takes place among people. |
|
After the overrun
of the US Embassy in Teheran 1979, US launched “Eagle Claw” [6]operation
to rescue the hostages inspired by IDF attack in Entebbe.[7]
The operation included the following phases: a.
Assemble a force in Gulf unnoticed b.
Infiltrate the force into Iran secretly c.
Fly a thousand kilometres in enemy airspace undetected d.
Land unnoticed near a city of three million
people e.
Locate and free the hostages spread into the
city f.
Escape through the streets of a hostile city g.
Arrange the pickup by helicopters h.
Fly back through the enemy airspace. Meanwhile,
not inflict any casualties among Iranian people. |
a.
Political needs and constraints may have forced
the military to will more than assess the success of the operation. b.
A long series of tasks required for a successful
mission would have required more parallel courses of action. c.
Intelligence based on facts was bypassed with hopeful
assumptions. |
·
War is so complex and chaotic that only the most
straightforward plans may have success. ·
Use “what-if” during the planning and create parallel
courses of action, so you are ready when the unexpected happens. |
|
In the
Falklands War of[8]
1982[9],
the media required continuous information to keep up the spirit of the UK population.
[10]Therefore,
MoD provided a flow of press releases to media. One of these releases was
drafted as“… two unexploded bombs on one warship have been successfully
defused…” If this would have been published, the Argentinian Air Force may
have learned that they were bombing with low-level attacks which did not give
enough time for the fuses to arm themselves.[11] |
a.
Need to manipulate the cognitive level of
operation sometimes may harm the physical level and wise versa.[12] b.
Strategic level needs may sometimes overtake
the tactical essentials. |
·
Every combat is wielded at three levels:
physical, information and cognitive. Action at one level may inhibit
operations at another level. ·
One should monitor adversary’s home front and
their media to gain impressions of their cognitive goals. ·
The motivation of soldiers and their families
sometimes is essential to build and sustain the morale of fighting troops. |
|
Montgomery
desired to capture the whole show not only harmed the Anglo-American relations
but also caused the costly and abortive Arnhem adventure during the Market
Garden operation 1944.[13]
Three airborne divisions were dropped into the Netherlands to seize key territory.
Unfortunately, the ground forces were not able to reach them in time.[14] |
a.
The leader’s personality and personal
ambitions sometimes take over more rational decision making. b.
Competition between colleagues and with
superiors made otherwise cautious commander make daring plans. |
·
The human relationships are still one of the primary
sources for mistakes since they may cause unrealistic endeavours or denial of
the facts. |
