still under editing
Original writing was published in Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/2011 http://www.upseeriliitto.fi/the_finnish_officers_union_in_english
4. Resolving conflicts with leadership and management in the post-modern world
Sun
Tzu: The
Book of Army Management says:
"On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.”1
“In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.”2
"On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.”1
“In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.”2
4.1 Political leadership
Political
level is the source of power and decision. It is at the political
level where decisions are made to wage a war or secede from it. At
strategical level power is transformed to organizations, flows of
assets and, as result, their effects. It is necessary for both
political and strategical level to interact (continuous re-evaluation
and collaboration) intensely during conflict since estimates at
political level are foundations of strategy and changes at either
level may effect to other.
The
political leadership must understand consequences and end states of
conflict in order to justify assets, casualties and outcomes to
members of their own society and also to global public opinion. There
are always such irregularities and uncertainties in conflicts, that
presumed end state may not appear. GUANZI
states that ”if you don´t understand the politics your enemy is
practising, you are not able to struggle with him. If you don´t
understand the nature of your enemy, you can´t anticipate his
actions. If you don´t know the general of your enemy, you shall not
attack first.”3
War
is not an end by itself, but a tool i.e. a part of bigger ensemble.
Clausewitz said war is using power to persuade opponent to bend on
ones will. Mao said, when the development at political level seizes,
war is to blast all obstacles and enable politics to proceed.4
WUZI
says there are five reasons to mobilize one´s army:
- First is struggle for political status,
- second is achieving an advantage,
- third is extended confrontation with hostilities,
- fourth is anxiety within state and
- fifth is famine.5
In
post-modern world the end state of an operation is not necessary
defeat of the enemy, but attain peace, retain order or stabilize
affairs.
There
is a tendency with soldiers to think war is a meaning itself or
defeating enemy is the end state, because war changes soldiers
understanding of world, values and priorities6.
To prevent military to wage their own war, the supreme commander of
nation must have intense interaction with other stake holders of
confrontation and keep the nations interest7
at first in his thinking.8
General
Airo (Chief of Operations in Finland during most of the WW II)
states, that Marshal Mannerheim was leading the war and he was
leading operations in war zone. There are many political stake
holders, dependencies and motivations in war, which the supreme
commander must understand and consider.9
To
become a political leader of democratic society generally happens
through election. In the election of supreme commander, it is not
necessarily advantage for candidate to stand out arguing on radical
idealism or clash of classes. More secure lines might be emphasizing
the common history of society, candidates own experiences of the
nations history (president Mauno Koivisto in 1981 – 1982 campaign)
or emphasizing the need to secure nations future (prime minister
Margaret Thatcher in 1979 campaign). The human nature in the other
hand is more prone to judge the face and appearance of the candidate
in television debate, than the rationality of issues candidate is
addressing.10
The
leader of nation is to prepare society to hardship and sacrifices
during the conflict and appear as a firm and trustworthy leader, who
takes care of the society and its members. In the post-modern era,
with plentitude of information competing to get attention of people,
the challenge is to get message through this mass of information, to
gross the threshold of attention, to deliver the message with logic
dressed in stories and to appear as calm and trustworthy. All this
when global media is telling different stories, people are tempted to
follow other stories and potential opponent is attacking with
information operations. The story has to be emotionally strong,
understandable to average people and delivered with right pathos as
for example George W. Bush, who spoke in Orlando 3 days before his
re-election offering no facts but the story of new world, which was
so perfect, logical, comprehensive and as such secured against all
real world issues.11
The
leader of nation has to keep the whole political front as unanimous
and stable as possible to prevent either the aggressors information
operations, opinions from own society or global opinion will brake
the integrity of political leadership thus braking one leg of the
Clausewitzian power tripod: people – leadership – usable assets.
For example in Lenin-Stalin era party leaders kept very strict party
discipline to prevent dangerous dispersion. Other communist parties
were using same “centralized democracy” -method as the Soviet
Communist Party.12
One
of the difficulties tasks for the supreme commander is to create a
willingness for individual soldier to give one´s life in pursuit
after more valuable goals of one´s society. That can be done by
fear, higher moral or with offering a possibility gain rewards.
Marshal Mannerheim appealed to the sacrifices of previous generation
in his speech 1918 in the lines of: may the patriotic spirit of the
freedom war rise to the heights, that everyone is competing, how to
more support the nation in crises!13
Ernest Renan has stated that the core of an nation is in the things
that its members share and in the things they have together
forgotten.14
Napoleon used the strength of patriotism15
and emphasized that by introducing the signs of national bravery i.e.
decorations. Promotion is another vehicle to encourage soldier to
higher achievements. The state may also offer a possibility to gain
better economical start and other rewards to its soldiers like
donating property, trade rights, taxation rights or pensions. As for
punishment there have been measures like fines, dismissing or
lowering in rank. More serious penalties have been measures like
execution of soldier (Stalin), execution of soldier and his family
(Hitler)16
or execution of soldier, his family, kin and all his supporters (Rome
on 200-400 centuries). In the post-modern society the political
leadership must tap values, motives and moral issues that makes
post-modern individual to sacrifice for society´s higher demands.
4.2 Strategic leadership
A
strategic leader is drawing assets from society´s sources of
superiority and using them with a recipient of success, whilst
surpassing weaknesses and friction to accomplish the end state
defined by political level.
At
strategic level one analyses both own and opponents centres of
gravity and weaknesses, as well as possible goals of opponent,
alternative lines of operation and courses of action to achieve those
goals. One plans, how to deny optional courses of action from
opponents as much as possible and then how to counter remaining at
operational level in order to reach desired end state with own
assets. Resources are being allocated at strategic level commander of
operation is delegated their use with necessary freedom of decision.
If
strategic situation is more rational, less complex or more contained,
it is possible to make a plan that anticipates opponents intentions,
changes of environment and friction within own forces. When situation
is managed with rational approach, there is only few changes in
battle order and environment is stable, strategical leader may remain
at management level. If there is a need to alter procedures, force
structure or situation has strategic importance, leader must walk
through his troops and subordinates to create a spirit of change,
empower people with information and show example.(Napoleon ride
through all his troop during the night before major attack. Wellesley
stated that the presence of Napoleon at battlefield was worth of force of an additional division at least)17.
Usually
in post-modern, multidimensional and open situation with several
levels of interaction, there might be possible to define only general
lines or intentions as a course of action to the end state18.
It might be a denote of the will of commander, which efficiently
communicated and in perceivable form, will establish an operational
guideline for every level of interaction. I some situations even at
the level of soldier, worker or salesman interaction with
stakeholder, the effect may gain a nature of strategy. In those
situations every person, who may face situation of interaction,
should understand their doing in the frame created by the denote of
commanders will.
A
post-modern organization is relatively flat in hierarchy with many
interaction interfaces at different directions (practically all
coalition operations within last 20 years have been networked
organizations (CJTF) with one nation as a hub). People at those
interaction interfaces make changes with their behaviour and deeds.
Strategy should be guiding every situation of influence. Strategy is
best embraced, when it is a part of organizational culture and
individual values, thus being resilient against feelings of stress,
fear or harsh conditions.
Confrontations,
where situations, stakeholders, rules of engagement and relationships
are varying swiftly, call for agility and sensitivity of strategy.
Agile
strategy
needs still foresight, but foreseeing is difficult because of the
amount of variables and their relations19.
Strategic scenarios include more decisive points where future may
take another path. Technically dominant may not necessarily win20,
but the one who can change the behaviour of opponent, neutrals or
other stakeholders within space of operation. YI
ZHOU SHU
says that one can attack to a state in six different situations: 1.
when one has parted rulers from ministers, 2. when one has dispel all
suspicions of attack, 3. when one has outmanoeuvred opponent to
position with few alternatives, 4. when one has supported opponent in
weakness, 5. when one has increased opponents decay of spirit, power
or government or 6. when one has consumed and engaged opponents force
and will.21
There
is a need for strategic insight together with foresight. In order to
create strategic insight one has to collect information, analyse it
and process understanding to be able to understand opponent´s
intentions as situations folds. Strategic insight helps to maintain
initiative and competitiveness over other stake holders. Information
must be obtained from different levels and domains to utilize
innovations or observations to be able to alter strategy. The process
of strategy should be open to external influences. It should have
many interfaces for interaction and information exchange with outside
stake holders.22
Strategist should foster contacts with different factors to obtain
information of weak signals or breaking innovations. This strategy
network is difficult to build because human being tends to gravitate
with colleagues, to confer anything else but strategical issues or to
emphasize information that support existing plans or beliefs.23
A
Strategic leader creates an intention on how to proceed to end state.
This intention, delivered with effective communications, will
simultaneously influence on people to be protected, people within
protective force, people who are neutral and people who are on the
opposing side. Implementation of strategy requires people to step out
from their areas of comfort. Effective strategy will always disturb
legacy, create roiling within organization and might start
argumentation both inside and outside of area of operation, which
again adds pressure on decision makers.24
4.3
Operational leadership
The
results
of every institution exists only outside of its boundaries.
Operational leadership exists only for outcome
of the institution. For the first thing operational leader must
define is the outcome of ones task and secondly organize available
assets to gain the results. Operational leadership is enabling
organization to deliver its outcome and ad value among stake holders
outside of its organization.25
The
changes in space of operation cannot be controlled, but one might try
to remain ahead of them or to be agile enough to cease the initiative
and gain a critical mass for effect on time of opportunity. A
Commander, who is change oriented, sees them as possibilities, seeks
them actively, finds alternative courses of action and implements
them effectively both inside and outside of his organization. This
ability requires features as follows26:
- Operational procedures and understanding to be able to surf the first wave of opportunity
- Organized methods at all levels and interfaces of the organization to seek changes that open possibilities.
- Cultural, procedural and leadership readiness to be able to execute changes faster than opponent both inside and outside of organization.
- A balance between changes and continuity within organization to keep it in the edge but not sliding into chaos.
The
commander of operation must not act before he understands entirety of
the space of operation and has foresight of possible future
scenarios. In every case commander must know his own organization,
both strengths and weaknesses. Commander must not forget either the
space where operation is to be put into practise, the nature of
opposing society, the forces opponent may be able to yield nor the
personalities of opposing commanders. Besides above mentioned general
information commander requires specific information on decisive
points, where his assumptions may be challenged and new possibilities
may be opened.
The
size of the space of operation, amount of events and complexity of
their interrelations has increased to a level, that no man alone can
master all information or unfolding opportunities. Alexander the
Great was great tactician, but when leading his troops to strike the
weakest point of opponents formation by personal example, he lost his
capability to see other changes of battlefield. Hitler tried to
understand situation and command his generals far from behind the
lines and lost opportunities because the delays of his
communications. The Duke of Wellington riding endlessly amongst his
troops, General Grant using telegraphing and General Guderian using
radios were able, besides creating the awareness of entirety, to
collect information directly from battlefield, to change their
operations accordingly and see the results of their decisions as
events unfolded. Understanding based on good information is key to
operational success. Often organizations, forcing information to
follow deep hierarchical structure, have failed to gain understanding
of situation or to project their force with effect.
Commander
of operation possesses firm basic information about the space of
operations to be able to understand situation, to have insight of
interrelations and to have foresight possible scenarios of future.
The picture of current operations provides information to follow if
chosen scenario and course of action are still realizable. If
commander is mislead to follow only current picture and act upon that
understanding, he will lose the foresight, revert to reactive agent
and miss the initiative. In the other hand, if commander is not able
to make decision upon his insight, foresight and intuition, he will
lose as well.27
A
successful deception at operative level requires a comprehensive
process, that calls both social, political and economical measures to
effect through physical, information and cognitive layers to be able
to distract opponent´s understanding from real world. If conflict
escalates the effect of these measures is reinforced with other soft
power28
components and surprising usage of hard power that may rise fog over
events and support indecisiveness on opposing side. Operational
leadership must create non-linearity of operations, discrete chain of
events, anomalies to expected situations and different approaches to
best practice methods. A success follows commander, who executes
unorthodox operation to direct his force in unforeseeable way to gain
effect in the weakness of the opponent. In this process the control
over beliefs of men is important.
One
must be able to divert opinions and beliefs of opposing side from the
real world and create a story that is perfect, self-evident,
comprehensive and evades all criticism.29
To
gain ground for this kind of story, one must foremost destroy all
other structures of trust between opponents forces, society´s and
government´s interaction30.
When one is attacking, the target is the opponent´s unity of will.
When one is defending, he defends his force´s, people´s and leaders
willingness to fight, to face hardship and to be adamant.31
In
order to be able to project right combination of force on time and in
sufficient amount to achieve results, it is mandatory to delegate
authority as low as possible. This is to tailor each projection of
force according to situation, stakeholders and their interrelations.
For example in a quest to separate local population from guerillas
one tries to find exact needs of population and full fill them with
tailored combination of force in each village to gain trust and
social stability.32
A comprehensive operation33
surfaces the profound problem – everybody wants to have power over
all other silos, but no one wants to be a subordinate.
4.4 Tactical leadership
At
tactical level methods for direct impact are: fire, movement,
protection, use of reserve forces, keeping contact, utilization of
gained success, continuous activity, purchases and sales,
interactions and deeds that improve your brand (or ethos). These
methods are used with varying tempo, direction and target to be able
to utilize the indirect effects in conjunction to direct. When one is
advancing there is no withdrawal. But when forced to withdraw, one
executes sudden attack. One must be active and maintain the
initiative. When opponent is forcing you to react, then gain
initiative in other level or direction of struggle. One must be swift
in execution, but when friction slows you down, one must gain speed
in other areas of impact.34
At
tactical level one can achieve a skill of sensing the event or
feeling of the battlefield. The tactical leader must understand his
opponents organization, procedures, strengths and weaknesses. Leader
must observe constantly his opponents spirits, formations, qualities,
weaknesses, strengths, opening possibilities and possible intentions.
When tactical leader senses his opponents forces battle technics,
changes of tempo and timing of execution, he attacks in abrupt way,
time or combination of force. Opponent must be attacked, when he
himself is preparing to attack or when he is not prepared to counter
the attack. 35
When
situation feels complicated or one cannot understand his opponent
intentions, it is better to pretend to be attacking, but execute it
with restricted force. When opponent reacts, his intentions and
forces may be revealed and one can utilize unfolding possibilities.
Destabilize your opponent with danger, surprise or ailment. Attack
without warning at target and on time your opponent is not able to
foresee. When you sense that your opponent is indecisive, use the
moment, seize initiative and strike him.36
Tactical
leader must possess courage to partition a given task and to make
complicated tasks simple. Simple task is fast to learn, execute,
improve – and discard when time comes.37
During
Finnish Winter War 1939 in Suomussalmi and other battles a tactic
called pincer attack was used. The advance of opposing force was
stopped at advantageous position for defence using only small amount
of infantry but very effective indirect fire. The majority of forces
were directed flanking opponents advancing column, using the
advantage of terrain familiarity. Fire attacks were launched from
sides of enemy with timely and locally superior force. Tempo of
battle was changed and initiative was captured from opponent, who
reacted retaining to defend in isolated pockets. The initiative was
maintained by fighting deep amongst opposing forces and preventing
isolated troops to get into contact with each other. Those pockets
were later managed one by one not able to support each others with
their superior direct fire weapon systems. This tactic was called
also as “motti”-tactics.38
4.5 Leadership of battle technical level
At
battle technical level both individuals, troops and weapon systems
are trained to be able to act according subconscious habit, motoric
memory or preset programming. In stressful situations and times of
fear a part in human brains, amygdala, takes control and it prefers
automatic habits or reactions like reflex.39
To be able to behave effectively under stress requires both
individuals and troops to exercise as part of bigger battle system,
obtain skill level of automation and to be able to sense cues40
of enemy action and execute ones task routinely with conjunction of
indirect methods. In this context the following principles of battle
technique are from a famous samurai and multi gifted person Miyamoto
Musashi. He developed the art of battle while winning over 60 duels
between ages 13 – 29 years and defined his understanding at 60
years old.41
While
using direct impact one must possess the skill to use his force
(weapon) in all its efficiency and variation. Mushasi says that is
not worth to die keeping other sword in scabbard and when griping the
weapon, one must focus to strike opponent. Mushashi emphasises the
concentration of will and power to strike. He warns to became too
familiar with one type of weapon, movement or method. If opponent
studies your habits, preferences or dislikes, he might use those
against you. So even at technical level one has to seem to be
unpredictable.
Musashi
emphasises training of battle technique to gain level of subconscious
habit and reflex. Musashi says that in battle you have to move like
you move normally, whether that be fast or slow or with short or long
steps. This is adhered in many sports activities specially team
sports where proximity helps click with other people42
and training movements to deep habit level gives team edge over other
teams in competition43.
One
has to maintain contact with opponent either by fight or reconnoitre
to observe how opponent is reacting, to seek open possibilities and
to gain understanding of his behaviour. Musashi says that every time
you defy the strike of your opponent, you must use the same movement
to harm him.
At
battle technical level one must utilize direct impact
accompanied with indirect methods for multiplied effect. To be able
to do so, a leader must understand his opponents force, feel battle
rhythm and strike against centres of opponents spiritual and physical
stability. To find those centres, one must align with opponent. Think
like he thinks to understand his avenues of approach, his
restrictions, his possibilities and spirit of will. Human mind has
tendency to imagine opponent as powerful and unbeatable and thus
manoeuvre too slowly into contact. If one thinks opponent is
formidable, he has already lost in spirit (at cognitive level) and
will face loss at physical level as well. If one thinks opponent is
as strong as his own forces with similar methods of fighting, then he
has to abandon his normal routines and strike with surprising method
to multiply direct impact with indirect effect.
Everything
can be changed, when the normal rhythm of fighting is disturbed. You
have to feel that moment in order to utilize it. A sudden thrust of
force or strike by reserve unit may start collapse like an avalanche.
When collapse starts one must keep pressure on opponent not to let
him recover.
If
opponent possess better ability of far ranging fire, one has to
penetrate into opponent´s formation in order to deny that
capability. While penetrating into opponent´s formation and clinging
into his troops one has to maintain ability to strike using strengths
like in Suomussalmi operation. Denying opponents strengths and
striking into his weaknesses has been called asymmetric fighting. It
includes indirect effects of fear, unawareness of situation or
physical hardness.
4.6 Management of organization
Managing is typical and necessary task in every organization.
Organization
is a tool to help people and machines to work together for better
productivity.
Productive
organization allows people and machines work together safely,
enhances collaboration between people to create innovation, allows
people to participate in decision making concerning their own tasks
and fulfils specific needs of men. In every organization there is one
person, who has the final decision and responsibility. He may also
expect others to follow his decisions. Besides this one mandatory
position, the other parts of organizations structure are various and
parallel. There may be line, matrix, composite, department, branch,
service, project, process, supply chain, network or consortium type
of organizations. Because organization product is measured outside
of its boundaries, every interface to client, subcontractor or other
stake holder is important. Every interaction with outside makes the
individual at the interface a leader, who “commands” other parts
of organization to provide services and “controls” the delivery
of the service measuring also feed back from customer. Organization
learns from every transaction or interaction taking place through any
interface along its structure.44
People
must know and understand the structure of organization and its
procedures to be able to work effectively as a part of bigger system.
The levels of hierarchy must be kept as minimal as possible to
maintain agility, to keep communication lines shorter and to foster
visibility through the structure. In post-modern world individual
must be able to work within multidimensional organization. Especially
in knowledge work one may be a part of a team for one task, whilst
doing same time admin tasks for line organization, browsing report
from latest project meeting, chatting to solve a problem given to
one´s adviser group and waiting a call from customer. His line
manager may be a co-operation partner in consortium, key account
manager of a supply chain or mentor to strategy team.
People, experts or knowledge workers are no commanded but mentored and piloted towards more productive and fruitful results
Both
skilful and knowledgeable people are organized in roles in which they
add value to organization´s products. With their roles people
understand responsibilities and expectations of their task. Human has
a tendency to judge other people by the roles he has experience of
i.e. stereotyping. Organization is not functioning if people
misunderstand roles of other people or due lack of communication
create false expectations. Human has also a tendency to fulfil
expectations of the role(halo effect). Normally human also takes
responsibility and even grows to meet the size of trust. Besides job
descriptions, quota and task lists, the role one is working in is
affected by one´s reputation or ethos. When people are interacting
in organizational roles, the outcome is affected by pathos. Pathos is
being communicated mostly with body language, which is the reason for
some to avoid collaboration with technical means.45
The
best results comes out from a team, group or patrol constituted
people with different skill sets and knowledge. People who know
themselves and each others. Each person has particular personality
and temperament. If the team understands these differences and
combines them, they will get better outcome from each interaction
with stake holders. The leader of organization starts building his
structures and processes by building up small core teams, teaming
them with needed additional competence, opening processes to have
teams work together towards common goals, maintaining teams cohesion
and interfaces by increasing self-conscious. When the team reaches
the end of its life cycle, members can be used as cores for new teams
or as mentors of other teams.
The outcome of every organization is only outside of its structure46
The
leadership area of influence is not any more defined by political,
juridical or organizational bounds. A leader must influence to every
individual, group or system within the space of operations and
through all lines of support. A leader extends his will, intent and
self-assurance through all processes, courses of action and chain of
supply to have this complex system working towards unified
objectives.47
Taking care of ones subordinates is not enough, because in
post-modern conflicts no organization is independent, but supported
by multitude of other units and facilities. A good leader is taking
care also of those organizations and specially of the process
interfaces between organizations to have the whole network to work
towards defined end state.48
One can rarely master changes, but always try to be ahead of them
Tomorrow
cannot be created, if yesterday is not abandoned. A leader must free
organizational assets from tasks that don´t add value, are weak in
revenue or which opponent has faced already twice. These assets
leader should invest to create something new. Everything organization
is doing either inside or outside, should be improved systematically
(Kaizen49
principle) or else organization will gain ineffective mass into its
structure and interfaces. Particularly public sector organizations
tend to evolve into thin functional silos and cover every process
with excess layers of administration. Organization, that concentrates
only solving current problems or uses always the familiar method or
denies that environment and stake holders are changing, is not able
to seize initiative or gain results.50
4.7 How to lead individuals, groups or societies and maintain their trust
Organizations,
that are planned to act in conflicts or in hard conditions, should
build up esprit de corps - a spirit of integrity and self-confidence,
which is created by sharing hardnesses, winning challenges or
succeeding in overcoming fearful situations. A Chinese tradition
says: officers do not sit, if troops are not able to sit also and
officers do not eat before troops. Proximity creates trust. Frost and
heat carves individuals to troops that may be able to face fear and
death of battlefield with coherent esprit de corps.51
A
human being is the strongest but same time the weakest link of
defence system. To be able to make hard decisions, project force or
stand hard times depends on human hearts and minds. All humans must
be treated with respect and just in the whole space of operations,
whether people belonged in defended societies, own military units,
neutral societies or opponents units. The justness and authority
support troops spirit to face death. People will follow eagerly and
leave their areas of comfort, if they have someone they trust to lead
them.52
WEILIAOZI
says
that when a leader is awarding as clear as sun in the sky, when a
leader is trustworthy like four seasons, when a leader is adamant in
his orders like battle axe, the army with all soldiers and officers
will follow putting their life into stake.53
At the moment, when the profound motives of leader is being questioned, everything he does becomes unreliable. 54
Without
confidence and trust there is no open society, because policing
everyone is impossible. There is no global economy, because trust
lowers tolls, opens commerce and creates transactions across borders.
There is no shared communications, electricity distribution network,
loans or just on time deliveries.55
Trust
between people is founded with prolonged interaction, but it can be
lost in one day. According to David Halperns study 24% of USA
citizens trusts to each others, South-Americans and Africans only 23%
whereas 68% of Scandinavians trust their fellow citizen. Trust is a
value of social system and it can support long chains of supply. In
the subscriber – provider -network trust is more efficient when it
is based on co-operation rather than contracted sanctions. If society
lacks trust, one can maintain organization only with authoritarian
leadership and tight controlled hierarchical line organization.
Man assesses himself according his intentions and others according their behaviour
The
most effective method to build network of trust is to behave as
agreed both to oneself and to others. Trust building is a process,
where personality and competence both count. The favourable
components of personality are morale, honesty, base of motivation and
intentions towards other people. The favourable components of
competence are skills, knowledge, performance, learnability and track
record. With these features and shared experiences of successes a
trust can be built to last opponent´s endeavours to brake alliances
with disinformation and harshness.56
On the basis of trusted relations a feeling of safety is being build.
A human activity at cognitive level requires feeling of safety from
both superiors and colleagues. Security supports concentration, when
individual is stressed, urges to seek alternatives, takes risks or
faces new challenges. A leader should be able to build a feeling of
safety and positive support amongst his subordinates.57
Every
organization tends to get fat in favourable times. Organizations tend
to augment administration, controls and sanctions, because they bring
feeling of safety, feeling of risk management and administrators want
to do their job well. In the other hand overly grown administration
methods implicates lack of trust, clear procedures or safety in
organization - sometimes even immature culture.58
In some organizations – especially public safety organizations –
controls and administration gradually tend to gain value on itself.
In deeply functional organization silos sometime forget supporting
the core business thus increasing marginal costs, gnawing motivation
of people or immobilizing organization. The signs of high-class trust
in organization are as follows:
- information is shared openly,
- mistakes are tolerated,
- risk taking is adhered as a method of learning,
- culture supports innovation and discrete opinions,
- people are loyal to colleagues on leave,
- people are talking openly and direct,
- interaction is filled with real world matters and facts,
- after official meetings there are less unofficial gatherings and finally
- organization is transparent to employees.59
Post-modern
confrontations and their conflicts requires different leadership and
managerial skills at each level of management. Conflicts may have
changed to fighting amongst people and leadership is still working
with people, amongst them and in front of them. The complexity of
operation requires understanding and decision making at every level
of interaction with stake-holders, neutrals or opponents. Very few
people can handle the big picture alone. A team of leaders should be
created reinforced with various experts as situation requires in
order to analyse, understand, foresee and execute operation with
success. Organizations that are co-operating along supply chain are
different in their culture and maturity, thus a leader must project
his vision and will over the borders of organizations. Leader must
become a coach that gets different players to function as a team.
References:
1
The
english translation by Lionel Giles first published in 1910. Online
http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar.php#sthash.SbkjdsJv.dpuf
2
The
english translation by Lionel Giles first published in 1910. Online
http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar.php#sthash.SbkjdsJv.dpuf
3Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.83 translated into English by Juha Mattila
4Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.28 translated into English be Juha Mattila
5Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.95 translated into English by Juha Mattila
6As
commander of air operation Tommy Franks in II operation of Persian Gulf
2003 emphasized the end state of quick operational success in
expense of longer term political goals. To General Franks massing
systems and men was key to the victory. Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin
sodankäynnistä.
7Clausewitz:
”Että kuninkaan ja hallituksen kunnia käy yksiin kansan kunnian
kanssa ja on sen hyvinvoinnin ainoa turva. Että kansa joka urheasti
taistelee vapautensa puolesta on voittamaton. Että vapauden
tuhoutuminenkin verisen ja kunniakkaan taistelun myötä varmistaa
kansan uudelleensynnyn. Se on elämän siemen, josta jonakin päivänä
itää uusi vankasti juurtunut puu.” Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin
sodankäynnistä
8John
Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
9Martti
Turtola; A.F. Airo - Taipumaton kenraali. Otava 1979 ISBN
-10:951-1-19918-8 s.168
10Todorov,
A et al: Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict Election
Outcomes. Science vol. 308 10.6.2005
11Arno
Gruen: Tahdon maailman ilman sotaa. Otava 2008 ISBN
978-952-01-0104-6
12Jukka
Seppinen: Neuvostotiedustelu Suomessa 1917 – 1991 Strategia ja
toiminta. Gummerus 2006 s.193
13Martti
Turtola: AF Airo – Taipumaton kenraali. Translated into english by
Juha Mattila
14Daniel
Chirot, Clark McCauley: Miksei tapeta niitä kaikkia? Poliittisen
joukkomurhan logiikka ja ehkäisy. Suom. Perti Stenman. Like 2008.
ISBN 978-952-01-0064-3
15Scanhorst
ranskalaisesta sotilaasta 1795 jälkeen: ”He uskoivat, että vain
he olivat valistuneita, älykkäitä, vapaita ja onnekkaita ja että
kaikki muut kansat olivat takaperoisia, nautamaisen typeriä ja
huono-onnisia. He uskoivat, etteivät he taistelleet vain oman
tulevan olemassa olonsa ja kohtalonsa, vaan myös koko ihmiskunnan
puolesta.” Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä
16John
Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
17John
Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
18Pauli
Juuti, Mikko Luoma: Strateginen johtaminen. Otava 2009 ISBN
978-951-1-23639-9 s.37
19Yves
Doz, Mikko Kosonen: Fast Strategy. Wharton School publishing 2008
20Miyamoto
Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa
Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
21Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.85
22Richard
P. Rumelt: Good Strategy Bad Strategy. Profile Books Ltd London 2012
23Lev
Trotski said whilst building up the Red Army: ”We have to resist
all attempts to build absolute Revolutionary strategy, that would be
based on our limited experiences of three years Civil War. During
this time units were fighting in special conditions not necessarily
like faced in National Defence. “ Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin
sodankäynnistä.
24Jari
Sarasvuo: Huomiotalous. Otava 2005 ISBN 951-1-20566-8
25Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000
26Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000
27John
Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.
28Joseph
S. Nye Jr: Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership. A Seminar at
Harvard Kennedy School 2006
29Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.65
30This
is to apart the integrity of Clausewitzian tripod which is most
often the center of gravity.
31Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.115
32General
Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN
978-0-307-27811-1
33Nato´s
Chicago Summit Declaration 2012: ”Our operational experiences have
shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on
their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. We
reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach.
In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on NATO’s
contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and
reconstruction is ongoing.”
34Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.149
35Miyamoto
Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa
Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
36Miyamoto
Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa
Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
37Jari
Sarasvuo: huomiotalous. Otava 2005. ISBN 951-20566-8
38Y.A.
Järvinen: Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka Talvisodassa. WSOY
1948 s.193
39Daniel
Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen.
Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0
40Charles
Duhigg: The Power of Habit. Randon House Books. London 2013
41Miyamoto
Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa
Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007
42Ori
Brafman & Rom Brafman: CLICK The forces behind how we fully
engage with people, work, and everything we do. 2010 Crown
Publishing Group. When
people click, there are five accelerators – ingredients –
factors that are involved: Vulnerability, proximity, resonance,
similarity and a safe place
43Charles
Duhigg: The Power of Habit. Randon House Books. London 2013.
44Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 22
45Charles
Handy: Understanding Organizations. Penguin Books 1999 s. 76
46Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 49
47Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 49
48Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 54
49Kaizen
is a
system of continuous improvement in quality, technology, processes,
company culture, productivity, safety and leadership by Steve
Hudgik
50Peter
F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 89
51Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.201
52Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.203
53Matti
Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta
Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.225
54Stephen
M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster,
NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8. Fused from the thoughts of Mahatma
Gandhi.
55Thomas
L. Friedman: The World is Flat. The Globalized World in the
Twenty-First Century. Penguin Books 2006
56Stephen
M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster,
NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8
57Daniel
Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen.
Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0
58Stephen
M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster,
NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8
59Stephen
M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster,
NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8
