2015-11-08

"Thoughts about C4I systems" blog broke the barrier of 10 000 views in October 2015

Thank you for the interest you have shown, I will try to do my best in writing these boring stories in the Future!

Why retired officer starts to keep blog, why does he not just keep things to himself?

Originally the blog for “Thoughts about C4I systems” was established as workspace in writing C4ISR systems and development issues with many friends that remained in the Finnish Defence Forces after my retirement in the end of 2012.

The idea was to create and deliver understanding of complex system of systems that we call C4ISR or CIS or ICT – as one prefers. Thus the theme picture is presenting real world snapshot of layered structure of many different generations of information management and communications. This picture is taken from presenter’s desk in The Shop of Signal School, Riihimaki.


There is a sedimented structure of different decades and means of computing and communications gathered on the same pile. This is the reality in military C4ISR also – several generations of information management policies, methods and tools are used at same time.

First text in 15. January 2013 was a joint venture with my previous colleague Harri. We were drafting articles about the maintenance of programmable electronics (ohjelmoitava elektroniikka) in Defence Forces to be published in Military Magazine of Finland (Sotilasaikakauslehti). That was in Finnish but all after that were translated or written in English. This was the second idea – practicing the writing in English.

The third idea was to build knowledge base to all interested in this boring subject. The fourth idea was to do the writing for my PhD thesis on these pages. The fifth idea was to share my experience to all younger officers and engineers in the Defence Forces of Finland so they would be wiser in their decisions and missions.

I have been wasting my time in writing 44 articles

There are 44 writings all together between 15. January 2013 until 31.October 2015 that earned all 10 000 views. If one categorises them, the following graph is depicting the distribution of the writings:
As it happens sometime only 11 writings are somewhat following the theme of this blog and others are covering other interests of the editor.



From these categories viewers have appreciated most Information assurance and cyber (1111 views), Information operations (827 views) and IT Governance (305 views). The rest are somewhat less interesting.

The top ten list of individual writings show the same tendency – IT-security from May 2014 and Information Operations from November 2013 are hype items. Rest appreciated are shown in the Figure below.

Who are these people that do not have any better to do than browsing this blog?

Most of the top ten views has been originated from Finland (40%) and USA (27%) as shown in following Figure:


Ukraine appears among the top viewers with 324 views with understandable reasons but surprisingly Poland and Switzerland appear also high in views together with 250 views. Quick outcome of this is that people in Poland and Switzerland are exceptionally interested in these kind of writings. France is explained with my current French colleague’s exceptional interest on these subjects. Similar situation is with 375 viewings from United Arab Emirates.

The statistics of Google blog naturally are not able to see the real origins of these views but only the primary public IP-address. Minority might be those people that are not using any Virtual Private Network or TOR anonymity in their browsing.

Almost third of views has been done using Chrome (32%) followed by Explorer (27%) and Firefox (26%). Safari remains quite rare with 9% of views. Rest remain under 1 %. Windows is the most common operating system (68%) with Linux (11%) and MAC (10%) following. Google and LinkedIn have been the most used means to find this blog and its writings.

It seems that there is quite continuous flow of 200 – 300 views per month independent of actual publications which means that key words and common interests are leading to these pages. Followers remain as minority.

2015-09-20

What horses were trying to teach me about leadership?




This paper is describing one viewpoint in improvement as a leader. As horses are social animals they have quite developed non-verbal communication system. This analysis is using horses as mirrors to non-verbal communication of human leaders.


MY MENTORS IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

SUIKUN DAHLIA alias PAAVO

Paavo was huge (withers around 178 cm high) Finnish cold blood, register number 1118-90. Head resembling a cello box. Back wide like paddleboard. It seemed that he had a good childhood in Dahlia stables with other race horse applicants. Paavo was a failure as racehorse when I bought him without seeing from summer pasture. Unfortunately he never learned to trot in a way racehorses should and gained a chronic leg problem in trying. Paavo had good self-esteem but panicked when force was applied. I was fortunate to spend about 3 years with Paavo. Finally his leg broke entirely and we had to put him down.


STRAGON SERAPIS alias SAKARI 


Sakari was high (withers around 180 cm high) mixed blood (non-registered), but oh so narrow shouldered after Paavo. Sakari’s back felt all bones and spine. Even with saddle there was a feeling of falling all the time. Sakari was brought up as sole foal, just with his mother, no social contacts or running wild in green fields with others alike. Sakari was sensitive like a moose when I first led him to our stables. Later of that same evening he rested his head against my shoulder when I was tending his lower lip. Sakari did not appreciate personal zone and he was unsecure in facing all unfamiliarity. We spend together about 3 years both in Oulu and Helsinki. Sakari went back to Oulu and had life of jumping and personal training horse.

SARKKO

Sarkko was normal built (withers 172 cm high) Finnish cold blood, register number 2416-96.He was born in famous family of both race and riding horses (Fathered by Harkko). Brought up in vicinity of the Ypäjä Horse Academy and got wide upbringing as both race and riding horse. Later he was mistreated and when I entered his pen for first time, he was shivering against the furthest of it's side afraid of me. Sarkko was with me also about 3 years. I had to sell Sarkko to mounted Police of Helsinki, where he served almost 5 years before the retirement.






TRUST BETWEEN MEMBERS OF TEAM

Horses – like Human- are social animals. Social structure means that herd has positions relation to roles and responsibilities. Leading mare is telling where to eat and when to move. Leading stallion is watching over for threats and protecting the herd. There is an individual space that members with lower status respect. There are codes of conduct that all members are following and adhering the youngsters to follow. Peaceful coexistence is the ideal status within the herd.

Social relationships are built on trust and role expectations. Members of herd trust that leading mare is finding best grass and water enough for everyone. They also trust that leading stallion is giving them early warning if threat approaches. Mares are taking care their foals. Foals are following the example of their elders. Individuals in those roles do their best to live up the expectations of others. Otherwise they are denied the social comfort and habits of the flock.

Trust is two directional since leader considers the proposals of other members, but after decision she is expecting others to follow. More independent Paavo was often proposing routes and directions when we were trekking through forests of Kello. Sometimes I let him take us where he wanted and sometimes I took us through new routes and sceneries. Especially in midwinter when land was covered with snow up to the stomach of the horse, I let Paavo to find paths beneath pulverised snow. Or in dark autumn nights when we were walking with Sakari. I did not see but some slight lightness in the sky between trees showing possible road track. I trusted Sakari’s better night sight to keep us on the right track. 

PROXIMITY

Being together

Trust and confidence in the relationship are built on base of doing tasks in closeness. Horse notes your body talk, and in best situation, you watch horses body talk. Both will learn the others manners and get used to them. Trust is based on expected behaviour. One of the ways to do this is to work with horse in round yard, with as minimum sources of distraction as possible. Working in this context means more socialising with the horse than drilling it. Leader can play with horse, tickle his curiosity or just be in the moment and let other be as well. Being in the moment might also be just leading horse to juicy clover field and sit beside as horse chews. Horse is gradually taking you as team lead and surveyor of threats and he can concentrate on enjoying the clover.

We had ideal terrain in Kello to explore with Paavo. Many were the trips in to the nearby woods that I made with him. Mainly lazily walking barely using halter but guiding by seat we explored and cleared sand bunkers, fallen trunks, hills and shallows. Occasionally I raise him to gallop and we sprinted through clear trail and again down to walk in negotiating more unfamiliar ground. In tight places or steep slopes I unmounted and led Paavo by walking ahead. This created relationship in which we both trusted each other. We learnt to know our abilities by overcoming together many challenges. 

Touch

Feedback is essential for positive habituation. The fastest feedback is the release of pressure. As soon you sense that horse’s muscles are moving towards your request, you should release the pressure. Horse’s skin is sensitive as it can sense a fly standing on its hide. One should not pat horse forcibly but make similar movement with fingers that other horses may do when they are “grooming” each other’s with their teeth and lips.
Saddle makes it easier to sit on horseback but without saddle there is better touch between the horse and rider. I tried to have all terrain riding done without saddle. With Paavo’s wide back it was pleasant but on Sakari’s narrow back very painful. I had to use thick western blanket with Sakari but only thin cloth with Paavo to prevent sweating. The touch of one’s seat was sensitive without saddle and horse was listening seat aids well. We had training lessons with Sarkko wearing only saddlecloth and halter with western rope. Seat aids were enough to guide horse’s motion only direction needed some added signs with rope.

Who is moving who

Moving feet does not mean that you frighten horse running around, but gently use your statue and leverage of rein to move horses hind leg for one crossing step. Just ask horse to give way more with your spirit than pushing with hand. As soon as horse reacts with leg muscle, release the pressure and leave horse in peace of being together without asking anything. This is the simple request-release action that should become normal behaviour of a leader. Leader does not yell to horse or - even worse - hit it if trying to build a trusting relationship. Leader can show his feelings but not throw them on one’s companion. 
We spend countless hours with Sakari walking 8-figures on ground before every riding session. I had him in rope halter and asked him to follow me through the path of large 8. There were sudden stops that sought Sakari to pay attention and not walk over me. This was to teach him to respect my personal area. There were changes in direction to teach horse to follow without anticipation. The lesson gained was that in building relationship based on trust, there needs to be activity in togetherness.

SPIRIT AND ENERGY OF A LEADER

Leader’s energy is calm, steady and consistent. Energy should be focused towards next challenge. 

We took habit to have city treks with Sakari in Helsinki. Nervous Sakari was in his comfort zone in forest and off-roads but did not like cars at all. So we started having street walks. Past parked cars, incoming buses and loud sounding JCB’s. The key thing was calm and steady seat. No tension in leg muscles, loose feeling to mouth, slight tap with heel if hesitation occurred. Lesson was that leader should preserve calmness and steady drive towards set coals to create path of comfort to his followers.

Be interested about things since horses are.

Horses are both curious and sensitive. New places and creatures are interesting to horses. We had often our dogs following riding treks with Paavo and Sakari. Horses were following what dogs were doing. Paavo realised that dogs were keen splashing in water and he was showing out the ditches with water to our dogs. With Sarkko we took the relationship with dog further by introducing obstacle courses to man, horse and hound. Together all three of us jumped over trunks and ditches both horse and hound following the man in their turn. I was leading dog when riding with Sarkko through obstacle course where both horse and hound did tricks together. Lesson was that animals and humans were more focused and able to learn new skills, when providing challenges for both body and mind.

Make up your mind, stick with it and advance unwavering.

Sarkko was profoundly scared and hypersensitive when we got him. He became braver each day with us but kept the sensitivity for uncertainty of the rider. Once we were starting show jumping competition wearing a full uniform and facing high expectations to win that class. Sarkko cleared first obstacle easily, but then I made a mistake. I was trying to balance and slow down a bit his canter by pulling slightly with reins first time ever. Sarkko took it as wavering and refused the second obstacle.  As there is one correction allowed, we approached obstacle again and I was trying to force him over, he refused more markedly and dipped me down from saddle. The only rider in military uniform falls from his horse in second obstacle – what a humiliation. Lesson was that one should advance unwavering and trust the horse to do his job.

Integrity and consistence

Horses are herd animals. They build social habits to manage both normal pasturing and new experiments. Social habits make it possible for horses to be in automatic mode when eating in security of other herd members. Habits kick also horse to flight or fight in presence of danger. My wife was especially strict in doing everything in consistent way. Weather it was grooming, feeding, saddling up or competing everything was to follow same comfortable routine. Nor horse or the horseman were required to make any decisions but follow the comfortable habit. Lesson was that a leader should create comfort zone from normal work and routines and focus energy and decision making on major challenges.

Behave like you know where you two are riding

With Paavo we enjoyed a rare experience of riding with herd of elks. Paavo got a whiff of them much earlier than I got any clue. He signalled concern and fear by wavering in his gait. Once I got a glimpse of elks, I tried to hide my eagerness by relaxing my seat and leading Paavo consistently towards the herd. For short time we were jogging beside these great animals but eventually unable to cross rough terrain as long strides as elks. Lesson identified was that leader creates a spirit of sureness to allow others to experiment, try and fail while still sustaining safety.

Leader rewards for the slightest effort and smallest try, so his followers know that their efforts are noticed and appreciated.

With horses rider can reward in many ways. There are voice, hand, seat and leg aids that may provide feedback. Horse is as sensitive to voice as a dog. Horseman can habituated horse to take low, soft voice as reward. A gentle stroke with hand along the horse’s neck might do the trick. Relaxing ones seat is clear sign of approval. Furthermost stopping the pressure and leaving horse in peace is most rewarding feedback to horse. Feedback needs to follow immediately the right reaction.  When horses leg muscles start taking cross step, then the leg pressure should stop. Lesson is that direct, specific and clear feedback enforces wanted behaviour both in horses and people.

Leader is respectful in his requests, but he expects to be listened to. He follows through the effort that he has decided with enough energy to get it carried out.

With Paavo we did long explorations in the evergreen forests of Kello. As the terrain was former seabed and sandy, it was safe to go and try new paths running throughout area. We ended taking different routes every day. First it was me that chose our tracks but after I allowed Paavo to propose a path one day, he was eager to propose tracks of his liking. I accepted them only when they were taking us in new experiences and not heading back to stables. Lesson was that one should be able to listen to horse and consider his proposals rather than being autocratic all the time.

Rider seeks reaction from horse by applying moderate pressure with aids. If horse reacts, the release of pressure should be immediate. If horse is not listening, pressure needs to be emphasised with for example slight touch with a whip. Pressure needs to be kept until first signs of positive reaction is recognised. Lesson for leader is that after decision he should use moderate effort to communicate and motivate his people. People should be left to continue in their own peace, when reaction towards intended execution is recognised. When execution is not imminent, leader should focus his will on spot to get things started.

STATUE

Get control over your feelings, body and behaviour

I had problem of becoming tense in show jumping competitions. Sarkko was seeing this in my statue and sensing it through rigid seat and the edginess of my aids. The statue of one’s body is yelling out your feelings. When angry your shoulders are stiff and your movement rough and edgy. When in peace your shoulders are relaxed, your motion smoother and flexible. Anger projects fear whereas tranquillity projects safety. We were not successful in competitions before I got more control over my feelings. As I relaxed my behaviour and body, horse was back in safety and relaxed also. Only relaxed and willing horse could give its best effort on track. Lesson was that leadership needs self-awareness and self-control in all means of communication to get guidance through and create effect.

Look forward and beyond the next challenge

When advancing through a jumping course it is important to keep your eyes in the hurdle ahead. This will help you to estimate distance and pace of your horses gallop. It also signals your horse where you two are going. On the top of hurdle rider should fix his eyes to next hurdle and give horse signal to gain proper gallop. The statue of your body is all the time oriented onwards and towards next challenge. Legs and seat will define the corridor of advance to your horse. Reins and seat is providing your horse a balance on that track. It is comfortable for horse to advance towards unknown challenges when it has both corridor and balance.  Lesson was that leader might delegate tasks and missions to his followers with direction and balanced motion but never the full responsibility of result.

Relax and be cool – it will be copied

Sakari was uncomfortable in dark and in uneven terrain. He had problems stepping on snow in late autumn and on sand in late spring. Riding through evergreen forest in windy autumn evening was unnerving to Sakari. Although horse sees better in dark that human, it is also a prey animal so every crack of branch or off shape may be sign for a predator stalking. Rider takes then statue of the team lead by relaxing his legs and buttock, opening his shoulders and levelling his eyes generally upfront. Staring or trying to look something hard will signal horse that you noticed a danger. That might launch a flight reaction. Horse is quickly copying both nervous and relaxed behaviour. Lesson is that horse and human are learning by copying others behaviour. In stressful situation everyone’s eyes are on leader and his behaviour is loud signal to either flee, fight or relax and continue business as normal.

Leader provides serenity and safety thus following him is natural reaction

Horse is a social animal that follows the leading mare and is protected by leading stud. I had always long halter rope when leading my horses. They were following me behind my back and not by my side. With this I showed them their place behind the leader and went in first always to unfamiliar places and situations. There are two conditions for this: 1. Horse should respect horseman’s area and 2. Horseman is a trusted leader to horse.

When man bounds with horse there is no need for rope to have horse following him. We had many horses that we only took care over some time. They quickly found the place in our herd and followed us willingly without any ropes. It takes simply two issues: 
  1. The leader signals comfort and direction with his statue. 
  2. The horse accepts his place in the herd.

Sarkko adopted this so well that when we went to match show and I was trying to show my horse, he was relaxed, head down and with long back. Beside of us a full breed Arab horse that was stepping nervously around his trainer, Sarkko looked like a cow standing behind me. That was my first and last try to present my horses in a match show.

One who makes feet moving is the leader

In Kello we had both Paavo and Sakari together for a while. We had this special evening riding events for other riders and sometimes even for beginners. One session remains especially in my mind. We had one rider with her horse and her husband with us. I was riding with Sakari. The husband was sitting on Paavo in western saddle and the third rider followed last. Evening was getting dark but full moon and stars were providing enough light. After walking slowly to get the beginners seat relaxed, we came to beginning of straight path through woods. After everyone agreed we launched a cautious gallop. Sakari was eager to go faster but I signalled him to take it slowly with my seat. Paavo was right behind us eyes on me as he understood that he was trusted to take care of the beginner. The wife and her horse were not that relaxed or controlled. Her horse fight out from her control and tried to gallop past us. Paavo stopped the horse with his big behind signalling to stay at back. I showed example and went down to walk with Sakari and other horses followed. I was the leading rider that horses were following despite of their own riders.

SECURITY

No matter what happens, leader remains cool and solve situation with determination

Horse is a prey animal and first prone to flight. It is possible to habituate horse to first check the rider before darting into safe. If rider signals tension, then horse takes 5-10 steps away from danger even faster. Leader should remain relaxed in all situations. Both seat and statue are signalling tension and stress if leader is not knowingly control his feelings and body. Lesson is that body language is being copied in social situations. Distress is contagious in crew and leader’s behaviour is being copied in emergency situations.

Being left in peace within one’s own space means comfort

Unlike average belief one should not correct horse by constant aids: poking with heels, pulling with reins, squeezing with seat. On the contrary, correction should be quick and release of pressure is signal to horse that he is behaving correctly. Peace means security and comfort to horse. Lesson is that guidance is good but release of pressure, trust and space of operation is better when leading other beings.

MOTION

A horse in balanced canter can clear obstacles never faced before

We took habit to take Sarkko to fixed obstacle courses where ever we found them. This was good for his head but also taught us an important lesson of canter. Short, swift but balanced canter creates a foundation for horse to jump any surprising obstacle. This short canter was used where ever possible to practise it in different terrains and grounds following the teachings of Miyamoto Musashi.  Samurai taught that one should move in fight as one moves normally in everyday life. Lesson was that any system needs to first learn how to move in its environment and then use the motion to reach towards greatness.

You cannot steer a horse that is not moving. Once moving one should be clear in communicating the direction.

Once the short canter was there, it was easier to direct Sarkko through obstacle course while keeping balance both in approaching the hurdle and in landing after it. Motion and balance provides a source of energy that can be directed with rider’s seat and other aids.  If rider is also having balanced seat then he can guide horse with precise and timely aids (leg, hand, seat and voice). Balanced motion of rider and his horse is a foundation in all riding. There are some equestrians that merely travel on horseback while horse takes care both of them. There are also caballeros that wrenches and pushes his horse through the track. Lesson found here is that a leader should find a balance with his organisation in continual learning and improvement to excel in flexibility needed in turbulent environment of present-day business or combat.

HABITUATION

Security is based on rituals, habits. 

Sarkko was unsecure and nervous when we got him. Gradually the trust was built as described in first chapter. Habituation was important method in familiarising horse to scary things. In the beginning Sarkko was afraid of having little children on his back. We did habituate Sarkko gradually by hanging in different positions on his back, having two people riding with him and finally having a dog on his back. Eventually we were able to go through obstacle course where two people were riding on bare back, hopping on and off through the course, doing 360 turns on horseback and finally a dog sitting on horseback. Lesson was that by gradually introducing seemingly scary issues, horses and people can be habituated to a degree that they feel comfortable with previously feared things.

If there is need to step beyond comfort zone, then trusted leader is needed. 

Once comfort zone is created a gradual introduction of new and thrilling things may continue. We could extend Sarkko’s comfort zone so he passed clearly the stress tests of police riders. Once so tense horse was a reference for courage when leading a pack of other police riders through rioting crowd. Lesson was that any individual can extend his comfort zone either driven by trusted rider or just social expectation faced as a leader of herd.

Leader knows where to go and protects from all evil.

Sakari was brought up mainly in small corrals not having social contacts besides his mother. Whenever there was a scary thing Sakari was trying to get safety among his people. This went into extreme that one time scary Sakari bumped into my wife and pushed her over in his search for security. Riding with Sakari was easier since he was getting feeling of comfort from the rider’s seat. Lesson was that a leader with his behaviour creates a feeling of authority and comfort that no new challenge creates too much stress among followers.

A CHECKLIST FOR A LEADER

  1. Proximity is imperative to create basis for knowledge of each other’s habits, nature and competence when building a team.
  2. Leader’s energy is calm, steady and consistently focusing on next challenge.
  3. Leader should be interested of things that he wants his subordinates to excel in.
  4. Leader should make timely decision and continue unwavering in its execution.
  5. Leader should create a comfort zone around every day work and delegate decision making to subordinates. This enables leader to focus on future and more challenging situations.
  6. Leader is looked on as role model. In times of stress his behavioural is being copied. Leader should at least pretend to know what he is doing and appear confident in the eyes of his subordinates.
  7. Leader rewards for the slightest effort and smallest try, so his followers know that their efforts are noticed and appreciated.
  8. Leader is respectful in his requests, but he expects to be listened to. He follows through the effort that he has decided with sufficient energy to get it carried out.
  9. Leader is self-conscious and has control over his feelings, body language and behaviour. Relax and be cool – it will be copied.
  10. Leader should not exhaust himself with normal decision but look forward and beyond the next challenge to prepare his followers.
  11. Leader provides serenity and safety, thus following him is natural reaction to social species.
  12. Leader teaches his organisation to move around more familiar environment before he tries to reach towards unknown spheres.
  13. Leader coaches his organisation in continual learning and improvement. After adopting the balance of sustaining operation and continuous improvement, organisation is ready to face surprises of turbulent environment.
  14. Leader projects peace and comfort no matter how fearful situation. Determined motion is always better than hesitation in decision making. When subordinates are moving towards right direction, leader’s touch should be as light as possible but feedback as quick as possible.

2015-09-02

A short study of military information security policies and their application for multi-level security

Situation:

Current military information security policies are still using domain or facility as trust foundation. This is keeping military from improving their mobility and survivability.

Task:


  1. To your experience are there any other bases for trust that might be available to Armed Forces if they could move past air gap and bastion concepts?
  2. Apply other approaches for security trust foundation.


Analyses:

Current information security policies are based on traditional thinking of fortification architecture.

Figure 1: Traditional “fortification” approach to information security

IT-systems are isolated from other systems with Air Gap like moat isolated fortifications from even ground. Physical protection is being built like walls around castle keeping malevolent outside and beneficial inside. Reality requires people to enter and exit from fortifications via drawbridge as firewall is allowing transactions and sessions between other means separated systems. High towers are providing better surveillance and detection possibilities in fortification as security event and incident management is currently used in cyber environment.

What happened to medieval fortifications? They were conquered with battering rams, infiltrations from inside, besieging and finally with powder. Modern digital fortresses are breached with advanced persistent threats, spearfishing, distributed denial of service and finally with worms creeping everywhere.

There is an evolutionary roadmap of military information security architectures that roots in keeping important papers in vault. Vault become a building. Building was connected with other buildings by means of communications. In the end monitoring applications were spread on every host to gain pervasive control over everything that is moving. Then the cyber world connected further and control did not hold. Threats evolved with exponential pace and outmatched any attempts of deterring them via recognition. Vulnerabilities in existing systems are revealed faster than they are patched. The area of vulnerability is beyond any fortress to protect it.

Figure 2: Example of bases of trust and its evolution in operational military networks
What makes Military to release their trust on physical world and take leap towards virtual possibilities? 

Constraints:

There are very persistent mind models with military as:
  • Isolation is the best way to keep your networks and computing out of harms of connected world.
  • Isolation is hard to achieve as in real world information must flow between different fortified domains to provide information superiority. ISAF operation was suffering of “sneaker network”. Information was copied to CD, DVD and USB memories in one domain and dispatched to other bypassing security policy controls.
  • Malevolent software has long ago breached the Air Gap isolation and infecting systems via audio, electromagnetic radiation, hardware supplies, etc.
  • Optical cabling is the only way to connect sites since it does not radiate electromagnetic waves.
  • Optical cable is possible to tap by dispersing the radiated light from it.
  • Cabling is keeping troops in one position where as wireless communications is enabling the mobility
  • One medium for communications is enough if it is state of arts military design.
  • Military communications have fallen into measure and countermeasure race. Radio propagation is dispersed over time or frequency by spread spectrum technologies whereas spectrum analysis is improving faster with more powerful processing and wideband detecting.
  • Hierarchically structured radio stars with long ranges are easy to detect and locate in area of operation. After precise location radio stations and command posts are destroyed by indirect or airborne fire. One radio emission type is a single point of failure in battlefield.
  • One medium is not enabling effective emission control, EMCON. There needs to be communications mediums in different frequency bands together with wired applications that provide enough tactical freedom for electromagnetic deception.
  • Encryption is the only thing that safeguards your information.
  • Bulk encryption protects from man-in-the-middle tapping but does not prevent information misuse once user entity is breached. Injecting malevolent software by spear fishing is efficient especially when user terminal, session, application server and database server are not protected.

Options for solution:

A. Simple one way data transfer system up and manual transfer systems down as illustrated in Figure 3

There are several technical solutions (data diode) for one way data transfer from lower level to higher level class of confidentiality assuming that data is formalized and structured (NFFI, JC3IEDM, VMF, J-series). The challenge is to provide controlled downhill transfer. This option is proposing manual broker between classes of confidentiality. The basis of declassification of information is provided by managed life cycle. Simple policy of having plans confidential but their execution restricted provides rules for declassification at level of operations centre (3 function) where holistic understanding of ongoing operation is assumed thus the best understanding of needed information is also merged. This option forgets the other mediums of information sharing such as telephone, messaging and video teleconferencing as they are merely for informal and formal but unstructured information.

Figure 3: a concept for automated uphill and manual downhill in transferring data between different classes of confidentiality

B. Automated and policy controlled transfer of data between same classes of confidentiality as illustrated in figure 4

Since military C4I-systems are built and implemented separately, there are several systems at same theoretical level of confidentiality but for various reasons (as a fear of over extending the area of vulnerability within air gaped fortifications) they are not trusting each other to be connected directly. In this case various technical gateways has been introduced to exchange formal and structured data between domains. Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) started with defining generic gateways between national domains. The main data transfer metamodel was JC3IEDM.

Figure 4: a concept for data transfer between same class of confidentiality but untrusted domains

C. Automated hierarchical systems up data transfer between different classes of confidentiality as illustrated in Figure 5

Applying the previous option B for connecting controlled way several classes of confidentiality provides military a systems up concept. This concept allows formalized and structured data being transferred in automated way uphill, from lower levels of confidentiality towards higher levels. Again in this case unstructured and sometimes informal information is communicated downhill via emails, audio, video, files and messages. So called “sneaker network” was main breach in security policy in Afghanistan before AMN implementation 2010 onwards.

Figure 5: a concept for hierarchical systems up data transfer between different classes of confidentiality

D. Cloud computing solution for multi-level information security as illustrated in Figure 6

With modern cloud computing and identity and access management technologies military can provide both uphill and downhill flow of information. For uphill information flow, basic formalized and structured data gateways are used. Downhill feeds are provided by role based accesses from less trusted domains. Terminals are treated as zero trusted and information is only presented in their screens not stored in their non-volatile memories.

Figure 6: a concept for cloud computing solutions for multi-level information security

2015-07-19

A Strategic Approach for Cyber Defence part I

How, in duel of two long chains intertwined with each other and with environment, one may gain any advantage over the other?

Abstract

This paper is describing one approach for strategic analysis and planning to gain advantage in confrontations within Cyber Environment. A constructive research method is used where solution is built by combining systems thinking with variation of models from business strategy (Supply Chain Strategies and Enterprise Information Strategies) to classical decision making (Nash Equilibrium). Theoretical relevance is assessed by using ENISA’s method for assessing Cyber Strategies in EU.

Introduction

Extension to other strategic approaches
This paper extends the theory of usage or threat of use of organized force for political purposes  within man-made Cyber Environment. Besides Clarke & Knape’s (2010)  defensive triad of backbone network protection – power grid hardening – defence countermeasures and Granova & Slaviero’s (2013)  four perspectives of Offence – Defence – Technical – Legal, there are not many strategic approaches for confrontations in Cyber Environment among the numerous technical and tactical studies. This paper is not analysing cyberwar as there are no international policies  to define war in cyber environment solely. Confrontation and conflict  are used to describe the interaction between hostile parties within cyber Environment.

Cyber Space or Cyber Environment is understood in this paper as sum of Globe’s communication links and computational nodes where information is being processed and distributed benefitting both humans and machines.

There are no single or isolated strategies in Cyber Environment since strategy is combination of all forces in every dimension directed to deliver the effect to the opponent’s Center of Gravity in decisive point. Operations is cyber space are part of wider Information Operations, which should be a part of greater strategy to achieve political goals. Thus this paper uses phrase strategic approach.

Strategic options
Defence and offence are traditional strategic options in other dimensions of utilizing force. China has been one of the earliest adaptor in offensive cyber means since 1995 with their Information Warfare plan.  More recently there are for example USA, North Korea and Russia that have wielded their offensive force in cyber environment. USA has allegedly supressed the Uranium enrichment facilities in Iran by Stuxnet worm 2010. North Korea has allegedly frozen computers in South Korea by using DarkSeoul malware 2013. Russian has allegedly utilized Distributed Denial of Service attacks against Estonian government 2007, against Georgia 2008 and against Ukraine 2014.

There have been reactional defensive actions in all above mentioned situations and nations have been defining their cyber defence strategies since 2001 . Defence in cyber environment may consist of Deception, Separation, Diversity, Consistency, Depth, Discretion, Collection, Correlation, Awareness and Response.


Besides the traditional strategies Mattila (2014)  has defined also Isolation and Habituation as strategic approaches for confrontation in cyber environment. Isolation means that entity is trying to isolate its cyber structure from global network thus protecting it by filtration (Chinese Great Fire Wall) or isolation by air cap (most military and industry systems until recently).

Habituation is more networked method of accepting dependencies and vulnerabilities, but exposing all three bases of nation’s power to every day malevolent effects, thus habituating all instances to endure or shelter when facing attacks. It includes also building relationships to extend defensive network in all aspects of international co-operation. Mattila (2014) gives Sweden as an example for utilizing this strategy. There is also a military strategic approach which is claiming that preparation for everything is not feasible in postmodern conflicts but flexibility, adaptation, recovery and capability to continue after surprise is more valid line of strategy.  The four strategic options are depicted in figure 1.

Figure 1: Four strategic options defined in Cyber Environment

Assets and vulnerabilities in cyber environment
As information and communications technology has not yet stopped its invasion to all sectors of mankind, it has become both the greatest enabler and the most dangerous vulnerability. In military this was recognized by Milan Vego (2009) when he wrote that:

"This evolution in the [cyber] characteristics of the strategic center of gravity
will create quite an anomalous situation, in which one’s center of gravity will
be the single greatest source of both critical strength and critical weakness,
simultaneously. Thus, protection of one’s strategic center of gravity will be a
much more difficult task than it is today. At the same time, computer
networks … do not have the ability to physically destroy or neutralize the
enemy’s strategic center of gravity."
Information is the greatest asset to enable building trust between stake holders and a network of specialized nodes is always more effective than any monolithic structure. With further digitized and digitalized business, the ICT-systems (=cyber) become the biggest leverage that any organization or network may utilize. This system model is described in Figure 2 left hand side of drawing.

Figure 2: Center of Gravity and Systems analysis of Cyber Assets

Adversary sees this socio-technical structure as very potential waypoint to project different malevolent means to effect at political, economic, social or security areas. With classical Center of Gravity analysis method adversary may define that networks is the single source of power they should aim to eliminate. The right hand side of Figure 2 is showing the causality of flow in disintegrating networks by cutting the relationships with implementing distrust between people, information and connectivity. The disintegration means are available to offender since there are more malevolent software created than ever before.  Existing ICT-systems have known failures that take long time to remedy thus attackers have plenty of time to exploit them. Human being remains the most vulnerable part of socio-technical systems with his weaknesses. Offender has advantage over defence since the cyber system has so many vulnerabilities and it has disseminated to all parts of living, business and security.


THERE ARE NO CLEAR LINES OF CONFRONTATION IN CYBER ENVIRONMENT


Estonian situation 2007
Estonia had built its economy and civilian life accelerated with modern IC-technology after gaining independence when Soviet Union collapsed. It was a fresh member of NATO and one of the most wired nations when it was attacked with cyber means in April 2007. Three weeks it faced a massive Distributed Denial of Service attacks that were targeted to suppress the national network of governmental services, main political parties, biggest news organizations, biggest banks and telecommunications providers. Attack game from botnets (remotely controlled robot network of breached computers i.e. zombies) all over the Internet so there was no one source of attack to be defined.  

Since this event happened at same time as there was dispute between Estonia and Russia about II WW memorial displacement, Russia was approached. They claimed that it has nothing to do with Russian state, but may be initiated by some individuals and non-state connected groups. Estonian government requested help from NATO based on the Article 5 : “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”.

Estonian defended their cyber environment by coordinated effort from other regional Internet Operators, private companies and public agencies by filtering out foreign IP-requests.  There were major concerns risen amongst the citizens and government of Estonia but no crucial loss of trust was observed. 

The other members of NATO did not see armed attack, anyone being hurt or major damages happening. Agreements and Legislation did not include bullying in cyber space. The NATO ended up sending some cyber experts to Estonia only after assessing the situation for few weeks.    NATO was surprised by Russia at strategic level as it has been since in Georgian 2008 and Ukrainian 2014 operations.

As of 2008 one person with Russian origins living in the capital of Estonia has been found guilty in attacking the web page of one of the Estonian Parties. Russian authorities have denied all investigation cooperation with Estonian law enforcements agencies. Later the Head of Russian Military Forecasting Center, Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok stated: "These attacks have been quite successful, and today the alliance had nothing to oppose Russia's virtual attacks". 

Ukrainian situation 2014
As political crisis in Ukraine heated up more infections of “Snake” virus was reported from Ukraine during fall 2014. BAE Systems had identified 22 infections from Ukrainian government and its embassies.  This is major part of total 56 reported infections worldwide mainly targeting former Soviet Union countries but not Russian. Snake is a platform that allows outsider to gain access to infected computer and it can also carry autonomous malevolent features to computer.  Snake is considered to be strategic “sleeping cell” that is injected to several high value targets and only activated when need occurs.

This malevolent software was traced back to 2008 discovered “Agent.BTZ” when it was used successfully breaching information systems in Pentagon. Later there has been findings of several variants of this family as “Uroburos”, “Sengoku” and “Snark”. Some features in programming are directing to Moscow and level of professionalism is telling of major resources behind the development.  The fact that it was so clearly found activated in Ukraine during the conflict in eastern parts of country, is pinpointing Russia as a source.

Generalization of features of conflict in cyber environment as based on these two scenarios
Some basic features of confrontation in cyber environment are illustrated in Figure 3 as:

Figure 3: Nature of conflict in Cyber Environment

  • There are national stake holders, non-national groups and millions of Internet connected computers that might be used in attack. States can hide behind anonymous groups. Individual people may join into conflict.
  • There are no frontlines in Cyber Environment. The adversary might be attacking abroad, within the country or within organization by using any breached computer or manipulated people to launch malevolent measures.
  • There is no affirmative way of identifying the actual adversary that initiates attacks. The source may be found only after re-engineering the means of attack.
  • There is no international legislation or agreements that include cyber-attacks and enables the cooperation of law enforcement.
  • Advanced Cyber Adversaries do inject malevolent software in the systems of their opponents and activate them if need arises.
  • Attacker seems to have advantage in current cyber environment as Defender is not able to prepare against all possible threats. It remains on Defenders reactional proficiency of how quickly he is able to recuperate.
  • Race in developing Advanced Persistent means of cyber-attack require skilled teams and professional resources otherwise they may remain the copycat level of usual malevolent software. 2014 these mass variants were produced about one million a day. 
  • Cooperation between many Service Providers both private and public ensures quickest recovery from massive attack. There is seldom situation that organization alone can effectively deter cyber-attack.
  • Air gap isolation has been breached various times with attack vectors using “sneaker network”, contractor network or individual compromised users.
  • It is an advantage for adversary if he is able to collect information from his opponent’s cyber structure and behaviour of end users as it makes easier to produce an Advanced Persistence attack or Spearhead Trojans.

STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN CYBER CONFLICTS

Explains strategic options of defensive, offensive, isolation and habituation in confrontation situation
Information has become a major enabler for any socio-technical system to gain further productivity, wealth and performance. Information used whether digitized or digitalized is strategic asset i.e. Center of Gravity. Information as a Center of Gravity is both major enabler and severe vulnerability in Global cyber environment.

Offensive is an aggressive approach in using forces as a whole, combining all resources available for effecting the Centers of Gravity in a way that would fundamentally alter the relational posture of confronting parties in information utilization. Offensive may appear as aggressive infiltration in cyber space, intelligence gathering, denial of service or destroying information assets. USA may be appearing in taking this option.

Defence a set of cyber activities used for the purpose of deterring, resisting and repelling a strategic offensive, conducted as either a cyber space invasion, or an isolation from global cyber space, or a destruction of information assets. Strategic defensive does not need to be passive in nature but may involve deception, propaganda and psychological warfare, as well as pre-emptive or retaliation attacks. Defence normally requires cooperation within wider group of stake holders than military only. European Union seems to be following these strategic lines.

Isolation is following more traditional methods of defining borders of sovereign space in all dimensions and building ability to shut all avenues from foreign force projection with filtering or protecting gateways like customs, monetary hubs, governmental monopolies, firewalls, etc. China seems to be following this strategy as their “Great Fire Wall” is isolating national cyber space from global.

Habituation is more networked method of accepting dependencies and vulnerabilities, but exposing Government agencies, Armed Forces and private citizens of a nation to every day effects of malevolent behaviour, thus habituating all stake holders to endure through attack and quickly recover from its effects. It includes also building relationships to extend defensive network in all aspects of international co-operation. Sweden seems to take steps towards this strategic option.

The four strategic options or their combinations are available to each side of confrontation. In order to study the strategic decision making, the game theory called “Nash Equilibrium” is used in modelling two scenarios in simultaneous decision making of mixed strategies between duelling parties.  As the confrontation in cyber environment is not fulfilling all the requirements of pure Nash equilibrium, the outcome of this study is only conceptual. Scenarios are 1. Nation against Nation and 2. Nation against non-Nation. 

Blue and Red are players with 4 equally available options: Offence, Isolation, Defence and Habituation. Gained value from conflict varies between 1-5, where 1 means total loss and 5 means total win. Rules for game are as follows:
  • Both parties are trying to optimize the value of their cyber space as it multiplies their other functions.
  • Defence beats Isolation since isolation means that one is not gaining the full value of networking with others.
  • Offence beats Isolation 5 to 1 as Isolation often leaves the cyber area within the “Wall” very vulnerable and attacker has many ways to infiltrate within the “Fortress”.
  • Offence beats Defence only 5 to 3 since advantage is on attackers side, but defender is able to protect some of its assets and possible quickly recuperate after attack.
  • Offence beats also Habituation 5 to 3 as surprise gives advantage to attacker, but habituation has hardened the other side to sustain under attack. The quick recovery is also on habituates advantage.
Nation against nation
As both sides are nations that are logically striving to improve their economics and living by utilizing information in cyber environment, the loss of cyber capability is counted as loss of value. This logic is applied when both Blue and Red choose to attack the other. Outcome will be lose-lose as both parties are assumed able to destroy the information capabilities of the other side.

Comparison matrix shows that isolation will not become preferred strategy to either of parties since it ends up losing value in all variations thus it is eliminated. Both Blue and Red are preferring Defence and Habituation options since they create equilibrium in all variations, if neither of parties are aware of what the other is going to choose. The whole comparison and equilibrium analysis is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Cyber duelling between two national parties

Situation alters if there is a foresight of the doctrinal tendency.  RED might choose offensive since it will give total win if BLUE is known to withhold the defensive posture. Because of multitude of cyber weapons and vastness of the vulnerable surface of cyber space, there is always advantage for attacker. BLUE may compensate the advantage of attacker with means executed in other dimensions of struggle (air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic) or building a deterring capability for cyber-attack. USA has ongoing program for improving their cyber defence within HomeLand Defence Initiative but also is pursuing after cyber space dominance with offensive means.    Early 2000 Russia declared in their doctrine for defence that any tampering of their cyber space will be countered with nuclear retaliation. 

As with conventional and nuclear arms there is also possibility between nations to agree on armistice or non-offense. Russia and China agreed on May 2015 not to conduct cyber-attacks against each other. They also agreed to jointly counteract technology that may “destabilize the internal political and socio-economic atmosphere,” ”disturb public order” or “interfere with the internal affairs of the state.” 

There is a special situation with North Korea, who has been able to keep isolated from cyber space by denying digital communications and computing within country. They are using this strategic advantage and wielding cyber-attacks against other countries by using global cyber space. 

Nation against non-nation
When nation is confronted with non-nation, there might not be balanced motivation since non-nation does not necessarily have goal to improving its cyber based governance, economics and social living. RED might be using cyber environment for exploitation only and does not have to worry about investments. Also isolation is eliminated from RED’s options since non-nation does not necessary have control over any cyber structure. Confrontation between nation and non-nation is analysed in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Cyber duelling between nation and non-nation

Since RED is enjoying the advantage of non-value, it is logical for it to choose offensive strategy over other alternatives. Defence or habituation does not bring any value to non-nation without cyber infrastructure. BLUE nation chooses logical defence or habituation strategy since the outcome is always better than from isolation or plain offence. 

Because of anonymity techniques and vast network of stake holders, there is difficult in cyber space to identify your opponent. Thus many nations are using their non-nation networks, rented botnets or employed experts globally to attack their counterpart. This has been the case in Russian operations against Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014.  

Cyber confrontations between nations and non-nations as well as between numerous non-nation stake holders are normal in contemporary cyber environment. There are several on-line sensors that are providing information on attack vectors at IP-level and email level. Cyber threat analysis company Norse  for example is providing visual views.

Majority of the normal targets are domain names in USA or .mil and .gov. Attackers are using botnets or breached computers that are quite often in China, United States, India or Russia. Partially this is because the level of cyber literacy has not improved the same pace of proliferation of Internet and it is easier to breach the computers of novice users. Breached computers are injected with “zombie” malware that makes computer to obey orders of botnet commanders often without owner’s knowledge. Recently seized “Beebone” botnet in US and Europe was using polymorphic malware that changed its fingerprints about 19 times a day to avoid detection. 

TOGETHER OR ALONE

Defending BLUE might ask in their strategic analysis, is it better remain alone or create coalition against unavoidable cyber-attacks. The basic rules of value of connected nodes states that N nodes connected together will provide value of N x log N. This is also called Metcalfe’s law but it assumes that connection between all nodes is available and the quality of connection and nodes is about same level. Principle is depicted in Figure 6. 

Figure 6: Connected to other equally good one is more than just sum of nodes

Connected network of stake holders does provide more amber source for innovation together with more explicit and implicit knowledge. There is also a level of quality of transactions that is achieved when cultivated in working together. Connections provide different variations to be exploited so operational freedom might be better with network, especially for defence where both width and depth is required if dynamic defence is implemented.

Negative effect appears if some of the nodes or connections in network are lower level of quality. These weak links may be exploited by attacker. There is also human cognitive features that does not follow the linear behaviour expectations of technical nodes and connections. Or as Kevin Mitnick says, the most vulnerable piece of any information system is one credulous human being.  

This concludes part I of this draft article. Part II will be available later this month.

2015-04-18

MILITARY KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT: SENSE MAKING, DECISION MAKING AND KNOWLEDGE CREATION

Abstract: 

The paper studies evolution of military Knowledge Management from Command and Control perspective to support strategic planning and enterprise architecture of Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information System of systems.

Military Command and Control is studied in framework of Knowledge Creation through Evolution Theory and Path Creation to find road maps for Military Knowledge Management. Study finds some causalities and dependencies that have effect of Military Enterprise Architecture.

The study finds several ways to support the cognitive level of Information Superiority with C4I systems. The strategy should first diagnose the three dimensions of Sense making, Decision making and Learning with support of defined road map before any solutions are introduced. There should also be room for development in C4I since inflexibility in military structures may end in strategic and operational surprise.

This study is extending the three level Information Superiority Reference Model by Perry 2004. The cognitive layer is further defined with three dimensions: Sense Making, Decision Making and Learning.

Keywords: knowledge creation, sense making, decision making, learning

Introduction

Military Knowledge Management has changed as societies have been evolving and now we are questioning the rules of knowledge management of industrial era as opposed to information era (Mattila 2013 Feb). In this paper, the military combat operations process called OODA-loop defined by John Boyd (1987) (Osinga 2007:189-200) is studied in the framework of knowing organisation defined by Chun Wei Choo (1998). Framework is tested by the evolution theory (Mokyr 1997) and its path creation (Garud&Karnoe 2000). By combining Boyd and Choo one is able to define three abilities of military command and control process (OODA-loop) from the point of knowledge management as described in figure 1:
  1. Sense making, consisting of observation (sensing) and orientation (making sense), is interpreting the equivocal data by passing interpretations.
  2. Decision making, which is searching and selecting alternatives according to projected results, preferences and constraints.
  3. Knowledge creating, which is creating new knowledge and improving the whole OODA-loop through learning and knowledge acquisition.

Figure 1: Orientation for military knowledge management from sense making, decision making and knowledge creating approach

This paper defines the major evolutionary paths of each level of Knowledge Management and describes also the short cuts or downshifts that some military organisations have faced when reaching for more revolutionary goals. Paper provides also tools for strategic diagnosis by describing possible paths on both separate and integrated road map where interrelations and challenges may be easier to identify. The goal is to support strategic planning of how Information and Communications Technology, ICT is to enable the knowledge management in military organisation.

Description of evolutionary paths in Military Sense making 

Sense making can be projected to observation and orientation of John Boyd’s (1987) (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) OODA loop. OODA loop is analysed in relationship to environment modelled with Kurtz and Snowden (2003) Cynefin framework. Military may face the four different situations defined in this framework: 1. Known, 2. Knowable, 3. Complex and 4. Chaos. Sensing and Sense making is following different process in each of these situations.
Sensing needs to overcome the fog of battlefield (Clausewitz 1832: 217) and egocentricity (Elder & Paul 2011) of human being. Sense making needs to address the attempts of deception (Rothstein and Whaley 2013 p. 39) by adversary, biases of sense making teams and individual mental models. The four different sense making situations are described in following subchapters and in figure 2.

Sense – Categorise – Respond in known environment

In known environment cause and effect relations are repeatable, thus easily perceived and predicable. In this situation military is following their Standard or Standing Operating Procedures, SOP (US Army FM 100-9).

Both individual, team and organisation are observing an event. Event is being sorted with previously defined model like the assumed order of battle of adversary. Each category has a predetermined type of respond, which is being followed without orientation or decision making (Osinga 2007:192-194). A good example of this is firing based on predetermined targeting list.

Adversary is not normally behaving by the book (Rothstein & Whaley 2013:25-27). It is harmful if surveillance and reconnaissance systems are preprogramed with assumed standard patterns and fail to detect anything divertive.

This approach is realistic for the lower levels of conscript army, where time to train ISTAR capabilities is short. It is mistakenly followed in forces that believe in Information Superiority gained with sheer volume (Perry et al 2004:14). It is also followed in Armed Forces with access to resources overwhelming to its adversaries (Finkel 2011:58).

Sense – Analyse – Decide – Act in knowable environment

In knowable environment cause and effect are separated over time and space. It needs some scenario playing and systems thinking to create a possible model to describe the knowable environment. 
After detection the incoming data needs to be analysed to reveal all effective cause-effect relationships. The analysis needs several experts working together and the challenges of collective sense making will appear: cognitive diversity creates clashes of individual mental models, but in another hand cognitive diversity helps against homogeneity biases like myopia and egocentricity (Smart & Sycara 2013). Sense making is evolving the scenarios as new data is detected.  There is a need to create a bigger picture from smaller events and to recognise their interrelationships by systems thinking (Mattila 2014 Oct a). 

Current trends in Big Data and Business Intelligence are good example of organisation trying to use all information it controls (Berman 2013:130). By fusing and correlating data differently, organisation may create new knowledge and if succeeding in sharing it, may gain a competitive advantage.

Probe - Sense – Analyse – Decide – Act in complex environment

In complex environment cause and effect are only coherent in retrospect and similar events seldom repeat. Emergent patterns can be perceived but not predicted. 

It needs an initiative probe to make possible patterns more visible for observation. Understanding these emergent, new patterns needs multiple perspectives to be involved in sense making. It needs to create stories as base for understanding as they are simple and easy to communicate between team. General McChrystal (2011) has defined this as “Understand the operating environment and your organization while constantly adapting for purpose”.

This is the very base of military professional approach in sense making since situation almost always is at least complex in military environment according to lessons of Emptiness by Miyamoto Musashi (Lahdenpera 2007). 

Act - Sense – Analyse – Decide in chaotic environment

No cause and effect relationships are perceivable in chaotic environment. System is turbulent or there is no time to wait patterns to emerge. One might assume there is a potential pattern but it is not visible or reconstruction able. This has been the base in military operations for Douche, Guderian and Swartzkopf (Fuller 1961, Guderian 2001, US Army War College 2004)

It needs a quick and decisive intervention to reduce the turbulence and ability to sense immediately the reaction to the intervention. This deliberate action might create something that is either known or knowable and with effective observing and analysing it might make sense.

Fast and determined action was the main approach for German staff officers and key enabler against Allied officers who tried to approach situations as knowable (Muth 2011 p.191). General Guderian put this as “Es gibt keine verzweifelten Lagen, es gibt nur verzweifelte Menschen”, which roughly means there are no desperate situations only people.

Figure 2: A framework for military sense making from Knowledge Management approach

Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on sense making map of possible roads

The sense making ability may collapse and only behavioural routines will continue in crises situation and under extreme stress (Weick 1993). An exercised process should be in place before utilising more agile methods in sense making (Mattila 2014 Oct b).

Sometimes the feeling of having information superiority may cause a downshift. A complex situation is assumed as knowable and collecting more data is expected bring in the clarity. This might have been the case in late ISAF operation, where the collected data reached 40 Exabyte (10^18) in a month according to General Gartwright (2008).

A need for near real-time recognised operational picture to provide targeting information for target acquisition process may constrain the time and method used for fusion and recognition (JASON 2008). Thus targeting may fall short at basic event categorising and both friendly fire and collateral damage may occur.

Description of evolutionary path for Military Decision Making 

Decision is a function of residual uncertainty and the risks associated with the available options as a function of time. This chapter explains one possible road map to military decision making starting from authoritarian commander centric and gradually exploring more unconstrained and shared decision making patterns (Alberts &Nissen 2009). This chapter also discusses why the maturity of decision making is not improving linearly but has seen many revolutionary leaps and downshifts. The entire road map for military decision making is described in following chapters and in figure 3.

Authoritarian decision making in classic command and control

Decisions are made at top, Commander-centric, orders are flowing down and reporting heads upwards by support of hierarchical knowledge management. Decision making is based on individual understanding and any support should be only assertive as De Jomini (1862) puts it: “…, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case they may give him more confidence in his own judgement,…”.

Information flow is following line organisation to enable superiors to understand better situation than their subordinates. The levels of hierarchy and means of communications are delaying situational information which is relayed from bottom up and orders flowing back down. Information is shared “need to know basis only”.

Carrying out tasks is based on pretrained procedures and there is no need to change behaviour during the operation. Knowledge base is following the doctrine and managing issues following standard operating processes.

Shared strategic intention with synchronised operational execution

Unlike his adversaries Napoleon could delegate operational decision making to his generals, who were each heading a Army Corps, bataillon carré. Napoleon shared his battle intent with his commanders (Shamir 2011) and gave them some degree of freedom in execution. This enabled to achieve dominance in volume, time and space, deep strategic penetration or rapid concentration of force superior to more cumbersome adversaries. 

Ability to share strategic information by actively collaborating between Corps heads provides good strategic and operational level awareness, alignment and manoeuvrability even if the lower levels in organisation are rigidly following orders and informing superiors through line.

After being outmanoeuvred entirely by Napoleon in Jena 1806, Prussians renewed their officer education and created “auftragstaktik”, which was later translated to mission command (Van Creveld 1985:174).

Mission command

In mission command tactical freedom is delegated to combined arms force level by giving mission to forces including command intent of battle. Forces were expected to fulfil the mission in most suitable way adjusting their tactics as situation was unfolding before the eyes of their commanders. Higher command was controlling execution by defining end states rather than tasking detailed goals. 

Mission command needs continual dialogue with higher authorities and mission partners to better understand the changing environment and perspectives (Luck 2013). Collaboration helps in perceiving what shared awareness looks like. It also build trust between commanders. Trust enables commanders to empower their subordinates to make decisions even creativity as Commander-in-Chief of Reichswehr (Muth 2011) was demanding: “Rules are for fools”.

Mission command with peer level collaboration

New level of awareness enabled by force digitalisation has flattened previously hierarchical organisations because middle level commands are not needed for control and quick reaction. Peer level collaboration lacks strict command relationships and is based more on trust (Mattila 2014 March b). 

Whereas the recognised operational picture is presenting the current situation to everyone interested, there is need for continuous dialogue in building and preserving the trust between stakeholders. The shared understanding enables empowerment, cross-domain synergy and eventually improves effectiveness. It will consume time differently compared more line or functional approach. The study of J7 DTD U.S. Armed Forces (2013) proves that “collaboration releases the initiative of subordinates”

Self-synchronising with swarming tactics

Power to the Edge (Alberts&Hayes 2003) principle addresses the shift in relationships required to leverage shared awareness to foster self-synchronisation and achieve major improvements in mission effectiveness. Control is sustained with shared command intent and consciousness instead of tight line control.

Swarming is a way to manoeuvre forces to gain advantage in time and space. It enables asymmetric tactics with agility, focus and convergence. (Mattila 2014 Oct b)
General McChrystal (2013) could improve his Special Operations Task Force capabilities about 30 fold in Iraq Operation 2006. He did this by executing the vision: “If we’re going to win, we need to become a network”. He transformed task force from hierarchical command and control structure to the network of a swarming subunits. 


Figure 3: A Road map of Military decision making from Knowledge Management view

Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on decision making map of possible roads

Attrition with dominant resources (Boot 2003) has been keeping the command culture centralised and highlighted the linear planning and management more than leadership.

Improved communications and ability to gather up-to-date information from battle is not necessarily leading to mission command or more loosely controlled battle management as described by Van Creveld (1985: 238-251). The hunger for information at the top may produce an information overload resulting even longer lead times to prepare and launch operation. 

It is far easier to return to more centralised command culture when returning to peacetime garrison, tight fiscal constraints, and increased competition for promotion (Hastings 2005). It is also following Taylors (1911) scientific management methods, when higher headquarters centralise the control over myriad of detailed management events during peacetime.

At last there is the human himself as a decision maker in stressful situation. Human decision making has tendency to use pattern recognition. First decision maker is trying to categorise unfolding situation with his previous experience and then utilising the decision used previously. If there is no previous model to be recognised then human goes for most familiar action. As last effort human is trying to lessen undesirable outcomes and maximise his own utility (Alberts 2002:62-66). Thus human being is easily manipulated in stressful situations.


Description of evolutionary paths in Military Knowledge acquisition and Learning 

Military training has to prepare individuals and collectives to enter harm's way and perform physically and mentally demanding tasks at the highest possible levels of competence. Military training has the tradition to be more like discipline than a process of creating competence. 

This chapter is describing the sub-road map for military learning in more detail. The hypothesis starts by combining the organisational knowledge conversion process by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) with classic education ideas of behavioural, cognitive, constructive and social cognitive explained by Hergenhahn and Olson (2008). The model with four different approaches to knowledge acquisition, training, education and learning is described in figure 4. It is tested by explaining existing military training and knowledge creation approaches with it.

Military skills and understanding are learned in different way. Military skills are learned mainly in team training with progressive challenges tailored to each team of arms. Repetition is a disciplined way to establish team’s behaviour as part of a bigger system. At battle technical level both individuals, troops and weapon systems are trained to be able to act at level of subconscious habit, motoric memory or preset programming. 

Military understanding has several learning approaches. A strong legacy forces military to operate according to the doctrine and thinking by the book. A new request for educating soldiers how to think rather than what to think. This means introducing a combination of three thinking methods: systems thinking, creative thinking and critical thinking. With increasing complexity also need to educate team and organisational learning is arisen. This chapter is focusing on learning military understanding.

Drilling what to do and think with behavioural drivers

Drilling has been a tool for military training as documented vividly in Sun Tzu’s Art of War (1910) or in Prussian army (Smith 1998) when soldier was made a standardised, predictable and reliable unit to operate the musket. This is the basic way of socialising tacit skills (Choo 1988) when instructor (master) shows how to do movement to soldiers (apprentices) and then drills it continually supervising proceedings and correcting mistakes. 

In behaviourism learner gets positive feedback when his behaviour and learning results are moving in right direction. This is especially effective, when standard of needed performance is gradually increased and award from right behaviour is direct and public.
Soldiers and troops need to exercise as part of bigger fighting system, to gain automation level of skill, to be able to sense cues (Duhigg 2013) of enemy action and to fulfil ones task routinely to be effective under stress.

This industrial (Smith 1998: 45-48) way to educating and training troops may not be the best way to produce sense and decision makers. If the doctrine being educated is not applicable in the situation confronted, then officers do not have means to adapt into it (Harford 2011: 37-79).

Understanding how to think with cognitive drivers

General James Gartwright (2008) called after learning how to think and improving the pace of learning to meet current speed of evolution of business (3 months), technology (18 months) and war fighting (30 days). This requires the ability to create knowledge by bringing together explicit information from several sources. Combining different explicit and tacit ideas (Nonaka et al 2015: 23) needs systems thinking, critical thinking and operational analyses in social space.

The cognitive learning follows more the human way of creating understanding and processing information in his brain. New things are learned within a familiar orientation model. Problem solving is using cognitive approach, where one learns a new way of thinking (schema) and may use this “tool” further in solving for other similar problems. After learning these schemas, there remains a challenge of mapping problem to a right pre-existing schema. This needs logical reasoning like systems thinking (Senge 1990) or operational analyses.

Skills are learned mainly by team training with progressive challenges tailored to each team. Repetition is a discipline as a part of bigger system, but use of skills in different situations and environment is a driver for successful execution in progressively challenging environment. 
Understanding is soldiers’ ability to realise their space of operation, teams and systems, other combat supporters, supported and adversary as huge system where different parts interact with one another and with environment (Joint Doctrine Publication 04, 2010). It needs leaders to achieve synthesis of action (Nonaka et al 2015:33) when processing towards understanding of this phenomena. Leaders should reach a certain level of insight and foresight to be able to innovate and create best ways to operate their force as interdependent part of fighting system of systems. 

Experimenting with constructive drivers

The knowledge conversion process by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) includes: Socialisation – Externalisation – Combination - Internationalisation. Individual shares some experiences of his trials (tacit knowledge) with peers and together they come up (socialisation) with hypothesis for causality model of their analysed experience. They publish (externalisation) their findings in lessons identified (explicit) board. Someone else faces a challenge, finds these lessons together with few more similar, and fuses (combination) these concepts (explicit) to fit into situation in hand. One learns (internalisation) from this successful trial and increases his (tacit) knowledge.

Constructivism means that new information is learned by social and cultural interaction. Information is understood in relation to prior knowledge, experience and skills. Constructivism is using sociocultural dimension to support learning. Interaction with more capable peers, skilful leaders or cognitive tools do create mental constructions that enables students to recall learned things longer. The support is provided according to students’ maturity and it is gradually withdrawn as subjects become more internalised. This is a coach or mentor approach, where instructor is supporting enough to have student over first fears, provides safe environment for student to experiment, fail and learn, and gradually allows student to have more room for independent action. This provided an obvious competitive edge to German officers over their allied counterparts during the II WW as analysed by Muth (2011: 190-191).

Military as knowledge creating organisation driven by social cognitive learning

The competitive edge may be gained from continuous organisational knowledge creation and learning by “start talking and get to work” as Weber (1993) says. Conversations are the way knowledge workers discover what they know, share it with their colleagues and in the process create new knowledge for the organisation (Davenport&Prusak 2000: 88-106). This is one way of mitigating the constraint of one man’s understanding.

“A man has no ears for that to which experience has given him no access.” Nietzsche.

Knowledge conversion is enforced by social cognitive learning (Denler et al 2014). It means that learner's behaviour changes because of seeing others' behaviour and its effects. There are several factors that decide whether watching a model will result behavioural or cognitive change. These factors include the learner's developmental status, the noticed prestige and competence of the model, the effects received by the model, the relevance of the model's behaviours and consequences to the learner's goals, and the learner's self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to the learner's belief in his or her ability to perform according the behaviour.

Machines and men are collaborating, sharing information, creating understanding, learning from experiences and continuing the asymmetric ability over the adversary. This calls for training early to need (Faris 2013). This also needs to include machines in to the process of continuous learning (Mattila 2014). 


Figure 4: A Road map for military learning from knowledge management approach

Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on knowledge creation map of possible roads

When following the evolutionary road on the map of knowledge creation and training, there are two distinct leaps: 1. from what to think to how to think and 2. from team learning to organisational learning (Mattila 2014 Nov). 

As described earlier, U.S. Armed Forces have been trying to leap from what to think to how to think for decades, but they have this far downgraded back to behavioural basics because of the gravity of their doctrine, culture and C2 attitude (Finkel 2007).

Despite of U.S. Armed Forces tradition McChrystal (2014) achieved to take his Special Operations Task force from behavioural level 2003 direct to organisational learning within couple of years. 
From team learning to organisational learning there are four obstacles defined as follows:
  • First obstacle is the culture of information distribution by need to know basis only. With tactical level information management by push method, military will always face the dilemma of operational security and survivability. Single owner of information does not have full understanding of where information in his possession might be utilised. Military culture needs to be switched to need to share before anything happens (McChrystal 2014). 
  • Second obstacle is the autocratic culture of command and control if it is featured by “shut your big mouth and stop thinking above your rank” attitude (Harford 2011). This disables the systems thinking, critical thinking and creative thinking needed to try and error with badly needed critique. 
  • Third obstacle is technology. The building of information technology systems is still defined by the boundaries of a system (Doan et al 2012). Data is constrained by the system because of vendor attempts to preserve market with proprietary solutions. National policy is trying to keep technology dominance (US ITAR) by restraining system integration. Different branches in military are trying to sustain their independency and freedom of movement by abiding interoperability standards.
  • Fourth obstacle is information itself. Either information is unstructured so it is not searchable or understandable but by human. Or it is modelled in proprietary way that data transfer always needs interpretation. These problems may be managed with improving semantic structures that frame all pieces of information with standard metadata. Metadata explains data objects and their relationships (Allemang&Hendler 2011).  This way information is understandable both to humans and machines.
As military basic skills are trained in very repetition and behavioural way, there is a natural pull to simplify all training delivered in same way. This happens when training and real needs of operation are not linked to one another.

Consider the way to support knowledge management with information systems and automation

When military command and control is studied from knowledge management view, one recognises major opportunities but also challenges, when combining all three areas of C2 evolution: Sense making, Decision making and Learning as pictured in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Evolutionary roads of military knowledge management within Command and Control

From evolutionary map of paths in Figure 5 one may conclude that:
A. There is a possibility to use these maps of possible roads to create a linear strategy to improve C2 capabilities.

  1. Define the current C2 situation by admitting the typical features of each stage of C2. (Black even line in figure 5)
  2. Set goal stage for improved command and control in each sub feature. (Blue dotted line in figure 5)
  3. As gap between current and future capability is thus defined, there is possibility to analyse alternative roads leading from current stage towards future capabilities. Strategic courses of action are thus defined.
  4. As these roads are two-way, one should be aware of tendencies that keeps C2 from improving or reverse to starting position.
  5. Create the development programme based on strengths and resources and simulate it with social and cultural variables.

B. The classic OODA loop and military sense making are more complex than first impression may reveal. Since sense making is always a social event, there is a major impact by the relationships between people. Both individual and team mental models take time to be aligned and it takes even longer to educate whole organisation to follow the same logic. If, in the other hand, organisation is too homogeneous, there is a danger to have too narrow or blind sense making.

  • Military situation is normally more diverse than only one dimension of Cynefin framework at time. There might exist all four different stages of dynamics within the same area of operation: 


  1. Own force and their action might be known or knowable
  2. Regular parts of adversary force might fall into knowable category
  3. Irregular or militant parts of adversary might fall into complex
  4. Society, where operation is executed, may seem chaotic.


  • It needs all four means of sensing and sense making processing parallel information from each part of area of interest and more complex orientation and sense making process than any one of above defined.

C. Military organisations usually improve their culture for decision making with three alternative ways: by copying a successful organisation, by importing new culture, or by fostering a revolution.

  1. One might successfully copy new way of behaviour or best practice, but normally organisation needs to create its knowledge by trial and error, since mimicking does not stick for longer term.
  2. Importing new cultures is normal in military force when officers are rotated between different appointments spreading best in-house practices on way. This is possible is officers are provided room for initiative and change to ask WHY.
  3. Revolutionary transformation usually needs both strong outside threat and inside will. Corporate behaviour is slow to change especially within military organisations.

D. Road map for decision making does not state that swarming and self-synchronised way is better than hierarchical and information constraint way. Organisational culture and situation is dictating also the command and decision making style. Hierarchical culture does not support self-synchronising and conversely.

E. Most flexible structure of C2 culture is gained, if Sense making in complex situations, Decision making delegated within swarming network and Learning as organisation are combined.

F. Combining Mission command with Sense making in Chaos situations and learning together made German staff officers way better than their Allied counterparts in the II WW.

G. U.S. Officers have been struggling in their efforts of improving C2 as their Sense making is heavily fixed with Known approach and Learning is mainly by the Book. Efforts in delegating Decision making have been bouncing back since their command culture prefers heavy planning and management.

H. Delegating decision making to swarming level and being able to learn continuously as organisation requires solid base of trust and openness of communication.

I. If one finds his force to be at first level of sense making, there is need to change knowledge, competence and process before it is implemented heavily in information system. Even if one’s own force is known, there may rise challenges in changing the Order of Battle quickly.

J. It needs more heterogenic team than before to bring up all possible aspects when analysing situation before decision making. Effective teamwork needs building by practice and challengers rather than more information technology. Information technology should be applied first to enable virtual collaboration of ad hoc sense making teams.

K. Delegating decision making towards mission command needs continual dialogue with higher authorities and mission partners to better understand the changing environment and perspectives and what a shared understanding looks like.

L. When one reaches towards more agile, focused force that has convergence, there needs to happen a transformation alike McChrystal implemented 2006 in Iraq: McChrystal (2013) explains the transformation strategy of Special Operations Task Force in Iraq as follows: “We began as a network of people, then grew into a network of teams, then a network of organisations, and ultimately a network of nations. Throughout, we evaluated the health of our network by how well each node shared a common but ever-evolving understanding of our organisation, of our battlefield, of our enemy, and of our strategy to defeat them—what we called ‘shared consciousness and purpose.”

M. There is a tendency (or entropy) in organisation, which does not face pressure from outside, to gain excessive bureaucracy, create narrow functional silos, simplify skills and competence to be easier trained and withhold most freedom of initiative from lower levels. Command and control culture of this kind does not necessarily survive in situations of complex crises. Especially if information systems are constraining the change to more flexible culture.

N. Repetition and drilling are essential in learning skills that are needed under stress but building competence that brings advantage in crises situation needs combination of trial, error and social reflection.

  1. The powers of human pattern recognition are used when education does create several mind models for possible solutions in future situations. 
  2. Since time and resources are constraining instructed learning, there is a need to learn more how to think rather that what. This leads to continuous learning concept that carries over the whole career of military officers.
  3. Skills are usually learnt together within a section or platoon. This should be extended to thinking, understanding and staff working if there is demand for improved situational awareness.
  4. As situation becomes more complex also the learning should change towards social cognitive means over the whole organisation to ensure the flexibility of military doctrine and operations. 

O. There is a heavy cultural, doctrinal, technical and information management opposition for improving learning in military environment. There should be special means of transformation in use when fielding the change in Military Organisations.

P. One should not expect that C2 strategies are linear, but always approach military C2 system of systems as a complex structure that is constantly in motion.


Discussion

This paper is extending the Cognitive layer of Perry’s (2004) reference model for Information Superiority. The collaboration between individual understanding and shared understanding is replaced with Nonaka’s (1995) knowledge creation process. Process is further framed with Coo’s (1998) Knowing Organization and Boyd’s (1987) Command and Control loop as illustrated in figure 6.

Figure 6: The combination of approaches used in this study

The Combination opens three dimensions of Sense making, Decision making and Learning, where knowledge creation has major effect in military affairs. Evolutionary paths of these three dimensions are defined empirically based on case studies and literature survey. By combining evolutionary paths a Military Knowledge Creation road map of interrelated paths is defined.

The road map for Military Knowledge Creation is used in defining options and constraints for C4I development strategies. These strategies are used further in other studies that try to define model for development of C4I capabilities in Military Environment.