Management of ICT related issues in Military Organization

Principles of system and its management

Every enterprise creates a viable  system that functions within a viable system. Every system can be described by defining the operation i.e. system. The operation has an overlaying metasystem for control i.e. management. This cybernetic structure is functioning in an appropriate environment affected by many interactions. According to Stafford Beer (1981), these three functions are necessary to any organization. A military organization may be described by using Beers model as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A generic model of a military enterprise with its management structure

Each of the Services (Land, Navy, and Air) operate in their particular area of operation. They are commanded with their operative level management. The Armed Forces is having management (Commander in Chief) who has command (Direction) over all Services . The Commander and his general headquarters also coordinate the effort between Services with one hand and with another hand he audits the interaction between services and their area of operation to judge the outcome of their effort. Besides the current operations described above, the Armed Forces need planning function to analyze possible futures and prepare forces for both opportunities and challenges. Since planning and current operations may have contradicting focuses, there needs to be a strategic vision, identity, to drive the balance between everyday operations and preparing for the future.

The following story may describe a military organisation in its operation:
The commander of Land Forces is executing his mission for preventing adversary to approach key terrain in the desire to gain leverage for their offensive. The commander is facing a dominant adversary with lots of indirect firepower and asks fire support to suppress the artillery battalions his troops are suffering. 

The joint chief of operations receives a request from Land Forces, assesses the situation and issues support task to Air Force as they are the quickest to provide it. He also tasks his operational division (J3) to coordinate support between Air and Land Forces. The commander of Air Force receives the request for support and task to provide it. He establishes a connection between his staff and the headquarters of the Land Forces with the assistance from the liaison officers of each staff.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chief of Intelligence meets the Joint Chief of Planning in General Headquarters with alarming news. There is evidence that the adversary is transporting more reserve troops to the theatre of operation via railroad. They meet the Joint Chief of Operations and try to find a balance to Joint Fires situation. The Commander in Chief makes the decision to constrain Air Forces support to what has already being prepared, assigns heavy artillery battalions to support Land Forces and gives a mission to the Air Force to destroy transport avenues and suppress the reserve units.

The military organization is viable when it survives the external threats, maintains its integrity against internal threats, evolves as environment changes, can create synergy with its parts and is able to maintain dynamic equilibrium with its parts. The usage of information supported by Information and Communications Technology is essential in enabling the viability of a military enterprise.

Delivering military value with ICT

The traditional military capabilities are Force Utilization, Force Production, and Force Support . Military command and control is a bundle of processes that monitors, assesses and directs the before mentioned capabilities. The loop of Observing, Orienting, Deciding, and Acting  is the foundation for all command and control (C2) in military affairs. ICT –structure bounds the C2-functions together over boundaries of organizations and distance of geography. The information that ICT-related functions provide enhances military command and control processes - i.e. adds value - in Force Utilization for example as follows:

• the effect of kinetic arms by accurate, on-time targeting data, improved ballistics, cursor-on-target, fire-and-forget
• Situational awareness by providing both blue force and red force pictures
• Commander understands the possible future
• Trust between units and entities in the battlefield.

The value of information and supporting ICT-functions for the force utilization capability can be defined as the following use case: 

Reconnaissance observes that motorized enemy formation is advancing. The event is forwarded with ICT based systems both to the commander and his troops. The commander includes the event to his orientation. He decides to launch one of the prepared countermeasures. Units receive these orders by ICT-based systems right after getting the observation of inbound motorized adversary. 

The air surveillance detects incoming enemy fighter/attackers. The event is forwarded to all units as part of Recognized Air Operational Picture, RAOP. Based on the information, land units take cover and anti-aircraft units prepare to fire. 

The value of information in OODA –loop can be illustrated as a stream in Figure 2: Observer – ICT – Orienteer – ICT – Decider – ICT – Actor. The information is the glue to a battle system. Information is provided by ICT functions that bind military force as System of systems. 

The Red Force (i.e. enemy) is trying to gain dominance at information level by surprise, deception of sensors or sense-making, or trying to deteriorate the trust between commanders, their troops, and ICT-systems of the Blue Force. They use all means and ways of the Information Operations to gain this effect:

The Red Force deploys trolls to create fabricated discussions in social media, sends malicious manipulated content with Twitter, and has famous people to promote their agenda. The Red Force conceals the identity of the force they send to the operation and thus denies the action of international agreements and coalitions. The Red Force has breached the ICT-systems of Blue Force and now launches the countermeasures for their processing capability. They deny the availability of ICT-services, deny the truth of data, and launches malicious software to increase complexity in the cyber environment. 

The enemy collects electromagnetic radiation to analyse the operation idea and weaknesses of the Blue Force. They launch jamming operations to conceal their true movement and prevent the Blue Force to use their communications freely. The Red Force tries to locate the command structure of the Blue Force and suppresses their command posts by missile attacks, special operation forces attacks or terror attacks.
 

Figure 2: An example of value stream enabled by ICT functions

The value ICT-functions are providing is defined as information that binds different parts of force utilization together, produces understanding to commanders, produces awareness to troops and builds trust among all stakeholders and their tools . If the adversary can suppress ICT-functions at least for a time, the Military System of systems disintegrates to sub-systems inefficient independently.
The valuable information is more appreciated if it is provided with:

• On-time and in-place of need
• Flexibility to adapt changes in situation
• Support that response within expectations
• Ease of use, resiliency and security
• Integrity, accuracy and continuous flow.

The value is perceived differently at each level. The commander appreciates more if information improves his understanding of possible future, information enables him to achieve an advantage over the adversary, or information leads to success. Troops appreciate more if information comes when needed and is true so they can survive the battle and be successful.
 

Enabling military capabilities with ICT

Information Superiority over one’s adversary can be defined according to Sun Tzu: “if you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles” .  The knowing can be divided into two attributes: Understanding and Awareness. The information flow, supported by ICT-functions, improves Commander’s Understanding and Situational Awareness of troops as depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3: An example of Information and its meaning to Force Utilization

Reconnaissance has observed that motorized enemy formation is advancing. Observation is forwarded both to the commander and his troops. The commander reflects this event to his operational analysis, which is based on a combination of historical, resource and doctrinal knowledge about the enemy. He identifies expected a pattern in the enemy maneuvering and decides to launch one of the prepared countermeasures. Units receive the orders right after they become aware of inbound motorized adversary in their view on Recognized Ground Operational Picture, RGOP.  They commence a prepared action based on Blue Force Track of their units and engage the approaching enemy based on Target Acquisition information from the position that gives a terrestrial advantage to them. The commander monitors the proceedings of his troops from Recognized Operational Picture.

The air surveillance detects incoming enemy fighter/attackers. The event is forwarded to all units as part of Recognized Air Operational Picture, RAOP. Based on the information, unit commences their prepared countermeasures. The commander of the operation gets confirmation of pattern he recognized earlier. The enemy has launched deep flanking manoeuvre with strong air to ground support. He notes this as operation plan of his adversary and assesses again all other ways that adversary can surprise him with means in reserve.

As information becomes a value, it needs to be managed and governed. There needs to be accountability defined within the military force. The owner is responsible for the particular type of information through its life-cycle. Records Keeper stores information according to requests from the owner and keeps records available. The user of information is getting the value out of it. The provider of information pushes or publishes information as events or stream to all possible users. The protector is accountable of defending the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.

Managing Risks of Information and ICT-functions concerning Operational Security

As information becomes more valuable to military force utilization, the aspiration of the adversary to suppress it grows. If the adversary can deny the information flow either from commander or troops, they become disabled. Suppression happens when the adversary can disable ICT-functions so that the Blue Force is disintegrated to elements, platforms or units of single function. 

When considering the information value chain described earlier, the trust between men and their machines become the most desired target for an adversary. Further the chain of information extends and comes more interdependent, the easier it is for an adversary to break it and deny the availability of information. With few sequential breaks, service is suppressed to a degree that people start losing their fate on machines. More intense the situation, quicker people switch to alternative methods or busy themselves with meaningless work. Once lost trust is hard to regain and sometimes takes, even more, time than building trust up in the beginning. 

Besides trust, the other important factors in risk analysis are Reliability, Integrity, and Confidentiality, all parts of Security. Long chains of information service are vulnerable since all links are needed for fully functional service. One link down in the long chain of information service is a seed for mistrust. If the incident is not remedied led by service driven process, then availability is lost for a longer time, and trust deteriorates beyond repair.

A standard military procedure is requiring three independent detections of the same target before data is qualified as trustworthy. With three sources of information, one will achieve 50% probability of getting true detection. It does not need a lot from adversary to turn the table to his advantage with a little deception of sensors or man-in-the-middle manipulation.
The last essential foundation for trust is sureness that the enemy does not know as much as you do. If the confidentiality of the information flow is lost and the enemy may gain information superiority this way, the trust to technical systems is lost. 

Risk management of ICT-related issues in a military environment is crystallized into TRUST. The trust is a function of Availability and Security as depicted in figure 4. 

Figure 4: The essentials in managing risk of ICT systems

The availability of ICT system of systems is also endangered by continuous change. There are a plethora of sources for changes in ICT systems. Vendors are updating their software products in continuous streams.  The detection of malicious software requires updates several times during the day. It becomes harder to keep up detecting specific fingerprints of new viruses, worms, and other malevolent applications as their production rate is almost 100 000 new variations per day. Changes are also due new requirements that users are expressing as their operation advances. The adversary is also trying to disintegrate the ICT system of systems into dysfunctional parts and changes are made to remedy lost assets. 
Most of the military ICT service providers do not allow untested changes in their operational environment. Thus, they have established Testing and Evaluation environments to do pretesting, staging and integration before releasing new configurations to be implemented through change management. The change management is one of the foundations for ITIL service delivery processes.

The importance of trust may be illustrated with the following story:

Besides being surprised by the thrust of German armoured left wing through the Ardennes, the Allied defeat in France in 1940 was because of inadequate communications. The telephone system was unreliable; telegram messages were chronically late. The high command was not able to communicate with its subordinates and become divorced from reality. The British communications relied on wired lines, which were not applicable in mobile warfare. The few radio connections were overburdened with encrypted messages. Thus, intolerable delays were created. 
 

Managing the performance of ICT related functions

The performance of military ICT related systems, processes, and people may be expressed emphasizing the user view of value with function pictured in figure 5:

• Quality of services 
• Availability of services
• Security of information and ICT assets
• Timely provided services
• Cost-efficiency from operational expenses viewpoint
• Return of Investment from capital expenses viewpoint
• Added ICT capability to provide new opportunities to military affairs.

The weight on current operations emphasizes the lagging metrics for performance. Only the last metric is more leading in building added capability for future.

Military environment emphasises the current performance over possible future. As defined earlier,  Availability and Security are the main performance indicators in a military environment. The commanders of forces require ICT services provided in new positions, with different quality and pace. They expect these requirements to be fulfilled on time aligned with the proceedings of their operations. When users face problems in using ICT services, they expect to get resolution promptly. Information services provided to units vary in volume, sensitivity to delay and integrity. All these features are included in Quality of Service. 

The value chain that provides ICT services is measured against the cost-efficiency of operations, OPEX and ability to provide Return on Investment, ROI through the life-cycle of system components. Finally, the last key performance indicator is measuring the leading feature of being able to build future ICT services and implement them as part of System of systems.

Figure 5: Performance of ICT system of systems

The following story illustrates the challenges in managing performance of CIT services:

A Signals Force was used to take care of their ICT -systems and believed that the systems were valued by their supported. Great was the confusion, when the Joint Chief of Information, JCIO demanded performance to be measured based on the availability of connection. The telephone was not the service but just a mean to deliver a connection to end user. The quality of voice communication and accessibility of subscribers become more important for the JCIO than the mere device. 

Furthermore, the JCIO preferred the swiftness of change of a subscriber access line and accuracy of the telephone catalogue over the model of a telephone. The commanders of Signal units were appraised based on how much human resources they were spending per connections and subscribers. They were shocked since this was entirely new management culture they were expected to adapt. 
 

Managing ICT related resources

The means, that ICT Services are made of, include human capital, material, immaterial, financial, organizational and facility resources as depicted in figure 6. These resources are transferred to ICT Service Production with other enablers: Principles, Processes, and Culture . The resources are distributed through the life-cycle: 

• means that are sustaining the older, legacy parts of ICT System of systems
• means that are operating the principal parts of the current system of systems
• means that are involved in developing new features or components for a future system of systems
• means that are kept in reserve.

Figure 6: Resources enabling the production of ICT services

The adversary that is bound towards attrition type of operations tends to use force in destroying resources as much as possible to exhaust their opponent. Thus, military ICT needs to have resources in reserve, survivability under the fire, resilience in their utilization and reliability in the structure of ICT system of systems. The requirement for survivability may be illustrated as follows:

The structure of military ICT needs to follow architecture beyond the high availability of civilian IT or n+1 reliability. The rational adversary is trying to disintegrate the physical and logical topology of military ICT structures. He optimises the usage of warheads in the main nodes in the topology. The simple topology of the hub to spoke requires only one strike to take down the centre and leave the spokes isolated. More connected topologies require more strikes but only fully connected provides the best survivability if the structure is self-healing as illustrated in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Examples of topologies and their survivability in military area of operation

There should be a constant change ongoing to keep the cost-performance of ICT system of systems in balance. If though, for some reason, there is a need to do more discrete change, the management of resource transformation from legacy structure towards a structure that provides new capabilities might become a challenge. There is a minimum level of ICT capability that needs to be ensured through the entire transformation. Almost all existing information needs to be migrated from old systems to new systems. Thus, it takes time and resources to transform modern ICT structure. This is illustrated in the following story and Figure 8:

Signals provide continuous service and readiness to bind together all components of military force. Thus, there is a minimum level of capability that Signals is required to provide continuously. When Signals is facing a major technology transformation, it needs to extract its most professional teams from providing legacy service, lower the service production to its minimum level and assign these most competent teams to build new technology and processes. Sometimes this requires also other changes in sourcing the legacy services. The sustaining units may have to take new responsibilities of old users. Vendors may be needed to take responsibility in operating some legacy but familiar ICT service while Signals units focus on building new capabilities. 

Building new capability sometimes follows S-curve. In the beginning, it takes time to have new systems settled and processes in place, but once the pilot is accomplished, then migration might be accelerated. From another viewpoint, the end user may be slow in adapting new services but after first quick wins and reliable production, they become the quickest learners for the new features.

Figure 8: Managing the transformation of CIT capability 

Assuring the strategic alignment of ICT efforts

The ICT service production is firmly a user and client driven chain of value. The major drive is to fulfil everyday needs of users, commanders, and maintenance. Everyday challenges of units pull the ICT service production to consume more resources in resolving end user problems at the tactical level. The operational level Commanders project their new requirements with a strong will. The ICT service development is driven strongly by these demands towards achieving immediate operational objectives. 

Every ICT service provider has their flow of maintenance changes that alter the configuration daily. There is also development stream particular to each service provider that provides new components fitting into their future special needs. Thus, it is difficult to maintain strategic focus and use resources in building new ICT capabilities for future through the entire value chain.

Figure 9: Challenges in gaining strategic alignment

The strategic goals and programs should be presented together with tactical and operational requirements on the boards of decision making. Every decision of change should take ICT services towards strategic goals, or else entropy  will create disorder within the System of systems. There should be Chief Information Officer, CIO responsible for both usages of information and production of ICT services at all levels from strategic down to tactical. The CIO is the adviser to the commander in information and ICT related matters. The CIO does monitoring, assessing and directing  using the ways of guidance of the ICT capability owner, the hierarchy of military command and control, and coordination and auditing of a general model for management. 

Since ICT structures have complex interdependencies, the CIO needs to hold in one hand a Portfolio to manage HOW things are proceeding. The ICT portfolio includes both legacy capabilities and new capabilities for balancing their transformation and sustaining the minimum level of readiness. The portfolio also helps in managing key resources as most competent teams of CIT professionals and other sources of professional service production.

In his other hand CIO holds an Enterprise Architecture to define WHAT needs to be built in proceeding towards different and sometimes contradicting goals. The Enterprise Architecture explains how functions of military affairs are supported with Information, which is supported by Information and Communications Technology. It helps CIO to communicate his strategy to his superiors when asked about reasons to invest in Information and ICT. It also helps him to communicate the requirements and meaningfulness to his subordinates who are otherwise interested mainly technical issues. 
 

The Governance model for ICT related issues

The governance of ICT related matters include all aspects of COBIT 5 management  mainly strategic alignment, value delivery, risk management, resource management and performance measurement. Before defining the management, this paper described the value stream and all value chains related to ICT service production. The basic process of governance is a cycle of monitoring, assessing and directing  according to level and model of the Armed Forces general command and control structure. 

The cycle of governance uses ICT capability portfolio to refer HOW the thing was planned to do versus how they are implemented. Governance also uses Enterprise Architecture from strategic level down to tactical level defining WHAT is done currently versus what needs to be done to achieve goals.

Figure 10: A simplified model for the Governance of ICT-related issues in Military Environment

The ICT governance framework depictured in Figure 10 above is a basic method to govern or manage from strategic level through operational level down to tactical level. Only focus and ways are different at each level.

The main challenge for governance is the nature of value chain structures needed to put together and provide information based value to military users. The length of value chain may stretch all way from Redmond, Washington (Microsoft) to Shenzhen, Guangdong (Huawei). Unlike other pieces of military armament, no one manufacturer takes the life-cycle responsibility for all components of ICT. The only responsible remains the Armed Forces themselves. The mainstream of ICT development is not following military requirements but needs of consumers and civilian enterprises.

Using Evolutionary Theory in Explaining System of systems Development

Introduction

The paper describes one way to model evolution and development of System of systems. In the context of this paper, the System of systems is a socio-technical structure where Information and Communication Technology is intertwined with human and other structural components. Because of openness and intertwined components, System of systems is complex in nature. Thus, there is a need to understand better the relationships and interactions between components and their environment.

The hypothesis for a model is based on Darwinian (1859) Theory of evolution. It is expanded by Mokyr’s (1998) application of the evolution of technical systems. The Mokyr’s system is modularized using Andriani’s and Carigani’s (2012) approach to modular design and innovation. The modular system is then generalized as System of systems.

Mokyr defines knowledge as underlying structure needed to design systems. The model for knowledge is extended using features of Choo’s (1998) model for Knowing Organization. The extended model is projected to the environment of generic human community and military affairs to expose dependencies between entities and their environment. The forces exposed are explained by combining Mokyr’s and Choo’s theories and reviewing them with Bertalanffy’s (1968) general system theory.

Finally, the model is simplified to illustrate essential interactions and dependencies. The simplified model is easier to use in studies of Information and Communications Technology development. For this purpose, the extended and streamlined model is also explained using classical military development example of mechanized forces and maneuver tactics (Vego, 2007).

Darwinian evolutionary model as basis

The standard Darwinian model includes an Underlying Structure (genotype) that defines the Manifested Entity (phenotype). This connection between Structure and Entity is tight so at moment t Structure produces (maps) similar Entities. However, Darwinian model is a dynamic system. Within time, the Structure might change (mutation) and produce different Entities. When Entity (t) and Entity (t+1) are facing the similar stress of Environment, Natural selection may occur. One of the Entities may adapt better to the stress Environment is causing. The reproduction of better adapted Entity may be more vigorous and gradually overtake the less adapted Entity. See illustration in Figure 1.

Figure 1: a standard Darwinian model for Evolution

Natural selection shapes the character defined in Structure and expressed in Entity. Adaptation means that characters of an Entity evolve gradually to fit better into required function. Exaptation means that a character adapted to a particular function is adopted to a new use (Gloud; Vrba 1982). 

Extending the definition of Knowledge and System

Joel Mokyr (1998) uses the Darwinian model in explaining the evolution of technical systems in Human Societies. He names Knowledge as the Underlying Structure that defines the characters of technical System (Manifested Entity) pictured in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Mokyr’s model for evolution of technology

Mokyr proposes that designing or building a technical system needs useful knowledge. The useful knowledge at the moment (t) defines the characters of System (t). The system is used by a community of people for a function in a particular environment. New knowledge can be created by research or experimenting with existing systems. If the newly accumulated knowledge appears to be useful, then new system (t+1) is designed   and build. Natural selection occurs when the community is comparing new and old system and adopting either of them for further use.

An alternative evolution path is opened if users start to use old system for some new functions. While learning by doing, the user might not understand the principles of this new combination, but it seems to produce results. 

The Mokyr’s evolution model for technical systems has been further extended by Andriani and Carigani (2012) in their study for modular exaptation. It states that Systems are most usually evolving at substructure, module level. In combining System from different modules, it becomes possible to adopt modules elsewhere and use them as part of the new combination. The approach opens the third path for evolution model: new modules are designed, composed of previous modules, and existing modules elsewhere are included into the composition. The composition is further called System of systems (Wikipedia 2016) as it is defined by interrelated modules or sub-systems that produce or enable more functionality and performance together than separately. Figure 3 presents an extended evolutionary model for System of systems development.

Figure 3: Evolution model for System of systems

Cattani (2005) extends the evolutionary model further by proving that organizations can accelerate their knowledge creation by preadaptation. An organization can produce modules to fit better in existing the System of system and further usage within the community when they are running parallel design lines and experimenting with various combinations. Preadaptation provides a wider variety of possibilities to choose for production. Accumulated creative capital may appear to be useful further when new functional demands rise (Harford, 2011: 234).

Features of knowledge and information

In Mokyr’s evolutionary model, knowledge is accumulated by research and experimentation. There is also the possibility to learn by doing, but it transfers to knowledge only if the phenomena can be explained with some existing model, thus understood. When knowledge accumulation is studied from Choo’s (1998) knowing organization approach, knowledge creation provides a model to enrich tacit knowledge to explicit with Nonaka’s (2015) SECI process. Innovation is also often based on coopting modules or subsystems elsewhere and utilizing them in a different combination (Christensen, 2011). 

Knowledge can be active when it is referred, and it remains accessible. Knowledge can also be dormant, kept in storage, and not utilized in designing new components. Knowledge has characteristics as follows (Dalkir 2011:2):

• Using knowledge does not consume it.
• Transferring knowledge does not diminish it.
• Knowledge is plentiful, but there are only a few opportunities to use it.
• Much of the explicit knowledge is lost in filing and much of the tacit knowledge out the door at the end of the day.

So there is a window of opportunity for each piece of knowledge if it is available at the time. As the human community is now doubling its amount of information every two years, there is always information which never reaches the level of knowledge. Besides learning, research, and knowledge creation, an organization can also acquire knowledge with new hires.

Mapping knowledge to design and building new or legacy systems depends on the following status (Mokyr 1998):

• As long some selecting agents do not share the consensus of knowledge, there remain old design and systems as niches. The military has a tendency to sustain traditions as horses in their ranks long after they were fully replaced by motor vehicles in operations (Guderian, 2001).
• If some part of knowledge is rejected by the majority of selecting agents, it does not vanish but survives in records. There is a change that after generation change among selectors, previously rejected knowledge find a new use. Frequent rotation of officers in several positions sometimes provide opportunities both to senior and junior officers to proceed with their earlier ideas (Harford, 2011:50).
• Most of the information are dormant. There is no know utilization for that information until new ways of analyzing information emerges. Business Intelligence and Big Data are trends in trying to make use of exponentially increasing the volume of data (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013:34).
• Human way to process information. There is a loss of information in human communications. All ways of communication need to be enforced to transfer knowledge. Human recognizes patterns and matches them with most recent or familiar ones to create understanding. Human thinking is tuned towards satisfying rather than optimizing (Snowden, 2012).

Mokyr modeled the awareness of existing knowledge, the unknown knowns, with access cost. The access cost is replaced with Choo’s (1998:61) model for information use as illustrated in Figure 4. For more complex approach one should see Dalkir’s (2011) Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice.

Figure 4: Mokyr’s Evolution Model extended with Choo’s model for Information Use

Choo’s (1998) process for information use includes three functions: Information Needs initiate Information Seeking, which enables Information Use. There is feedback from Use to Needs as process unveils possibilities and constraints. The process runs embedded in two sub-environments: 

• Information processing environment, where the need and seek processes are affected by cognitive needs and affective responses.
• Information uses environment, which is defined by the situation of use.

The cognitive needs in processing environment are affected by situational stops, where human faces different gaps, barriers or options when reaching after information. The human uses available bridging strategies to overcome these gaps. Human also has different habits in using acquired information. The affective responses include feelings that are defining behavior. Uncertainty, confusion, and anxiety are examples of prohibiting feelings. Feelings of confidence, optimism and clarity are driving information seeking. Relief, satisfaction or disappointment are the possible outcome from information usage.

Work and social settings define information usage environment. Varying the combination of people facing the same problem produces different outcomes as social structure affects their thinking. Organization, task domain and access to information also define the outcome. Also, expectations concerning resolution and the way it is communicated, have an impact on the solution.

Effects of Community and Environment of use

The model assumes that System of systems is open. It has external interactions with its environment and in this case particularly with its users, the community of human beings (Bertalanffy, 1969:141). Mokyr (2004) defines features of resistance in adopting new systems. Meanwhile, Harford (2011) defines features that might accelerate adaptation. 
In process of natural selection between legacy system and new system, Mokyr defines the following sources for resistance to adaptation:

• Value. The change will have effect in existing value chain and power structure. There will be stakeholders within the community that feel losing either value or power if the new system is being adapted. Thus, they will oppose the change.
• Ideology. Human community includes a degree of phobia and conformism that will resist all new. They may be defined at political, religious, cultural or ethnic levels.
• Epistemology. The existing system and knowledge hold a status of general acceptance. Human nature has a tendency to value possessions over future options. Thus, new information or components may be opposed as they do not fit into accepted understanding or usage.
• Systemic. Individual autonomic systems differentiate from others only per their features or price. In the other hand, if the new component has a decisive dependency on other parts of System of system, then systemic resistance needs to be considered. When the system of systems grows beyond control, as telex, land line telephone or TCP/IPv4 has, it slows down the evolution.
• Dependency on frequency. The rate of change and adoption depends on a number of users. In one hand, smaller and better-connected communities adapt new feature quicker than larger. The other hand, the large, well-connected population may adopt new features faster as social imitation/learning surface extends and touches more people. Some changes do follow a particular path of evolution that makes them more resistance to further changes. For example, a service established by legislation may enjoy protection from competition and natural selection.
• Comfort. Human being is seeking status quo with routines and rituals that provide comfort for everyday life. This comfort is further stabilized with habits that lessen the stress of decision making. In stressful situations, human often has a tendency to use familiar or previously proven solutions than unprecedented. Similar deepening comfort zone i.e. funnel of comfort is with communities as they seek stability (Duhigg, 2012).

There are also features in organizations ability to design new system that produces natural friction:

• Lack of complementarities. New knowledge may be available and useful to design a new module, but manufacturing technology is not mature to support building the physical form. The asymmetric situation is familiar to communities, whose strategy is defined by staying on the very edge of technical evolution.
• Speciation. Language is used in communicating existing and new knowledge. Some areas of expertise may develop jargon to differentiate themselves from the rest. This linguistic speciation may prevent dissemination of knowledge. Differentiation may also be founded at political, ethnic or ideological level. New understanding does not easily overcome barriers rooted in beliefs or upbringing. The base of trust is also powerful differentiator especially in the area of information security. It is hard to move the base of trust from physical formats towards virtual formats (Mattila, 2016).
• Organization structure. The organization, that is ought to produce new systems or their components, effects the outcome. Deeply functional and specialized organization can produce mainly components sized according to their functional unit. Cross-unit development does not occur unless there is a willing authority above all units involved. Matrix or composite organizations are more flexible and oppose less when creating new concepts and designs when a network of value changes (Christensen, 2011:33). Connectivity of the value network is also defining the adaptation of new modules. The more connected organization is, the more open it is to new knowledge and exaptation of useful modules.
• Entropy. The second law of thermodynamics can explain the loss of information as well as the gradual disorder that grows in open evolutionary systems. Information loses its content and integrity when communicated due uncertainty or entropy in a channel. The open socio-technical system also has some dynamic microstates with their agendas, both human and technical. The human community always has subcultures and unofficial organizations that affect the official organization and dominant culture. (Bertalanffy, 1969:143)

Figure 4 illustrates the effects of community and environment to embedded System of systems.

Figure 4: Environment and community effects in evolution of open System of systems

There are also positive forces in environment and community that may accelerate the evolution:

• Curiosity is a mean that fulfills the human need for knowledge or truth (Reiss, 200:31).
• Strategic transformation or changing environment is best approached with adaptation. Based on Donald Sull (Syrett, 2012:100) this is achieved by building three capabilities: 

1. A strategic anticipation to recognize patterns of change
2. Organizational agility to exploit opportunities or mitigate threats as they unfold
3. Resiliency to absorb uncertainty and surprises

• Adversary or Competitor may change the status quo of confrontation by action because of intolerable pressure or try to exploit occurred opportunity. Both states and enterprises are mutually dependent in a way that action prompts a reaction from other stakeholders (Porter, 1980:16). 
• Challenges of everyday life drive the process of evolution. When facing a problem, one tries out few variants available to solve it. Failures are weeded out and successes copied. This process of variation and selection goes on and provides constant drive (Harford, 2011:12). The sociotechnical system evolves with this process at the micro level (Tavistock, 1989). 
• Maturity. The S-curve theory of technical improvement explains that in the early versions of new systems, the pace of technical improvement is slow. With better understanding, control and diffusion, the rate of technological improvement will accelerate. In later stages of maturity, improvements will asymptotically reach a natural limit, hence the S profile (Christensen, 2011:44).

 

Optimistic model for evolution of System of systems

A system that composes of individual subsystems that are interrelated is called System of systems (SoS).  The SoS is open and interacting with its environment and community that is using it. The SoS has been designed to fulfill a function based on knowledge that the community possess and can use. As an open system, the SoS has a tendency to lose its coherence gradually with time. Friction and entropy are powers that change the structure and usage of SoS at the micro level. 

There are three main paths for System of systems to evolve:

1. Preadaptation is driven by the need to develop new SoS’. It includes research, experimenting or acquiring new knowledge with other means. Several optional solutions may be produced and explored to find the best fit. Gained knowledge and prototypes are used to design new SoS’ to fulfill the requirements of the new function.
2. Adaptation happens when the SoS is coopted gradually for different usage without necessarily understanding why it fit to the new function.
3. Exaptation occurs when component C from another system is coopted as part of SoS’ in making it more efficient or fitting to the purpose.

There are driving and resisting forces that effect in the evolution of function and SoS. This optimistic model is simplifying them into two opposing forces: Resistance and Drive. The optimism is the decline in the picture in Figure 5. The model assumes that there is a generic drive to improve and develop the performance of community, systems it is using, and knowledge it possesses.

Figure 5: An optimistic model to explain evolution of System of systems

Knowledge is imperative in preadaptation and exaptation. For knowledge creation there is a process of information need, seek, and usage. Environment and community are affecting this process from cognitive, affective and situational dimensions.

The model can be explained with different evolutions of socio-technical systems, but one of the military classics is the development of mechanized warfare before the II WW. Heinz Guderian has been recognized as one of the main inventors of mechanized warfare. He wrote 1936 a book called Achtung – Panzer that described battle tank as component enabling mobile warfare when supported with radio communications, motorcycle reconnaissance, and close air support. He proved the case by leading the attack of his armored forces through the Allied defense 1940 with speed that overtook the Allied leadership by surprise both at tactical and strategical level. Speed and firepower of maneuver tactics were named “Blitzkrieg”. Later 1951 in his book “Panzer Leader”, he described the challenges faced when trying to develop new mobile tactics within the Wehrmacht through 1930’s. The first battle tank was coopted (Exaptation) from earthmover as tracked vehicle that was able to carry armor, large gun or having high maneuverability.  Singular tanks were used during I WW with variable success. After the war, their technical development went further, but tactical use remained at the level of singular weapon platform (Adaptation). 

Guderian explained these facts, proceedings in technology, and defined new tactics for land warfare in 1936 (Preadaptation). The generals of cavalry did not favor his ideas (Resistance). Despite this, he continued developing (cognitive means and affective responses) panzer tactics in motorized logistics company using trucks and cars (Experimenting or Domain-driven Design). He also cooperated with Luftwaffe as they were developing dive bomber (Ju 87) 1935 and introduced close air support (Exaptation). Artillery pulled by horses were not quick enough to support mechanized spearheads.  The strategic need (Drive), for Germany to increase tactical speed, overdrive the resistance. When Germany launched the offensive 1940 against France and Allied defense, there were as many battle tanks on both sides. The Guderian way of using armored divisions and operation plan created by Manstein (Melvin, 2010) made the crucial difference and results prompted others (Soviet Union, USA) to copy (Adaptation) mobile tactics with variable outcomes.

Discussion

The main objective of this paper is to present a logical model to study the life cycle of open socio-technical systems and causation of their development. The model seeks to improve the understanding of evolution in the usage of Military Information and Communications Technology.

The model is based on Mokyr’s evolutionary model for technical development. It is further extended by Andriani and Carigani’s (2012) modular exaptation to create a better understanding of System of systems development. Intentional knowledge creation is explained using Cattani (2002) model of preadaptation. Choo’s (1998) approach for the Knowing Organization is used to understand better forces affecting information processes. Christensen (2011) introduces exaptation as a possible path for evolution. The composed model is evaluated against Bertalanffy’s general system theory as major forces effecting evolution are simplified. Finally, a practical, optimistic approach (exploitation phase in the flow of events in Gunderson & Holling’s (2002) Panarchy model) is chosen in providing the model with a positive incline towards development.

The model is defined only to sufficient level to gain a robust understanding of forces and interrelationships in the evolution of socio-technical complex systems. The model is used in other papers to study the evolution of military Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information System of systems and related functions.

At the macro level, the model does not consider for example transformation model developed by Gunderson and Holling (2002). At the micro level, presented model does not describe a holistic open system with feedback and decision-making functions special for social behavior (Ackoff & Emery, 2008). It requires further Systems Thinking, Modeling and experimenting to be matured and detailed. The model creates a generic framework to study recent Information and Communications Technology related developments, especially in Military Communities.

A Way forward in developing the key capabilities of Nation Defence in Finland by using Enterprise Architecture views

A WAY FORWARD

The strategy for the FINDEF was first to create an enabling ICT structure that would provide leverage to process rethinking and integration. The third phase was to build new capabilities required in National Defence. The sequential strategy was based on the understanding that strongly siloed ICT structure was preventing information and processes from integration. Further, there was understanding that without platforms to develop integrated processes and shared information environments, there were no gains achieved in developing asymmetric military effects illustrated in Figure 36. 

By 2008, the first phase was achieved, and the description of enabling ICT structure as part of the defence system in Finland was described as a nationally defined service platform for common and joint processes. The technical structure included core network that connected data centres providing application and content services accessed via access networks. Tactical level field networks were connected to nation level structure via connection points.

Figure 36: Simplified model for improvement strategy for the Finnish Defence Forces 2004

This writing was focusing on the first phase - transforming the ICT structure so that it would enable further proceedings in developing common and joint functions of military affairs. The transformation of ICT structure in Finnish Defence Forces 2004 – 2008 was following basic lines of evolution in using ICT to support military strategic and operational functions as pictured in the following Figure 37. The evolutionary model for ICT application includes interrelated layers of Networking, Computing, Information Security and Information Management. 

On 2004, the Finnish Defence Forces were using transport networks based on Synchronous Digital Hierarchy in connecting garrisons and command posts together. Computing and communications services were provided mainly within local areas and branches in each garrison. Each garrison created a local domain that was loosely connected to other garrisons enabling data sharing. Information security was based on ownership of physical and technical domains. It was trusted since it was operated and developed under each line command: North, East, West, Air and Navy. Connecting the trusted domains to other domains was untrusted. Unstructured official and unofficial digital information were produced in files created in various formats and stored in Folders managed mainly by individuals. For sharing of information, there were some shared Folders and disks accessible to carefully defined users. Most of the files were shared by intranet electronic mailing system between individuals.

Figure 37: The journey of the FINDEF 2004 – 2008 on the roads of evolution of Military ICT usage

The transformation accelerated the ICT structure to the level where networks were specified supporting more centralised computing and multichannel access. Computing was based on virtual infrastructure providing both distribution for survivability and flexibility for new requirements. Information security was based on a trust in systems as they were more controlled, end users were separated from services, and there was a structure for defence in depth built. The file oriented information management culture was gradually moving via page sharing to more real-time sharing culture of enterprise social media.

The transformed ICT structure enabled the major change of the Command structure of the Finnish Defence Forces. There remained only three commands: Land, Maritime and Air. The National University of Defence provided a level of academic knowledge and education needed in Force Production and specialised units directly under the Defence Staff were providing unified support to all Commands.  

Defence Forces had taken its first step towards process supported matrix and virtual enterprise. The step was enabled by new ICT structure dividing Military Affairs into four domains of shared information: Tactical, Operational, Support and Public. The domains are described in Figure 38.

Figure 38: Information domains of the Finnish Defence Forces 2008

Tactical domain remained further divided into Intelligence, Sensor, Fires and Land Forces deployable field networks. OPNET provided a platform for nationwide military missions at operational and tactical levels. Tactical domains were connected to OPNET providing interoperability and coordination required in joint and combined operations between Services, Allies and other Governmental Agencies. HALNET and INET were connected in a way that enabled establishing the Force Production and Support in the more cost-effective manner by using example strategic partners for Logistics and Training.

The four domains provided Information Environment to further process development in all three military areas: Force Utilization, Production and Support. The ICT infrastructure enables information flow within the Defence Force but also between its key partners. A basis for more efficient National Defence value chain illustrated in Figure 39 was created. Further papers will explain proceedings at the process level and the development of Land Forces Tactical domain on their journey towards a new strategic basis for National Defence.

Figure 39: The 2008 platform created with ICT structure for developing essential capabilities in Military Affairs of Finland

This is the final paper in the series of eight (A - H) studies describing how the ICT structure of the Finnish Defence Forces was transformed before 2008.

Architecture for Information Management Transformation; Part G of Introduction to ICT rationalization program of the Finnish Defence Forces from Enterprise Architecture viewpoints

TRANSFORMING THE ARCHITECTURE OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

STARTING FROM BASICS

The digitization of unstructured formal information had started already in early 1980’s in the Finnish Defence Forces. First there were Personal Computers introduced to replace typing machines. Then, at mid-1990, the first digital content management system was implemented to capture both personal emails and formal correspondence together with the publication of standard operational procedures. The system was based on Lotus Notes in the beginning and included taxonomies and metadata models for all formal unstructured information exchange and records keeping within the FINDEF. There was a demand in early 2000 to update the content management system and migrate from Lotus file types towards Microsoft files. The main driver was to achieve interchangeability between other stakeholders. 

The same time, there was a need to update the whole content management system. Thus, a roadmap for migration of file types was created starting from early SmartSuite version 4 evolving through Office XP towards more open file types based on eXtensible Markup Language, XML. The roadmap is illustrated in Figure 31.

Figure 31: A roadmap for migrating the file types for unstructured content within the Finnish Defence Forces

There was a migration window for all legacy file types from SmartSuite version 4 to most current version 9.8 defined. The migration window pushed all content towards one format, SmartSuite 9.8, which was to be supported in read-only function until 2008. All earlier versions together with their applications were cancelled by 2005 (version 4) and 2006 (version 97). The simplifying of office suites also helped in cutting the local support and providing a more stable configuration in workstations. The Microsoft Office 2003 version was defined to be the first family of file types providing a path towards next MS Office versions and more open file types that enabled publication of content as well as archiving better that proprietary file formats.

New file formats opened integration opportunities in IBM Domino, SAP and IBM WebSphere platforms as they were introduced as part of process integration programs in Enterprise Resource Management and C4ISTAR implementation. Integration improved the transferability between unstructured and structured data.

RECOGNISING SITUATION OF THE MATURITY IN CONTENT MANAGEMENT

When the maturity of content management was assessed in the FINDEF, there were three main levels found pictured in Figure 32.  The lowest level was based on individual interests, separate ways of working and personal applications in personal computers that stored personal files. Individualism was recognized the hardest cultural boundary to break as some of the Branches and Units within the FINDEF were using Confidentiality as an excuse not to share any information.

Figure 32: Measuring the maturity of content management in FINDEF

The second level of maturity was found in teams and units that were competing against each other, sharing within the team but not elsewhere and sometimes having surprisingly advanced applications to manage their files. There were many closed workplaces established in Lotus Notes platform; each  Unit had their intra-web page for internal publications, and closed networks hosted shared drives for restricted content.

The third level of maturity found was Defence Forces wide. Official letters, records and standard operational procedures were captured in common parts of Lotus Notes.  People were thinking disseminating information beyond their particular department or team. There were some attempts to share instruction and training content between Defence Schools and Units of Force Production. There were repositories for forms and templates to assist in writing more structured letters and orders. Official letters were accessible to all authorised personnel back to three years in time.

Since the variance in content management culture was found wide, a significant threat was detected for process integration. Thus, ICT rationalization program was tasked to enable the acceleration of content management maturity. The acceleration intention included following goals:
• Enable social communication
• Enable more formal publications
• Enable content sharing with stakeholders outside of Defence Forces 
• Improve the confidentiality of content through all sharing and exchange transactions
• Enable content transformation between unstructured and structured repositories 
• Build ability to improve formal and structured data exchange between all relevant stakeholders.

ENABLING PROCESS INTEGRATION AND MATURING THE CONTENT MANAGEMENT

TIERA implemented tools and services to improve communication between people and machines as well as the maturity of content management as defined in Figure 33.

Figure 33: Enabling communication and content sharing in the FINDEF

Social communication between people was enabled with Collaboration tools like IBM SameTime. It enabled people to have virtual meetings by sharing presentations, white board and exchanging opinions both in voice and chatting. The collaboration was later enabled also with Video Tele-Conferencing, VTC service between all Units. VTC also enabled unintended signals, body language, included in virtual meetings. These enablers were used 2010 when remote work was officially allowed in Defence Forces. People were permitted to work from the nearest garrison rather than commuting through half the Finland every day.
As telephone devices were taken away from desks, the Computer Telephony Integration in SameTime enabled better awareness of presence and conference meetings. Intranet chatting was also adopted quickly by personnel for informal communication while working. 
Shared folders and web pages were substituted with two portals both for Administrative and Operative Environments. People were recommended to publish content on those platforms rather than in their restricted web pages. Pages begun to capture more content from shared files as HTML editing and publishing become easier.

Content sharing with outside stakeholders was improved by creating digital workspaces to be used in integrated projects and development tasks. The official Internet email MIL.FI was secured better, accessed directly from Intranet workstations and file transfer was allowed in controlled manner to get rid of private file sharing with memory sticks.

Similar file sharing was enabled online between Administrative and Operative Environments to have control over the content that flows between confidential levels. Filters and content screening was applied in gateways for monitoring purposes. Enabled official file sharing gradually throttled the informal file sharing and security improved.

As SAP was extended to be the Enterprise Resource Management platform and WebSphere become the portal platform, there was a path created by improving exchange between unstructured and structured data. The Excel-application from MS Office suite was integrated with SAP platform and allowed transfer of data between two worlds. It was imperative that commanding officers were able to extract data from SAP and create reports and presentations quickly and based on factual information. The Word application was similarly integrated with Domino platform and enabled the transformation of Word-document to Domino content.
 

XML-interfaces (XI) were prepared between SAP and the stakeholders along the value chain via electronic message broker. A gateway structure was providing secure and unbroken transactions between nodes in a long chain of value creation. Another gateway was created to allow outsiders access the SAP of FINDEF. The gateway allowed strategic partners to manage essential information on material warehousing and repair. Information integrity was important for the Defence Forces ability to sustain readiness and be able to deploy forces as needed. The third gateway enabled operations abroad to access home services. It was not necessary to establish isolated entities for support systems in operations anymore. The crew in operations focused only on providing battle management system services to troops rather than running administrative support systems. They were provided via global connections from Homeland. See the concept of information exchange between stakeholders in the value chain in Figure 34.

Figure 34: New gateway structure for data exchange between relevant stakeholders in Defence

TRANSFORMING THE CULTURE IN INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND MANAGEMENT

In enabling the cultural transformation of content management in FINDEF, there were three parallel lines of operation adopted: Information Management, Information Assurance and Computing. The transformation to these enablers is illustrated in Figure 35.

Figure 35: Basic plan in transforming information management, assurance and computing in the FINDEF

The line of information management included support to get rid of last paper-based content and migrate towards electronic documents. It was enabled by content integration, collaboration and new publishing services. The second course of action was to migrate from file based content management towards page and database data management. The migration was enabled by publishing services, tool integration and improved information security. The third course of action was to change the feeling from individually owned content towards Defence owned content. It was imperative to change the culture of “need to know” towards “need to share” to build the Defence Forces as learning organization.

The line of information assurance included increasing the awareness of rights and responsibilities to an information user. The user profile means both consuming and creating information. The awareness was established with the integration of security guidance and operations guidance into the same document of standard operational procedures. The integrated procedures made it was clearer to the user, what was possible and what was not allowed. The second course of action was to improve understanding of publishing and accessing information. There was a profound mistrust of people that prevented publication of sensitive information. It was mitigated by showing what role based access management means and providing exemplary behaviour models of improved ways to publish information. The third course of action was improving the awareness in information confidentiality among users. From individual responsibility, the transformation was done towards organizational responsibility for managing content between levels of confidentiality.

The line of computing included improved access, identity and role management. It enabled an access both for strategic partners and via wireless access. Identity was uncoupled from terminal devices, and Microsoft relied on functions. A full smart card based identity management was introduced together with Single Sign-On, SSO feature in making the life of end users easier but simultaneous the access more secure. Assured identity was transferred to role management instead of applications. Role management provided an underlying layer to manage different roles and their rights to access services and use information. It was possible to differentiate individual and his roles in peace time and war time. Definition of roles become a responsibility to superiors and organizations. Human resources were accountable for issuing smart cards to true identities. A Chief Information Officer was responsible for the whole in each Unit of Defence Forces. 
System administration was linked to service management and extended with role and identity management with rigorous implementation of ITIL-processes and IT-service management system. The integrity of services and availability of information become a driving force for ICT Service Provider organizations together with information security.

This ends the series presenting the Transformation of the FINDEF from Enterprise Architecture viewpoints but the conclusion still to be published!