2013-02-25

PART I: Confrontations, Conflicts and their Management in Postmodern era


still under editing


Original writing was published in Sotilasaikakauslehti 11/2011 http://www.upseeriliitto.fi/the_finnish_officers_union_in_english

Confrontations, Conflicts and their Management in Postmodern era


Sun Tzu - Attack by stratagem:
... Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence;
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans;
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;
the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.”


1. From wars between industrial states to confrontations of post-modern societies


The industrialization did change the society, national states emerged and in Napoleonic wars the first symptoms of mass warfare occurred. In France Napoleon established an conscription law and drafted a mass army of infantry and cavalry. The strategy of Napoleon was to use the strengths of his conscript grand army (conscription, patriotism, operational manoeuvreability of army corps and logistical solution) to destroy the opponents main force i.e. ability to wage war and thus dictate the terms of peace agreement. Napoleon concentrated political, strategical and operational leadership to himself thus compromising his operational agility with “patent solution” and ending losing wars among others to Russia.1

In the Civil war of USA general Sherman destroyed the economy and people´s willingness to continue fighting by attacking through the state of Georgia and destroying about 100 km widely and 500 km deeply cities, farms, railroads, shops, material, industry and weapons.
This was first time that force was massed against opponents economical and industrial assets. The railroads provided operational manoeuvreability and telegraph provided fast communications first time. The Southern troops were better led at tactical level but Jefferson and Grant combined political and strategical level to better the opponent.2

In the First World War industrial power was used to provide weapons for army, navy and air force with a magnitude of mass production. Firepower and lethality of military force was multiplied compared to Boer war or Civil war. Railways were used to gain operational manoeuvreability but after dismounting armies tactical movement was limited to walking speed. To keep the integrity of the troops and hoist their spirits a variety of information means were used. Later this was called propaganda.3

In China 1934 the long march of Communist Party was a military loss and brought Chinese communist movement to a brink of end. Later Mao created tales of communist heroism out from miseries of march and spread them as propaganda amongst people thus gaining the support of ordinary people and finally a military victory over Chiang Kai-shek.4

In the Second World War industrial productivity increased firepower and tactical speed. The battlespace extended to air (The Battle of Britain), to electromagnetic space (signal surveillance), to will of the home front (V-weapons and resistance movements), to information domain (propaganda in press, party ceremonies, radio and movies), to industrial assets (large scale air bombardments of cities) and to diplomatic level (Stalin had Germany and UK competing about the terms of non-aggression pact on August 19395). As conflict proceeded Stalin increased his capability to control the vast spectrum of struggle - military, economical, social, technical, diplomatic, ideological and national aspects of confrontation – better than his colleges at the time6. Both Hitler and Stalin had trouble trusting their military leadership thus spreading their activity at operational and sometimes even tactical level besides their efforts at political and strategical level.7 Both leaders made same mistake of pulling decision making too high, operating hierarchical control over malfunctioning communications and stiffening their operational and tactical level with inadequate delegation.

After the WW II confrontation between two ideologies escalated to conflict we know as “Cold War”. On the military line of operations two sides ended up with Mutual Assured Destruction with nuclear weapons and arms race to keep up with deterrence. The other line of military operations were local conflicts with conventional arms backed by both sides of ideology. Both ideological sides were operating along the line of economical operations to enhance political and economical development in the nations within their domain of influence and opposing the economical development in the nations of the opponents domain. In the line of social operations USSR conducted class struggle with means of international media, exchange of culture, education and sports. International Communist Party provided effective avenue of influence as well.8 Both political, economical and social lines of operation was supported by projection of military power either for stability or for instability. The Communist Party in USSR did combine these lines of operation at strategical level with powerful effect.

In Vietnam War NVA and NLF launched an Tet -operation in 1968. It was unsuccessful on the line of military operation, but on the socio-political line of operation, probably unintended, it ended as a strategic victory by entering to living rooms in USA via television channels and breaking the will of the home front to continue military campaign. With opposing from home front, political leadership did not sustain and military withdrawing concluded by 1975.9

The western pact won the confrontation of “Cold War” mainly with successful operations along the lines of economy and politics. The home front of USSR broke because of mothers opposing casualties caused by lengthening war in Afghanistan and Party was failing in homeland economy. The political leadership gained valuable lessons at political-strategical level and combining different lines of operation to successful course of action, they got rid of old constraints in operational thinking. The military leaders in the other hand restricted their thinking against all the lessons of Sun Tzu and stovepiped themselves as weapon system managers at tactical level.

In so called International War on Terror, and specially, when US lead coalition conducted the Freedom Iraq operation in 2003, US lead military leaders learnt that opponent is able to adjust their operations and organisations. The opponent was good at analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the coalition and acted upon the findings as follows:

  • guerilla operations were combined with conventional tactics,
  • industrial and military products were integrated with COTS information technology to create more effect on physical and information level,
  • propaganda was used to weaken both the will of fighting forces and the home front of coalition.

Iraq resistance changed their way of fighting both at strategical, operational and tactical level so that coalition force would suffer their weakness such as disability to sustain their operation or wage effective information operation in very different culture from their own.10

In all armed conflicts occurred after 1991, the most lethal weapons have been machete, AK-47 and suicidal bomb (In Rwanda almost a million people was killed within three months in 1994). Before 2005 the number of armed conflicts had declined 40% and the number of major conflicts (over 1 000 casualties) had dropped 80%. Only 5 % on all conflicts are wars between states.11


2. Possible challenges in the confrontations of post-modern world


At political level a leader is moved by opinion of voters, opinion of other party members, opinion of major coalition partners and opinion of global society. The effectivity of those opinions has multiplied with modern, public, commercial media, who is competing for receivers attention emphasizing extraordinary, radical or negative news. The themes that go over the threshold of one´s attention are still heat, dread and grudge12.

The liberation of global economics has increased after the fall of communist block in 2000 century. Economically speaking the earth is flat13, because knowledge work is not spatially restricted. Even the heavy fabrication industry is finding optimum between labour, taxation, energy, raw materials and logistics with fewer concerns of geographical or state borders.

A post-modern state is more interdependent of other states and their assets like energy, rare materials, capital, competence and labour. Capitalism separates good products from bad even faster than before with assistance of technology and information14. This enhanced separation process divides production structure either to small specialized companies or huge global organizations who are leaders of supply chains or near monopolist builders of business ecosystems. Products and their production structures do change faster compared to last century. So does requirements for competence and jobs. Companies are located more and more in cities, that grow to be metropolises, centroids of economy. These centroids are growing to be economically larger than states and thus more influential and more profitable targets for attacks.15

In western world social activity happens merely in metropolis where people are single, women are more educated than men, amount of working people is less than those of cared by society and more people are becoming marginalized from society.16 Changes in the essence of childhood are lessening our ability to create normal relationships with people. Need to be accepted is being satisfied in virtual world, where social and moral rules are more simple and may differ greatly from those of real world.17

Empty home, ritualistic religion and indistinct nationality are not able to bring people together like in the times of French Revolution, to possibly give their lives for greater needs of their society. The structure of social capital is changing significantly18, which increases the vulnerability of post-modern western individual, leaves him exposed to influence and in crises times more prone to seek security from authority. As this is happening in this world, there is another world, where 97% of people does not watch CNN and only one of five owns a television. That is a reality, where people are ready to even die for their religion, tribe, village, kin or their nucleus family.19

The armies of post-modern states are more professional, smaller and more technical. They are more interdependent of public and private companies that support them even in a space of operation. Long supply lines may cross borders and international dependence is a fact even with national army. With professional army soldiers and citizens seldomly interact. This may lead to separation between armed forces and the society it is supposed to secure, because fewer people do participate in defending their community. This alienation has happened for example during the last centuries of Roman Empire.20

As weapon systems become more expensive, international co-operation between providers and military forces intensifies and that leads to similar tactics and battle technics of forces. Complexity requires more professional soldiers and increases interdependence between military and industry.21 Compared to Napoleonic Army Corps22 or WW II division which were hierarchically led independent forces, a post-modern force is a coalition of specialized military, non-governmental and civilian organizations, which creates a value driven chain. It is a process driven provider-subscriber network, that creates besides vertical also horizontal value. The management of this value adding network is based on information flow, trust and common understanding.23

In the other world using violence is a business as usual for some people. With vast stocks of conventional weapons delivered from depots of cold war era, some people do continue tyrannize, blackmail and harass their fellow human beings.24

In post-modern societies people may either lower their acceptance of military operation because it does not happen in their reality but news. In the other hand violence is not an everyday thing in their lives, so even a slight casualty may change the general opinion.
It might be easier to manipulate the thinking of public and politics of post-modern society because of their real world distance from violence.25 In the other world it is more probable to face violence. Deaths of children and young people is considered natural. Those societies, on the other hand, are passively facing violence and then struggling with life.26

A democratic leader of the post-modern society wants to share risks, gain gravity of positive public opinion and political will by creating multinational coalitions. Coalition also minimizes effects of complexity and expenses of war and gain positive ethos in front of public.

It is easier to political leader to send either employed or paramilitary people than draftees to operations with aims or methods difficult to justify to ordinary citizens. With information spreading globally without delay and media trying to produce most selling news of the day, the opinion of shareholders, neutrals and global media is effecting more in the space of operations. The public pressure is having impact specially on political decision making.27

In the other world power is in the hands of different parties with divergent interests. There are warlords and chieftains, whose living is depending on armed violence. There are charismatic leaders, whose power is depending on continuation of confrontation and conflict.28

The British military has adopted the following aspects on changes in conflicts as society evolves from industrial to post-modern as29:

  1. The means and aims in conflict are changing. Industrial societies were trying to destroy each others military forces. Post-modern societies try to utilize force to change the behaviour of opponent and other stake-holders.
  2. At tactical level force is utilized amongst people. The space of operation includes houses of people, streets of cities and fields of farmers. The space of operations is extended into living rooms globally delivered by mass media.
  3. Conflicts are often timeless and never ending. There seldom is a military line of operation leading to end state. With military means there is a possibility to gain and maintain conditions, that allow to proceed in other lines of operation to comprehensive solution.
  4. Post-modern states are handling their confrontations sparing living force and securing their economical networks. They operate in a pressure of general opinion shaped by global media. They seldomly invest all their focus and resources to solve a confrontation.
  5. Post-modern armies do use their existing weaponry, suffer from their restrictions but find new applications as they are utilized in modern space of operation.
  6. In most cases the parties of conflict are not states, because either the argument over interests rises between smaller societies or internationally states want to create coalitions to minimize risks and gain positive ethos in the eyes of general opinion.



3. How to change the behaviour of opposing sides i.e. how to resolve conflicts of post-modern time


There is a need for both pre-emptive and reactive measures to change the behaviour of parties involved in post-modern confrontations and conflicts. It takes comprehensive30 effort along all four lines of operations (political, economical, social and military) to change the opposing interactive structure of political leadership, population and force as defined by Clausewitz. The combined operations do create an effect on physical or on information level from where it is projected to cognitive level amongst all shareholders and stakeholders of conflict. Information, knowledge and experience together creates understanding or feeling on the cognitive level. Only understanding or emotions make individual or society to change their behaviour.31

The physical level is familiar to all generations of warfare. On the physical level a force of material, people and movement is being utilized. On this level one also meets a friction caused by environment, weather or malfunctioning systems. On the physical level casualties are suffered concretely. The military dimensions of physical level are ground, sea, air, space, electromagnetic waves, cyberspace and time.32

Those events or features on physical level, that are sensed by human or other sensors, create information. Information can be delivered to other entities by means of communication. A piece of information in an information or communications system is called data. Information is being processed, delivered and saved either in cyber domain, human brains or other media.
Communication between entities occur on information level and often it has a nature of interaction. Information answers to questions like: what, where, when or who. Information is a raw material, which is being refined to knowledge for humans and artificial intelligence to understand.

A information created by real world event is being interpreted along a long line of communication and information processing on the information level to a meaning. That line is not always linear, so the meaning may be true, untrue or delusion. Information is being packed to mediums (audio, picture, text, video, etc.) and packing process loses or distorts information. Mediums are being forwarded through channels (massmedia, Internet, conversation, clipboards, information systems and other means) that are not linear. When information is delivered via interaction of human beings, there is always ethos and pathos, which effect on how information is understood.33 Between machines there is often an interface to adapt information between different ontologies, data models or message models. That interface may loose information, change its meaning or add noise.

On the cognitive34 level human thinking is processing information and knowledge to understanding, which is one of the basis for insight and foresight.35 Cognitive level includes also believes, feelings, values and will. The questions being answered are why and what comes out of this. Decisions are being made on this level with a mixture of logical and emotional deduction or realization. Tacit -knowledge is also cumulating on the cognitive level36.

In all action, communication and thinking is happening over the physical, information and cognitive levels as interaction between entities and environment. Societies (family, groups, organizations, states, nations) interact between each other socially and economically. There has been political and military interaction between industrial states, but those means have expanded even between entities like interest groups and insurgents during post-modern era.

In a confrontation between post-modern societies all means of social, economical, political and military are being used on the physical and information levels in order to create a meaning on cognitive level thus change the behavior of opposing individuals, groups or societies. While effecting to opposing entity, the understanding and behavior of other stakeholders and bystanders within the space of operation are also targeted. To create an effect one has to have interaction on one or several lines of operation: social, economical, political or military.

On the social line of operation there is possible to execute following tasks:
1. Found a plinth that enables higher level interaction by providing basic nutrition; founding schools to advance literacy; founding religious buildings, shops, markets and wells; training police forces, search and rescue forces and health care personnel.
2. Ameliorate structures for higher social interaction and necessities by supporting open gatherings and independent media, building the integrity of society with religious events or sports and educating teachers, officials and journalists.
3. Contain and restrict inter- and intra-action societies within the operations space by denying usage of media, gatherings, movement outside or by censoring the content in interaction situations or restricting the usage of communications and Internet.

On the economical line of operation there is possible to execute following tasks:
1. Ameliorate economy by providing loans or investing, giving bilateral priorities for commerce, forgiving loans or their interests, donating production lines or other facilities, importing advertise, importing shops of friendly chains.
2. Contain economy of the society subject by manipulating its currency, lowering its credit rating, freezing foreign assets of the society or its key personnel, building up export duties, banning commerce of key products, restricting importation of energy or raw material.
3. Prevent or Force economy by creating commerce or economical blockades, freezing international assets or investments, occupying key companies, cutting energy supplies or foodstuff, hold up society to execute their basic professions by tampering with irritation, energy, commerce, fertilizers, etc. Removing population away from the opponents eminent area of operations and support.

On the political line of operation there is possible to execute following tasks:
1. Ameliorate the societies in the space of operations by supporting democratic elections, opening media channels to every interest group, supporting creating associates or congregating, educating party and administrations officials, exchanging of cultural events and values, exchanging of entertainment or sports.
2. Contain or pressure the societies in the space of operations by giving disapproval statements, publishing diplomatic missives, creating political alliance for diplomatic pressure, seeking condemning resolutions from international bodies, starting to bargain about requirements and their fulfilment, Creating untrust between society and its key personnel by publishing embarrassing information, supporting opponents opponents in their quest.
3. Deter or Coerce the societies in the space of operations by seeking condemning resolutions from international bodies, summoning to international justice, terminating contracts, severing diplomatic relations.

On the military line of operation there is possible to execute following tasks:37
1. Ameliorate societies in the area of operations with military force by building infrastructure, ensuring police, border and SAR -services, educating, training and mentoring local societies, supervising the stabilized situation. Examples like UNIFIL, UNFICYP, UNMOGIP.
2. Contain with military force by supporting other lines of operation with surveillance (no fly zones, ban of arms), enhancing local police and frontier guard to prevent illegal passage, using military intelligence to support other lines of operation. Examples like adhering no-fly zones over Iraq, tasks in the beginning of Libya operation 2011.
3. Deter or Coerce with military force the opposing society to create a threshold that would keep opponent at bay or change its behavior in other lines of operation. Examples like deterrence of Cold War, Operation Desert Shield in 1990, Estonian bronze warrior episode with massive DDOS -attack in 2007.
4. Destroy the opponents assets or centers of gravity like C2 structure, production of basic goods, infrastructure or military power in order to achieve end of state together with other lines of operation. Examples like Falkland war 1982, Desert Strom operation 1990 – 1991.

The operation is planned to achieve the end of state by using means from all lines of operation. After analysis and war gaming a course of action will be defined and operation starts. Operation is a series of parallel and consecutive tasks that are effecting either on physical or on information level. The aim is to have definite effect on cognitive level and change behavior of opposing society and their leaders. Confrontation, conflicts and operations are managed at four levels: political, strategical, operational and tactical. These levels intertwine through space of operation and occasion at one level may have major affect on others.38

Reference:
1General Carl von Clausewitz: On War. Translated by Col J.J. Graham 1909
2General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1
3General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1
4Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.28
5Geoffrey Roberts: Stalin´s Wars. Yale University Press 2006 s. 33
6Geoffrey Roberts: Stalin´s Wars. Yale University Press 2006 s.12
7Geoffrey Roberts: Stalin´s Wars. Yale University Press 2006 s.10
8Jukka Seppinen: Neuvostotiedustelu Suomessa 1917 – 1991 Strategia ja toiminta. Gummerus 2006 s.269
9General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1
10ARMY TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) 2009
11General David Richards, Greg Mills Ed.: Victory among People, Lessons from Countering Insurgency and
Stabilising Fragile States
12Pauli Aalto-Setälä: Merkitystalous. Helsinki 2005 ISBN 951-607-261-5
13Thomas L. Friedman: The World is Flat. Globalized World in The Twenty-First Century. Penguin 2006
14Kjell A. Nordström: Speaking at Elisa seminar in Helsinki 2010
15Peter Gordon et al: Economic impact analysis using a model of consistent interregional economic and highway network equilibria. University of Southern California.
16Kjell A. Nordström: Speaking in Elisa seminar Helsinki 2010
17Liisa Keltikangas-Järvinen: Tunne itsesi, suomalainen. 9.painos WSOY 2010
18Putnam R.D: Bowling alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon&Schuster 2000
19Pauli Aalto-Setälä: Merkitystalous. Helsinki 2005 ISBN 951-607-261-5
20Adrian Goldsworthy: In the name of Rome. The men who won the Empire. Lennart Sane Agency 2003
21Janne Mälkki, Risto Marjomaa, Jyri Raitasalo, Tero Karasjärvi, Joonas Sipilä: Sodan historia. Otava 2008 ISBN 978-951-1-21885-2
22Dunn-Pattison R.P: Napoleon´s Marshals. Methuen&Co, London 1909
23Seppo Niemelä: Menestyvä yritysverkosto. Edita 2002 ISBN 951-37-3648-2
24John Keegan: A History of Warfare. Vintage Books 1994
25Janne Mälkki, Risto Marjomaa, Jyri Raitasalo, Tero Karasjärvi, Joonas Sipilä: Sodan historia. Otava 2008 ISBN 978-951-1-21885-2
26John Keegan: A History of Warfare. Vintage Books 1994
27Janne Mälkki, Risto Marjomaa, Jyri Raitasalo, Tero Karasjärvi, Joonas Sipilä: Sodan historia. Otava 2008 ISBN 978-951-1-21885-2
28Col Kenneth Allard: Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. CCRP
29General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1
30NATO agreed 2010 that ”Comprehensive Approach” -concept will create a foundation of their strategy. Comprehensive Approach means that Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic elements (DIME) are being used jointly and combined at strategical and operational level to achieve the end state in a conflict.
31DoD: Network Centric Warfare. Department of Defense Report to Congress 27 July 2001. (www.dodccrp.org)
32Colin S. Gray: Another Bloody Century – Future Warfare. Phoenix 2005 ISBN 0-3043-6734-6
33Pauli Aalto-Setälä: Merkitystalous. Helsinki 2005 ISBN 951-607-261-5
34Cognition: the act or process of knowing including both awareness and judgement. Webster´s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1983
35UK Joint doctrine publication 04: Understanding. Development, concepts and doctrine Centre, December 2010
36Tacit -knowledge: born from experiences, effecting in all human behavior, sometimes even subconsciously.
37General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1
38A single unwise tactical move by a soldier on patrol can instantly change the character of an entire operation and, when broadcast by the ever-present media pool, can also affect strategic considerations. Col, PhD Kenneth Allard: The Somalia Operation: Lessons Learned. CCRP


2013-02-23

How to enhance capabilities of a complex military battle system by C4I development


This paper is still to be edited!

How to enhance capabilities of a complex military battle system by C4I development


A military task force projecting force to change behaviour in the space of operations includes armament, vehicles, soldiers, combat support and service support elements, information, leaders and their staff and operational plans. These elements are welded together creating a complex fighting system with commanders will, example of leaders, vigorous training and information provided by C4ISR systems. The system survives casualties and friction caused by rough environment, opponent, other neutral or active stakeholders, home front and public media, when it is being trained, supported and educated with adequate behaviors and understanding to cope all the surprises of the space of operation.

A short story of fighting systems evolution

In the 1300 century a horse and its rider created a Mongol fighting system. Horse gave superior tactical and operational mobility. Composite riding bow gave superior fire power and a rider presented intelligence and surveillance capabilities and integration with other troops and larger forces.1 All the components smoothed together during their life time gaining power and endurance required by Mongol art of operations. Chingis Khan exercised horsemen and Chinese siege technology together and reached dominant tactical capability and asymmetry over his opponents forces. He gained better operational understanding by continuous learning and nominating leaders by their competence not by their kin.2

Emerging industrialization created 1st generation of fighting systems late 1900 century and generated a superiority of magnitude with mass production. A heavy machine gun with its crew was dominant in the space of operations of WW I. As components of fighting system, people and animals carried the gun, reconnoitre for targets, directed fire and supplied ammunition belts. Weapons and ammunition were manufactured in mass production lines. Crews were trained with military drilling to achieve motor co-ordination and automation.3

With the 2nd generation of fighting systems weapon was attached to a platform which gave better mobility, provided supplements and enabled automation of manual tasks. Human and animal were substituted with machines and automation. The armoured tank of WW II represents an automated fighting system, where man was still making decisions and providing agility. Because of technology and automation it took longer time to train tank crews or pilots to function well within a system. The first main battle tanks were produced in one company, but with standardization of parts and urgency of need, subcontractors quickly emerged to enable specialization and manufacturing capability.

With the 3rd generation of fighting systems weapon platforms like main battle tank were connected together by a man and communications devices, which enabled platforms to act co-ordinated as larger force. During 1920 – 1940 Germany massed main battle tanks, supported them with dive bombers and created tactical and operational dominance according to Heinz Guderian´s vision.4 Armoured army groups consisted of tank companies, which presented firepower and mobility. Other units provided support and supplies. The industry provided large number of tanks with mass production. Lack of raw materials and knowledge were considered as a challenge. It took also longer to train armoured formations to be able to manoeuvre as required by “blitzkrieg” operations.

In the 4th generation of fighting systems weapon platforms were provided with sensors and fire management systems, which automated firing and enhanced capability to survive in battle field. The 4th generation ground based air defence system is an example of semi automated holistic system where programming and applications are playing major part in their capability. Man is included only as a decision maker in surveillance and firing processes. Large companies or consortiums of military industry can produce and maintain 4th generation complex technical fighting systems. People are needed less, but they have to be highly educated to understand complex systems and extendedly trained with simulators to gain experience of different situations.5 Since fighting systems are complex and their capability is measured with system against system confrontation, the arms race is hoisting prices. There has even been talks that conscripts armies, nations with less educated people or nations with small population are not able to use these advanced fighting systems.

In the 5th generation fighting system weapon platforms are integrated with other subsystems like sensor systems, logistic systems, sapper systems, air defence systems and C4ISR systems. Of course there are soldiers, vehicles, leaders and their plans as with the earlier generations. The 5th generation military system provides not only massing effect of similar fighting platforms like main battle tank, but exponentially increasing capability by networking together specialized subsystems.6 The modern military task force is based on integrated fighting system in which any of the sensors that sees a target can give tracking to the best weapon platform optimized according to situation. Machines and men are collaborating, sharing information and creating understanding, learning from past experiences and sustaining the asymmetric capability over the opponent.7 The integrated 5th generation fighting system owes its capability mainly to programming and electronics. The hardware may even be a mixture of products from civilian, governmental and military shelves.

To develop and maintain the military task force with 5th generation of fighting system, there are two main alternatives:
  1. There is one company or consortium of industry that can produce and integrate an programmable system layer that runs through sensors, weapons, soldiers, vehicles and C4ISR systems and creates an integration layer for all other subsystems. There is an example of Israeli armed forces digitalization program ZAYAD and the main contractor ELBIT.8
  2. The C4I system of the task force is developed to speak and understand every dialect of multivendor subsystems. Subsystems may vary within lifecycle or by mission, but C4I system adapts in every change and is able to communicate effectively with man. There are examples like LINK 16 which is connecting all subsystems of U.S. Air component or Sanomalaite in Finnish Land component.


How to develop, train and maintain complex military task force and gain capabilities that create asymmetric advantages over opponent?

The post-modern society requires more capabilities, agility, multifaceted abilities and cost-effectiveness through the length of life-cycle from its defense systems. The 5th generation of fighting system creates an opportunity to build integrated man-machine task forces that can almost autonomously accomplish a military task either as centralized force structure or as distributed nodes of force still able to act co-ordinated like a hunting pack of wolfs. By connecting these task forces together adhoc, one can also form a larger military formation to achieve spatial massing. Besides fighting the task force may be required to handle missions like protecting inhabitants, supporting recovery from natural disaster, supporting other governmental agencies in homeland defense or be able to participate peace keeping operation as a part of combined, joint and multi-agency force internationally.9

All the subsystems of task force - weapon systems, sensor systems, vehicle systems, C4ISR systems, logistic systems and several specialized branch systems - are required to change information with each other without a man in the middle translation. Modern space of operations is more dynamic than earlier. Humans and machines of the task force are required to learn from their own experience or others in the same space of operations to be able to adapt to changes and to recover subtly from sudden losses. The task force system is connecting to support elements and processes with continuous flow of digital information to maintain its automated systems available, supplied and intact. The provider of support may be far in homeland or in home front using civilian supply chain management system. Information should flow seamlessly along the length of supply chain although management systems may be civilian, governmental or military. The information exchange requirements do not include only technical information but all bounds of supply chain should also understand commanders intent, current situation and be able to act promptly to sudden changes. The entirely chain of support should enhance a patrol of warriors penetrating opponent´s strongholds, having insights of situation and opponents weaknesses and projecting cost-effectively joint force to change opponents behaviour.10

The capability of this post-modern task force is more than material or technology, you
don´t see it presented in exhibitions, nor you can purchase it from one provider and you are not able to copy it somewhere or develop it in 18 months. The task force fighting system is a strategic asset and it is based on strengths of one´s nation whilst compensating one´s weaknesses. Post-modern world is flat11, space of operation is global and opponent is unpredictable so fighting system must be agile:
  • Both manual and automated processes must be adaptable to situation and they should be able to learn from lessons within hours.
  • The fighting system should be upgradeable with new hardware or programmable capabilities throughout the whole life cycle.
  • The system should be trainable to conscripts and other personnel involved in the operation.
  • The system should integrate both existing military and civilian subsystem and foreseeable future subsystems.

The task force fighting system should be updated daily and new capabilities should be introduced twice a year. The systems intra integration should consist of services like programmable functions and information which can flow between the nodes. Development is co-ordinated through the threads of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leading and education, personnel, facilities, information and interoperability (DOTMLPFII) intertwining together as a bundle.12

A intertwined structure of the fighting task force requires development with small steps of experimenting, system testing, field testing and piloting and very strong feedback from users. This spiral development13 allows close collaboration between developers, maintainers, leaders and users thus encouraging to innovate and empowering user driven development. As new capability is being introduced to system of men, programs and technology with small doses, the co-ordination of progress is controlled and the testing time would allow more resilient threads like procedures, behaviour or competence to mature accordingly thus keeping risks at bay.

The development and maintenance of task force fighting system requires several system entities in order to maintain co-ordination, integrity and maintainability:
  1. A production version of system used by task forces in operations, missions and training
  2. A reference version of system used for maintenance and system testing by network of maintenance and support organizations.
  3. A pilot version of next capability entity to be able to field change through intertwined DOTMLPFII -threads by pilot task force
  4. A test version of next capability entity to be able to test technical and information integration as a full system with user cases created for new features. This entity is used by development programs and integrators together with a network of maintenance and support organisations.

Besides these entities there are several different versions of technical subsystems that may be developed more waterfall -like14 and tested with V -concept15. The method of spiral development enables to maintain current capability fleet of task forces but develop gradually new capabilities maintaining service safety and both technical and procedural support.

An example how spiral development has been utilized for intertwined DOTMLPFII C4I -system development

The following example is depicting how Land Forces of Finland developed their new light mechanized infantry task force capability, while maintaining legacy brigades and their training. By developing C4ISR -system within task force´s fighting system Finnish Army was enhancing the overall change of the land forces capabilities. The end state of the total program is renew the concepts of land fighting, support to other agencies and peace keeping in Finland. This is to adjust land forces to lesser manpower, shorter training time, diminished training facilities but capable to cope with more demanding challenges of post-modern operations.

The C4I -system of a Finnish brigade Model 05 (M05) was the legacy capability to be maintained and development was executed using two new versions Model 12 and Model 18, which were aimed to enhance new combat and tactics development. Numbers refer to the years systems were planned to be fielded for conscript training throughout land forces.

The first development spirals were aiming to only minor changes of M05 system in order to get tactical thinking and procedures moving towards to the new concept. The M12 used M05 as a bases but it was modified with both military and civil subsystems to enable other branches development and education of personnel. M18 was the target system for the renewed task force based on new technology and providing required capabilities with consistency and survivability in the post-modern space of operations.

The spiral development took place between 2008 – 2013 covering all the DOTMLPFII -threads as follows (DOTMLPFII – alphabets in brackets refers to the threads that were targeted with each spiral):

Year 2008
  • (DOTMLPFII) a strategy was defined to develop new capabilities stepping through three entities of brigade/task force C4I -system (M05, M12 and M18) that could enable the required development in other fields, branches and layers of the future task force.
M05
  • (DMI) the M05 -system was altered so that a single brigade was attached with message system as part of greater force. This was aimed to start thinking of swarming tactics, enhance information exchange and enable better indirect fire support.
  • (OMI) the brigade command and control system was taken to upper echelons to enable interoperability through the chain of command, build up a common operational picture and create better understanding to staff processes and reorganization.
M12
  • (D) analysing and testing different options to update M05 system to better support development of battle technics, support to other agencies and international operations.
M18
  • (II) analysing options to develop information management and exchange capabilities with either message formats, standardized queries or service oriented architecture and semantic data. This was to create innovative thinking for future possibilities and their application.
  • (LII) testing different military and civilian communications equipment and analysing modern technologies enhanced education and innovation amongst army and potential providers. This was supported by researching and experimenting by universities.
Year 2009
M05
  • (OTP) a service management and support organisation was started first as virtual organisation to enable people to adapt new procedures and processes.
  • (PI) the use of command and control system was extended from company commander to the Commander of Land Forces in order to boost security thinking and information management processes.
  • (OTLI) the command and control system throughout land forces was unified to start collaboration and information exchange between forces, to enable C2 -process development and to create new interoperability issues to be solved and to start a learning spiral.
M12
  • (M) while testing different new methods of data transfer, a hidden feature was found from old M05 system and it was decided to exploit in M12 -systems IP-modernization.
M18
  • (ML) the first new technology prototypes and experiments were ordered to demonstrate possibilities of new technology and how integrated systems may have to be developed.
Year 2010
M05
  • (DOLII) by spreading message system to cover the whole land force and connecting it to navy´s similar system, a joint information flow and collaboration was enabled.
M12
  • (ML) by adding civilian routers to existing field communications system, an opportunity was created for personnel to learn how IP -transmission and routing behaves in field environment.
  • (OLI) by publishing a command and control SOP for land forces, a basis for C2 processes development was established and understanding of post-modern C2 processes was spreading.
  • (TMLII) the first versions of battle management systems were tested in both international peace keeping operations, in co-operation missions with other agencies and in combat training. This gained experience of maturity and ability to enhance fighting efficiency at troop level.
M18
  • (MLII) a first version of semantic model of land operations ontology was published to give information to system providers and other development programs of new way to manage and exchange information and gain interoperability.
  • (M) by testing with the prototypes of M18 subsystems in laboratory, a feedback was gained to steer the next spiral of development of the new technology features.
Year 2011
M05
  • The updating of M05 system was ceased and resources transferred to M12 enhancements.
  • (OL) the maintenance personnel of M05 were educated to maintain and support programmable electronics with new processes.
M12
  • (D) a first version of renewed battle concept was created to start the education and change of thinking
  • (DTL) education of the new concept was started to gain feedback from command post exercises and war games.
  • (OMLF) Several subsystems and updates of M12 system was fielded to operations and training in order to gain feedback to improve integrity of technology, training facilities and maintenance.
M18
  • (TML) by testing M18 subsystems in field, a feedback was gained concerning training ability and survivability for next spiral of development.
Year 2012
M12
  • (DML) A first architecture and system description of M12 C4I -system was composed for integration tests and to support the technical education and tactical war gaming.
  • (T) M12 technical systems were introduced to conscripts and training started even with non-finished system (open beta version16).
  • (FL) new facilities and training systems were build to enhance training of conscripts for the new fighting concept
  • (MOLI) a test of indirect fire control was executed with M12 system in life fire exercise in order to certify safety of service and deepen the integration with artillery.
  • (OPF) A former virtual organisation for maintaining and supporting the programmable electronics was founded officially after maturing of processes and gaining required competence. ITIL -processes ensured interoperability with supporting C4I-centre and its subcontractors. Programmable electronics maintenance was integrated to existing weapon systems maintenance organisation to enhance cost-effectiveness and begin the change in logistics branch.
M18
  • (OTL) A plan was composed to migrate M12 training to M18 training with lessons learnt from M05 to M12 migration. Also procurement plans for the first series of new system was authorized.
  • (LI) A first system integration exercise did introduce the whole M18 C4I -system prototype. Technical and user case tests were accomplished and integration risks were managed. This was giving final fixes and green light to proceed to prototype field tests in a pilot unit.
Year 2013
M05
  • (T) The last of training with legacy system will be done. The capability is maintained in storage and in reserve but all conscript training will include M12 systems and new battle technics.
M12
  • (DOTMLPFII) The M12 training will commence with full capacity and M12 will be used both internationally and nationally. This gains lessons for the new battle tactics and technics to be learnt, while developing M18 system and finalizing the concept of operation.
M18
  • (DOTMLPFII) The pilot unit starts to train conscripts with first prototype of M18 task force C4I -system. Frequent exercises and intense field research by Military University, schools of branches and providers will give lessons to be able to finalize task force fighting concept by 2015 and execute next migration from M12 to M18 between 2015 – 2018.

M18+
  • (DOTMLPFII) Change continues. Twice a year new spiral of features is introduced, tested and fielded. New capabilities are enabled, innovation flourishes but risks remain manageable. New development and maintenance culture enables to maintain task force fighting system capability dominance without risks of no return through the whole life cycle of task force capability.

With developing spirals of the C4I -subsystem, the total fighting system of task force was gradually developed as well. The feedback of the C4I -changes was enormously helpful to reveal the development maturity of the fighting system, because C4I -system intertwined with every other subsystem. Developing a complex system includes risks that are not entirely technical and thus not manageable solely with V -development and testing method. Spiral method with constant information feedback and lessons learnt, helped to manage development and risks of intertwine system. Some spirals of development did not succeed because of technical immaturity, inability of personnel to operate systems or simply because user did not have any reason to use the new feature. In those situations spiral method enabled unsuccessful subchanges to be returned to earlier stages for better preparation. The overall change migration went on, other subchanges created bursts of excitement and goals were even exceeded.

During the development occurred that trainers competence and procedures were the most hardest to change, because it was easier for them to stick with old habits. The same time conscripts did accept every change with eagerness and swift, because they did not know the legacy procedures. The spiral method introduced subchanges gradually and mixed with old features. New technology was introduced as a part of an old system, old system was used just a pit differently to enable new procedures or new military tasks was done via familiar civilian interface. That made it easier for personnel to change their existing habits.17 Amongst the personnel the highest threshold for change was when old message terminal was substituted with field computer or when one brigades special procedures were forced to change similar to the others were following. With the power of example and social force to be able to interoperate in test exercises even the stickiest habit was being changed.

References:
1Per Inge Oestmoen: The Realm of The Mongols. http://www.coldsiberia.org/monmight.htm
2John Keegan: A history of warfare, First vintage books edition 1994.
3John Keegan: A history of warfare, First vintage books edition 1994. s.361 - 366
4Heinz Guderian: Achtung-Panzer! Cassel Military Paperbacks 1999 ISBN 0-304-35285-3
5Rubert Smith: The Utility of Force. First Vintage Books edition 2008. Chapter 6
6David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes: Power to the Edge. CCRP 3rd printing 2005
7Terry Costlow: Next-generation battle tech gets put to the test. Defense Systems Jan 14, 2011
8Ground Forces Digitalization program Israeli Defense Forces (ZAYAD). Defense update 2005 issue 1. http://www.defense-update.com/products/z/zayad.htm
9Juha Mattila: Vastakkainasettelu, konfliktit, taistelut ja niiden johtaminen. Sotilasaikakauslehti, Joulukuu 2011 in finnish only
10Juha Mattila: Uudistetun maataistelun johtaminen ja viestitoiminta. Sotilasaikakauslehti, Joulukuu 2012 in finnish only
11Thomas L. Friedman: The world is flat. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. April 2005
12U.S. Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff instruction 3170.01H 10th January 2012: Joint capabilities integration and development system. The JCIDS process provides a solution space that considers solutions involving any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLFP is added with information and interoperability by the author.
13Juha Mattila: A variation of spiral development and acquisition method applied to military command, control and communications system production. Defence University of Finland publications 2004
14Herbert B. Bennington: Production of large computer programs. The Navy Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel and the Office of Naval Research in June 1956
15Brian Marick: New models for test development. Reliable Software Technologies 1999.
16 Open beta testing serve the dual purpose of demonstrating a product to potential users, and testing among an extremely wide user base likely to bring to light obscure errors that a much smaller testing team might not find. This is s normal procedure in software production.
See TidBITS, http://web.archive.org/web/20111004155501/http://tidbits.com/?@236.BzSIbUcwjzO@
17Charles Duhigg: The power of habit. Random House Books 2013