How to enhance capabilities of a complex military battle system by C4I development

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How to enhance capabilities of a complex military battle system by C4I development

A military task force projecting force to change behaviour in the space of operations includes armament, vehicles, soldiers, combat support and service support elements, information, leaders and their staff and operational plans. These elements are welded together creating a complex fighting system with commanders will, example of leaders, vigorous training and information provided by C4ISR systems. The system survives casualties and friction caused by rough environment, opponent, other neutral or active stakeholders, home front and public media, when it is being trained, supported and educated with adequate behaviors and understanding to cope all the surprises of the space of operation.

A short story of fighting systems evolution

In the 1300 century a horse and its rider created a Mongol fighting system. Horse gave superior tactical and operational mobility. Composite riding bow gave superior fire power and a rider presented intelligence and surveillance capabilities and integration with other troops and larger forces.¹ All the components smoothed together during their life time gaining power and endurance required by Mongol art of operations. Chingis Khan exercised horsemen and Chinese siege technology together and reached dominant tactical capability and asymmetry over his opponents forces. He gained better operational understanding by continuous learning and nominating leaders by their competence not by their kin.²

Emerging industrialization created 1^st generation of fighting systems late 1900 century and generated a superiority of magnitude with mass production. A heavy machine gun with its crew was dominant in the space of operations of WW I. As components of fighting system, people and animals carried the gun, reconnoitre for targets, directed fire and supplied ammunition belts. Weapons and ammunition were manufactured in mass production lines. Crews were trained with military drilling to achieve motor co-ordination and automation.³

With the 2^nd generation of fighting systems weapon was attached to a platform which gave better mobility, provided supplements and enabled automation of manual tasks. Human and animal were substituted with machines and automation. The armoured tank of WW II represents an automated fighting system, where man was still making decisions and providing agility. Because of technology and automation it took longer time to train tank crews or pilots to function well within a system. The first main battle tanks were produced in one company, but with standardization of parts and urgency of need, subcontractors quickly emerged to enable specialization and manufacturing capability.

With the 3^rd generation of fighting systems weapon platforms like main battle tank were connected together by a man and communications devices, which enabled platforms to act co-ordinated as larger force. During 1920 – 1940 Germany massed main battle tanks, supported them with dive bombers and created tactical and operational dominance according to Heinz Guderian´s vision.⁴ Armoured army groups consisted of tank companies, which presented firepower and mobility. Other units provided support and supplies. The industry provided large number of tanks with mass production. Lack of raw materials and knowledge were considered as a challenge. It took also longer to train armoured formations to be able to manoeuvre as required by “blitzkrieg” operations.

In the 4^th generation of fighting systems weapon platforms were provided with sensors and fire management systems, which automated firing and enhanced capability to survive in battle field. The 4^th generation ground based air defence system is an example of semi automated holistic system where programming and applications are playing major part in their capability. Man is included only as a decision maker in surveillance and firing processes. Large companies or consortiums of military industry can produce and maintain 4^th generation complex technical fighting systems. People are needed less, but they have to be highly educated to understand complex systems and extendedly trained with simulators to gain experience of different situations.⁵ Since fighting systems are complex and their capability is measured with system against system confrontation, the arms race is hoisting prices. There has even been talks that conscripts armies, nations with less educated people or nations with small population are not able to use these advanced fighting systems.

In the 5^th generation fighting system weapon platforms are integrated with other subsystems like sensor systems, logistic systems, sapper systems, air defence systems and C4ISR systems. Of course there are soldiers, vehicles, leaders and their plans as with the earlier generations. The 5^th generation military system provides not only massing effect of similar fighting platforms like main battle tank, but exponentially increasing capability by networking together specialized subsystems.⁶ The modern military task force is based on integrated fighting system in which any of the sensors that sees a target can give tracking to the best weapon platform optimized according to situation. Machines and men are collaborating, sharing information and creating understanding, learning from past experiences and sustaining the asymmetric capability over the opponent.⁷ The integrated 5^th generation fighting system owes its capability mainly to programming and electronics. The hardware may even be a mixture of products from civilian, governmental and military shelves.

To develop and maintain the military task force with 5^th generation of fighting system, there are two main alternatives:

1. There is one company or consortium of industry that can produce and integrate an programmable system layer that runs through sensors, weapons, soldiers, vehicles and C4ISR systems and creates an integration layer for all other subsystems. There is an example of Israeli armed forces digitalization program ZAYAD and the main contractor ELBIT.⁸
2. The C4I system of the task force is developed to speak and understand every dialect of multivendor subsystems. Subsystems may vary within lifecycle or by mission, but C4I system adapts in every change and is able to communicate effectively with man. There are examples like LINK 16 which is connecting all subsystems of U.S. Air component or Sanomalaite in Finnish Land component.

How to develop, train and maintain complex military task force and gain capabilities that create asymmetric advantages over opponent?

The post-modern society requires more capabilities, agility, multifaceted abilities and cost-effectiveness through the length of life-cycle from its defense systems. The 5^th generation of fighting system creates an opportunity to build integrated man-machine task forces that can almost autonomously accomplish a military task either as centralized force structure or as distributed nodes of force still able to act co-ordinated like a hunting pack of wolfs. By connecting these task forces together adhoc, one can also form a larger military formation to achieve spatial massing. Besides fighting the task force may be required to handle missions like protecting inhabitants, supporting recovery from natural disaster, supporting other governmental agencies in homeland defense or be able to participate peace keeping operation as a part of combined, joint and multi-agency force internationally.⁹

All the subsystems of task force - weapon systems, sensor systems, vehicle systems, C4ISR systems, logistic systems and several specialized branch systems - are required to change information with each other without a man in the middle translation. Modern space of operations is more dynamic than earlier. Humans and machines of the task force are required to learn from their own experience or others in the same space of operations to be able to adapt to changes and to recover subtly from sudden losses. The task force system is connecting to support elements and processes with continuous flow of digital information to maintain its automated systems available, supplied and intact. The provider of support may be far in homeland or in home front using civilian supply chain management system. Information should flow seamlessly along the length of supply chain although management systems may be civilian, governmental or military. The information exchange requirements do not include only technical information but all bounds of supply chain should also understand commanders intent, current situation and be able to act promptly to sudden changes. The entirely chain of support should enhance a patrol of warriors penetrating opponent´s strongholds, having insights of situation and opponents weaknesses and projecting cost-effectively joint force to change opponents behaviour.¹⁰

The capability of this post-modern task force is more than material or technology, you

don´t see it presented in exhibitions, nor you can purchase it from one provider and you are not able to copy it somewhere or develop it in 18 months. The task force fighting system is a strategic asset and it is based on strengths of one´s nation whilst compensating one´s weaknesses. Post-modern world is flat¹¹, space of operation is global and opponent is unpredictable so fighting system must be agile:

• Both manual and automated processes must be adaptable to situation and they should be able to learn from lessons within hours.
• The fighting system should be upgradeable with new hardware or programmable capabilities throughout the whole life cycle.
• The system should be trainable to conscripts and other personnel involved in the operation.
• The system should integrate both existing military and civilian subsystem and foreseeable future subsystems.

The task force fighting system should be updated daily and new capabilities should be introduced twice a year. The systems intra integration should consist of services like programmable functions and information which can flow between the nodes. Development is co-ordinated through the threads of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leading and education, personnel, facilities, information and interoperability (DOTMLPFII) intertwining together as a bundle.¹²

A intertwined structure of the fighting task force requires development with small steps of experimenting, system testing, field testing and piloting and very strong feedback from users. This spiral development¹³ allows close collaboration between developers, maintainers, leaders and users thus encouraging to innovate and empowering user driven development. As new capability is being introduced to system of men, programs and technology with small doses, the co-ordination of progress is controlled and the testing time would allow more resilient threads like procedures, behaviour or competence to mature accordingly thus keeping risks at bay.

The development and maintenance of task force fighting system requires several system entities in order to maintain co-ordination, integrity and maintainability:

1. A production version of system used by task forces in operations, missions and training
2. A reference version of system used for maintenance and system testing by network of maintenance and support organizations.
3. A pilot version of next capability entity to be able to field change through intertwined DOTMLPFII -threads by pilot task force
4. A test version of next capability entity to be able to test technical and information integration as a full system with user cases created for new features. This entity is used by development programs and integrators together with a network of maintenance and support organisations.

Besides these entities there are several different versions of technical subsystems that may be developed more waterfall -like¹⁴ and tested with V -concept¹⁵. The method of spiral development enables to maintain current capability fleet of task forces but develop gradually new capabilities maintaining service safety and both technical and procedural support.

An example how spiral development has been utilized for intertwined DOTMLPFII C4I -system development

The following example is depicting how Land Forces of Finland developed their new light mechanized infantry task force capability, while maintaining legacy brigades and their training. By developing C4ISR -system within task force´s fighting system Finnish Army was enhancing the overall change of the land forces capabilities. The end state of the total program is renew the concepts of land fighting, support to other agencies and peace keeping in Finland. This is to adjust land forces to lesser manpower, shorter training time, diminished training facilities but capable to cope with more demanding challenges of post-modern operations.

The C4I -system of a Finnish brigade Model 05 (M05) was the legacy capability to be maintained and development was executed using two new versions Model 12 and Model 18, which were aimed to enhance new combat and tactics development. Numbers refer to the years systems were planned to be fielded for conscript training throughout land forces.

The first development spirals were aiming to only minor changes of M05 system in order to get tactical thinking and procedures moving towards to the new concept. The M12 used M05 as a bases but it was modified with both military and civil subsystems to enable other branches development and education of personnel. M18 was the target system for the renewed task force based on new technology and providing required capabilities with consistency and survivability in the post-modern space of operations.

The spiral development took place between 2008 – 2013 covering all the DOTMLPFII -threads as follows (DOTMLPFII – alphabets in brackets refers to the threads that were targeted with each spiral):

Year 2008

• (DOTMLPFII) a strategy was defined to develop new capabilities stepping through three entities of brigade/task force C4I -system (M05, M12 and M18) that could enable the required development in other fields, branches and layers of the future task force.

M05

• (DMI) the M05 -system was altered so that a single brigade was attached with message system as part of greater force. This was aimed to start thinking of swarming tactics, enhance information exchange and enable better indirect fire support.
• (OMI) the brigade command and control system was taken to upper echelons to enable interoperability through the chain of command, build up a common operational picture and create better understanding to staff processes and reorganization.

M12

• (D) analysing and testing different options to update M05 system to better support development of battle technics, support to other agencies and international operations.

M18

• (II) analysing options to develop information management and exchange capabilities with either message formats, standardized queries or service oriented architecture and semantic data. This was to create innovative thinking for future possibilities and their application.
• (LII) testing different military and civilian communications equipment and analysing modern technologies enhanced education and innovation amongst army and potential providers. This was supported by researching and experimenting by universities.

Year 2009

M05

• (OTP) a service management and support organisation was started first as virtual organisation to enable people to adapt new procedures and processes.
• (PI) the use of command and control system was extended from company commander to the Commander of Land Forces in order to boost security thinking and information management processes.
• (OTLI) the command and control system throughout land forces was unified to start collaboration and information exchange between forces, to enable C2 -process development and to create new interoperability issues to be solved and to start a learning spiral.

M12

• (M) while testing different new methods of data transfer, a hidden feature was found from old M05 system and it was decided to exploit in M12 -systems IP-modernization.

M18

• (ML) the first new technology prototypes and experiments were ordered to demonstrate possibilities of new technology and how integrated systems may have to be developed.

Year 2010

M05

• (DOLII) by spreading message system to cover the whole land force and connecting it to navy´s similar system, a joint information flow and collaboration was enabled.

M12

• (ML) by adding civilian routers to existing field communications system, an opportunity was created for personnel to learn how IP -transmission and routing behaves in field environment.
• (OLI) by publishing a command and control SOP for land forces, a basis for C2 processes development was established and understanding of post-modern C2 processes was spreading.
• (TMLII) the first versions of battle management systems were tested in both international peace keeping operations, in co-operation missions with other agencies and in combat training. This gained experience of maturity and ability to enhance fighting efficiency at troop level.

M18

• (MLII) a first version of semantic model of land operations ontology was published to give information to system providers and other development programs of new way to manage and exchange information and gain interoperability.
• (M) by testing with the prototypes of M18 subsystems in laboratory, a feedback was gained to steer the next spiral of development of the new technology features.

Year 2011

M05

• The updating of M05 system was ceased and resources transferred to M12 enhancements.
• (OL) the maintenance personnel of M05 were educated to maintain and support programmable electronics with new processes.

M12

• (D) a first version of renewed battle concept was created to start the education and change of thinking
• (DTL) education of the new concept was started to gain feedback from command post exercises and war games.
• (OMLF) Several subsystems and updates of M12 system was fielded to operations and training in order to gain feedback to improve integrity of technology, training facilities and maintenance.

M18

• (TML) by testing M18 subsystems in field, a feedback was gained concerning training ability and survivability for next spiral of development.

Year 2012

M12

• (DML) A first architecture and system description of M12 C4I -system was composed for integration tests and to support the technical education and tactical war gaming.
• (T) M12 technical systems were introduced to conscripts and training started even with non-finished system (open beta version¹⁶).
• (FL) new facilities and training systems were build to enhance training of conscripts for the new fighting concept
• (MOLI) a test of indirect fire control was executed with M12 system in life fire exercise in order to certify safety of service and deepen the integration with artillery.
• (OPF) A former virtual organisation for maintaining and supporting the programmable electronics was founded officially after maturing of processes and gaining required competence. ITIL -processes ensured interoperability with supporting C4I-centre and its subcontractors. Programmable electronics maintenance was integrated to existing weapon systems maintenance organisation to enhance cost-effectiveness and begin the change in logistics branch.

M18

• (OTL) A plan was composed to migrate M12 training to M18 training with lessons learnt from M05 to M12 migration. Also procurement plans for the first series of new system was authorized.
• (LI) A first system integration exercise did introduce the whole M18 C4I -system prototype. Technical and user case tests were accomplished and integration risks were managed. This was giving final fixes and green light to proceed to prototype field tests in a pilot unit.

Year 2013

M05

• (T) The last of training with legacy system will be done. The capability is maintained in storage and in reserve but all conscript training will include M12 systems and new battle technics.

M12

• (DOTMLPFII) The M12 training will commence with full capacity and M12 will be used both internationally and nationally. This gains lessons for the new battle tactics and technics to be learnt, while developing M18 system and finalizing the concept of operation.

M18

• (DOTMLPFII) The pilot unit starts to train conscripts with first prototype of M18 task force C4I -system. Frequent exercises and intense field research by Military University, schools of branches and providers will give lessons to be able to finalize task force fighting concept by 2015 and execute next migration from M12 to M18 between 2015 – 2018.

M18+

• (DOTMLPFII) Change continues. Twice a year new spiral of features is introduced, tested and fielded. New capabilities are enabled, innovation flourishes but risks remain manageable. New development and maintenance culture enables to maintain task force fighting system capability dominance without risks of no return through the whole life cycle of task force capability.

With developing spirals of the C4I -subsystem, the total fighting system of task force was gradually developed as well. The feedback of the C4I -changes was enormously helpful to reveal the development maturity of the fighting system, because C4I -system intertwined with every other subsystem. Developing a complex system includes risks that are not entirely technical and thus not manageable solely with V -development and testing method. Spiral method with constant information feedback and lessons learnt, helped to manage development and risks of intertwine system. Some spirals of development did not succeed because of technical immaturity, inability of personnel to operate systems or simply because user did not have any reason to use the new feature. In those situations spiral method enabled unsuccessful subchanges to be returned to earlier stages for better preparation. The overall change migration went on, other subchanges created bursts of excitement and goals were even exceeded.

During the development occurred that trainers competence and procedures were the most hardest to change, because it was easier for them to stick with old habits. The same time conscripts did accept every change with eagerness and swift, because they did not know the legacy procedures. The spiral method introduced subchanges gradually and mixed with old features. New technology was introduced as a part of an old system, old system was used just a pit differently to enable new procedures or new military tasks was done via familiar civilian interface. That made it easier for personnel to change their existing habits.¹⁷ Amongst the personnel the highest threshold for change was when old message terminal was substituted with field computer or when one brigades special procedures were forced to change similar to the others were following. With the power of example and social force to be able to interoperate in test exercises even the stickiest habit was being changed.

References:

1Per Inge Oestmoen: The Realm of The Mongols. http://www.coldsiberia.org/monmight.htm

2John Keegan: A history of warfare, First vintage books edition 1994.

3John Keegan: A history of warfare, First vintage books edition 1994. s.361 - 366

4Heinz Guderian: Achtung-Panzer! Cassel Military Paperbacks 1999 ISBN 0-304-35285-3

5Rubert Smith: The Utility of Force. First Vintage Books edition 2008. Chapter 6

6David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes: Power to the Edge. CCRP 3^rd printing 2005

7Terry Costlow: Next-generation battle tech gets put to the test. Defense Systems Jan 14, 2011

8Ground Forces Digitalization program Israeli Defense Forces (ZAYAD). Defense update 2005 issue 1. http://www.defense-update.com/products/z/zayad.htm

9Juha Mattila: Vastakkainasettelu, konfliktit, taistelut ja niiden johtaminen. Sotilasaikakauslehti, Joulukuu 2011 in finnish only

10Juha Mattila: Uudistetun maataistelun johtaminen ja viestitoiminta. Sotilasaikakauslehti, Joulukuu 2012 in finnish only

11Thomas L. Friedman: The world is flat. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. April 2005

12U.S. Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff instruction 3170.01H 10^th January 2012: Joint capabilities integration and development system. The JCIDS process provides a solution space that considers solutions involving any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLFP is added with information and interoperability by the author.

13Juha Mattila: A variation of spiral development and acquisition method applied to military command, control and communications system production. Defence University of Finland publications 2004

14Herbert B. Bennington: Production of large computer programs. The Navy Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel and the Office of Naval Research in June 1956

15Brian Marick: New models for test development. Reliable Software Technologies 1999.

16 Open beta testing serve the dual purpose of demonstrating a product to potential users, and testing among an extremely wide user base likely to bring to light obscure errors that a much smaller testing team might not find. This is s normal procedure in software production.

See TidBITS, http://web.archive.org/web/20111004155501/http://tidbits.com/?@236.BzSIbUcwjzO@

17Charles Duhigg: The power of habit. Random House Books 2013