Abstract
This paper defines a road map that military ICT service production has drawn over last decades. It starts the natural individual tendency of closed system, which evolves to ability to manage a network of systems as functions. Gradually networked system gets better connection to its users and defines more process structure. As organisation is recognised more a service provider a networked business model starts unfold and finally it becomes fully featured value chain model with appropriate governance. The ICT service production model road map is defined to help improving the information enabled Armed Forces.Introduction
In this paper the Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) models and Telecommunications Network Management (TMN) methods are studied in a framework of transforming military ICT service production witnessed in the Defence Forces of Finland 1990 - 2010. Service process maturity model (CMMI-SVC) is used when different model and maturity level is differentiated.
Based on experiences from Finland, paper defines the major evolutionary path of ICT service production models and their neighbouring process frameworks. Paper also describes short cuts or downshifts that some military organisations have faced either when reaching for more revolutionary goals or allowing the entropy to have effect on their organization. Paper provides tools for strategic diagnosis by describing possible paths on map, where interrelations, challenges and opportunities may be identified. This is to support strategic planning of Information and Communications Technology for supporting the military core business.
Orientation to road map of Military ICT operation models
There is a possibility to create a description of general road map of ICT operation models used in military organization in particularly the Finnish Defence Forces. This hypothesis is based on experiences and lessons identified when developing the Defence Forces Automated Data Processing and Telecommunications operations 1990 – 2010.
Author has identified these lessons as he was:
- The head planner for C4I operations in Leijona exercise 1994, the largest joint military exercise in Finland since WW II.
- One of the planners and implementers of Communications and Information Systems operations structure transformation by 1997 in the Defence Forces.
- A client for previous CIT provider. The designer and pilot for new C4I operations structure early 2000 when head of J6 of Northern Command.
- The program lead of C4I transformation in Defence Forces 2004-2006.
- The chief of C4I operations in C4I Agency in Finland 2007
- A client for previous C4I Agency. The head of G6 in Land Forces while the transformation of Army fighting was planned and implemented 2008-2012.
The hypothesis is based on the following evolution in general ICT business models:
- Telecommunication operation model development from TMN to eTOM versions.
- IT operation model ITIL development through versions 1 to 3.
- IT Governance model CobIT development until version 5 (2012) .
- The Services operation maturity model CMMI-SVC v1.2 (2009) .
- The Supply Chain model developments CSCMP .
- Some military ICT operation organization transformations in Finland.
There is a generic evolutionary path as models mature and environment appears more complex. There are also some revolutionary roads that are skipping phases of evolution. Similarly one may find downshifting roads on the map pointing the fact that systems also decline, close up and disintegrate or choose to reverse as described in figure 1.
Figure 1: the hypothesis for a road map for ICT operation models in military organizations
In road map there are five stages for ICT operations model: technology oriented my device – my way, network oriented my system - vendors way, service operator – best practice way, service provider – business model way and more overarching value chain way. These stages are described further in the following chapter.
An Evolutionary Path for ICT Operation Models in Military Environment
My Device – My Way
It is a very natural way to start operating new device with “handicraft” or “craft” principle . One worker takes the whole responsibility to operate and maintain the device from start to end of the life cycle in unique way. This is the most effective way of operate devices, if there are no similar systems in operation or there are no interrelated functions between different devices that manual management cannot execute. The quality of administration is defined by the expertise of one worker and may vary from high master ship to novice blunders. The service in this context is maintained device.
This per device approach does not allow more effective division of labour or improvement of productivity through specialization. Workers assigned to take care singular devices feel responsibility and sometimes associate themselves with device and its importance to organization. Changes in this established socio-technical structure are often strongly opposed. Military are also facing challenges to sustain skilful staff in business continuity or survivability situations.
Some organisations continue this principle of handicraft when devices are integrated to systems, networks and domains. They continue assigning more people to take charge of increasing number of devices. As long the devices remain unconnected, there is no trust relation or confrontation between different ways of operating separate devices. This is particularly the case when military enterprise itself remains a loose consortium of functional parts that remain disconnected both from their environment and from other units as described in figure 2.
Figure 2: an example of distributed and non-interrelated ICT operations
Later this craft principle has been changed to more standard way, but vendors still tend to prefer their proprietary solutions for element management. LME, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard and IBM delivered their proprietary management solutions included in their system (server or network node) delivery.
All coordination within this model is done at higher levels of hierarchy and issued by orders down to each function or device operator. It takes long time to react to any incident and even longer to build anything new in connection to existing technology or services.
My System – My Vendors Way
With telecommunications digitalization it become possible to integrate element managers to higher level network management system. A first layered structure was introduced by CCIT as M.30 1988. Further it evolved to Telecommunications Management Network, TMN M.3010. It included layered structure that described how network elements are managed by element management layer. Element management is connected by network management layer, which is support service management and business management layers as depicted in figure 3.
Figure 3: Main features of TMN model 1996
Telecommunication system vendors design their own products for TMN compliant management and often military were buying together management with transportation layer (like PDH management) or private branch exchange systems (like LME).
Service level was not as mature as technical levels, but a call centre supported with customer management applications was established. First Network Management Centres were established where more than one type of system was controlled. First incident management processes within that centre were implemented and trouble ticketing system normally supported this incident management.
Centralized control reduced complexity of coordination and reaction times were reduced. As incident were forwarded by element layer, specific applications to collect incidents and correlate them were installed. First dashboards for network availability was presented.
As the Finnish Defence Forces reorganised their Communications and Information System structure 1997, the first CIS management structure was also launched at element and network level and later at service level. This included the first architecture for CIS services management. It included the functional, physical, information and logical illustrations of architecture. There were both end user service catalogues and agreements between development organizations and CIS operation organizations. Network Management Centres were established according line command so they inherited authority from their reference level although they had service agreements along client-provider lines as defined in figure 4.
Figure 4: an example of network management organization
Later due some rotation of personnel service agreements were forgotten by provider, trust of clients were lost and only network management processes sustained.
ICT Operator – A Best Practice Way
Information Technology Infrastructure Library books has been published since 1989. ITIL version 2 was consolidated into nine sets of books 2001. ITIL version 3 was published 2007 and updated 2011. ITIL become a best practice for Information Technology System Management and was copied also by military ICT system operators as they were reaching towards service operator model. ITILv2 framework and its core processes are illustrated in figure 5.
This was the first vendor or technology agnostic operator model for ICT service operators trying to align with their customers and end users. It replaced TMN parts with Service Support processes and introduced Service Delivery processes. TMN remained at element management level and in telecommunications network management systems. ITIL started also improving application management together with IT assets management. As the first processes were implemented the maturity assessment with key performance indicators was also established.
In Finland ITIL was added over the existing TMN model starting from 2003. The first ITSM was implemented and ITIL v2 core processes established. Trouble ticketing was changed into event management and call centre to help desk. The first ITIL gap analysis was done 2004. Service Desk was assessed to be at the best level of capability and service level management at least. Process implementation faced opposition from system specific operators and administrators and was gradually halted because of lack of will for reformation. There was only slight understanding of service operations connection to military business at J6 level but no initiatives were launched. Nor there were service level agreements existing between operator and end user organizations. Also operator level agreements had been withering because the lack of understanding of supply chains and authority of line command.
Figure 5: A basic model of ITIL v2 framework and core processes
ICT Service Provider – Business Model
ITU published Business Process Framework (eTOM) as a standard on 2003. The framework quickly adopted ITIL core processes within its operations block. Besides introducing customer interface for ICT development processes and improving client relations management, the eTOM framework also introduced better model to manage vendors/suppliers both for operations and development of ICT services. eTOM model was a basis for organization of an ICT Service Provider with all essential business process blocks described. The basic eTOM framework and applied implementation is described in figure 6.
Since there are seldom finance transactions inside military force, eTOM customer relations management was divided into four levels:
- Service Desk was managing daily relationships with end users by receiving their re-requirements, supervising service fulfilment and managing end user events. They also in-formed end users of changes in service availability and conditions of use.
- Regional C4I service unit had liaison officer that was collaborating with units Chief In-formation Officers for quarterly services and managing perception at service agreement level by delivering monthly reports to each unit.
- Operations liaison officer resided in the Command of each Service managing changes in annual agreements and delivering quarterly reports on delivered services and used resources.
- Development liaison officer rotated between Services, process owners and J6 division in managing future capability development issues by maintaining development agreements and reporting of the proceedings of development programs.
Billing and revenue management processes were sustained, but only at production costs level for military clients. There were paying customers in other market segments that were billed in open market manner. Performance was assessed also with cost-efficiency indicators transparent in resource management view.
Supply Chain Management was managed both by operations and development. The Supply Office for operations managed all operations contracts with partners, sub-providers and suppliers. All operations supporters were annually included into planning process for following year as new requirements and services were to be realized. Asset management was managing both in-house and out-house resources and process improvement extended to vendors. The Procurement office of development managed all development contracts. Development had always 2-5 years focus and they had annual workshops with existing and possible developers.
Figure 6: eTOM model applied to military enterprise closed market with extension to vendor networks
In Finland Defence Forces were facing major change in 2008 thus a major transformation of C4I (including former CIS and all ICT functions) was launched 2004. From 2004 to 2007 the operation model was changed gradually from national J6 level down to units. A C4I agency was established in the beginning of 2007 that took the responsibility of providing all common ICT and C4I services for Defence Forces and some Governmental Agencies over Internet, over Support net (HALNET) and over Mission net (OPNET). All but tactical C4I was collected under one service provider.
A closed market structure pictured in figure 7 was created within the triangle of customer-provider-client. Service Catalogues were established to each market segment. Service Level Agreements were signed between Provider (C4I Agency) and each military unit (clients). Between Customers (Service Commands) and Provider a specific SLA was defined for both service development and operations. The business model for C4I services was based on eTOM framework with ITIL replacing Service Support and Delivery processes. eTOM was further framed with Customer-Provider-Client closed market governance model adopted from municipal level transformation in Finland.
Figure 7: a Customer-Provider-Client model for closed markets applied to C4I service production inside Defence Forces
Major challenges were faced in service transition from development to operations, process driven operations versus line command authority, customer driven culture versus order driven culture and cost-efficiency. They were mostly unfamiliar to military organizations.
Value Chain Model with Governance
ICT was recognized more and more a main enabler of military force as information become main asset and force digitalization proceeded. From C4I service provider ICT business model evolved towards value chain model with enterprise governance and management by implementing ITILv3, Supply Chain Management, managing complex capability development and change, improving enterprise level governance and management by CobIT 5. This enhanced model is described in figure 8.
ITIL version 3 was published 2007 with model to manage complex system of systems service design and transition. This approach was used together with three different development models:
- Waterfall development model for simple and known parts for system of systems
- Iterative development model for unknown parts for system of systems
- Spiral development model for complex parts of system of systems.
The eTOM vendor management was extended with Supply Chain Management processes as ICT Service Provider generally extracts over 50% of its value from external sources. With continuous replenishment supply chain Provider may improve reliability at the same time as stocks become more cost-effective.
Figure 8: C4I service production business model within military enterprise
Since military C4I structures become more complex and IC-technology together with information become greater enabler for force utilization, more emphasis was put into creating capability out from intertwined system of people, process and technology. This large structure was called System of systems implicating that there are several subsystems interconnected or interrelated within larger structure. As digitalization of military force proceeded, the fighting, supporting and production systems become more integrated with each other and people. This called more systematic approach for training and exercising the troops while operating technical systems and introducing new subsystems in the field. U.S. DOD JP 1-02 dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defined 2001 the DOTMLPF analysis to assess all components of military capability (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) together.
Gradually a permanent testing and evaluation (T&E) process was created. For ongoing testing a reference environment appeared as “small world” and all new features are tested and evaluated before fielding. Often before a major fielding one also pilots the capability change to finalize the interoperability of all capability components. Only after this two phase testing and evaluation, new feature is migrated to operations. System of systems development is mainly fielded as migration (data migration, system migration, software migration) rather than roll-out since it is often a change that moves through the existing structure replacing some legacy parts. ICT development adopted similar method for experimenting with different solutions together with long term research and development arm.
ISACA published CobIT 5 in 2012 to create one framework that includes all IT related processes, methods and controls to promote enterprise wide governance over IT functions. CobIT 5 reaches to close the gap between business and ICT operations. It consists of into enterprise IT governance part and IT management part. CobIT 5 has become a good framework to assure that major parts of ICT business are in place within enterprise.
In Finland the C4I business model 2007 was improved further by implementing systems design and transition process within C4I Agency. As Land Forces were proceeding in digitizing their forces, a programmable electronics development and support method was established to improve strategic flexibility of the force. C4I Agency went further to develop supply chain and mature their ITIL, eTOM and SCM processes to be able to outsource centralized application services for support and administrative IT by 2015.
Simultaneously all fixed military telecommunications networks are also under transition towards one governmental operator. C4I Agency is planned to migrate the networks and connectivity operations to TUVE operator that is planned to provide services to all governmental and adjacent agencies. This division of all ready integrated technologies is a good example of system but not service oriented thinking.
Currently there is major transformation in Finnish Defence Forces that achieves to integrate all development under new logistics centre. It includes also ICT and C4I development, which is extracted from current C4I centre. This reminds the change that UK MOD did some years ago, then learnt that it does not work and 2013 started to transform their ICT operations and development more close to operations and got rid of the standard logistics procurement/development method.
Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on map of possible roads
Process holds the service operation system together. Without process there is no possibility to mature operations towards better capability but remain functionally isolated (CMMI-SVC level 0) or just reactively putting down fires (CMMI-SVC level 1). Only connecting providing services with technology and further connecting users together with services enables operator to start improving his maturity. Thus the first leap is in implementing best holistic service process framework like ITIL and changing the culture of traditional functional line command organization to client driven process centric matrix organization. There is natural opposition in military organizations towards this support process approach although it is invented originally in branches of military logistics and field artillery. There needs to be evident and tangible reason/goal to get everyone leaving their comfortable device or system ways and adapt unfamiliar way of working together.
Over fluent service delivery and support, operator is able to add other features like development, supply chain and ICT business model. The biggest challenge for military is understanding the closed market and its controlling mechanism. This fails quite often and military decides to outsource operator and create open market interface that civilians do master. Open market interface between force and main enabler does not always function either because contracts may be too rigid as in UK or civilian operator is not able to adjust to crises requirements as in Finland .
Next leap is when ICT service operation is aligned with military core business in continuous way and service provider matures to act as hub for value chain. This requires two changes in military culture:
- Information and after that knowledge becomes an asset like finance, material and hu-man resources. ICT becomes same time a major enabler to military force and contro-versy between buying arms or ICT is replaced with system of systems capability analysis.
- Military adapts means to lead and control assets that are not under their direct com-mand. This requires ability to align complex networks of value providers and have them working aligned with trust to each other.
It needs time and persistence to mature in service operation but one delusionary leader can take organization quickly back to square one. This happened in Finland when within one year half of the organization that was following TMN model degraded to CMMI level 0 just because new leader was firm believer of centralised planning and neglected all service level agreements. This was enough to dismantle
all trust that took three years to build. Similar phenomenon happened when one commander with line-staff command ideas dismantled whole customer-provider-client business model which took four years to build.
There is some evidence that organization can succeed with revolutionary path from TMN straight to eTOM business model. This happened partially in Finland during 2004 – 2007 transformation. It was possible since incremental transition was done each year, responsibilities were built gradually towards new processes and transformation was implemented from bottom up. One major weakness in this approach was the need for strong leader for change. After the transition leader was rotated and some successors and middle level managers were not that enlightened with business model. Kotter (1996) emphasizes this phase calling it "instituting the change".
Conclusion
Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications technology management, service production and IT governance in military organizations has been following the operation models of generic enterprise ICT. It has matured with general maturity models and integrated with business like IT governance usually does. This does not include tactical ICT and C4I service production but services supporting operational, force support and force production.
The stages of ICT service production maturity are same but on the road military peculiarities are providing different challenges and opportunities. On the one side there is military command approach that may accelerate transformation but on the other side there is culture that might be opposing all changes persistently. If there is no clear driver that affects the whole organization, military has tendency to fall back to earlier stages on the map of operation models. All that is needed for reverse gear is to change the commander of the operating unit.
It also seems that military ICT can utilize and learn a lot from general operation models if they are adjusted to fit into special business needs. Only implementing best practices does not give the capability or survivability in crises time. It requires to tailor general models into military organization, processes and culture. It also needs to change some terms to ease communication with military practice, while keeping the base of the model intact to be able to fit it into the culture and behaviour of supply chain.
This paper presents a road map for ICT management, operation, service providing and integrating with military core business. This road map may be used to help in defining ICT strategy or diagnosing the status of service processes maturity. It is imperative to develop service operations capabilities as new technology and information content are becoming more important as enablers for military force utilization, support and production.
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