Study your Command and Control system and culture before implementing it to Information System.

"We are what we repeatedly do." 

Aristotle

"We never had time to do anything properly. 

Consequently, we always had to find time to do it twice."

Marcus Aurelius

"The key success in the twenty-first century is the management of knowledge and expertise." 

Peter Drucker

"In an economy where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one sure source of lasting competetive advantage is knowledge."

Nonaka & Takeuchi

"The most dangerous phrase in the language is 

' we've always done it this way '."

Rear Admiral Grace Hopper

“I still learn something new every day. 

Education and knowledge are the reason behind progress of man, his happiness and stability. 

The path of education and knowledge is the key to building a nation 

that achieves progress in all walks of life”.

His Higness Shaikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum

1. Knowledge Management approach opens better opportunities to improve military C2 capability than basic acceleration with information system

A military combat operations command and control (C2) process called OODA-loop (Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action) defined by John Boyd (1987) has been choosen often for a model of military process to be improved by information services. The approach for U.S. Armed Forces (Joint Pub 3-13) in improving C2 capability is to run OODA loop faster than adversary to achieve and maintain advantage in battlefield i.e. Information Superiority. This is usually enabled by information systems.

This paper is studying OODA loop under the framework of knowing organisation defined by Chun Wei Choo (1998) and emphases knowledge management is more important than mere information technology in gaining better C2 capabilities. There are three capabilities in the OODA-loop from the point of knowledge management:

1. Sense making, consisting of observation (sensing) and orientation (making sense), is interpreting the equivocal data by enacting interpretations. Sensemaker is required to recognize the area of awaress one is approaching. There are four distinctively different sense making models when approaching situations that are: Known, Knowable, Complex or Chaos.
2. Decision making is searching and selecting alternatives according to projected outcomes and preferences. There is a major difference how decision making is implemented in military organization that defines the capability of decision making.
3. Knowledge acquisition is creating new knowledge and improving the whole OODA loop through knowledge conversion and sharing of information. There is a huge improvement in ability of creating new knowledge when one evolves from behavioural oriented learning towards more constructive and social ways of learning in military organization.

These three components of C2 capablities are described in figure 1.

Figure 1: Orientation for military knowledge management from sense making, decision making and knowledge acquisition approach

Three following chapters are describing the three areas of OODA loop improvement by illustrating their evolution in military organizations using road map approach. Map visualises the main evolutionary path but also some short cuts and downshifts that has occurred on the way.  

2. Description of evolutionary paths in Military Sense making 

This chapter is concentrating on how observing (sensing) and orientation (sense making) of Boyd’s OODA loop is executed. Sensing needs to overcome the fog of battlefield and egocentricity of human sensing. Sense making needs to address the attempts of deception by adversary, biases of sense making teams and individual mental models

When sense making situations is modelled with Cynefin framework by Kurtz and Snowden (2003), four different models of approach can be defined: 1. Known, 2. Knowable, 3. Complex and 4. Chaos as described in figure 2. Sensing and Sense making is following different process in each of these situations, thus implementing of only one in information system will result constrained and predictable capability.

Figure 2: Road map for military sensing and sense making from OODA approach

The four different sense making situations are described in following subchapters.

2.1 Sense – Categorise – Respond in known environment

In known environment cause and effect relations are repeatable, thus easily perceived and predicable. In this situation military is following their Standard Operational Procedures, SOP.

Both individual, team and organisation are observing an event. Event is being categorised with previously defined model like the assumed order of battle of adversary. Each category has a predetermined type of respond, which is being followed without orientation or decision making. A good example of this is firing based on predetermined targeting list.

It is not often that adversary is behaving by the book. Even more harmful is when surveillance and reconnaissance systems are preprogrammed with these standard patterns and fail to detect anything divertive.

This approach is realistic for the lower levels of conscript army, where time to train ISTAR capabilities is very short. It is erroneously followed in forces that believe in Information Superiority. It is also followed in Armed Forces with access to resources overwhelming adversary’s.

2.2 Sense – Analyse – Decide – Act in knowable environment

In knowable environment cause and effect are separated over time and space. It requires some scenario playing and systems thinking to create a possible model to describe the knowable environment. 

After detection the incoming data needs to be analysed to reveal all effective cause-effect relationships. Sense making is evolving the scenarios as new data is detected.  There is a need to create a bigger picture from smaller events and their recognise their interrelationships by systems thinking. 

Current trends of Big Data and Business Intelligence are good example of organisation trying to utilise all information it possesses. By fusing and correlating data differently, organisation may create new knowledge and if succeeding in sharing it, may gain a competitive advantage.

2.3 Probe - Sense – Analyse – Decide – Act in complex environment

In complex environment cause and effect are only coherent in retrospect and similar events seldom repeat. Emergent patterns can be perceived but not predicted. 

It requires a initiative probe to make possible patterns more visible for observation. Understanding these emergent, new patterns needs multiple perspectives to be involved in sense making. It needs to create narratives as base for understanding as they are simple and easy to communicate between team.

This is the very base of military professional approach in sense making since situation almost always is at least complex in military environment. Interestingly this has been defined already by Miyamoto Musashi, Samurai and Ronin from early 1700 century Japan.

2.4 Act - Sense – Analyse – Decide in chaotic environment

No cause and effect relationships perceivable in chaotic environment. System is turbulent and there is no time to wait patterns to emerge. One might assume there is a potential pattern but it is not visible or reconstruction able.

It requires a quick and decisive intervention to reduce the turbulence and ability to sense immediately the reaction to the intervention. This deliberate action might create something that is either known or knowable and with effective observing and analysing it might make sense.

Fast and determined action was the main German staff officers approach and key enabler against Allied officers that tried to approach situations as knowable.

2.5 Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on sense making map of possible roads

Especially in crises situation and under extreme stress, the sense making capability may collapse and only behavioural routines will sustain. Thus there should be exercised process before utilizing more agile methods in sense making.

Sometimes the feeling of having information superiority may cause a downshift, when complex situation is addressed as knowable and collecting more data is believed to provide the eventual clarity. This might have been the case in late ISAF operation, where the amount of collected data reached 40 Exabyte (10^18) in a month.

Requirements for near real-time recognised operational picture to provide targeting information for target acquisition process may constrain the time and method used for fusion and recognition. Thus targeting may fall short at basic event categorising and both friendly fire and collateral damage may occur.

3. Description of evolutionary path for Military Decision Making 

Decision is a function of residual uncertainty and the risks associated with the available options as a function of time. More naturalistic methods for human decisions are seeking first behaviour in similar conditions, then human goes for most familiar. If none of the mentioned is applicable, human is trying to minimize undesirable outcomes and maximize his own utility. Thus human being is easily manipulated in stressful situations.

Figure 3: A Road map of Military decision making from Knowledge Management view

3.1 Authoritarian decision making in classical command and control

Decisions are made at top, Commander-centric, orders are flowing down and reporting heads upwards by support of hierarchical knowledge management. 

Information flow is following line organisation to enable superiors to understand better situation than their subordinates. Situational information and orders flowing back down are delayed by levels of hierarchy and means of communications. Information is shared “need to know basis only”.

Carrying out tasks is based on pretrained procedures and there is no need to change behaviour during operation. Knowledge base is following the doctrine and managing issues following standard operational processes.

3.2 Shared strategic intention with synchronised operational execution

Unlike his adversaries Napoleon could delegate operational decision making to his generals, who were heading Army Corps, bataillon carré. Napoleon shared his battle intent with his commanders and gave them some degree of freedom in execution. This enabled to achieve timely numerical strength, deep strategic penetration and rapid concentration of force superior to adversaries. 

Ability to share strategic information by actively collaborating between Corps heads provides good strategic and operational level awareness, alignment and manoeuvrability even if the lower levels in organisation are rigidly following orders and informing superiors through line.

3.3 Mission command

In mission command tactical freedom is delegated to combined arms force level by giving mission to forces including commanders intent of battle. Forces were expected to fulfil the mission in most suitable way adjusting their tactics as situation was unfolding before the eyes of their commanders. 

Higher command was controlling execution by defining end states rather than tasking detailed goals. 

Mission command requires continual dialogue with higher authorities and mission partners to better understand the changing environment and perspectives. Collaboration helps in perceiving what shared awareness looks like. 

3.4 Mission command with peer level collaboration

New level of awareness enabled by force digitalisation has flattened military hierarchical organisations because middle level commands are not needed for control and quick reaction. Peer level collaboration lacks strick command relationships and is based more on trust.

Although the recognised operational picture is presenting the current situation to everyone interested, building and maintaining the trust requires continuous dialogue between stakeholders. It will consume time differently but shared understanding enables empowerment, cross-domain synergy and eventually improves effectiveness compared more line or functional approach. 

3.5 Self-synchronising with swarming tactics

Power to the Edge (Alberts&Hayes 2003) principle addresses the shift in relationships required to leverage shared awareness to foster self-synchronisation and achieve major improvements in mission effectiveness. Control is sustained with shared command intent and consciousness instead of tight line control.

Swarming is a way to manoeuvre forces to gain advantage in time and space. It enables asymmetric tactics with agility, focus and convergence.

Gen McChrystal was able to improve his Special Operations Task Force capabilities about 30 fold in Iraq Operation 2006 when he implemented the vision: “If we’re going to win, we need to become a network”. He transformed task force from hierarchical command and control structure to the network of a swarming force. 

3.6 Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on decision making map of possible roads

Attrition with dominant resources has been keeping the command culture centralised and emphasised linear planning and management more than leadership.

Improved communications and ability to gather up-to-date information from battle is not necessarily leading to mission command or more loosely controlled battle management. The hunger for information at the top may produce an information overload resulting even longer lead times to prepare and launch operation. 

It is far easier to return to more centralised command culture when returning to peacetime garrison, tight fiscal constraints, and increased competition for promotion. With the low number of events happening during peacetime it is also tempting to higher headquarters to centralize the control of myriad of more detailed peacetime management events. 

4. Description of evolutionary paths in Military Knowledge acquisition and Learning 

Military training has to prepare individuals and collectives to enter into harm's way and perform physically and mentally demanding tasks at the highest possible levels of proficiency. Military training has the tradition to be more like discipline than a process of creating competence. 

In this paper learning is analysed from the knowledge management point of view, emphasising especially organizational knowledge acquisition defined by Chun Wei Choo (1998). Four different approaches to knowledge acquisition, training, education and learning are described in figure 4 opening a different view to evolution in military skills and competence acquisition.

Military skills are learned mainly in team training with progressive challenges tailored to each team of arms. Repetition is a disciplined way to establish team’s behaviour as part of a bigger system. At battle technical level both individuals, troops and weapon systems are trained to be able to act at level of subconscious habit, motoric memory or preset programming. 

Figure 4: Road map for military learning from knowledge management approach

Military understanding has several learning approaches. There is a strong legacy of operating by the doctrine and thinking by the book. There is also increased request of not educating soldiers what to think but how to think. This means introducing a combination of three thinking methods: systems thinking, creative thinking and critical thinking. 

4.1 Drilling what to do and think with behavioural drivers

Drilling has been a tool for military training as documented vividly in Sun Tzu’s Art of War or in Prussian army when soldier was made a standardised, predictable and reliable unit to operate the musket. This is the very basic way of socialising tacit skills when instructor (master) shows how to do movement to soldiers (apprentices) and then drills it continuously supervising proceedings and correcting mistakes. 

In behaviourism learner gets positive feedback when his behaviour and learning results are moving in right direction. This is especially effective, when standard of required performance is gradually increased and award from right behaviour is direct and public. 

4.2 Understanding how to think with cognitive drivers

General James Gartwright (2008) called after learning how to think and improving the pace of learning to meet current speed of evolution of business (3 months), technology (18 months) and war fighting (30 days). This requires the ability to create explicit knowledge by bringing together explicit knowledge from a number of sources. Combining different explicit and tacit concepts requires systems thinking, critical thinking and operational analyses.

The cognitive learning follows more the human way of creating understanding and processing information in his brain. New things are learned within a familiar orientation model. Problem solving is using cognitive approach, where one learns a new way of thinking (schema) and is able to utilise this “tool” further in solving for other similar problems. After learning these schemas, there remains a problem of mapping problem to a right pre-existing schema. This requires logical reasoning like systems thinking or operational analyses.

Skills are learned mainly by team training with progressive challenges tailored to each team. Repetition is a discipline as a part of bigger system, but utilisation of skills in different situations and environment is a driver for successful execution in progressively challenging environment. 

Understanding is soldiers’ ability to perceive their space of operation, teams and systems, other combat supporters, supported and adversary as huge system where different parts interact with each other and with environment. It requires leaders to achieve synthesis when processing towards understanding of this phenomena. Leaders should reach a certain level of insight and foresight to be able to innovate and create best ways to deploy and operate one's system as interdependent part of fighting system of systems. 

4.3 Experimenting with constructive drivers

The full knowledge conversion process by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) is described in figure 5. Individual shares some experiences of his trials (tacit knowledge) with peers and together they come up (socialization) with hypothesis for causality model of their analysed experience. They publish (externalization) their findings in lessons identified (explicit) board. Someone else faces a challenge, finds these lessons together with few more similar, and fuses (combination) these concepts (explicit) to fit into situation in hand. One learns (internalization) from this successful trial and increases his (tacit) knowledge.

Figure 5: Knowledge conversion process (Nonaka&Takeuchi 1995)

Constructivism means that new information is learned within social and cultural interaction and is understood in relation to prior knowledge, experience and skills. Constructivism is using sociocultural dimension to support learning. Interaction with more capable peers, skilful leaders or cognitive tools do create mental constructions that enables students to recall learned things longer. 

The support is provided according to students’ maturity and it is gradually withdrawn as subjects become more internalized. This is a coach or mentor approach, where instructor is supporting enough to have student over first fears, provides safe environment for student to experiment, fail and learn, and gradually allows student to have more room for independent action.

4.4 Military as knowledge creating organisation driven by social cognitive learning

The competitive edge may be gained from continuous organisational knowledge creation and learning by “start talking and get to work” as Alan Weber (1993) says. Conversations are the way knowledge workers discover what they know, share it with their colleagues and in the process create new knowledge for the organisation.

Knowledge conversion is enforced by social cognitive learning. It means that learner's behaviour changes as a result of observing others' behaviour and its consequences. There are several factors that determine whether observing a model will result behavioural or cognitive change. These factors include the learner's developmental status, the perceived prestige and competence of the model, the consequences received by the model, the relevance of the model's behaviours and consequences to the learner's goals, and the learner's self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to the learner's belief in his or her ability to perform according the behaviour.

Machines and men are collaborating, sharing information and creating understanding, learning from past experiences and sustaining the asymmetric capability over the opponent. As military is adapting the continuous knowledge conversion process between people, they also need to include machines in to the loop of continuous learning. 

4.5 Leaps, downshifts and revolutionary paths on knowledge creation map of possible roads

When following the evolutionary road on the map of knowledge creation and training, there are two distinctive leaps: 1. from what to think to how to think and 2. from team learning to organisational learning. 

As described earlier, U.S. Armed Forces have been trying to leap from what to think to how to think for decades, but they have this far downgraded back to behavioural basics because of the gravity of their doctrine, culture and C2 attitude.

Despite of U.S. Armed Forces tradition McChrystal achieved to take his special operations forces from behavioural level directly to organisational learning within couple of years. 

5. Consider what kind of knowledge management to support with information systems and automation

When military command and control is studied from knowledge management view, one recognises major opportunities but also challenges in three areas of C2 capability evolution: Sense making, Decision making and Learning as illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Evolutionary roads of military knowledge management within OODA-loop

From evolutionary road map of Figure 6 one may conclude that:

• There is a possibility to use these maps of possible roads to create a strategy to improve C2 capability. 
• 1. Define current C2 situation by acknowledging the typical features of each stage of C2. 
• 2. Set goal stage for improved command and control in each subfeature. 
• 3. As gap between current and future capability is thus defined, there is possibility to analyze alternative roads leading from current stage towards future capabilities.
• 4. As these roads are two-way, there is possibility to be aware of tendencies that keeps C2 from improving or reverse back to starting position.
• Most flexible structure of C2 culture is gained if Sense making in complex situations, Decision making delegated within swarming network and Learning as organization is combined. 
• Combining Mission command with Sense making in Chaos situations and learning together made German staff officers way better than their Allied counterparts in II WW.
• U.S. Officers have been struggling in their efforts of improving C2 as their Sense making is heavily fixed with Known approach and Learning is mainly by the Book. Efforts in delegating Decision making have been bouncing back.
• Delegating decision making to swarming level and being able to learn continuously as organization requires different base of trust and openness of communication.
• If one finds his force to be at very first level of sense making, there is probably a need to evolve knowledge, competence and process before it is implemented heavily in information system. Even assuming that one’s own force is known may rise challenges when facing fast changes of order of battle.
• Analysing situation before decision requires more heterogenic team than before to bring in all possible aspects. Effective team work requires building by practice and challengers rather than more information technology. Information technology should be applied first to enable virtual collaboration of adhoc sense making teams.
• Delegating decision making towards mission command requires continual dialogue with higher authorities and mission partners to better understand the changing environment and perspectives and what a shared understanding of right looks like.
• When one reaches towards more agile, focused force that has convergence, there needs to happen a transformation alike McChrystal implemented 2006 in Iraq: McChrystal explains the transformation strategy of Special Operations Task Force in Iraq as follows: “We began as a network of people, then grew into a network of teams, then a network of organizations, and ultimately a network of nations. Throughout, we evaluated the health of our network by how well each node shared a common but ever-evolving understanding of our organization, of our battlefield, of our enemy, and of our strategy to defeat them—what we called ‘shared consciousness and purpose.”
• Repetition and drilling are essential in learning skills that are needed under stress but building competence that bring advantage in crises situation requires trial, error and social reflection.
• There is a tendency in military as in any other organization, which does not face pressure from outside to gain excessive bureaucracy, create narrow functional silos, simplify skills and competence to be easier trained and withhold most freedom of initiative from lower levels. Command and control culture of this kind does not necessarily survive in complex crises situations. Especially if information systems are constraining the change to more flexible culture.
• One should not expect that C2 strategies are linear, but always approach military C2 system of systems as a complex structure that is constantly in motion.