Modern Cognitive HF Communications for Military

Traditional HF-radio

The military has been using high frequency (HF, 3 – 30 MHz) propagation for its features bending over the surface of earth especially when ground is well conducting. Navies have been using HF, particularly for surface propagation as the wave bends far beyond the visual horizon. Ground and special forces have been using the ionosphere reflection to extend the connection even further beyond the radio horizon.

Traditionally HF connection has been used to transfer information with Morse code (CW) and voice (AM). Channel distribution has been following basic 300 Hz spacing. With advanced modems, the throughput can reach up to 19 Kbps without forward error correction. The challenging propagation planning has been replaced by automatic link establishment (ALE)  . Currently, it can establish a new link within 10 seconds. Automated HF communications have become available even without profound and extended training. It used to take three months of continuous training to produce an HF operator team from musical people that could provide 60/60 marks per minute throughput with Morse code.

The specifications for traditional HF radio are captured from https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/defence/hf-3000-skyfst 

Modern cognitive HF-radio

The most modern way of utilizing HF communications includes spreading the transmission over the whole band from 3 MHz to 30 MHz. This provides below the Noise level modulation at amplitude dimension but can be received through decoding. Spreading the transmission also provides up to 153 Kbps data transmission, which applies to Internet Protocol (IP) connections. When spread spectrum is used together with 3rd generation Automatic Link Establishment, the modern cognitive HF radio is born. The artificial intelligence ensures link establishment within 500 milliseconds, adjusts to volatile channel conditions, and transmits IP-packages avoiding detection by traditional signals intelligence.

The specifications for modern HF radio are captured from http://www.kyynel.net/public-safety-security-defense.html

How to drive the ICT of Armed Forces i.e. Governance of ICT in the Armed Forces?

How does ICT system work?

According to COBIT 5 framework, the ICT is composed with Governance, Planning, Building, and Running. Let’s use some analogues from automobile business to clarify the structure and functions of the ICT:

• The governance includes the ways of monitoring, evaluating and directing the actions. With automobile this means observing events around the car, breaking, accelerating and turning the steering wheel as assessed necessary.
• The planning includes the ways of anticipating the future: orientation, when and where to fill the tank, whom to give the ride, when to have service, etc.
• The building includes the ways and means to renew the ICT structure of technology, processes, and people either gradually part by part or at once by buying a new car.
• The running or delivering includes the operation of ICT systems according to processes accomplished by people to create value to the users. This means actually driving from one place to another and providing a reliable journey to the passengers.
• Then there is the actual utilization of ICT services i.e. Information management and for example situational awareness. Only the utilization leads into Information Superiority. From transportation business viewpoint this means that passengers are delivered safely on time to places they request with all their luggage intact.

How to drive the ICT system?

The governance of ICT is described in many best practices as ISO/IEC 38500, ISACA COBIT 5 (a framework for governance and management of enterprise IT), AXELOS ITIL v3 (a framework for IT service management), and TM Forum eTOM (a business process framework for digital enterprise). All of these models emphasize five key focus areas for governance: value creation, risk management, performance management, resource management, and strategic alignment.

Value

Value creation means that transportation creates added value to the passengers. They enjoy the swift and safe journey to where they want arriving fresh and ready to meet the actual reason for travelling. In ICT, this means that the end user perceives the added value of information, connectivity, situational awareness, and collaboration. The pre-expectations include that value is provided continuously (24/7) and sustaining the security where ever they choose to soldier. This means that the value creation chain is working smoothly. There are Service Catalogues that clearly set the expectations for ICT Services. There are Service Level Agreements between providers and users to establish trusted relationship. There are Operator Level Agreements to integrate several operators as value chains.

Risks

Risk management means that if there is an interruption during the drive, reserve car is ready to take the passengers on if the first car has a flat tire. There are also military police to escort the transportation and counter all security threats. In ICT language, this means that Availability and Information Security are optimized to provide reliable, confidential and assured ICT services to end users.

Performance

Performance management means that the transportation is fast enough to get there on time, the seat is good enough to feel comfortable, and there is water enough to compensate dehydration. In ICT language, performance means Quality of Service, Processing power, speed of transfer, Cost-Efficiency, and Flexibility.

Resources

Resource management means that the fleet of cars is maintained and inspected, drivers are well educated and licensed, and fuel stations are available. In ICT language, resources include human capital, material(HW), immaterial(SW), financial, organizational, and facility assets. These are the means that are used to create value through processes by using technical systems.

Strategic alignment

Strategic alignment implies that the fleet of cars is maintained at an optimal level providing Return of Investment but also expected the level of comfortable travelling experience, there is a differentiating value compared to competitors, and continuous development is keeping competitors catching up the advantage. In ICT language, strategic alignment means building and sustaining the information superiority over the enemy.

Your are ready to drive - how about some assisting features?

Once these five elements are in place, the actual governance is possible i.e. monitoring the status of all value chains, assessing the needs for a change, and directing the needed adjustment to either drive current or future goals. Planning can be supported by Capability portfolio, which balances risks, resources, investments, current operations and building the future capabilities. The other tool for planning is Architecture. Architecture is describing the structure (people, processes, and technology) from enterprise level down to single technical component level. Enterprise Architecture ensures that planning reflects strategic goals through business, information, and technology layers. A Target Architecture improves communication within development project and ensures that strategic goals and reference architecture guidance are followed.

Evolution of military information management in support and mission environments

Abstract

This paper defines a roadmap that military information management has been following mainly in business and supportive domains of military affairs. Paper describes a seven stage evolutionary path from print based information management to intelligent information. These seven phases are connected with paths of evolution, shortcutting and downgrading provided with examples. The military information management roadmap is defined to help Enterprise Architecture work in defining current situation and journey to possible end state.

Introduction

Military Information and Communication Technology has evolved through decades in keeping the separation between networking, computing, information security and information management. Now evolution is reaching towards more convergent ICT structures, and there is a special awareness needed to include these requirements into military ICT strategies. Many enterprise architecture models describe information 

This paper is a part of series of papers that are describing the roadmaps of each layer of CIT technology applicable in military support and mission networks as pictured in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Orientation of military ICT domains i.e. networks

The paper focuses on military support and mission networks like USA’s APAN , NIPRNET , SIPRNET  or NATO’s AMN  and FMN . This paper is not explaining Internet or evolution in governmental extranet nor any tactical military networks.

The series of studies illustrate a major technical evolutionary path for each layer of technology and describes some shortcuts that military organisations have experiencing both when revolutionizing their information management culture or being driven back with negative forces of their culture. This paper provides tools for enterprise architects to do strategic diagnosis using evolutionary roadmap where the current situation can be assessed, and the possible future state may be defined. 

Orientation to Military ICT roadmaps

There is a possibility to create a description of the general evolution of Information and Communications Technology, ICT in military support and mission information environments. A generic evolution is depicted with four aligned roads of Networking, Computing, IT securing and Information Management in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Roads of military ICT evolution

This paper is describing the sub-roadmap for military information or content management  in more detail. See the other papers of this series for a description of all roads on the ICT roadmap.

Digital Information may be divided roughly into structured and unstructured information based on its organization. Unstructured information does not have a pre-defined data model, or it is not organized in a pre-defined manner.  Unstructured information requires a human being to understand it as it is presented mainly as text, audio or video. Structured information is organized according to the pre-determined data model, or it is annotated using an ontological taxonomy.  It can be understood both by human and machine. The study of structured information in a military environment is covered elsewhere in the series of ICT roadmaps.

Description of evolutionary path for Information Management 

The information management in the military environment has been defined by its mean of storing. First information was printed on paper and bind to books or documents which were stored on shelves of a library or archives. The management of information was using bibliographies to publish information on information and physical items (i.e. books or documents) in controlling distribution. Processes were supported by manual flows of paper.

With automated data processing systems, information was captured in digital format, arranged in files, stored in folders and managed by distributing files through email. The management was using physical access to systems, encryption and restrictions in access to folders. The processes were defined by the functions that were using information systems. 

In the cyber environment, the writing or drawing in information production has been first supplemented and then substituted using audio and video. A human being as a primary information provider is gradually substituted by machines which sense their environment and provide both structured and unstructured information in vast magnitude i.e. big data.  The volume, velocity, and variety of this new data have gone beyond the ability of legacy computers to process small data for humans from it. The methods of managing big data cannot be based on material items anymore.

The following sections are explaining the evolutionary stages in the management of unstructured information in a military environment as per their medium.

Print

Since the printing innovation by Gutenberg, the unit for managing information has been mainly a page, document, and a book. Printed paper is still utilized in many official military documents. Sharing of information is based on distributing letters, memorandums, minutes-of-meetings and paper documents. It is considered to be good to manage top secret information on paper because of its physical constraints and manageability. 

File

When personal computing did gain the footage in military official information management, the paper was converted to file and book to the folder. First, they were stored in data mediums like tape, floppy disks, compact discs, memory sticks, etc. Sharing information is based on delivering these mediums containing files and folders. The military is tackling the issue of non-connected systems by transferring information between systems via manual data mediums (like USB sticks or DVD) . The personal level and manual information management expose to risks of data leaks. In the largest military data leak 2010, almost 400 000 classified logs from Iraq War were published by Wikileaks.  

In the Finnish Defence Forces, the first file sharing content management became utilised through 1980’s when personal computers were introduced as common data processing entities. One of the first command posts was using Nokia manufactured PC’s and floppy disks back in 1985.

Storage

Further, these files and folders were stored in hard disks and accessed via file management structures (for example FAT, NFS) - first in single PC’s and then increasingly networked storages. The distribution of files between storages was first done by File Transfer Protocol, FTP or via Email (mainly SMTP).  

The more current ways of managing and distributing files are cloud based. Besides the legacy storage area networks, the storage may also be organized in converged where all computing components are integrated as one computing package.  The other end for cloud computing storage is to use hyper-converged infrastructure, where a lot of standard attached storages are virtualized using software defined storage. 

The cloud-stored files are accessed via different means. Most common file sharing platforms are for example MS Sharepoint, OneDrive, Dropbox, BitTorrent, Netflix. 

In the Finnish Defence Forces, the first Email service (Vaxmail) within a deployed force was provided 1994. Defence Forces wide Email and file sharing service (Esikuntajarjestelma -95) were implemented in 1995. It also included collaborative consumption pages as a private point of sales.

Web page

Publishing information on pages has been there since newspapers. A digital page was introduced in 1980. The method is composed of hypertext (HTML)  structured page, Uniform Resource Locator (URL)  to provide an address to HTML page, Hypertext Transfer Protocol  to provide session between page and viewer, and a web browser  to present the content of the digital page to a viewer.

The military is challenged with this publish and pull method of content management since the culture of “need to know” requires predefined detailed access rights. The MS SharePoint has come one of the most used platforms for both files and web pages (U.S, NATO). There are also other platforms in use as IBM WebSphere (FIN, GER) or Open Source based (FRA, U.S). Most of the operational planning is done via portals and orders are both prepared and shared as HTML-pages.

In the Finnish Defence Forces, the first Domino portal was published 1995 and WebSphere Portal 2007. 

Social Media

Sharing information with social media means has exploded in private life where Wikipedia, Facebook, and Twitter gained popularity. The military has been following this trend in an Internet environment. In 2007, the first military accounts started appearing in social media. In 2009, US started first plans for exploiting the social media. 

The whole change from the one-way publish-pull policy of early Web toward more interacting and collaborating web is called Web 2.0.  Web 2.0 is defined by social networking, video sharing, web applications and collaborative consumption. Military are using enterprise social media tools as part of their content management platforms e.g. SharePoint and WebSphere.

In the Finnish Defence Forces, the first force wide collaboration toolset was published 2010 which included voice, chat, whiteboard and meeting management. 

Semantic Web Information

The next generation of markup Web is called semantic or sometimes Web 3.0.  This means that information is not referred as a page, but the basic unit is a sentence or word that defines the subject, predicate, and object. This language makes all unstructured data readable by both humans and machines. The semantic web uses Resource Description Framework (RDF)  to describe information, taxonomies, and interchangeability features. The Web Ontology Language (OWL) describes ontologies and data syntax is described in Extensible Markup Language (XML). Queries are done via SPARQL. 

Most of the military Open Source Intelligence systems have been using semantic structures in categorising events extracted from data flows on Internet since 2005. Some of the information integration and big data applications in military Enterprise Resource Management have been using semantic models to exchange data. 

In the Finnish Defence Forces, the first Battle Management System based on semantic knowledge model was introduced 2010 and 2015 it was rolled out for the training of conscript troops.  

Intelligent Web Information

The future generation of managing “unstructured” information may be based on research done under the title of Web Intelligence or Web wisdom. It concerns mainly of using artificial intelligence as meta-component of all information. Each piece of information thus possesses some program to enable different ways of processing data. 

One critical for information is to recognize the context where it is required to use. The context or situation can be defined by acquiring more information about the current and compare the situation with patterns of causality history to set the best approximation for intended purpose in using information. 

The map of roads

With the previous seven stages of means in managing unstructured information, one may create a map for possible evolutionary roads that military organizations have journeyed in their attempt to develop information and content management. This roadmap is not based on maturity models and linear improvement.  It is defined by a derivation of evolution model  and tested with samples from military organizations. The roadmap for military information management evolution is illustrated in Figure 3. The main path is following the generic evolution: print – file – storage – page – some – semantic – intelligent. There are also alternative paths for accelerated evolution and reverse or downgrade. The following section provides examples of each journey.

Figure 3: Roadmap for military Information Management

Leaps, shortcuts and paths of downgrading on information management map of possible roads

Military organizations have followed the main path of information evolution. The Finnish Defence Forces have journeyed through all stages but the last as explained in the previous section. Within the Services of U.S. Armed Forces, there are all the stages of information management present at same time.

There are two leaps in evolutionary path that may present challenges for information management culture. The first is a long cultural leap from individually possessed files in personal folders to publish knowledge in pages. From an individual viewpoint, one is first in control of his information by pushing it to others with means like email or access to shared folder. Then suddenly one is required to publish “his” information to everyone by a web page with no apparent control of who has access, reads the content and - worst of all - utilizes the information.  From organization viewpoint, there is first hierarchical control on all sharing of official information. Then suddenly, the commander of armed forces comments publicly a blog writing that private soldier published on lessons learnt in the UNIFIL operation. 

Secondly, there is an extended information structure leap from the huge amount of shared unstructured data (text, pictures, videos, personal sensor data) via enterprise social and other medias towards structuring everything in two additional dimensions: metadata and logic.  The leap is imperative to enable artificial intelligence, machine learning, and improve man-machine collaboration. It has taken two years to the Internet to have 4 million domains using schema.org  markup.  The U.S DoD has been attempting to build horizontal integration of their enterprise data since 2008 by using standard ontologies. 

There is a possibility to accelerate evolution by utilizing shortcuts and passing by some stages. The Land Command of Finnish Defence Forces jumped from file defined directly to the semantic defined battle management system. It required a coherent effort to change technology, ontology of information, processes, and behaviour of people at same time. 

There is also change to downgrade the culture of information management since new technology is providing ways to get rid of old bottlenecks and friction. Search engines, active directory , and access to cloud-based file management  have extended the file based content management within military enterprises hugely.

The 2010 leak of Iraq War Logs downgraded the U.S. and NATO attempts to share information more freely amongst warfighters.  The access to sensitive information was constrained for a single defence analyst. 
 

Examples of the usage of roadmap

The Enterprise architect may use a simple illustration in communicating the current situation of technology, information, business and culture of the military organization. With the same map, the architect may communicate the possible future states and probable challenges on the journey towards end state as illustrated in Figure 4.

It might occur that even if technology enables huge improvements, the information management methods or organizational culture make them unrealistic.

Figure 4: Simple concept for enterprise architecture

With the information management roadmap, an enterprise architect may be able to show tangible the current situation of content management status. If the adapted strategy for information superiority is after utilizing the edge of technology, then semantic web and intelligent content may be the end state. This might be challenging to achieve, since the information management culture of an average society is somewhere around social media and that culture may prevent the full use of technology. 

The more evolutionary strategy might adapt smaller steps and set goals to transform from files to web pages and allow the culture of the organization to develop more iteratively as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: an example of information management architecture analysis

The cultural stages of military organization in information management are explained in other papers of military knowledge management.

It might be that the technology or culture are not the biggest obstacles, but existing information security policy is preventing the development. Thus, there is a need to express the information management roadmap on the same map as the evolution of information security. For example in Figure 6, the domain based information security is preventing to achieve information management alike social media since there needs to be service based information security in place.

Figure 6: an example of interdependence between the layers of ICT infrastructure

See the previous papers for other ICT technical layers and their evolution in military use!

Battlespace management A

A short orientation towards Battlespace Management and opportunities that have emerged with evolution of Information and Communications Technology

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. Sun Tzu 

This paper is describing entities, domains, dimensions and forces of modern Battlespace. Basic management approaches for Battlespace are explained, and four stages of management culture are illustrated. These two descriptions provide a foundation to assess what ways a force can improve their ability to control complex Battlespace. A method is provided to analyse the Doctrine, Maturity and Technical readiness of the military organisation.

Complexity of a Battlespace

War is a chameleon; its form fluctuates and mutates, and only its basic nature is invariant. Clausewitz

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an integral attribute of the nature of war. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, requiring an original solution. Warfighting, FMFM1, U.S. Marine Corps

Battlespace is typically defined by the boundary of Area of Operation, AOO. Currently, though, there are several dimensions that AOO extends well beyond a designated geographical area. Within the AOO there may be appointed Areas of Responsibility, AOR. If there is no Unity of Command, Battlespace is divided between several authorities. The division of responsibility is normal and calls for cooperation and coordination. Battlespace is composed of all entities and their interrelationships within the AOO. The entities within Battlespace may include the following:

• Blue Force. Militarily organised or other force within Battlespace that has a mission to achieve an end state assigned by strategic level.
• Blue enablers. Other entities that Blue Force uses as support, enablers or effectors in Battlespace.
• Protected Population. The main population or society that Blue Force is protecting and assuring its core functions.
• Red Force. Main opposing force or network that has confronting or conflicting agenda in the AOO.
• Red Enablers. Other entities that Red Force uses as support, enablers or effectors in Battlespace.
• Red Society. The main base of resources for the Red Force.
• Neutral. Other entities that may remain neutral or change their status to support either of the sides. Neutrals are everywhere amongst enablers, population and society.
• Global Opinion. The global conscious or opinion that is affected via press, television and more often via The Internet and Social Media.

The Battlespace may include the following domains and dimensions:

Physical domain. The tangible domain where events take place. Physical domain can be further divided into dimensions :

• Maritime. Covering 70% of the Earth’s surface reaching down to the seabed and including islands and littoral areas. 80% of the world’s cities are within 300 km from the sea. There are about billion barrels of oil that are shipped in Oil Tankers in a day. 40% of that shipping goes through the Strait of Hormuz.  Harbours are main avenues to sea, thus essential for maritime operations and main targets for a suppressor.
• Land. Most of the population in developed countries live in cities. Thus, urban areas are probably included in Battlespace. All entities in Battlespace are operating on land. Land and its features can be manipulated to enhance mobility, protection and lessen the lethality of warheads. Moulding ground, fortifying, creating obstacles, blocking rivers, digging ditches have been usual ways to change Battlespace in favour for National Defence.
• Air. From the surface to the ionosphere, airspace is used by all entities. They use it to fly aircraft, fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, deliver weapons, create electromagnetic pulses or for visual observation. Airfields and bases are the main avenues to airspace thus they are both essential to the user and main target to the suppressor. Usually extends beyond normal AOO.
• Space. Anything in orbit or beyond is regarded as outer space. Plethora of functions can be hosted in satellites as intelligence, communications, navigation, meteorology or warheads. Normally extends beyond normal AOO.
• Electromagnetic Spectrum. The electromagnetic environment within Battlespace pervades other physical dimensions. It can be used for support (sensor, communications) but also to destroy or disrupt (Jamming, Electromagnetic Pulse, High Powered Microwave). Usually extends beyond normal AOO.
• Cyberspace. Not a natural but man-made space where digitised information is communicated, processed and stored.  It can be globally connected like The Internet, but also appear in single USB-stick. Growingly perceiving the platforms used in other dimensions. Most of the sensors, arms, vehicles, support systems, media, economy and societies use Cyberspace to multiply their combined effect or improve their performance. Within last 20 years, Cyberspace has become environment also for offensive operations. Since cyberspace is man-made, it can be prepared for both defence and offence. Most often extends beyond assigned AOO.
• Resources. Resources include people, material, finance, facilities, goods and the value or supply chain that is needed to produce or deliver them. The developed societies are very dependent on various global value chains . They can be used either to reach for resources to support entities in Battlespace but also to block and isolate Battlespace, or manipulate the value of resources possessed by Red Force and Red enablers.  Sourcing for resources extends well beyond the AOO.
• Time. A man-made dimension that helps to manage the future and to recognise events and their causality in the past. Time is used to orchestrate activities in other dimensions, through synchronisation and sequencing. Time and synchronisation are also enablers for utilisation of cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Denying time can suppress many capabilities in other dimensions.

Information domain. The level where events are presented to humans or collaborated between humans and artificial intelligence. Information is born when an event occurs in the physical domain if it is being observed by a human being. Machine sensor provides data from the event and later when it is recognised either by human or artificial sense making, it turns to information. Information can be presented as Common Relevant Operating Pictures such as Common Operating Picture, COP or tactical pictures as Recognised Maritime Picture, Recognised Land Picture, Recognised Air Picture, Recognised Logistics Picture and Recognised Environmental Picture.

Cognitive domain. The domain where orientation and decision are taking place. It is also the domain where opinion, attitudes, and feelings are created. The cognitive domain is targeted by deception, surprise and propaganda.  There are different ways to gain an understanding of the state of cognitive domain. One may detect data from commuting, shopping and consumption to create behavioural models. One may do polls or surveys and measure social media content or media content to tap current feelings and attitudes of society.

The physical entities interact through some or all of physical dimensions, create and receive information, which turns into understanding and feelings. Besides military force, there is always other forces like political, economic, and social forces in play within the shared Battlespace. All forces try to create effects that are observed and hope that, because of new understanding, opinions, attitudes and feelings, the behaviour of entities in Battlespace changes. A simplified interaction model is depicted in the following Figure 1. 

Foundation for Battlespace Management

The orchestration of all forces, ways they use in all dimensions and their combined effects through dimensions is called Battlespace Management, BM. BM includes the common functions of Command, Control, and Communication (C3) used by the Commander in Charge (CiC) of AOR. The C3 means integrating all force components under one, unified command.

The BM also includes ways to coordinate, synchronise, and prioritise efforts through all forces creating effect within Battlespace but not necessarily under unified command :

• Coordination. Coordination brings together different force capabilities and activities available within Battlespace into optimised and productive relationship. Coordination reaches after entities along the supply and value chains together with vertical forces of the military, economic, social, and political.
• Synchronisation. Coordination is enhanced by synchronisation, which sequences capabilities and activities, at the appropriate tempo, in time and space. 
• Prioritisation. Coordination and synchronisation highlight competing demands for time, space and finite resources. Prioritisation determines their allocation, in accordance with CiC’s concept of operations.

The core BM functions are sense making, decision making and knowledge creation. They have different attributes depending on the environment, situation, force, and the culture of the network of entities.

Sense making  varies depending the situation in designated AOO. Known situation prefers straightforward sensing, categorising and acting. The knowable situation requires sensing, analysing and decision before action. The complex situation needs to be probed first, and then analyse-decide-action loop can follow. The chaotic situation requires action first with limited force to create a reaction. The reaction can be sensed, analysed, decided and acted.

Decision making  can be centralised and authoritarian. Orders and reports flow down and up following the line of command. Decision making can also be shared at strategic intention level, which allows higher level synchronisation of operational execution. In mission command, tactical freedom is delegated to combined arms task forces level. Synchronisation, coordination and prioritisation is ensured by commander’s intent, collaboration and shared situational awareness. The mission command can be further accelerated by enforcing collaboration between tactical level commanders. The last step includes self-synchronization between different arms and components of force. Hierarchy is replaced by collaboration and consciousness, but it requires professionalism and trust . Self-synchronisation enables swarming tactics, fastest reaction and flexibility at the tactical level.

Capabilities to knowledge creation and learning  are decisive for the flexibility  of force. 

Learning can happen based on the book, instructing what to think and how to act. Abilities to adjust can be improved by learning how to think and possibilities for acting. The third gear is learning as a team with social constructive drivers. The fourth gear is creating knowledge as an organisation with social cognitive drivers.

By combining all three attributes of sense making, decision making and learning together, a roadmap for Battlespace management is pictured. Four different stages of BM for military force can be defined in Figure 2:

• Type A: a force following fixed doctrine, having mostly authoritative decision making and preparing for known or knowable situations. As communications are following the line of command, the BM systems are built hierarchically. The performance of the whole depends on Commanders and their Staffs. There might be an advantage gained when a modern force type A confronts a non-modern force. 
• Type B: a force that is more flexible, uses a wider variety of command cultures and prepares mainly for complex situations. The performance of force depends on trust between all commanders, their ability to think differently and share information. 
• Type C: a force that prepares to adapt rather than control situation, utilises all ways of command culture and can learn from lessons overnight. This is called networked force, where institutional hierarchy is replaced by social, collaboration and self-synchronization networks enabling swarming tactics and low-level initiation.
• Type D: a force that wavers between the three cultures above. This culture requires the widest and most flexible C4ISR services or just an open collaboration between people and mainly manual processes.

 

Prerequisites for Battlespace Management System

This section describes the analysis that needs to happen before any investment plans are done to improve the capability of Battlespace management. Three approaches need to be considered: Operational doctrine, Maturity Roadmap and the readiness of Technical infrastructure.

Defining Operational doctrine

Based on earlier description, there are three different categories that a Military Force may find themselves from Management viewpoint:

• Hierarchy-driven: Force follows a fixed doctrine. It has mostly an authoritative decision-making process. The Force often prepares for known or knowable situations. Since sense making, decision making and learning are following the line of command; the BM systems are built to support hierarchical topology. The performance of the Force and its network depends on the quality of Commanders and their Staffs. 
• Mission-driven: Force structure is flexible. The structure allows the use of a wider variety of command cultures. The doctrine prepares for known to complex situations. The performance of force depends on trust between all commanders, their ability to think differently and share information.
• Swarming: The agility of Force structure is optimised. The Force prepares to adapt rather than tries to gain control over the situation. The Force utilises all ways of command culture and can learn from lessons overnight. In networked force, the institutional hierarchy is replaced by social, collaboration and self-synchronization relationships between entities that are using swarming tactics and exploiting low-level initiation.

Once the category of operational doctrine is chosen, then the maturity roadmap and technical ability can be defined. Assuming that the military force is representing the hierarchy driven doctrine, then next step is to identify the current status of maturity.

Maturity Roadmap for Battlespace management

Battlespace management is following the general maturity model  where technical systems, processes and competence and attitude needs to improve at the same pace. The matrix  in Figure 3 is describing the journey of maturity for Battlespace management. The map can be used to define the current situation and also create a vision of the level of aspiration. The phases of maturity evolve through weapon system orientation towards Branch and Service oriented culture. There is further leap towards Joint force interoperability and necessary stage to start strategic development. Optimisation and innovation phases will provide the level of strategic advantage.

For example, the hierarchy-driven force above may currently be at weapon system level since the prevailing culture of differentiation and independence has been overruling. Now strategic goal may be to mature capability to the degree of a Joint Force. This means at least three lines of development: technology, process and people. One might execute the development by acquiring Battlespace Management System that forces the processes, information sharing and the competence of people to make a leap at once. One might instead choose longer but maybe lasting effect by more iterative development approach. In any case, some technical prerequisites are needed before any development at space management happens.

Basic technical prerequisites

The building of a technical foundation for Battlespace management illustrated in Figure 4 starts with the battle identity. Blue force and associated entities should have (1) identities that are rendered authentic. Red force and related entities need to be recognised or else they appear only unrecognised events and lead to information overflow that can be even worse than lack of information. Each entity must be knowledgeable of their relative (2) position in the appropriate dimension of the battlespace. There is also need to have a position in time dimension for each position in other dimensions. The agreed categories of battle (3) statuses for each entity enable them to tell the others of their availability or situation. 

All this information or data needs to be (4) communicated promptly to a level where the (5) fusion of data from all entities of this dimension takes place. This data may be converted to recognised pictures and disseminated to all requiring entities if they have means to present the data.

One dimension alone is handicapped and needs the recognised situational data from other dimensions to become more comprehensive. Merging (6) dimensional data and correlating them creates information at the level of operational pictures. Operational pictures also include spatial, geospatial, temporal and weather information together with cognitive level features of entities in Battlespace. Common Operational Picture (COP) is the most generic level product for Battlespace awareness, but there is also a variety of Branch specific pictures for example logistics, HR, engineers, signals and fires. Finally, there is a need for communications and presentation (7) layers to be able to disseminate the COP to all entities requiring the information.

If one chooses to implement a Battlespace Management System, it might happen at tactical or operational level. In any of these cases, there needs to be the technical foundation (1-4 and 7) in place to gain any benefit from any of the Battlespace Management Systems.

Criticism of information technology driven battlespace awareness

Network-centric perspective is clearly tactical. All the complexities and uncertainties in a war are reduced to essentially collecting, processing, and transmitting vast amounts of information and to speed of command. Milan Vego, 2007 

Where C4ISTAR is imperative for warfare, the concept of Network Centric Warfare, NCW and its current applications are sometimes simplifying the complexity, fog and friction of warfare, which are mainly based on human behaviour, competency and personalities. The following critique has been argued against too extensive information reliance:

Information dominance: one’s ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an enemy’s ability to do the same. 

• In acquiring blue force information from event level requires overcoming the human intermediates who are the main sources of contradictions, falsifications and uncertainties.
• It is even harder to collect information with certainty from the red force. The red force will be initiative and full of mischief and deception. Surveillance and targeting sensors are predictive in their detection and categorization.
• Information does not necessary convey to awareness, and further understanding since human ways to gain understanding are not only defined by available information.
• Information overload is normal phenomena both through man-machine interfaces and machine-machine interfaces.

Shared Awareness: Information from all the sensors is available to all the network participants. 

• Information based on event data may provide some tactical level awareness but for both operational and strategic level understanding, event data is the faulty foundation.
• There is a tension between the sender’s perception of reality and receiver’s personal understanding. With humans, they are defined by personalities, mind models, stress levels and ways of thinking rather than merely presenting data on a computer screen.
• Commanders have inborn myopic towards the tactical situation. There are plenty of examples of higher level commanders trying to micromanage their lower level subordinates just because they see the more detailed picture.

The speed of Command: the ability to observe, decide, command, and act far more quickly than the opponent. 

• There is a definite difference between tactical, operational and strategic command. The speeding of OODA loop may have effect only at the tactical level. The orientation phase is much more important in other levels of command.
• The previously mentioned myopic micromanagement may also significantly slow down the C3 cycle.
• The famous Blitzkrieg way of battle was a combination of mobility, shock, locally concentrated fires and quick decision making based on pre-exercised mind-models. The effectivity of decision making does not come only from increased awareness.

Decision superiority: the ability to operate well within an enemy’s decision cycle, to significantly reduce or lock out his options. 

• Decision superiority requires better-trained commanders and their staff rather than only increased information.
• The military doctrine, culture and way of educating officers may prevent them from acting on situation or constraint the available decision models.
• The more complex the technical system, more sensors connected, easier it is to the adversary to suppress or to degrade the battlespace management system thus infusing mistrust between commanders and their information systems. Once trust is lost, there might be challenges to build it up during the operation.

It is important to build battle management capabilities through all components of doctrine, organisation, training, learning, material, personnel, facilities, information and interoperability since no one improved component makes a significant difference in the war against a resourceful adversary.

Genesis of a leader

An example of a growth as a leader

This narrative is a personal story of the writer’s own growth as a leader when serving the Finnish Defence Forces as an officer 1984 – 2012. For reference purposes, stages are reflected three growth models: John Maxwell’s (2011), Jim Collins (2001) and Bill Torbert’s (2004). The paper has two goals: 1) to illustrate evolution of a leader and importance of reflection, 2) to provide references for learning, self-reflection, and self-control.(Pardon me for not being able to include the footnotes with this version)

Short introduction to growth models for leadership

John C. Maxwell is approaching leadership modelling it with five following levels of maturity . His model is providing a clear base for development and values as a leader. He recognises that each level includes the previous levels, and leadership is built by accumulating them in each situation. The following matrix is illustrating Maxwell’s five levels as a leader.

Levels	Features
5. Pinnacle	These leaders have reputation and respect. They use intuition and time their effect intentionally. It requires to develop followers rather than lead followers. They create a legacy within the organization, extended platform for leading.
4. People Development	The key thing is empowering others. Leaders use their position, relationships, and productivity to invest in their followers and develop them until they become leaders. Teamwork is highly appreciated as tasks are distributed but responsibility is centralized. Growth is built by developing people with vision that inspires. This level allows the leader to take larger responsibilities.
3. Production	Leader gains influence and credibility by getting work done and goals achieved. The leader becomes a change agent: tackle problems, support people to the new level of effectiveness. There is a danger in doing things oneself and not with people and forgetting to take care of relationships.
2. Permission	The level is defined by relationships. Treating people as individuals with value provides ground for influence. Gradually there is trust growing between leader and her people as they become more familiar with each other. Leader switches from “Me” to “We” and openness creates the positive working environment. Permission seeking leaders may appear too soft and indecisive.
1. Position	An entry level of all leaders. Position as a manager is based on rights granted by position, title, and rank. Position based “boss/chief” has subordinates who are controlled with rules, policies, and regulations. The level is an invitation to growth for a possible leader. Staying at this level may lead to emphasizing manager’s rights more than responsibilities.

 
Jim Collins with his team analysed all Fortune 500 companies from 1965 to 1995 and found eleven good to great examples . Then the team analysed those 11 with their hypothesis model of six features where leadership was the first. They defined features for level 5 leadership that were an enabler for companies to break from good to great. The levels are explained in the following matrix.

Levels	Features
5 Executive	Builds enduring greatness through a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will.
4 Effective leader	Catalyses commitment to and vigorous pursuit of a clear and compelling vision, stimulating higher performance standards.
3 Competent manager	Organizes people and resources toward the effective and efficient pursuit of predetermined objectives.
2 Contributing team member	Contributes individual capabilities to the achievements of group objectives and work effectively with others in a group setting.
1 Highly capable individual	Makes productive contributions through talent, knowledge, skills and good work habits.

 
Bill Torbert and his team created an action inquiry – a systems thinking approach to describe transformation of a leader . The development process was tested in Boston College. Unlike other models, this provides a roadmap of different paths between stages but for the purpose of this narrative, the model has been simplified to linear growth as illustrated in the following matrix.

Levels	Main features
7 Alchemist	Moves between levels and utilizes the best applicable action-logic to the situation and group. Meets each situation at the pace and action logic of the group he is interacting. Ability to transform the pace and focus of the current conversation or meeting. Seeks analogies across different domains and promoting collaboration using his spiritual energy. Stands in the tension of opposites and aims to blend them. Has grown beyond his ego and promotes the society and higher values.
6 Strategist	Is more self-aware of action and time. He uses all four conventional approaches when the situation requires and aligns individual, team and organizational goals. He recognises levels of other people and enables their development. He allows others to make mistakes but assures that they will learn from them both at behavioural and strategical levels. Strategist consciously seeks new ways of framing opportunities, dilemmas, and conflicts. He actively seeks resolutions both inner and outer paradoxes and tries to use apparent conflict as empowering leverage. Strategists expressions are spontaneous, both genuine and intense. His focus is on the continuous development of himself and others.
5 Individualist A transition phase	Takes relativistic perspective focusing on both present and historical context. He feels conflicting emotions when facing situations and seeks independence, creative work. He is attracted by difference and change more than similarity and stability.  He influences more by listening and finding patterns rather than advocacy. May not provide certainty and firm leadership often expected by more conventionally oriented employees.
Threshold of self-awareness and self-control
4 Achiever	Works with 1-3 year period juggling creatively with shorter time goals. He shifts between planning, performing and assessing to gain outcomes that matter. Achiever makes incremental, single loop changes in behaviour to eventually reaching the planned results. Satisfaction occurs when “I have achieved outcomes by successfully juggling with quick wins, agreed-on deadlines, and efficient work”. Achiever seeks more long-term effectiveness than short-term efficiency. Achiever values more teamwork and agreements reached through consensus. He welcomes feedback and seeks mutuality in relationships with co-workers. He might though be myopic in comprehending the feedback and does not easily deviate from his proven mind models.
3 Expert	Concentrates on a strategic level as he is improving in mastering his discipline. He emprises projects from 6 months to 12 months by wielding logistical power. He feels satisfaction when “I accomplished the task as efficiently as possible”. The expert does not identify himself with the group but seeks to stand out from others. They are typically hard project workers, seek completion of the task, and willing to learn from experts more acknowledged than themselves. Experts are perfectionists or competitors that find hard to work in teams. They also find it very uncomfortable to work outside their area of mastery.
2 Diplomat	Concentrates on performance by gaining self-control to act effectively. He seeks high-status group members and tries to imitate their routines. The basis of his authority is norms and routines of his organization. He concentrates on routine tasks and feels satisfaction, when he is on time for work, meeting or completing the routine task. He takes the values of significant others the highest good. Behavioural skills – right moves and words in right times – are main tools towards acceptance. At best diplomat provides reliability, loyalty, and goodwill that improves trust and morale in the organization. Diplomats avoid negative situations, cannot criticize others, or question group norms.
1 Opportunist	Concentrates on the physical world and trying to gain control over it. He has short time horizon when trying to grasp opportunities and firefight emergencies as they occur. The opportunist achieves his goal when declaring “I won”. At best opportunist is good at short-term actions to unchartered areas in work. Longer-term these short-term wins will appear to be costly. Opportunist typically avoids responsibility and seeks externalizing blame.

Next chapters are narrating particular features through four stages that writer has lived through last four decades. These features are projected over the levels and descriptions of above three growth paths in intention to show that person can improve his managerial and leadership skills. 

Stage of maturity
Maxwell’s	Position>	Permission	Production	People	Pinnacle
Collins	Individual	Team member	Manager	Leader	Executive
Torbert’s	Opportunist	Diplomat	Expert	Achiever	Individualist	Strategist	Alchemist

The three models have implemented into the same matrix, but their levels or stages are not normalised, so they are not comparable. Bolded, big font indicates the stage and arrow (>) points towards possible transformation as a leader and a person.
 

My story

When I was in my twenties just out from Military College, I thought that being the best operator of all technical systems and leading by excellent example in accomplishing were the only things needed to be a successful leader of Signal troops. I hated every undefined feature in Signals procedures and spent hours in writing how things should be done. I pressed my subordinates with both lengthy instructions and dynamic behaviour. I competed against my peers and superiors in being most skilful, strong and strict young officer in the field of Signals business. 

Up to a certain level, everything went well. Conscripts followed my instructions, sometimes out of fear towards my temper and overarching skills, and sometimes just to get things over with and return to barracks. My peers did not like me because of constant competition, and I did not gain any close friendship with them. My superiors either disliked me and turned their attention somewhere else or trusted me and gave me freedom of action.

I felt left alone with my role of being the best. Gradually, I changed my behaviour to be more supportive towards my peers. I shared my work with them and helped them in their problems. I teamed up with some splendid fellows to study together, and we all were successfully in gaining entrance to General Staff College. I learned that sharing will enable collegial support, and that will get you further than selfish hoarding of information and constant comparison and competition.

Later I realized that I had been risen to behave like that. The whole education system was driven by recognition of individual success .  Through my entire education, competition among students was constant as we were judged every time in exercises, exams, and tests. Only in conscript training some credit was gained by the team as we were together able to survive in skiing through the dark forest, settling a camp and countering an enemy attack just before sunrise. Even that was ruined, when bonus holidays were given based on individual success in shooting, running or exams. Team sociology  was educated at Military College only in theory when competition between cadets was constant, and only sanctions were addressed on team bases. 

After graduation from Military College, I was given a task to compose integrated teams of signal out of a heterogeneous group of conscripts under my responsibility. I did not have any practical experience on building team integrity, but taking them out into the woods, and assigning them with challenges to overcome, were producing results. Otherwise my expert skills and the way of using them to humiliate my conscripts or peers were only counterproductive.

Transfor- mation	Twenties
Maxwell’s	Position>	Permission	Production	People	Pinnacle
Collins	Individual>	Team member	Manager	Leader	Executive
Torbert’s	Opportunist	Diplomat	>Expert	Achiever	Individualist	Strategist	Alchemist

When I was in my thirties, just out from General Staff College and an eager student of telecommunications technology, I thought that, if I just make sense of every technical detail and compose them properly as a system, I would be able to build a better world. I spend hours in making sense of complex C4I systems, designing better information and telecommunications structures, and defining better processes for telecommunications network operations. I drafted orders that gave very detailed instructions on how to install routers and modems within telco facilities. I thought that strict project management was the key to success. People and systems would bend to my will if they were just managed in a strictest and controlled way all the time.

By collaborating with my peers and subordinates, I was successful in building technical systems, but almost all attempts to change the behaviour of people were failing. I tried to create bridges between telecommunications and information technology people. I provided them with designs combining telecommunications and information technology. I described them use cases, where both network and session engineering was needed to make whole OSI-stack functioning. I had no success in getting them closer and cooperating. Not even having their rooms on the same aisle made any changes to their confrontation. I tried to introduce common processes to improve their combined service production with no results. I was doing my best in sense making and designing systems. I spend nights in drawing logical charts on how processes should be running. Although all logic was speaking towards the change, people were afraid, not sharing the same language or distrusting each other. Moreover, I was not able to take them into the forest to overcome shared challenges.
I threw myself into studies of change management  and iterative development . There I found my first understanding and tools to lead changes by using my personality and human social behaviour . I abandoned strive for significant, one-time change and went after evolution with smaller steps.  I invited people in exercises to share their problems and seek for combined solutions. I spoke with people, visited their sites of work, listened to them, and recognised their skills and achievements. I was seeking their permission to lead them forward.

Later, I realized that I was educated to approach all subjects in a systematic way. All the education in General Staff College and the University of Technology was preparing me to understand and design  material and immaterial systems , not more complex systems that are a mixture of people, machines, and their interrelationships. I was provided with many tools to change technical systems but non to support human being in leaving his/her area of comfort. My communication was based only on analytical and logical facts, and they were not enough to move people from their comfort zones they had built in their history. 
I did not touch their feelings, changed their attitudes, nor was I able to help them to process their fears of new and unclear future. My education was perceiving a human being just as a piece of machinery that followed technical procedures . With my rational explanations and demands, I was seen more as a threat than as a leader that would take everyone along a safe journey towards the better future.

Transfor- mation	Thirties
Maxwell’s	Position	Permission	Production	People	Pinnacle
Collins	Individual	Team member>	Manager	Leader	Executive
Torbert’s	Opportunist	Diplomat	Expert	Achiever	Individualist	Strategist	Alchemist

When I was in my forties, I thought that managing programmes, making sense of everything, meeting people and telling stories of safe roads and better futures were the keys to making things to happen.  I was managing programmes  of hundreds of millions of euros, which were meant to change the behaviour  of thousands of people. Since timetable was tight and I had to detach money from current operations to finance the change, I was forced to use much outside help in planning and executing the transformation. I did manage changes through the whole DOTMLPFII  sphere extending over four years. The transformation was done incrementally, and I did my best to walk my talk among people.  

I was lucky to work with some bright individuals and able people. The technical transformation was achieved according to the schedule partly also because it was executed supported by outside professionals - best in Finland. However, I failed miserably with my people. I was thinking of combined effort of mine and outside professionals within integrated project teams. In the planning phase, my people took the role of audition rather than co-planning. In the design phase, they adapted role of judgement and critic rather than sharing information and gaining competence. In the implementation phase, they were good only to comment proceedings and achievements from seats of stand. In the operation phase, they were incapable of taking over the new systems and their administration as an organization. I had to hand pick individuals amongst them and assign responsibilities in the new organization. Despite the time and money spend in my people, they were not ready to take new steps and improve their competence along the program.

I stumbled over a culture of the workplace. I thought that people I had worked with were eager to make changes after few years of less intensity, but I was wrong. Their culture had reversed from where I had left them four years earlier. They had lost their common spirit and were divided into small groups of “tribes” with rivalling mind-sets. Some people were almost aggressive in their reaction declaring that “the world sucks, and you are from deep with your talks”. Most were perceived things with an attitude of “we have already tried that – it will not work”. Moreover, some people were trying to shine more than actually do. As an organization, they were not ready to start any journey of transformation, so they marginalized themselves to be the audience rather than real players in the field.
I lost those people. It was not enough to give people as clear technical concepts as possible. It was not enough to appoint capable managers to head the projects. It was not enough to talk with individuals and motivate them. Social structure, common spirit and adhered procedures kept good people from changing. I had to work around this group of people, and it left me very frustrated and sad.

Later I learnt about organizational cultures  and their maturity for change . I studied social structures in workplaces and was astonished when reading about tribal leadership .

Transfor- mation	Forties
Maxwell’s	Position	Permission	Production>	People	Pinnacle
Collins	Individual	Team member	Manager>	Leader	Executive
Torbert’s	Opportunist	Diplomat	Expert	Achiever>	Individualist	Strategist	Alchemist

When I reached fifties, I took time  and effort in migrating and integrating different cultures within my organization by gradually involving them into new challenges and offering mentoring and help adjusted to each specific need.  I even fabricated some crises to weld people together by outside threat.  I was also distributing projects so that there were always parallel paths in progress to ensure that single failure did not end up as a disaster.  I was able to deliver the planned services with my organization, but I was not successful in transforming them at capability level.

Users were keener on clinging existing tools and procedures than adopting any new ways of working.  My ICT efforts were not transformed to new procedures and further capabilities of fighting forces.  I was using advanced technology, good practices, and best people to deliver world class information services, but my superiors were seeing me more as an expense rather than an enabler. Successes inside were not transferred as a value outside of my organization.

I tried to create examples. I asked Commander to act as an example, use new services himself and demand his subordinates to utilize them also. I was using collaboration tools weekly to manage my distributed organization and thus being an example for my people to market new services further. I required my staff to utilize wiki to manage both current operations and planned issues. We were flat and efficient ICT-organization, but still our clients, the end users, were shy to adopt new ICT services.

Together with other process owners, we initiated doctrinal, organizational and cultural transformations:   

• the renewed fighting of Land Forces together with Chief of Operations and inspectors of Infantry and Sappers utilizing Battle Management System;  
• improved intelligence with the Head of G2; 
• enhanced artillery fires with the Inspector of Artillery; 
• standardizing the C2 processes with the Chief of Readiness;
• implemented a new way in maintaining of programmable electronics together with the Head of G4 .

We defined progressively advancing measures for each field exercise for troops and guides instructors to improve their troops. We composed joint exercises to give meaning for co-operation and new tasks to benefit from new ICT-services.  We produced concepts, guides, presentations and videos to help instructors in their new training. Every public occasion was used to recognise behaviour towards the future model. We planned an information operation to get people and units to change their behaviour and culture. This was possible only with shared understanding and unified effort to make a change towards achieving greater goals than any single unit or branch were able to accomplish.

Only after the owners of the core businesses started transforming, I was able to support them with ICT services and evolve the capabilities of the Land Forces. My staff and people of Signals begun to feel being a part of something bigger and doing meaningful work. That empowered them for further achievements. I learnt that, if you want to make a change, first you have to get people moving, and then you might be able to steer the movement and energy with quick wins, recognition and bright vision. 

Transfor- mation	Fifties
Maxwell’s	Position	Permission	Production	People	Pinnacle
Collins	Individual	Team member	Manager	Leader	Executive
Torbert’s	Opportunist	Diplomat	Expert	Achiever	Individualist	>Strategist	Alchemist

Today, I sometimes feel, that I know how the world is running. For these occasions, I have wallpaper titled Egocentricity . Human being has a tendency for being egocentric: 

• Egocentric memory is a natural tendency to forget information that does not support the adopted line of thinking. 
• Egocentric myopia refers to thinking within an overly narrow point of view.  
• Egocentric righteousness is a tendency to feel superior based on the belief that one has actually figured out how the world works.  
• Egocentric blindness is the natural tendency not to notice facts and evidence that contradict one’s beliefs or values. 

Having this reminder, I try to continue my journey humbly and work harder to improve my understanding of how world functions, people behave, societies interact and technology develops towards more complex and interdependent global system.  

Remembering that even to produce a simple household item like a toaster from scratch is not possible for any one man.  

Bearing in mind the saying of Peter Drucker: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast” . 

Envisioning, that sometime in the future, I might be feeling the euphoria of finding features of Alchemist  in me.

List of references

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• Managing Successful Programmes, Axilos
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