Battlespace management A

A short orientation towards Battlespace Management and opportunities that have emerged with evolution of Information and Communications Technology

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. Sun Tzu 

This paper is describing entities, domains, dimensions and forces of modern Battlespace. Basic management approaches for Battlespace are explained, and four stages of management culture are illustrated. These two descriptions provide a foundation to assess what ways a force can improve their ability to control complex Battlespace. A method is provided to analyse the Doctrine, Maturity and Technical readiness of the military organisation.

Complexity of a Battlespace

War is a chameleon; its form fluctuates and mutates, and only its basic nature is invariant. Clausewitz

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an integral attribute of the nature of war. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, requiring an original solution. Warfighting, FMFM1, U.S. Marine Corps

Battlespace is typically defined by the boundary of Area of Operation, AOO. Currently, though, there are several dimensions that AOO extends well beyond a designated geographical area. Within the AOO there may be appointed Areas of Responsibility, AOR. If there is no Unity of Command, Battlespace is divided between several authorities. The division of responsibility is normal and calls for cooperation and coordination. Battlespace is composed of all entities and their interrelationships within the AOO. The entities within Battlespace may include the following:

• Blue Force. Militarily organised or other force within Battlespace that has a mission to achieve an end state assigned by strategic level.
• Blue enablers. Other entities that Blue Force uses as support, enablers or effectors in Battlespace.
• Protected Population. The main population or society that Blue Force is protecting and assuring its core functions.
• Red Force. Main opposing force or network that has confronting or conflicting agenda in the AOO.
• Red Enablers. Other entities that Red Force uses as support, enablers or effectors in Battlespace.
• Red Society. The main base of resources for the Red Force.
• Neutral. Other entities that may remain neutral or change their status to support either of the sides. Neutrals are everywhere amongst enablers, population and society.
• Global Opinion. The global conscious or opinion that is affected via press, television and more often via The Internet and Social Media.

The Battlespace may include the following domains and dimensions:

Physical domain. The tangible domain where events take place. Physical domain can be further divided into dimensions :

• Maritime. Covering 70% of the Earth’s surface reaching down to the seabed and including islands and littoral areas. 80% of the world’s cities are within 300 km from the sea. There are about billion barrels of oil that are shipped in Oil Tankers in a day. 40% of that shipping goes through the Strait of Hormuz.  Harbours are main avenues to sea, thus essential for maritime operations and main targets for a suppressor.
• Land. Most of the population in developed countries live in cities. Thus, urban areas are probably included in Battlespace. All entities in Battlespace are operating on land. Land and its features can be manipulated to enhance mobility, protection and lessen the lethality of warheads. Moulding ground, fortifying, creating obstacles, blocking rivers, digging ditches have been usual ways to change Battlespace in favour for National Defence.
• Air. From the surface to the ionosphere, airspace is used by all entities. They use it to fly aircraft, fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, deliver weapons, create electromagnetic pulses or for visual observation. Airfields and bases are the main avenues to airspace thus they are both essential to the user and main target to the suppressor. Usually extends beyond normal AOO.
• Space. Anything in orbit or beyond is regarded as outer space. Plethora of functions can be hosted in satellites as intelligence, communications, navigation, meteorology or warheads. Normally extends beyond normal AOO.
• Electromagnetic Spectrum. The electromagnetic environment within Battlespace pervades other physical dimensions. It can be used for support (sensor, communications) but also to destroy or disrupt (Jamming, Electromagnetic Pulse, High Powered Microwave). Usually extends beyond normal AOO.
• Cyberspace. Not a natural but man-made space where digitised information is communicated, processed and stored.  It can be globally connected like The Internet, but also appear in single USB-stick. Growingly perceiving the platforms used in other dimensions. Most of the sensors, arms, vehicles, support systems, media, economy and societies use Cyberspace to multiply their combined effect or improve their performance. Within last 20 years, Cyberspace has become environment also for offensive operations. Since cyberspace is man-made, it can be prepared for both defence and offence. Most often extends beyond assigned AOO.
• Resources. Resources include people, material, finance, facilities, goods and the value or supply chain that is needed to produce or deliver them. The developed societies are very dependent on various global value chains . They can be used either to reach for resources to support entities in Battlespace but also to block and isolate Battlespace, or manipulate the value of resources possessed by Red Force and Red enablers.  Sourcing for resources extends well beyond the AOO.
• Time. A man-made dimension that helps to manage the future and to recognise events and their causality in the past. Time is used to orchestrate activities in other dimensions, through synchronisation and sequencing. Time and synchronisation are also enablers for utilisation of cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Denying time can suppress many capabilities in other dimensions.

Information domain. The level where events are presented to humans or collaborated between humans and artificial intelligence. Information is born when an event occurs in the physical domain if it is being observed by a human being. Machine sensor provides data from the event and later when it is recognised either by human or artificial sense making, it turns to information. Information can be presented as Common Relevant Operating Pictures such as Common Operating Picture, COP or tactical pictures as Recognised Maritime Picture, Recognised Land Picture, Recognised Air Picture, Recognised Logistics Picture and Recognised Environmental Picture.

Cognitive domain. The domain where orientation and decision are taking place. It is also the domain where opinion, attitudes, and feelings are created. The cognitive domain is targeted by deception, surprise and propaganda.  There are different ways to gain an understanding of the state of cognitive domain. One may detect data from commuting, shopping and consumption to create behavioural models. One may do polls or surveys and measure social media content or media content to tap current feelings and attitudes of society.

The physical entities interact through some or all of physical dimensions, create and receive information, which turns into understanding and feelings. Besides military force, there is always other forces like political, economic, and social forces in play within the shared Battlespace. All forces try to create effects that are observed and hope that, because of new understanding, opinions, attitudes and feelings, the behaviour of entities in Battlespace changes. A simplified interaction model is depicted in the following Figure 1. 

Foundation for Battlespace Management

The orchestration of all forces, ways they use in all dimensions and their combined effects through dimensions is called Battlespace Management, BM. BM includes the common functions of Command, Control, and Communication (C3) used by the Commander in Charge (CiC) of AOR. The C3 means integrating all force components under one, unified command.

The BM also includes ways to coordinate, synchronise, and prioritise efforts through all forces creating effect within Battlespace but not necessarily under unified command :

• Coordination. Coordination brings together different force capabilities and activities available within Battlespace into optimised and productive relationship. Coordination reaches after entities along the supply and value chains together with vertical forces of the military, economic, social, and political.
• Synchronisation. Coordination is enhanced by synchronisation, which sequences capabilities and activities, at the appropriate tempo, in time and space. 
• Prioritisation. Coordination and synchronisation highlight competing demands for time, space and finite resources. Prioritisation determines their allocation, in accordance with CiC’s concept of operations.

The core BM functions are sense making, decision making and knowledge creation. They have different attributes depending on the environment, situation, force, and the culture of the network of entities.

Sense making  varies depending the situation in designated AOO. Known situation prefers straightforward sensing, categorising and acting. The knowable situation requires sensing, analysing and decision before action. The complex situation needs to be probed first, and then analyse-decide-action loop can follow. The chaotic situation requires action first with limited force to create a reaction. The reaction can be sensed, analysed, decided and acted.

Decision making  can be centralised and authoritarian. Orders and reports flow down and up following the line of command. Decision making can also be shared at strategic intention level, which allows higher level synchronisation of operational execution. In mission command, tactical freedom is delegated to combined arms task forces level. Synchronisation, coordination and prioritisation is ensured by commander’s intent, collaboration and shared situational awareness. The mission command can be further accelerated by enforcing collaboration between tactical level commanders. The last step includes self-synchronization between different arms and components of force. Hierarchy is replaced by collaboration and consciousness, but it requires professionalism and trust . Self-synchronisation enables swarming tactics, fastest reaction and flexibility at the tactical level.

Capabilities to knowledge creation and learning  are decisive for the flexibility  of force. 

Learning can happen based on the book, instructing what to think and how to act. Abilities to adjust can be improved by learning how to think and possibilities for acting. The third gear is learning as a team with social constructive drivers. The fourth gear is creating knowledge as an organisation with social cognitive drivers.

By combining all three attributes of sense making, decision making and learning together, a roadmap for Battlespace management is pictured. Four different stages of BM for military force can be defined in Figure 2:

• Type A: a force following fixed doctrine, having mostly authoritative decision making and preparing for known or knowable situations. As communications are following the line of command, the BM systems are built hierarchically. The performance of the whole depends on Commanders and their Staffs. There might be an advantage gained when a modern force type A confronts a non-modern force. 
• Type B: a force that is more flexible, uses a wider variety of command cultures and prepares mainly for complex situations. The performance of force depends on trust between all commanders, their ability to think differently and share information. 
• Type C: a force that prepares to adapt rather than control situation, utilises all ways of command culture and can learn from lessons overnight. This is called networked force, where institutional hierarchy is replaced by social, collaboration and self-synchronization networks enabling swarming tactics and low-level initiation.
• Type D: a force that wavers between the three cultures above. This culture requires the widest and most flexible C4ISR services or just an open collaboration between people and mainly manual processes.

 

Prerequisites for Battlespace Management System

This section describes the analysis that needs to happen before any investment plans are done to improve the capability of Battlespace management. Three approaches need to be considered: Operational doctrine, Maturity Roadmap and the readiness of Technical infrastructure.

Defining Operational doctrine

Based on earlier description, there are three different categories that a Military Force may find themselves from Management viewpoint:

• Hierarchy-driven: Force follows a fixed doctrine. It has mostly an authoritative decision-making process. The Force often prepares for known or knowable situations. Since sense making, decision making and learning are following the line of command; the BM systems are built to support hierarchical topology. The performance of the Force and its network depends on the quality of Commanders and their Staffs. 
• Mission-driven: Force structure is flexible. The structure allows the use of a wider variety of command cultures. The doctrine prepares for known to complex situations. The performance of force depends on trust between all commanders, their ability to think differently and share information.
• Swarming: The agility of Force structure is optimised. The Force prepares to adapt rather than tries to gain control over the situation. The Force utilises all ways of command culture and can learn from lessons overnight. In networked force, the institutional hierarchy is replaced by social, collaboration and self-synchronization relationships between entities that are using swarming tactics and exploiting low-level initiation.

Once the category of operational doctrine is chosen, then the maturity roadmap and technical ability can be defined. Assuming that the military force is representing the hierarchy driven doctrine, then next step is to identify the current status of maturity.

Maturity Roadmap for Battlespace management

Battlespace management is following the general maturity model  where technical systems, processes and competence and attitude needs to improve at the same pace. The matrix  in Figure 3 is describing the journey of maturity for Battlespace management. The map can be used to define the current situation and also create a vision of the level of aspiration. The phases of maturity evolve through weapon system orientation towards Branch and Service oriented culture. There is further leap towards Joint force interoperability and necessary stage to start strategic development. Optimisation and innovation phases will provide the level of strategic advantage.

For example, the hierarchy-driven force above may currently be at weapon system level since the prevailing culture of differentiation and independence has been overruling. Now strategic goal may be to mature capability to the degree of a Joint Force. This means at least three lines of development: technology, process and people. One might execute the development by acquiring Battlespace Management System that forces the processes, information sharing and the competence of people to make a leap at once. One might instead choose longer but maybe lasting effect by more iterative development approach. In any case, some technical prerequisites are needed before any development at space management happens.

Basic technical prerequisites

The building of a technical foundation for Battlespace management illustrated in Figure 4 starts with the battle identity. Blue force and associated entities should have (1) identities that are rendered authentic. Red force and related entities need to be recognised or else they appear only unrecognised events and lead to information overflow that can be even worse than lack of information. Each entity must be knowledgeable of their relative (2) position in the appropriate dimension of the battlespace. There is also need to have a position in time dimension for each position in other dimensions. The agreed categories of battle (3) statuses for each entity enable them to tell the others of their availability or situation. 

All this information or data needs to be (4) communicated promptly to a level where the (5) fusion of data from all entities of this dimension takes place. This data may be converted to recognised pictures and disseminated to all requiring entities if they have means to present the data.

One dimension alone is handicapped and needs the recognised situational data from other dimensions to become more comprehensive. Merging (6) dimensional data and correlating them creates information at the level of operational pictures. Operational pictures also include spatial, geospatial, temporal and weather information together with cognitive level features of entities in Battlespace. Common Operational Picture (COP) is the most generic level product for Battlespace awareness, but there is also a variety of Branch specific pictures for example logistics, HR, engineers, signals and fires. Finally, there is a need for communications and presentation (7) layers to be able to disseminate the COP to all entities requiring the information.

If one chooses to implement a Battlespace Management System, it might happen at tactical or operational level. In any of these cases, there needs to be the technical foundation (1-4 and 7) in place to gain any benefit from any of the Battlespace Management Systems.

Criticism of information technology driven battlespace awareness

Network-centric perspective is clearly tactical. All the complexities and uncertainties in a war are reduced to essentially collecting, processing, and transmitting vast amounts of information and to speed of command. Milan Vego, 2007 

Where C4ISTAR is imperative for warfare, the concept of Network Centric Warfare, NCW and its current applications are sometimes simplifying the complexity, fog and friction of warfare, which are mainly based on human behaviour, competency and personalities. The following critique has been argued against too extensive information reliance:

Information dominance: one’s ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an enemy’s ability to do the same. 

• In acquiring blue force information from event level requires overcoming the human intermediates who are the main sources of contradictions, falsifications and uncertainties.
• It is even harder to collect information with certainty from the red force. The red force will be initiative and full of mischief and deception. Surveillance and targeting sensors are predictive in their detection and categorization.
• Information does not necessary convey to awareness, and further understanding since human ways to gain understanding are not only defined by available information.
• Information overload is normal phenomena both through man-machine interfaces and machine-machine interfaces.

Shared Awareness: Information from all the sensors is available to all the network participants. 

• Information based on event data may provide some tactical level awareness but for both operational and strategic level understanding, event data is the faulty foundation.
• There is a tension between the sender’s perception of reality and receiver’s personal understanding. With humans, they are defined by personalities, mind models, stress levels and ways of thinking rather than merely presenting data on a computer screen.
• Commanders have inborn myopic towards the tactical situation. There are plenty of examples of higher level commanders trying to micromanage their lower level subordinates just because they see the more detailed picture.

The speed of Command: the ability to observe, decide, command, and act far more quickly than the opponent. 

• There is a definite difference between tactical, operational and strategic command. The speeding of OODA loop may have effect only at the tactical level. The orientation phase is much more important in other levels of command.
• The previously mentioned myopic micromanagement may also significantly slow down the C3 cycle.
• The famous Blitzkrieg way of battle was a combination of mobility, shock, locally concentrated fires and quick decision making based on pre-exercised mind-models. The effectivity of decision making does not come only from increased awareness.

Decision superiority: the ability to operate well within an enemy’s decision cycle, to significantly reduce or lock out his options. 

• Decision superiority requires better-trained commanders and their staff rather than only increased information.
• The military doctrine, culture and way of educating officers may prevent them from acting on situation or constraint the available decision models.
• The more complex the technical system, more sensors connected, easier it is to the adversary to suppress or to degrade the battlespace management system thus infusing mistrust between commanders and their information systems. Once trust is lost, there might be challenges to build it up during the operation.

It is important to build battle management capabilities through all components of doctrine, organisation, training, learning, material, personnel, facilities, information and interoperability since no one improved component makes a significant difference in the war against a resourceful adversary.