Transformation of command post structure; Part D of Introduction to ICT rationalization program of the Finnish Defence Forces from Enterprise Architecture viewpoints

This is the 4th part of writings on transformation of C4I of FINDEF by using architecture models.

ARCHITECTURE FOR THE STRUCTURE OF COMMAND POST

Concentration of command assets as one target point for adversary

The command post structure for FINDEF was following old command post centric architecture inherited from II WW times. The staff officers, facilities and staff tools were co-located in the same camp creating one target point. Command post was slow to relocate, and every relocation affected the command and control functions availability. There were additional sites prepared and back up post assigned, but they were not in readiness to take over but with delay. 

Command post was reasonably easy to detect and identify since it had typical features notable in electromagnetic radiation, heat radiation and traffic. Since location did not change for 24 hours, a rudiment targeting process was able to detect, identify and target the command post. If the decision to fire was taken, one cheap ballistic missile with 500 kg warhead of high explosives was enough to destroy unhardened command post even with 500 m circular error probability. The simple architecture of as-is command post structure is depicted in figure 20.

Figure 20: Model for AS-IS Command Post of FINDEF before 2004

The intermediate operational level command post or headquarters would host typically between 80 – 150 staff officers and unique information that was not backed up. The loss of function would last several hours as backup headquarters would try to gain the adequate level of awareness. The loss of value for Blue Force would be non-replaceable during the same operation. There were severe single points of failure in the command structure of FINDEF as the available firepower and precision of adversary’s C2-attack capabilities improved. 

From monolithic headquarters towards command post system

During modelling, simulation and field tests in TOC-project, several variations were experienced in trying to solve the challenge of survivability. Survivability of headquarters was studied from three directions of protective means: 

• Sheltering: Digging a fortification for all regional and above headquarters appeared to be too expensive and vulnerable to other than kinetic effects.
• Dispersion: The culture of staff officers and staff processes were very proximity oriented. The maturity of content management was not enabling remote staff work at first hand.
• Mobility: The pace of transporting one monolithic headquarters did not seem to be enough to happen inside the target acquisition cycle of the adversary.

Technical opportunities were studied from two lines of operation: platform-centric or network-centric. The platform-centric approach assumed that all needed assets for C2 are within the structure of command post. The approach provides three options for improved survivability: 

1. Alternative command post indicates that there is manning and infrastructure intact if the main site is disabled. There is some delay in substituting lost function. Alternativity requires more resources and provides reliability by 1+1 model. 
2. Substituting command post assumes that there is some other headquarters in action that can quickly absorb responsibilities of the disabled command post. Relies heavily on sharing of information and ability to reassign duties. Does not provide but the reliability of 1+1 model.
3. Distributed command post provides survivability by residing in several sites at same time. Headquarters might be divided into tactical, main and sanctuary command posts sometimes specialized to particular tasks as logistics, planning or tactical execution. The model does provide 1+n reliability.

The network-centric command post structure assumes that communications, information processing and storing are all provided from geographically distributed “cloud” and only staff officers reside on the site of the command post. The approach provides three options to improve survivability:

1. Lightweight headquarters concept provides more than three simultaneous command posts either actively engaged or ready to take over. Since technology is in the network, it is easier to support more command posts and transfer them with a higher pace. The model provides n+1 reliability.
2. Transferable headquarters have smaller functional subparts that can be distributed or assembled in different variations. A subpart of 10-20 staff officers may specialise either to planning, intelligence, support, situational awareness or tactical execution. Besides n+1 reliability, the concept provides transferability that may counter the C2W target acquisition capability of the adversary.
3. Mobile command post structure is divided into small - five staff officers – command post cells. The cells are mounted and operational also while moving. Mobility and small physical aperture provides the best protection against C2W countermeasures but calls for wide wireless bandwidths.

After few exercises with these models, it came apparent that the maturity of processes, content management and skills in using technical tools needed remarkable improvement before more distributed command post structures were introduced. 

Although, there was not maturity for linear technical development, a vision for more survivable command post structure was created. The vision is in Figure 21.

Figure 21: A model for TO-BE architecture of Command Post Structure 

Headquarters are divided into small cells of five staff officers with two support crew members. Each cell is independent in means of working, housing, moving and protection. After arrival at the connection point, the cell is camouflaged, plugged in and ready to take over within 15 minutes. The cell can be mounted in vehicles or containers. The cell may also use portable IT-devices to access to command and control services in the network. 
Each cell is specialised to some of the functions within headquarters: planning, intelligence, situation or commanding. The cell can sustain either 8- or 12-hour shift in action, and then rest and be ready to take over before being activated again. Intensive shift cycling in virtual staff work requires well-educated staff officers who are familiar with working online and in a virtual environment. There is a need to alter the traditional proximity based mind model of staff work.

The cell is a building block for composite command post that can be assembled within a fortified shelter to provide classical headquarters within the same site. Command post may also be distributed geographically and specialised in different functions. There may be logistics, operational planning and tactical execution oriented command posts within one headquarters. To enjoy the best survivability, cells may be fully distributed. Fully distributed cells are located different sites independently and moving every eight hours minimum. There are no electromagnetic fingerprints, heavy traffic or strong heat signature to be detected. Headquarters are vulnerable only to attacks in the cyber environment.

Spiral development transforms mind models and habits gradually

The TOC prototype in the Northern Command did create positive expectations for higher commanders 2001. They gave permission to proceed with concept towards the main exercise in mid-2002. The TOC provided lighter movement of staff cells from the main site to alternative site. It also enabled open collaboration between parts of same headquarters and their subordinate headquarters. The trust to the concept was established, and 2004, the major exercise in the Northern Command called for all headquarters to use TOC concept in staff work. The majority of reserve officers did adapt quickly to virtual staff working methods where some older commissioned officers faced difficulties.

The Land Forces of FINDEF was planning to improve tactical command post infrastructure from 2005 onwards and saw the opportunity of composite command post structure. After traditional armament procurement, Land Command was able to field the first containers and vehicles in their 2010 main exercise. Fortunately long procurement provided the Land Command with enough time to improve the maturity of content management, sharing culture, C2 processes and information systems. Time used well enhanced the adaptation of new method in exercise. Still, for officers with experience from the Northern Command, it was easy to fit into virtual headquarters, but the rest were feeling being slightly out of their comfort zone.

The Inspector of Signals was able to declare at the beginning of 2010 a linear development strategy for new command and control structure. By the end of 2012, the Land Forces of FINDEF had reached the required capability in survivability possible with Army Command, Control and Information System, M-12 and the maturity of Land Forces culture, processes and content management.

Next part will explain the architecture of information management