Digital Transformation of Military Affairs

1. Introduction

The world is facing a possible societal revolution with ubiquitous digitalization enabling new ways of doing governance, manufacturing, business, transportation, education and social relations. The change will also affect the reflection of power between interest groups and, therefore, also ways of military affairs. 

When facing the inevitable change, the military is forced to transform, particularly undertake a digital transformation since digitalization will enable the military to change their affairs at least to the degree as it enables the society and government. 

The paper defines the digital transformation, gives an example of the benefits gained from transformation, presents two examples of recent transformations from the US and Russia, tries to foresee the way the military may react in transformation based on historical analysis, and explains the environment, challenges and, lastly, the opportunities presented for military within the next decade.

2. What is Digital Transformation in a Military Context?

Digital transformation  of military affairs means integration of digital technology into all areas of military functions, fundamentally changing how military force is utilised, supported and generated to gain strategic advantages.

Digital transformation  is enabled by Digitalization, which is supported by Digitisation.  These stages are commonly followed in the evolution of force digitalization.

• Digitalization  evolves the ways of affairs, improves the force performance, builds agility and robustness of military processes using digital infrastructure and platforms.  Military process digitalization is achieved, for example, through integrated Command and Control platforms from soldier and platform level to higher commands, integrated enterprise resource management platforms, and integrated development and training platforms.
• Digitisation includes Communications and Information Technology infrastructure that enables mobility, one pane for services, one source for truth, and secure and available information related services. 

The above two stages define the common roadmap for digital transformation in Figure 1. The military has been digitising its functions using digital and computer technology. Primarily, digitisation has automated isolated functions, creating some improvements by automation (e.g., office automation, simulator training, targeting automation).  Nevertheless, the military system has an invisible ceiling that requires effort to break through and gain significant performance advantages. The ceiling is created by the hierarchical and stove-piped organisation, conservative organisational culture, and challenges in significant transformation programs (technology, processes, competence). 

Figure 1: Roadmap for Digital Transformation of Military Affairs

Digitalization of end to end processes (e.g., enterprise resource management systems, integrated C4ISTAR systems, integrated learning and force generation systems) provides military with much better performance than for example produces cost-savings, less workforce in support functions, and faster force generation cycles. Further improvements in sharing information and gaining advantages in affairs are hindered by the next ceiling preventing to gain new capabilities. Breaking the capability ceiling requires different security policy and essential resources, which calls after a change in political thinking. Democratic political decision making is prone to evolve military capabilities only slowly and mainly replacing old capabilities with updated technology (e.g., better protected main battle tank, more performing fighter, or more automated aircraft carrier).

Only after having digitalized the main processes of force utilisation, generation and support, the military may be able to do them differently and gain a strategic advantage compared to probable adversaries. The strategic advance means, for example, acquiring tactical mobility that surprises enemy (German armoured units in WW II), operational mobility that surprises adversaries (German use of train transportation in WW I) or gaining dominance of essential battle dimension (Russian dominance of space with Sputnik in 1960s).

Currently, there may be indications and opportunities for political decision making to assess security situations differently and create a revolution in military affairs through digital transformation. Considering the environment where military force is generated, supported and utilised, there are significant changes illustrated in Figure 2 (leaving out the actual environment of confrontation and conflict):

• Space-based economics and security 
• Smart Governance
• Social Media
• Platform and Social business
• 4th Industrial revolution
• Internet, 5G mobile connectivity, Internet of Things, Big Data, and Artificial Intelligence 

Figure 2: Contemporary environment of military affairs

3. Why is Military Interested in Digital Transformation?

The reasoning behind the need for the digital transformation of military affairs may be illustrated through a story of the transformation of Finnish Defence Forces (FINDEF) 2004 – 2015 in Figure 3. The FINDEF started their significant functional automation effort in the 1950s when establishing first mainframe computing resources for administrative support, radar-based air defence surveillance, and networked archipelago defence on the shores of Gulf of Finland. The digitisation of force created hundreds of specialised digital systems which seldom were in connection with each other, but a human operator was required for data transfer. The era of digitisation ended when the white paper for Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004  declared the following goals to guide the transformation:

 “Command of the smaller, more mobile wartime forces in the 2010s requires a situation picture as real-time as possible. To ensure correctly timed command arrangements, an integrated intelligence, surveillance and command, and control system will be developed for the Defence Forces. This will enable the common real-time situation picture to be communicated to every service and the creation of sufficient communication links. The command and control system will be internationally interoperable.”

“The Defence Forces’ information management system will be rationalized. The new information technology platform will be divided into operational and administrative environments by the end of 2009. The administrative environment will be highly centralized, allowing allocation of resources to meet the needs of the operational information technology environment and also to enable other security authorities (determined separately) to be linked as users into the system.“

The portfolio of the transformation of the FINDEF included three primary folders of change programs:

1. ICT Rationalisation (TIERA) 2004 – 2008 creating an enabling Information and Communications Technology infrastructure to support other changes. The focus was both on technical development but also improving the ICT service provider maturity. Subprojects included, for example, Rearranging the network infrastructure, Consolidation of shared services in the Administrative environment and establishing joint operational ICT environment providing simple information services empowered with collaboration and content sharing.

2.Development of both operational and support processes of FINDEF with two programs of:

• Integrated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (iC4ISTAR) 2004 – 2010 focusing on improving mainly the processes of force utilisation and
• Enterprise Resource Management (ERM) 2005 – 2012 focusing on enabling force generation and support processes.

3. Network Enabled Defence 2006 – 2015 where joint and shared enablers will help to reach more excellent capabilities. This phase was calling after innovations and research to exploit new capabilities at military levels of tactics, operations, and strategy in pursuing advantages over possible adversaries.

The challenge of this kind of transformation was captured from Gartner Group, who says that there are two main gaps to overcome on the journey:

• The first gap is preventing the development of joint functions. Stovepiping is predominant in enterprises where units are diversified with a historical, cultural legacy. There is a need to change the power structure in the enterprise as “stovepipe” ownership, investments and service production.
• The second gap is preventing the development of new capabilities. Overcoming this calls for new ways of approaching adversary, projecting force, and affecting an adversary’s system and utilisation of force. Militaries throughout history have struggled with these transformations of doctrine .

Figure 3: Plan for the digital transformation of the Defence Forces Finland

By 2008, the first phase was achieved, and the description of enabling ICT structure as part of the defence system in Finland was described as a nationally defined service platform for common and joint processes. The technical structure included a core network that connected data centres, providing application and content services accessed via access networks. Tactical level field networks were connected to nation level structure via connection points.  The 2009  white paper for national security provided acceleration to transformation proclaiming that:

“The Defence Forces command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems generate an integrated military situation picture (land, sea, and air as well as information and the IT environment). The national system is utilised to expedite planning, command and control and execution. Defence capability against an adversary’s cyber-attacks is maintained and improved. The nationwide logistic system taps into the resources of the entire society in supporting the military defence.” 

The 2012 white paper  recognised the achieved process performance improvements and guided towards further steps in transforming the force structure and capabilities towards 2015:

“In 2015 the wartime strength of the Defence Forces will be approximately 230 000 troops. The aim is to have more capable units and weapon systems in order to compensate for the reduction in troop strengths. The formation of regional troops alongside operational and territorial units will bolster the local defence capability.”

The 2017 white paper for defence  recognised the outcome of the reform by stating that:

“The Finnish Defence Forces reform, carried out from 2012–2014, adapted the size and the basic structure of the Defence Forces to meet stringent financial demands and the then lower threat level of the security environment. The defence budget was cut by approximately 10 per cent. The reform’s savings goals were met. During the defence reform, the number of salaried personnel was reduced to approximately 12 000 employees. The Defence Forces’ service activities and logistics were concentrated. The wartime strength was reduced to 230 000 troops.”

Furthermore, the 2017 defence report acknowledged the new joint capabilities, flat command organisation (from 4 levels to 2), less than half of the cold war forces managing the same defence mission, and shared C4ISR and logistics capabilities:

“The actions of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the Defence Forces’ joint capabilities are coordinated in joint operations, led by Defence Command Finland. The military services make use of the Defence Forces’ shared C4ISR and logistics. The Defence Forces prepare to carry out military defence according to the concept of comprehensive security, in concert with the other authorities and partners.”

4. What other Technically Accelerated Transformations Have Made an Advantage for Military?

Military forces have gained from the technical development of their societies before. If the industrial revolutions and the development of military capabilities creating strategic advantage are illustrated on the same line of time, the alignment is evident in Figure 4:

• The first Industrial revolution produced standard armament, national conscript armies and Navy. Napoleon exploited these to their full, followed by Prussians designed by Scharnhorst.
• The 2nd Industrial revolution created an assembly line, railroad, telegraph, and automobile. They created a definite advantage in operational manoeuvrability and firepower first in the U.S. Civil war and later in the First World War.

               (The 2nd Industrial performance was further developed to tactical “Blitzkrieg” 

                 manoeuvrability and firepower by Mechanised Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe in the 

                 Second World War.)

• The 3rd Industrial revolution introduced synthetic manufacturing, digitisation and software applications. They were fully exploited as both operational and tactical capabilities in NATO AirLandBattle doctrine and then in practice Desert Storm operation in Gulf.
• The ongoing 4th Industrial revolution has introduced cyber-physical products, Internet-based supply chains and software-defined everything. Most probably the military will utilise these abilities in creating new capabilities for operations in Multi-dimensional Battlespace.

Figure 4: Comparing Industrial revolutions to Military capability use in the battlefield

The industrial revolutions seem to affect military capabilities and their use. Nevertheless, the effect has not been linear, but:

• The military was able to quickly to copy the abilities of manufacturing, communications and transportation
• The military has been much slower in applying the technical abilities in creating tactical or operational capabilities
• Forces who have been supported by the strong political will were able to gain strategic advantage, which adversaries were able to copy fast if their societal abilities have allowed.

5. How Digitation and Digitalization have improved Armed Forces?

In order to understand the contemporary transformation programs enabled by digitation or digitalization, we take a look of examples from the U.S.A and Russia.

5.1 U.S. Network Centric Warfare, 1996 – 2002

The U.S. Joint Vision 1996 is an example of holistic digital transformation that aimed to improve both operational and tactical performance remarkably using digital technology and data to create superior situational awareness. The Network Centric Warfare transformation is illustrated in Figure 5. The transformation is based on technologies trying to overcome the stove-piped organisation and systems. Therefore, a System of systems (SoS) concept was created to integrate existing and new systems. Global Information Grid (GIG) provided strategic and operational connectivity. Holistic encryption solution enabled everyone to share their information at the Secret level (Type 1 encryption).

The program faced challenges of autonomous systems that were not designed to work together, disconnected networks and non-interoperable encryption, and lack of training and experience in Joint Fighting. The Gulf War 2003 saw the power of operational and strategic situational awareness but also suffered from a lack of tactical awareness and cooperation.

Figure 5: U.S. Network Centric Warfare transformation, 1996 - 2002

5.2 Russian Red Army Tactical Command and Control transformation, 2009 – 2018

The Red Army experienced in their Ladoga 2009 exercise that their command and control process did not address the needs of modern fast pace battlefield. Therefore, Russia launched a digitalization of its tactical land command and control in Figure 6, aiming for performance three times better than what they witnessed in 2009. 

The tactical C2 was changed from manual to digital end to end using YeSU TZ battle management system incorporating 11 C2 functions including artillery, EW, ground vehicles, air defence, engineering and logistics.  In the Zapad 2018 exercise, the western observers witnessed changed tactical units capable of modern combat.

Figure 6: Russian tactical C2 transformation, 2009 - 2018

6. What may be the Opportunities or Constraints for Military Digital Transformation within the next decade?

To understand the outside forces of change, we first explore the possible changes in the security environment where military power may be projected. Secondly, we change the viewpoint to actual transformation and see what challenges the military may face in their next journey. Thirdly, we introduce some of the opportunities of digital transformation and their possible effects on military power.

6.1 Evolving environment of confrontation, conflict, and war

The evolving operational environment and spectrum of threat have forced the military to transform their legacy organisations, doctrines and capabilities. The next decade will see, for example, the following trends of change that may affect in military ways of projecting power:

1. Operations will happen in a multi-domain environment cross the traditional air, maritime, land and extending to space, electronic, and human. "Multi-domain formations possess the capacity, endurance and capability to access and employ capabilities across all domains to pose multiple and compounding dilemmas on the adversary. "Convergence achieves the rapid and continuous integration of all domains across time, space and capabilities to overmatch the enemy. Underpinning these tenets are mission command and disciplined initiative at all warfighting echelons." 
2. The capabilities that provide multi-domain effects reside throughout the instruments of national power, within the private sector, as well as within coalition partner instruments of national power. 
3. Large groups of combat and support units moving together are replaced by smaller clusters of tactical units separated by empty spaces. A disaggregated battlefield favours autonomy and demands that close-combat units operate for long periods without reinforcement. 
4. Recent conflicts involving states are increasing “hybrid” in nature, combining traditional battlefield techniques with elements previously associated with nonstate actors. Adversary creating hybrid threat can synchronise various instruments of power against specific vulnerabilities to create linear and non-linear effects. 
5. The distinction between war and peace, combatant and non-combatant, and even violence and nonviolence (think cyber warfare) is becoming uncomfortably blurry. War amongst the people is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields - all the people, anywhere - are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere, with civilians around, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force. 
6. The six megatrends in software and services  will change the societies and the way they use power and are vulnerable to it:
7. People will be more connected to others and machines through wearable and implantable technologies.• Ubiquitous computing, computing and storage are available for everyone. Today’s supercomputer will be in a pocket,• Smaller, cheaper and smarter sensors will be planted in homes, clothes, accessories, cities, transport, processes and networks. Therefore, providing both real-time and life-cycle data for better optimisation.• Collected big data will provide better situational awareness for decision making. Artificial intelligence will automate some information intensive functions and will provide human reasoning with a significant enhancement.• Social and economic life will be changed through networks and platform-based models. Assets can be shared; people can create social organisations other than nation and company; centralised trustees will be distributed.• Physical objects are “printed” from raw material. Construction, manufacturing, and health care will change. 
8. As this process takes place and new technologies such as autonomous or biological weapons become easier to use, individuals and small groups will increasingly join states in being capable of causing mass harm. 
9. Advances in technology will create the potential to reduce the scale or impact of violence, through the development of new modes of protection, for example, or greater precision in targeting.

The above indicates that significant powers are affecting current military structures and capabilities demanding changes in the next ten years. How the military will adapt to these forces may be analysed using the model of strategic posture and processes of military affairs in Figure 7. The strategic confrontation posture view studies the abilities of a military enterprise to manage risks and approaches to acting. Mattila and Parkinson  use these two dimensions  to assess the social capabilities of a military enterprise in a given area of confrontation.  The two dimensions lead into four different strategic postures: Evolutionary, Operational, Protective, or Pathfinder.

The evolutionary means that the military adopts new abilities with small and careful steps while sustains the performance of existing capabilities and processes. The Defence Forces of Finland (FINDEF) was in this posture compared to the Soviet Union during 1970–1980s .  The approach for FINDEF seems to remain the same since their 2017 Governments defence report  states that:

“The systematic development of the defence capability builds on decisions taken over the course of decades. Readiness which meets the demands of the operating environment’s transformation as well as rapidly deployable forces and systems and a large, trained reserve improve Finland’s chances to respond to a rapidly developing or a drawn-out military crisis.”

The operational dominance means doing things according to good practices, but faster, more robust, or using more resources than an adversary. The capability of joint operations has been the major advantage for the US and seems to be the foundation for the future, as stated in their National Military Strategy 2015 :

“The U.S. military is the world’s preeminent Joint Force. … We are prepared to project power across all domains to stop aggression and win our Nation’s wars by decisively defeating adversaries.”

The protective posture includes building on existing strengths and improving their quality while the same time tries to prevent adversaries from gaining the same dominant posture. According to Pellerin (2017), the U.S. has possessed this posture since their technological dominance has gone unchallenged in every operation domain, but today is challenged in all of them. According to the NATO  European nations defence expenditure (avg. 1.5% of GDP 2011-2015), they have relied on the US umbrella of protective posture with an average 4.0% of GDP defence expenditure.  

Achieving at the pathfinder position means driving innovation and development and adapting novel solutions while trying to improve the agility of the enterprise. According to the assessment by Finland MoD (2013; 31-53), the Russian military and defence industry under the guidance of Vladimir Putin chose this path when they transformed their old, cold war force towards a modernised, digitized force since 2000. China has been seeking asymmetric pathfinder advantages to degrade the US operational dominance with technical innovations :

“China’s military modernization also targets capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. operational and technological advantages. China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to these technologies, as well as harnessing its intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches.”

Figure 7: A framework for confrontation posture and value stream situation of military affairs 

The other part in Figure 7 is the structure of the enterprise, its processes and value streams. The model  presents two dimensions of process integration and process standardisation. These two dimensions outline the strategic operating model for the enterprise to arrange its processes and value streams: Diversification, Replication, Coordination, and Unification.

The diversified operating model is evident in the loosely integrated military enterprise, where smaller, independent forces are conducting operations independently in separate areas of operations. The autonomous forces fight differently, support their activities and develop their forces uniquely. These military units are usually deeply hierarchically arranged, and value is created mostly vertically along the lines of command. This operating model was typical in I WW when infantry and artillery regiments fought their battle separately, and air force was still in its infancy (Vego, 2007; I-19). It may be easy to introduce new branches or services to this functionally diversified organisation.

The replication operating model is trying to enhance operational efficiency by standardising the processes but not integrating them. The goal is to execute standardised processes faster than the adversary. Tactically and technically, the forces are similar, but they may engage the enemy in different areas of operation. The Commander in Chief is controlling the force production and support to maintain and improve standardisation. The western military were generating their forces before the II WW arranged in regiments of the branch (artillery, infantry, cavalry, engineers, signals) and learned during the war to create multi-arm brigades for combined arms effect (van Creveld, 1991; 98-116). The standardisation may become a legacy obstacle for revolutionary transformations but enable evolutionary development. Integration of branches may become an issue, however.

The coordination model integrates different processes aiming to optimise the operational efficiency. Multi-arm effects are used to engage a joint adversary in each area of operation. Operational level autonomy of force utilisation is enabled by coordinated efforts of force production and support. The Commander in Chief is coordinating the effort of each, possibly specific, force element. The classic example is a combined arms brigade, where unified command and control makes all different arms and branches to fight together (van Creveld, 1991; 98-116). Lately, a flatter organisation has been called a network-centric force (Vego, 2007; XIII-3). The armed forces of this process model may find it easy to introduce new digitalized units in its Order of Battle, but the size of the whole force may be a hindrance for more thorough transformations.

The unification model combines integrated processes and standardised force elements. The operating model aims to maximise operational effect and effectivity through similar force elements all facing the same kind of adversaries in their area of operation. The maturity of processes enables deep specialisation of units since they are always used in combined arms and joint manner. McChrystal (2015; 115) transformed the special operations force Iraq to work as a team of teams – many similar special operations teams that were fighting against Al-Qaeda in Iraq as one extended matrix enterprise. The revolutionary approach may work for this level of value streams and processes in military affairs.

The approach and success of the digital transformation depend on the political guidance, confrontational posture and the way that military units are organised. Next section will explore the challenges military may face when intending the digital transformation.

6.2 Challenges faced in private and military enterprises intending digital transformation

Before analysing the enablers for military organisations in their digital transformations, let us see what has happened in private enterprises meanwhile:

Most organisations are undergoing a digital transformation that directly impacts how they do business , 

• yet 70 per cent of employees have not mastered the skills they need for their jobs today, and 
• 80 per cent of employees do not have the skills needed for their current and future roles.
• Only 7% of leading organisations exhibit a digital-first and dexterous mindset 

In conclusion, the man is not ready for the opportunities that machines may provide. Either their skills or understanding is behind the possibilities offered by digitalization. 

Elsewhere, IDG has surveyed the challenges  enterprises see in transformation as follows:

1. Organisational resistance to change (Change is painful for 85-90% of personnel)
2. Lack of clear vision for a digital journey
3. Ineffective gathering and leveraging of data
4. Inflexible technology stack and development process
5. Stuck with a legacy business model.

The above results are aligned with previous findings of military technically enhanced transformations as follows:

1. The military is not riding on the first wave of technical development because they either lack of resources from political decision makers or military culture prefers the legacy solutions and evolutionary development of capabilities. (General Foch is reported to have said 1915 that "aviation is a good sport, but for the army it is useless" )
2. Once the military has seen the new opportunities on the battlefield, they are quick in adopting them in use if their force generation and support are flexible enough to absorb them. Although the injection of technology may not end with the expected outcome since the tactics and processes are much harder to change. Sometimes the institutionalised training units and school are slow to change their syllabus and send out soldiers and officers with outdated competencies. (Guderian developed the Wehrmacht tank tactics in transportation company with automobiles )
3. The military has to be given a clear vision and resources from political decision making, or the adversary has to present significant developments before they start transformations. (Red Army Command and Control transformation 2000-2018)
4. Even there is will, resources and understanding, the military may stumble with transformation because their System of systems is not fully digital, connected or integrated. Therefore, the data and performance are lost behind deeply isolated domains exclusive for each hierarchical organisation. (US Network Centric Warfare vision)

6.3 Opportunities and Enablers for Digital Transformation

Now it remains to present the opportunities and enablers for the digital transformation of military affairs.  According to a World Economic Forum survey made 2015 , the software and services sector will see the technologies in Figure 8, breaking the point of significant use within the next 10 years.

Figure 8: Tipping point of some critical software and service technologies

If the emerging technologies are exploited evolutionarily, then the 2025 scenario for coordinated way arranged military affairs may look like the following description in Table 1.

Table 1: Digital transformation of an evolutionary and coordinately arranged military force

Whereas, the pathfinder strategy may revolutionise military affairs like the description in Table 2. 

Table 2: Digital transformation of a pathfinder positioned and unified military force

Future technology may provide even further opportunities for changing the behaviour of one’s adversary, but this study is focusing on the conventional effects and force utilisation. Finally, it depends on military enterprises strategic posture, way of arrangement of forces and ability to wield new concepts, how it succeeds in digital transformation. All enabling technology is available for those capable of exploiting their features.

7. Conclusion

This paper seeks clarity and models to analyse the digital transformation in military affairs. Therefore, it defines the digital transformation of military affairs and creates a model to analyse different armed forces that attempts to transform using digitalization. Using the model, an example of the transformation of the Finnish Defence Forces gives a holistic view of a journey rather than separate, narrowly focused projects. 

A historical perspective puts the digital transformation in the context of earlier transformations and gives a hint of powers affecting the achievement. Examples from the US and Russia generate assurance of successful transformations but with clear strategic guidance, measurable outcomes and focus for the utilisation of resources.

The environment in the area of operation, the strategic posture of force, and the arrangement of value stream effect significantly in the ends, ways, and means of digital transformation. The two scenarios, in the end, are emphasising the different outcome with diverse postures and structures of military affairs.

The transformation journey, once taken, will not be without challenges as so many civilian organisations have experienced. From the historical viewpoint, the existing doctrine is the main prohibitor for transformation since it binds the tactics, training, weapons, organisation and culture into one amalgamated system.

This study does not use any particular or more statistical data from any of the current military transformation programs, so it would be interesting to see if the method and models introduced in the paper would provide foresight that improves the success in the journey of transformation of military affairs.