A Temptation of AI in Military Affairs

Will the European Military miss the widow of opportunity for the 4th generation industrial-based force generation?

Keywords: National Defence, Artificial Intelligence, Weaponization, Security Strategy

Introduction

The human ability to collect information, make sense of a situation, optimise action, and learn while executing has been challenged recently in games, simulators, diagnoses, and real-time analysis. How may this development reflect future tactical combat-level decision-making? Is the machine going to win the man in combat?

Based on recent AI progress, artificial cognitive abilities and skills are emergently dominant compared to human competencies. In theory, the military may access Artificial Intelligence, which could:

• Gain knowledge from a zero-knowledge starting point through gaming against itself and, within months, master a given battle scenario’s technical, tactical, and possibly operational level features for victory.
• Anticipate adversary moves ahead, create a picture of potential scenarios, and predict adversary manoeuvring in 3-D space within seconds in a fully digitalised battlefield.
• Make short-term decisions within 80 milliseconds and optimise decisions simultaneously at technical and tactical levels.
• Identify lessons from the events and gain 150 years of theoretical combat experience teaching itself overnight.

At the same time, the price has decreased, and the availability of components increased to build lethal autonomous weapons from commercial products. A “slaughterbot” that nearly killed the president of Venezuela in 2018 could be built by an experienced hobbyist for less than $1,000. States are not able to control the manufacturing of lethal weapons as it becomes easier to weaponize commercial cyber-physical products of the 4th generation of industrial manufacturing.

During the ongoing War against Ukraine, the Russian military is massing troops and firing where their operational art finds the best course of action. However, even in Russia, the live mass is consumed too fast concerning available expendable and willing human resources.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) aims to counter U.S. dominance asymmetrically in all five battle domains through intelligentised ”combat capabilities for joint operations based on the network information system and the ability to fight under multi-dimensional conditions.”

U.S. DoD all-volunteer force recruiting has been declining for the past 15 years, and no silver bullet has yet been found to mitigate the gradual loss of human potential and competency. Furthermore, the 2$ trillion annual budget is struggling to maintain the required fleets of armament.

With the emerging Russian threat, European militaries are struggling to build up their military capabilities while the cost of defence material is rising, recruiting cannot address the need for enlisted, and deadlines to achieve national defence goals are closing fast.

Will the temptation of AI overcome the ethical concerns and generals fill their order of battle from the cyber-physical actors and sensors of the fourth industrial revolution?

How the Use of Artificial Intelligence May Impact Military Confrontation?

Digitalization changes human endeavours from physical to social level, including military affairs:

• Information operations and cognitive warfare are ongoing and taking place mainly outside of the military attention
• The physical battlefield is more transparent due to the density of sensors deployed
• Asymmetrically used, remote-controlled weapon systems challenge 2/3 generation industrial platforms on the battlefield
• Cyber electromagnetic effects have proven effective against current generations of military system of systems
• The ability of defence industrial production becomes a key strategic asset in prolonged conflicts like in Ukraine
• 4th Industrial Revolution-based (4IR) information, data, and algorithm-driven military affairs promise major advantages for commanders.

The traditional near-peer analyses of a number of arms and men with Lancaster I and II laws of attrition between BLUE and RED Forces are not sufficient when the battlefield and opposing societies change in different ways, culture becomes either an enabler or obstacle for the military to adopt new capabilities and the national and coalition defence industry either can or not produce and maintain 4th industrial cyber-physical armament. The main components of a model assessing the impact of AI in the military system of systems are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A Model for assessing the impact of Artificial Intelligence technologies in military confrontation

Strategic Pressure Builds Up Between the European Union and Russian Federation Confrontation

Strategic analyses between the European Union and the Russian Federation bring up differences in resources and opportunities. Table 1 compares the larger but diversified European society against the smaller but more coherent society of Russia. Both populations are growing older and smaller over time. European society is producing more and dependent on exported energy whereas Russian society is smaller and dependent on energy exports. Both sides have about the same number of active troops, but European troops are more digitized than Russian. Furthermore, Russia has a wider base to recruit reservists than Europe and, with higher resilience against casualties, can play longer confrontation games. Both societies are exporting arms. EU exports advanced 3rd industrial generation armament whereas Russia produces surplus in 2nd and lower 3rd generation armament.

Table 1: Strategic comparison between EU and Russia concerning resources

European Union	Russian Federation
Democratic decision-making between 27 nation-states	One autocratic state with 193 ethnic groups
Over 448 M people, speak 24 official languages and believe in a god 52 %	Over 147 M people, speak one official language and believe 60% of orthodox
With a median age of 44.5 and a fertility rate of 1.46 live births per woman, society is in a negative population change	With a median age of 40.3 and a fertility rate of 1.42 live births per woman, society is in a negative population change
Produces 16.6 % of the world GDP Consumes 59 billion GJ energy of which 3/5 is imported	9th largest economy with 54% coming from oil and gas exports
Military expenditure 1.6% of GDP	Military expenditure 5.9% of GDP
Active-duty troops 1.34 million	Active-duty troops of around 1 million
Not tested but probably more fragile concerning casualties	Tolerates over 1200 casualties/day and is resistant even over 500 000 casualties over 2 years
Nuclear capable (FRA) with high digitalization level of Forces	Nuclear capable but low digitalization level of Forces
Exports over 20% (FRA, GER, ITA) of arms in the world	Exports 11% of arms in the world
Produces more 3rd and 4th generation advanced armament	Produces more 2/3rd generation bulk armament

Based on the analysis, it seems that Putin’s regime has a window of opportunity in using the smaller but coherent population to support less advanced but higher volume armed forces to achieve his political goals after he failed to use information operations and the European energy dependency to manipulate democratic decision-making. 

Military Capabilities Comparison Reveals the Gap for AI Opportunities

After the strategic level analysis, the following Table 2 takes the research one step down to the military operational analysis of systems performance and capabilities. Table 2 illuminates the fact that the EU military forces are somewhat minor to the Russian operational performance as the Russians can use wider avenues of attack (physical, information, cognitive and social) for their joint operations and gain dominance in social and physical realms. Military scenarios wargame with Russian 2nd and 3rd generation troops storming over the European side borders using the “shock and awe” or the “blitzkrieg” art of manoeuvring, bypassing the few defending forces and speeding towards the capitals, seizing them, and freezing the conflict as experienced in the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. 

Table 2: Operational-level systems analysis of the EU and Russian military capabilities

European Union	Russian Federation
Reactive rather than proactive political decision-making with slower implementation	Faster decision-making and implementation top-down through the regime
Open media and social media for foreign manipulation	Ability to wage information operations and cognitive warfare while protecting society from foreign manipulation
Advanced digitalization, data, and information but lacking knowledge creation	Ability to disable or suppress advanced technology on the battlefield (by jamming GPS, radars, sensors, and targeting emitters)
Few advanced 3rd generation industrial weapon systems lacking interoperability	Ability to manufacture higher volumes of 2/3 generation armament
Incohesive and non-interoperative forces with little or no combat experience	Ability to train simple, repetitive skills for technical military performance
	More advanced operational art with 3rd generation forces
Fragile societies in hardship and casualties	Ability to tolerate more casualties and societal hardships
Defence industry is not able to sustain or reproduce 2/3rd generation armament in masses	Ability to transfer society to support 2nd and 3rd generation Armed Forces power projection for a longer time

Because of the real or perceived underminer status of the EU military decision-makers, there is a temptation to invest in:

• more automated force (decreasing the probability of human casualties) against conventional fighters, 
• precision targeting payloads (preventing collateral losses when fighting in densely populated areas) versus area bombardment 
• faster identifying and recognising adversary manoeuvring on the battlefield (to use sparse blue forces more optimally)
• countering the dominant operational art of the red force (faster analyses of the available lines of operation and selecting effective courses of action)
• sustain advanced 3rd generation armament in taxing environment to improve capability availability (digital twins to pre-emptive maintenance)
• manufacture 4th industrial dual-use cyber-physical products in sensor and effector platforms (meeting the red 2nd and 3rd manufacturing advantage with 4th generation additive manufacturing).

Is the Digital Leap Possible for the EU Military Forces?

Digital leap or transformation is always challenging, particularly for the military, because of the nature of military culture to sustain command and control structure even in chaotic situation. Figure 2 provides some simple checkpoints to improve the transformation towards more digital, data-driven and artificial intelligence-enhanced force:

1. Define your strategic posture against your potential adversary to adjust goals and resources in balance
2. Define your process development opportunities and limitations for each core function, i.e., Force utilisation, generation, deployment/projection, sustainment, and support
3. Consider your Forces' ability to take steps on the digital transformation road
4. Define why you need to change. Is it to improve cost-efficiency in times of diminishing budgets, potential threats from adversaries, or just implement a transformation dictated by politicians
5. Consider the width of your leap towards the future, particularly, how wide transformation your current culture supports
6. Divide your transformation portfolio into three folders: unfreeze, move, and refreeze. 

Figure 2: A simple tool to improve success in military digital transformations