Analysis of Competitive Forces in Contemporary Military Affairs in Europe

Competitive Forces in European Military Affairs

Contemporary European militaries are facing pressure to transform from various approaches. One model for studying these pressures is Porter’s Five Competitive Forces. (Porter, 2008) When these five forces are applied in military confrontation, as seen in Figure 1, the competitive forces in the European Theatre may look like:

1. Competitive Rivals, adversaries with operational advantage of conventional forces, for example:

The Russian Red Army has transferred to an attrition-generating force with volume and robustness, no other than Ukrainian force can withstand. (Gavalas, 2026) 

Iran's showcase of using massed waves of ballistic or cruise missiles, drones, and electronic warfare in the 12-Day war, no other than Israeli Iron Dome can withstand. (Croft, 2025)

 2. Potential for New Entrants, i.e. unconventional operations like:

Hybrid operations or full-spectrum influence activities below the threshold of conventional war, as observed in Finland through the 2000s. (Saari, 2026)

Information, or cognitive or influence operations, Russia and Iran have used over the past four years (Papadaki, 2024) (Bugayova, 2025)

CyberElectromagnetic operations or Network Warfare capabilities that the Chinese PLA has been generating and mobilising. (Green, 2025)

3. Supplier Power, the defence industry, dual-use technology, and society's ability to sustain military force over an extended time, for example:

Nationally defined, downgraded over the past 30 years, platform-centric, and US-driven weapons development cannot provide armament to European armed forces at the pace at which threat scenarios are developing. (Cohen, 2025) (EDA, 2025)

Adapting to the pace of arm-counter-arm evolution as seen in the Russo-Ukrainian theatre

Sustaining forces in either high manoeuvre or trench warfare is challenging, as seen in the Russia-Ukraine war. (Sanford, 2025)

The past four years' transformation of Russian economic and industrial sectors to support its Armed Forces is a strategic advantage over European Forces. (Conolly, 2025)

4. Customer Power, citizens of European societies and national critical infrastructure may appear fragile when facing the Russian effect:

European nations are not volunteering for the Armed Forces in numbers, and their willingness to take arms to defend their nations does not meet the current Russian ability to source and consume live force. (Dalberg, 2025)

The European home front's inability to accept losses or sustain through hardships, as seen in Ukraine. (Jones, 2026)

Vulnerability of digitised infrastructure in Europe. (Slakaityte & Surwillo, 2024)

5. Threat of Substitutes, conventional sensor and effector platforms being replaced by lethal autonomous weapon systems, like the following:

Remotely controlled (First Person View, FPV) UAS/UGV/USS have become the most used and lethal effectors in the Russo-Ukraine battlefield. (Ahrirova, 2025) (Defence Ukraine, 2025)

The emergence of lethal autonomous weapon systems will change the tactical level of warfighting. (Hwang, 2025)

Figure 1: A view of the power fields that contemporary European military is facing following Porter’s five forces of competitive strategy

How are European Militaries Addressing the Competition in their Public Strategies?

One can see the ongoing dynamics in all five viewpoints, so the Commanders of European Armed Forces are not facing a simple situation. The following short sample of National Defence or Military strategies provides a glimpse of current approaches. The military is mainly focusing on updating and increasing conventional forces, leaving gaps for Russian strategists to exploit. 

Table 1: A Sample of Current Defence or Military Strategies in Europe

Nation and year	Approach	Resource focus	Observations
Finland, 2024 (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2024)	Deterrence with high Readiness and repelling attacks in the worst case	Air Force platforms 64xF-35A Navy platforms 4xPohjanmaa Corvettes Renewed Land Force mobility and fires platforms	Conscription is believed to provide manpower enough manpower to meet the Russian strengths. NATO membership is believed to strengthen the defence in both deterrence and repelling.
Sweden, 2024 (Försvarsdepartmentet, 2024)	Total national defence and contribution to NATO forces.	4xBrigades 2xCorvett Divisions 6x Fighter-Attacker Divisions 2xGBAD battalions	Force includes cyber defence and EW units. Civil defence addresses societal fragility. Contribution to the NATO IAMD program. Digitalisation and integration of sensors and effectors.
Poland, 2024 (MilMag, 2024)	Accelerated modernisation and buildup of the Forces will provide deterrence against Russian ambitions.	Over 208,000 active forces, with 42,000 territorial defence forces, East Shield fortifications, together with the Baltic states.	The growth of the armed forces, technical modernisation, the construction of the Eastern Shield, and the reinforcement of Poland’s position within NATO.
Germany, 2024 OPLAN DEU (Bundeswehr, 2024) (Defense Advancement, 2024)	Bring together the key military elements of national and collective defence with the necessary civilian support services to ensure mutual whole-of-government support at various levels of escalation – in peacetime, hybrid threat situations, crises, and war.	The Bundeswehr aims to have 203,000 active military personnel. 94xTyphoon, 87x Tornado. In an emergency, up to 800,000 allied troops and 200,000 vehicles must be able to pass through Germany within six months and receive host-nation support.	Updating the conventional platforms while increasing the strength and number of active units. Recognises the sustainment and manoeuvring challenge, and includes the improvement of the defence industry.

It seems that the potential Russian Frontier nations rely on NATO coalition deterrence and are preparing to utilise conventional forces, and are planning to receive support from other coalition members in the worst case.

A Simple Model for Management

 And why do we continue getting management wrong

Wikipedia defines management as a ”process of managing the resources of businesses, governments, and other organisations.” [Wikipedia] But management can also be understood as "the transformation of resources into utility" [Fredmund Malik] or as "to forecast and to plan, to organise, to command, to co-ordinate and to control" [Henri Fayol] or as ”the coordination and administration of tasks to achieve a goal.” Quite generic and somewhat controversial definitions. The article aims to describe management through a single model that includes most aspects of resources, transformation, tasks, utilities, and goals.

Creating a Simple Model

The simple model merges the above into one system view, as illustrated in Figure 1, composed of:

• Inputs are the resources or efforts, like personnel, time, money, material, information, and immaterial components.
• Actions are tasks that the organisation is doing to produce outputs.
• Outputs are the products, services, artefacts, information, or performances that the organisation produces, delivers, or creates using inputs and actions.
• Outcomes are the impacts, effects, or value that the outputs have on targeted systems of systems like businesses, consumer market, audience, valuation, or the theatre for conflict.
• Feedback is the information management collects from outcomes, outputs, actions and inputs in an attempt to steer the process through foreseeing, planning, coordinating, and appraising. This may be called data-driven decision-making  or a learning organisation.  

Figure 1: A Simple Model for Management

Using the Simple Model to Analyse Management Mistakes

The simple Management Model helps analyse, at a high level, the existing management operation models and guides possible remediation in Table 1.

Table 1: Samples for analysing and remediation of current management using  the Simple Model for Management

Component	Typical Misconduct	Possible Remediation
INPUTS	Management focuses on efforts and resources, such as hours/money/ material consumed, or manning /machines/contracts activated. This may lead to management by cost centres.	Follow resource consumption relative to outputs, and focus on core resources, such as competencies[1] (Pareto: 20% of inputs deliver 80% of outputs[2]).
ACTIONS	Management focuses on transactions, utilisation of service points, and performance of subsections. This may lead to suboptimisation and a stovepiped operation model.	Measure throughput and quality of the entire value stream rather than subcomponents, and then focus on eliminating ”muda” or wastefulness in LEAN process thinking.[3]
OUTPUTS	Management focuses mainly on manufactured products, delivered utilities, or what can be quantified, while neglecting everything else[4]. This may lead to burning resources or missing the strategic purpose.	Outputs are not linear causes of outcomes, so a Balanced Scorecard-type approach needs to identify the relationships among inputs, actions, outputs, and outcomes.
OUTCOMES	Management focuses on ends or goals but measures them using key performance indicators without an overarching context, such as benchmarking, market share, share valuation, and new user acquisition. This may lead to Machiavelli’s view[5] that the ends justify any means, like in Russian operational thinking.[6]	Effects or impacts are essential to identify and measure to keep the system/business on track towards its objectives.  Management may use a results-based approach to make progress toward the destination statement (Ends).[7] Military planning or design uses Lines of Operation and Courses of Action to deliver impact on Centres of Gravity.[8]
FEEDBACK	Management may focus on collecting feedback or data from a few components and on either lagging or leading indicators. This may lead to a stagnant organisation/system that lacks agility or flexibility, which will be replaced by competitors or destroyed by adversaries.	Management must create a balanced mix of leading and lagging indicators to improve reaction and prediction.[9] Leading Indicators are early signals that predict future trends (e.g., employee engagement predicting retention rates). Lagging Indicators are confirming past performance but don’t allow for proactive adjustments (e.g., revenue after a quarter ends).

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[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_competency

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_principle

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muda

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McNamara_fallacy

[5] https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_end_justifies_the_means

[6] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ends-justifies-means-logic-led-russia-war-and-repression

[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balanced_scorecard

[8] https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags/01_AJP/AJP-5_EDA_V2_E_2526.pdf

[9] https://metricsexplained.com/resource/balancing-leading-and-lagging-indicators-a-strategic-approach

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Improving the Model

When the model in Figure 1 is compared against a sample of other management models, one may find that:

• The model aligns with Boyd’s OODA loop in decision-making while including several feedback loops to learn and adjust the system. Nevertheless, it does not illustrate the cognitive processes of sense-making and decision-making.  
• The model facilitates Deming’s PDCA circle for iterative improvement, but does not illustrate the management functions of planning and checking.
• The model aligns with parts of the ISO37000 governance framework by reflecting the organisational purpose, oversight, strategy, and interfaces with beneficiaries and sources. 
• Porter’s five forces may be applied to the model in a specific environment or market. 
• One can also understand Hamel’s and Prahalad’s value chain for core competencies (inputs), products (outputs), and business (outcomes), but the model does not explain the utilisation of core competencies, particularly.
• The model misses some of the stakeholders and the strategic dynamics of Kaplan’s & Norton’s 3rd generation Balanced Scorecard. 
• The model lacks the functionally layered structure of Beer’s Viable System Model , but it may fulfil the viability definition by responding to environmental changes and achieving its purpose.
• The model fails to support Hamel’s Humanocracy viewpoint because the action component lacks the details of structure, bureaucracy, and human relationships. Therefore, it fails to illustrate the evolutionary tension between hierarchies and networks of competency. 
• Furthermore, the model in Figure 1 does not describe the environment or the theatre/market where the outcome takes place, as defined in EFQM  and studied in Introduction to Environmental Systems and Processes. 

While trying not to increase the complexity of the model, but address some of its essential gaps, the improvement presented in Figure 2 adds:

1. relationship between the system and its environment for adapting to environmental changes, 
2. sources for the inputs residing outside of the system for supply chain management,
3. relationships between actioning elements to recognise human relationships and lines of communication, and 
4. elaboration of the target systems (e.g., BtoB, BtoC, audience, theatre of war) of outcomes with the Cynefin Framework of four domains based on situational awareness.

Figure 2: Somewhat improved management model

With the above improvements, the model extends towards:

• Collecting data from the system’s environment supports capturing mega and microtrends and improving foresight.
• Understanding the short and long-term chances in sources for inputs improves predictions concerning supply chain changes, educational levels, labour market fluctuations, etc.
• A simple relationship graph of the organisational structure and a connection graph of the unofficial relationships help to know yourself, as Sun Tzu teaches.
• Understanding that not all markets, societies, and theatres of war are similar when it comes to making an impact. Collecting data points from a simple target area (i.e., known) requires sensing, categorising, and sense-making, which may use best practices. A more complicated target area (i.e., knowable) requires more effort in analysis (see Orientation in OODA-loop) before decision-making. In complex and chaotic situations (e.g., digital transformation, battlefield, or unknown unknowns), the target system needs probing or action to elicit a reaction that can be detected, identified, and analysed.