Analysis of Competitive Forces in Contemporary Military Affairs in Europe

Competitive Forces in European Military Affairs

Contemporary European militaries are facing pressure to transform from various approaches. One model for studying these pressures is Porter’s Five Competitive Forces. (Porter, 2008) When these five forces are applied in military confrontation, as seen in Figure 1, the competitive forces in the European Theatre may look like:

1. Competitive Rivals, adversaries with operational advantage of conventional forces, for example:

The Russian Red Army has transferred to an attrition-generating force with volume and robustness, no other than Ukrainian force can withstand. (Gavalas, 2026) 

Iran's showcase of using massed waves of ballistic or cruise missiles, drones, and electronic warfare in the 12-Day war, no other than Israeli Iron Dome can withstand. (Croft, 2025)

 2. Potential for New Entrants, i.e. unconventional operations like:

Hybrid operations or full-spectrum influence activities below the threshold of conventional war, as observed in Finland through the 2000s. (Saari, 2026)

Information, or cognitive or influence operations, Russia and Iran have used over the past four years (Papadaki, 2024) (Bugayova, 2025)

CyberElectromagnetic operations or Network Warfare capabilities that the Chinese PLA has been generating and mobilising. (Green, 2025)

3. Supplier Power, the defence industry, dual-use technology, and society's ability to sustain military force over an extended time, for example:

Nationally defined, downgraded over the past 30 years, platform-centric, and US-driven weapons development cannot provide armament to European armed forces at the pace at which threat scenarios are developing. (Cohen, 2025) (EDA, 2025)

Adapting to the pace of arm-counter-arm evolution as seen in the Russo-Ukrainian theatre

Sustaining forces in either high manoeuvre or trench warfare is challenging, as seen in the Russia-Ukraine war. (Sanford, 2025)

The past four years' transformation of Russian economic and industrial sectors to support its Armed Forces is a strategic advantage over European Forces. (Conolly, 2025)

4. Customer Power, citizens of European societies and national critical infrastructure may appear fragile when facing the Russian effect:

European nations are not volunteering for the Armed Forces in numbers, and their willingness to take arms to defend their nations does not meet the current Russian ability to source and consume live force. (Dalberg, 2025)

The European home front's inability to accept losses or sustain through hardships, as seen in Ukraine. (Jones, 2026)

Vulnerability of digitised infrastructure in Europe. (Slakaityte & Surwillo, 2024)

5. Threat of Substitutes, conventional sensor and effector platforms being replaced by lethal autonomous weapon systems, like the following:

Remotely controlled (First Person View, FPV) UAS/UGV/USS have become the most used and lethal effectors in the Russo-Ukraine battlefield. (Ahrirova, 2025) (Defence Ukraine, 2025)

The emergence of lethal autonomous weapon systems will change the tactical level of warfighting. (Hwang, 2025)

Figure 1: A view of the power fields that contemporary European military is facing following Porter’s five forces of competitive strategy

How are European Militaries Addressing the Competition in their Public Strategies?

One can see the ongoing dynamics in all five viewpoints, so the Commanders of European Armed Forces are not facing a simple situation. The following short sample of National Defence or Military strategies provides a glimpse of current approaches. The military is mainly focusing on updating and increasing conventional forces, leaving gaps for Russian strategists to exploit. 

Table 1: A Sample of Current Defence or Military Strategies in Europe

Nation and year	Approach	Resource focus	Observations
Finland, 2024 (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2024)	Deterrence with high Readiness and repelling attacks in the worst case	Air Force platforms 64xF-35A Navy platforms 4xPohjanmaa Corvettes Renewed Land Force mobility and fires platforms	Conscription is believed to provide manpower enough manpower to meet the Russian strengths. NATO membership is believed to strengthen the defence in both deterrence and repelling.
Sweden, 2024 (Försvarsdepartmentet, 2024)	Total national defence and contribution to NATO forces.	4xBrigades 2xCorvett Divisions 6x Fighter-Attacker Divisions 2xGBAD battalions	Force includes cyber defence and EW units. Civil defence addresses societal fragility. Contribution to the NATO IAMD program. Digitalisation and integration of sensors and effectors.
Poland, 2024 (MilMag, 2024)	Accelerated modernisation and buildup of the Forces will provide deterrence against Russian ambitions.	Over 208,000 active forces, with 42,000 territorial defence forces, East Shield fortifications, together with the Baltic states.	The growth of the armed forces, technical modernisation, the construction of the Eastern Shield, and the reinforcement of Poland’s position within NATO.
Germany, 2024 OPLAN DEU (Bundeswehr, 2024) (Defense Advancement, 2024)	Bring together the key military elements of national and collective defence with the necessary civilian support services to ensure mutual whole-of-government support at various levels of escalation – in peacetime, hybrid threat situations, crises, and war.	The Bundeswehr aims to have 203,000 active military personnel. 94xTyphoon, 87x Tornado. In an emergency, up to 800,000 allied troops and 200,000 vehicles must be able to pass through Germany within six months and receive host-nation support.	Updating the conventional platforms while increasing the strength and number of active units. Recognises the sustainment and manoeuvring challenge, and includes the improvement of the defence industry.

It seems that the potential Russian Frontier nations rely on NATO coalition deterrence and are preparing to utilise conventional forces, and are planning to receive support from other coalition members in the worst case.