How to command and control the renewing land component of Finnish Defence Forces and how to support it with signals

How to command and control the renewing land component of Finnish Defence Forces and how to support it with signals

By Juha Mattila, Colonel (ret)

This article was published in Finnish Military Magazine (Sotilasaikakauslehti) December 2012

The Finnish Defence Forces is renewing its land operations by integrating a combat system of systems for battalion task force, improving capabilities to modify battlespace, developing better understanding of space of operation and ability to foresee possible events, enabling combat system to engage opponents combat system deeper within his formation, enabling reconnaissance and surveillance to keep closer contact with opponent and shortening time to restore fighting capability. This renewal includes all land component troops and restores their compatibility. The renewal requires to modify command and control procedures, to replace C4ISR system, to rethink signals tactics and to improve signals and C² training.

Battalion task force is executing its mission as a part of Finnish Homeland Defence under provincial leadership

A Battalion task force is operating decentralized either by company or by group of companies using simultaneously different battle procedures and troops distributed in battle space of several tens of squarekilometers. Battalion task force is being commanded and controlled with information and services provided by tactical Battle Management System, which integrates seamlessly units, weapons, sensors and logistics. Tactical battle management system is complemented by push-to-talk, collaboration and telephone voice services.

All organisations, that are supporting battalion task force, are connected either to tactical battle management system or provide information via integrated, joint C4ISR -system. Battalion may be reinforced with several additional units and can manage all supporting elements with joint C4ISR-services.

The commanding officer of battalion task force is able to extend his command and control to the level of subordinates subordinate, to supporters sub-provider and to other elements acting within his area of influence. The task force is able to analyse opponents goals, forces and weaknesses. This can be done, besides military lines of operation, also along lines of psychological and electro-magnetic operations.¹

Planning and foreseeing aims to limit opponents options for operation, to broaden the spectre of own possibilities and to gain surprise at operational level

To reach an end state within dynamic and complex space of operation, requires analytical tools to see own and opponents possibilities in interaction with other entities and environment. The most effective way to innovate with different views and alternatives is to include different experts in war gaming together with planning staff. Every stakeholder is represented in a role game, where all thinkable alternatives are being tested, decisive points are found and optimum courses of action are seasoned.² The best courses of action are further defined to draft plans amongst which the commanding officer is deciding the course that is to ordered to troops. The planning staff continues playing with other possibilities testing assumptions against unfolding situation and other options revealed during games. The executing staff starts to implement and control troops with operations order. Commanders decision is condensed to intent of operation and further communicated to entire network of co-operators to create alignment for combined effort and guide lines for unexpected situations.

The Common Operational Picture is delivered to every leader to enable understanding of current situation. If commanders are acting only on basis of a current situation, they will not be able to get ahead of events and will eventually lose initiative, tempo or balance³. Whereas leaders and staffs, who combine symptoms in current picture to scenarios of war gaming and in the light of this information re-analyse their assumptions and alternative plans, may be able to understand the bigger picture and therefore foresee possibilities and events and prepare troops to confront them. In the other hand, if commanders remain waiting for better information, clearer awareness or guidance from superiors, they may end up with major casualties⁴.

The commander of task force must create discontinuous events and surprise opponent by deviating his manoeuvres and combat methods. Success is being created with unforeseeable tactics⁵. When surprising force is being projected towards weak points of opponent´s combat system, it may destroy his confidence and trust for the very ground of his action. In this process it is important to control imagines and thoughts of opponent´s force.⁶ Sun Tzu advices to attack to the mind and plan of your opponent⁷ .

The commander in post-modern space of operation is not able to interact physically with every subordinate like Napoleon did riding through his troops during the night before attack. Neither is commander being seen everywhere amongst his troops or support chain like Alexander the Great was when he charged among the first soldiers. Commander is not a “slave” of his command post, but is able to disembark amongst his troops and still maintain understanding of overall situation, to keep contact with his staff, to control his support chain and to give a feeling of presence via virtual means.

At tactical level Commander must have courage to part complicated tasks and make them as simple as possible.⁸ Modern command and control system supports commander in his effort to co-ordinate subtasks, but allows subordinates also to adapt to the unfolding situation, if they have understood the commanders intent. A complex operational mission is executed with simple tactical level tasks and that requires all stakeholders to participate the planning process.⁹ When one has participated in the planning and war gaming, it is easier to understand commanders intent and to prepare for all possible scenarios at tactical level.

If you know your opponent and your own force, you can execute mission in the edge of chaos, where your opponent may not be able to reach.

When the force is employed through the whole battlespace, Common Operational Picture is enabling cohesion with supporting awareness of enemy, own forces and environment. Improved ability to reconnoitre and survey enables distributed force to keep contact to opponent and other stakeholders of battlespace. Information presented in COP is giving needed early-warning for troops and explains change of situation to support elements and reserve forces employed in the same area of interest.

COP is tailored to role and it is possible to subscribe on demand extending from infantry patrols to logistics patrols and present in their combat management terminals. The picture gives information also about accessibility of roads, weather forecasts, enemy reconnaissance, usage of fire and changes of terrain. The information is real time enough to provide awareness of physical and electro-magnetic events in the space of operations.

Renewed tactics necessitates that combat management system is able to support troops even when deployed amongst opponents formations. Communications system must tolerate losses, network must be reconfigurable to maintain connectivity and transportation of data must adapt to emission control restrictions using cable connections or different wireless waveforms. It is imperative to shape the space of operations beforehand, to build cable connections and to prepare ICT -infrastructure of the area.

Mission tactics of distributed troops is effective only if separate parts of combat system are able to synchronize their action with others. In some context this is called self-synchronization or swarming¹⁰, but examples of their time is to be found in II WW battles of the Suomussalmi 1940 and the Karelian Army attack with battalion task forces 1941.

The units and weapon systems of task force do align as system of systems effect when everyone understands the commanders intention similarly, all arms see their situation in relation to units they are supporting and everybody sees the time to target situation. The new awareness of battle space will enable to loose some boundaries and restrictions between troops. Instead it allow areas of interest and areas of effect to be created differently and change them as needed. Awareness also allows to execute supporting tasks with less preparation but without further friendly fire casualties. The battle system is able to react on unforeseeable events with self-synchronization while continuing the execution of own battle intent.

Swarming and deploying troops in distributed way is altering traditional methods of leadership and sustaining organizational integrity¹¹. Patrols and sections are not able to see or hear each other and platoon leader is not able to meet all his subordinates. Presence and leading by example is not possible in real world but in cyber world. Patrols are able to see each other as blue force signs in Battle Management System (BMS). This calls new tools to build integrity and troop spirit. Troops and sections can be brought together time to time, but the integrity of a platoon or company requires collaboration and trust building via BMS. This is done by introducing BMS to patrols early in the basic training, having platoons and companies real life exercises augmented with BMS simulation. Gradually this integrates real world and augmented reality in to seamless reality, hardens operational procedures and builds new integrity and “you don´t leave your buddy” spirit.

At the level of combat technique a distributed force is focusing timely its effect to weaknesses of opponents battle system and thus breaking his integrity, tempo or stability

Tactics is channelling opponent to vulnerable situation and combat technique is focusing system effect on weak nodes of his force. Distributed patrols infiltrate into opponents formations, recognise opponents weak points as targets and destroys them with multiarm effects: intelligent mines, intelligent explosives, indirect fire, electro-magnetic jamming, heavy direct fire and anti-tank weapons fire.

Attacking to singular or most accessible targets is not necessarily effective. Opponent must be seen as fighting system in which people, material, information, procedures, plan and spirit is joining as one entity. The kinetic and unkinetic effect must be focused to planned points of opponent´s fighting system in order to unstable its tempo and synchronization both physically and mentally¹². Leaders must recognize the time when opponent is in a brink of losing his control and engage reserve forces at that moment to unbalance his system. When opponent´s system starts to collapse, force must be utilized continuously not letting opponent to recover.¹³

In quest of asymmetry, it is beneficial to evade your opponents strengths or planned effects of his combat system. With light infantry against mechanized force, it is good to utilize terrain, weather and light conditions to infiltrate within the opponents formations to evade his heavy direct fire and to get closer to the weak points of his combat system. Light infantry can project multiarms combat power to opponents systems most critical nodes and disperse to be concentrated again engaging next wave of system targets.

There is no battle management or communications system that could substitute combat skills of a soldier. In stressful and fearful situations the amygdala of human brains takes control and it is driving action using reflex-like reactions and deep automated behaviour.¹⁴ To achieve the level of combat skills that can overcome fear and stress requires continuous training and numerous repetitions at individual level. To achieve that within patrol, squad and platoon with multiarms combat system requires even more repetitions to achieve trust and self assurance with complex system. As leaders have to be able to train their troops continuously, they themselves should improve tactical skills with more demanding war gaming executed with combat management systems.

The management of logistics network is aiming to maintain troops fighting capability and retain it as fast as possible simultaneously escaping opponents kinetic effect.

The logistics of distributed and mobile troops is possible only by establishing points of storage into the battle space. Light moving patrols are not able to carry all needed supplies with them. As battle space is being prepared with fortifications, minefields, explosive devices and communications cabling, the logistics is to prepare by establishing caches of material. This requires logistics to participate in operational planning and in war gaming of different scenarios. This is to foresee as much possible situations in order to anticipate needs of supplies when situation is evolving. Supply caches and their usability is being presented in Common Operational Picture.

There are no single key weapon systems in battalion task force, but many critical subsystems, that require special skills to repair. Specialized repair patrols are moving amongst troops and being able to repair most key subsystems. Those patrols have to move safely within battle space, to have warnings and information on enemy action, to be able to locate moving platform with malfunctioning system and to be able to repair severe problems in the battle space with possible teleconsultation. Most of the maintenance requirements has to be supplied with replacements and surplus batteries from supply caches.

The Battalion task force is not autonomous but requires support from network of logistics, fire and intelligence. This requires a chain of units, executing their special tasks within the intent of commander and trusting that each unit is doing its best to support troops in battle. The commander must be able to communicate his intent through to entire chain in understandable way and involve all necessary stakeholders in planning process. Even the supporting functions must be prepared for different scenarios and being able to react on unforeseeable events.¹⁵ The support network must be as transparent as possible to be able to run by trust and not only contracts and legal sanctions. The C4I system supporting supply chain management must be able to transfer messages and information from battle management systems to Enterprise Resource Planning systems of supporting organizations. The C4I system is to give access to joint and combined planning process for all required stake holders. The C4I system must also connect battle management systems and logistics mobile systems to provide seamless information of the situation in both systems.

Armed forces has been structured traditionally with weber-bureaucratic administration and hierarchical line-staff organization¹⁶. The post-modern armed forces has to move towards more process driven matrix-organization, that can be both hub of network and provider of support for clients. The transformation is enabled with C4I -system, but executed by changing procedures and culture of organization and by enabling people with new education and delegation of responsibility.

Battle Management System and Communications is being controlled from fighter to fire support and from patrol to commander with signal tactics

With renewal of land operations one is going for the system effect of distributed task force combat system of systems in deeper area of operations. BMS and Communications is the glue that contacts leaders, weapon systems, troops, sensors and logistics networks in to coherent combat system. The tactics of Signals begins at company level and ends at the level of last organization of supporting network. Signal tactics is including command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance including soldiers access to home front media services.

Signals must support troops with battle management system fighting in deep within opponents deployed troops, must stand heavy losses of equipment because of opponents strong air and electro-magnetic weaponry and must support distributed and moving troops. C4I-services has to be available starting from fighters and ending in the depth of support network. The command of Signals in not only deploying command posts or signal stations but also providing information and services. This recalls Information Technology Service Management skills as defined by library of ITIL¹⁷ but executed in military environment.

Targeting picture, Common Operational Picture, Fires and Logistics situation are the most important processes supported by C4I systems. Voice communications is more important at platoon level and battle management system is taking automated data processing out to leaders and patrols in the field.¹⁸ The most challenging situation for signals is to support troops with required services when emission control is denying all wireless transmissions or when opposing troops are attacking through signals network and trying to disconnect it to non-usable pieces.

Soldiers and leaders can learn from situations of battle space. Combat technique and tactics may be altered to be better suited for new requirements. Battle Management System is also able to learn in order to support users new queries. Signal tactics must understand, how to define the most favourable window for reprogramming of BMS, while otherwise maintain services as available and stable as possible.

Commanders will is not anymore the only thing to overcome friction of battle. C4I -system enables soldiers to understand commanders intent better, to self-synchronize without delay of command line and to see supporters efforts and maintain self-confidence through hardship. This is the capability that is enabled with next generation of tactical battle management system and communications.

References (Pardon the Finnish originals but sometimes they presents issues better than any English source): 

1 Juha Mattila: Maapuolustuksen uudistettu taistelutapa ja johtaminen. Viestimies 1/2011.

2 James W. Bryant: Strategic Development in a Large World. The International C2 Journal | Vol 5, No 1

3 John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.

4 The Red Army´s 44. Division was paralysed both at command level and troop level when attacking to Suomussalmi 1939-1940. Mika Kulju: Raatteen tie – talvisodan sankaritarina. Gummerus Juva 2011.

5 Emphasis is on the defeat and disruption of the enemy - by taking the initiative, and applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the times and places the enemy least expects - rather than attempting to seize and hold ground for its own sake. John A.Boyd: The Essence of Winning and Losing 1995.

6 Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.65

7 Sun Tzu: The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffin. Duncan Baird Publishers 2005. Ukrainian soldiers of 44. Division were panicked and left their positions after hearing some noises that sounded like Finnish soldiers skiing in dark forest – White Death -phenomen. Mika Kulju: Raatteen tie – talvisodan sankaritarina. Gummerus Juva 2011.

8 Jari Sarasvuo: Huomiotalous. Otava 2005. ISBN 951-20566-8

9 FM 5-0, The Operations Process. U.S. Armed Forces 2010: Understanding complex, ill-structured problems is essential to mitigating the effects of complexity on full spectrum operations. This understanding, achieved through collaborative dialog and analysis, facilitates learning and allows commanders to better appreciate numerous factors that influence and interact with operations.

10 Boyd, John R: The strategic game of ? and ?. A lecture from June 1989.

11 Mälkki, Juha. YEK 54: Tehtävätaktiikan olemus - Tehtävätaktiikan muodostuminen preussilais-saksalaisessa sotataidossa vuosina 1806–1945: ”Yksilön tuli osoittaa aloitteellisuutta sekä tarvittaessa rohkeutta toimia jopa annettujen käskyjen vastaisesti. Kurin rakentumisessa korostui näin ollen toimijalähtöisyys, itsemuodostettu kuri.”

12 ”the essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy […] That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial.” US Marines MCDP-1 chapter 4:The Conduct of War

13 Juha Mattila: Konfliktin ratkaisun johtaminen postmodernissa maailmassa. Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/2011.

14 Daniel Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0

15 Ref. Infantry Regiment 22 situation in summer 1944 with supply problems from depots of Viipuri area.

16 Pauli Juuti, Petri Virtanen: Organisaatiomuutos. Otava 2009. ISBN 978-951-1-23601-6

17 ITIL: Information Technology Infrastructure Library is the most widely accepted approach to IT service management in the world. ITIL provides a cohesive set of best practice, drawn from the public and private sectors internationally.

18 Juha Mattila: Urakan päätössanat. Viestimies 4/2012 s.