Basics of Information Operations 2/4

This is second part of IO basics

2. ABOUT INFORMATION OPERATIONS AGAINST NETWORKED SYSTEMS

2.1 Information Operations generally

Information Operations, IO (earlier called as Information Warfare, C2 struggle, etc.) has many lines of effect and some say it is not to be parted from normal military operations or comprehensive approach –strategy.

Picture 9: A Classical model of means of Information Operations
Most classical IO lines of effect are physical means, electro-magnetic means, cyber or computer system means and psychological means. These means of effect are supported always by Intelligence, verification of targets, training and logistics. Post-modern space of operation does not see the clear line between peace and war but some agreement in International law. Information Operations are ongoing because they can be seen as a part of political, socio-economical or finance confrontation. In operations generally, there is always confrontation, conflict of interests and offensive and defensive stake holders.
The analyses of information operation may be from system engineering, political or socioeconomic science point of view. The following explanation is presenting IO from more system engineering point of view. The adversary in this context is simplified to have means of effect (electronic, kinetic, cyber, propaganda and psychological tools) and intention to utilize because of possible gaining value measured by some logical means. The target is depicted as a system of systems with lot of human elements interacting with information and communication tools. Defender is assumed to have some defensive or information assurance measures, being able to detect in coming attack, being able to actively effect on attack and having assets in reserve to be able to continue after attack. The attacker is planning a course of action following simple multiplication function where

Maximum output of attackers deeds = cost of having tool X cost to breach trough defence / value of the node destroyed
or
Maximum output = Vulnerability of target X cost to manoeuvre through defence X cost of available warhead

In the equation variants are normalized so that costs are minimized whereas value is maximized. This is the simplest method of modelling information operation conflict with quantitative tools.

In USA Defense one approach for Information Operations divides it in offensive and defensive parts as in general model as seen in next picture. Offensive operations do include besides classical means also special information operations, deception and Command&Control warfare means. Defensive part includes counter-propaganda, counter-intelligence and operations security.

Picture 10: Information Operation from U.S.A and Russian view
Russian approach for IO includes also High Frequency Weapons (HFW), Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons and Biological/Chemical weapons. The absence of Electronic Warfare may be explained with fact that Russian Army has integrated EW as normal fires effects of their more kinetic operations. Other aspect also is that IW weapons in Russian category are non-conventional and thus possibly planned to use in operation before any lethal weapons. When this categorization is integrated with Russian military doctrine in next picture, following conclusions may be drawn:

Picture 11: Offensive profile of Military Doctrine in Russia since 2000

• Russian Information Warfare means are well suited to utilize in creating favourable conditions for more conventional measures of force utilization
• Information Operations are joint with economical and psychological operations before actual conflict as a pure Clauzewitzian model of having military force as an extension to other means in order to achieve political goals.
• Strategic electronic shock effect in creating strategic surprise is most probably including many information operation arms.

Col Komov describes also information blocking, deception, information over-flow, threatening, provoking, manipulation of public opinion and pressuring as means or goals of information operation in Russian’s IO doctrine.

Western military society has two concepts of The Effect Based Operations and Comprehensive Approach. They have process model on Information Operations effect focusing to change targets behaviour as depicted in next picture. This model is applicable on both individuals and societies.

Picture 12: Effect Based Operations approach in using measures to effect Information layer in a system of systems structure

Both concepts have process approach, where adversary is modelled with three layer system of systems. Physical layer is material, infrastructural and corpus layer, where conventional arms kinetic effect is causing incidents and losses, that create information in sensor systems or human information management level. Information is being transferred to feelings and thoughts in human cognitive level. There it is recognized, labelled and compared to existing and memories – both feelings and logic. This understanding is creating change in behaviour of adversary’s force, society and political leadership.

Information and psychological means are targeted directly to information layer, where it is being processed by human or technical information systems. This non-lethal effect creates emotional-logical understanding at cognitive layer and targeted change in behaviour. A mixture of different avenues is being used, when small terrorist group executes relatively small missions at physical level, but publishes it in Internet. It might be amplified with feelings and timing by news channels, mobile phone and Internet at information layer to a degree, which creates stronger feelings of fear within greater audience. This is the case for example in Iraq, where Al Qaeda element are “hyper-empowered” by information channels and media. According General McChrystal :” Through posting grisly videos of their suicide bombings online, for example, they magnified their actions in the eyes of the world audience, drummed up recruits and donations from sympathetic spectators, and made themselves all the more terrifying to Iraqis.”

2.2 Psychological operations

Psychological Operations, PSYOP or Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are intentional operations to influence audiences emotions, motives, reasoning and behaviour by utilizing information and indicators via selected channels of media. PSYOP can encourage popular discontent with the opposition's leadership. As Sun Tzu has said, one has to know his opponent, understand the thinking of his opponent and attack the coalition, trust and plan of his opponent before engaging in armed conflict.  One can combine persuasion with a credible threat to degrade an adversary's ability to conduct or sustain military operations.
By lowering the adversary's morale and then its efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions by creating disaffection within their ranks, ultimately leading to surrender.

An example of strategic PSYOP is from 2002-2003 US – Iraq operation where President of U.S.A did utilize psychological tools himself trying to create favourable public opinion in USA, Globally and in some measures also within Iraq people. See quotes in next picture.

Picture 13: An example of PSYOP themes U.S. was executing before coalition attacked to Iraq in spring 2003

In PSYOP plan there is main themes that are repeated to create deeper feeling and intended perception. In confrontation between U.S. led Coalition and Iraq, the U.S side had major theme of “Saddam’s Regime being threat to rest free world” but behind that there were other Courses of Action like improving national integrity with 911, turning citizens focus outwards from domestic problems and in the end preserving access to oil resources. Iraq in the other hand emphasized themes of “Innocent, good governance and suffer caused by economical ban”. Behind that façade were attempts to sustain the regime and drive to be “a head” of Arab world.

With Internet and global media PSYOPs and former Propaganda have extended the area of operations and introduced many more stake holders like sponsors, supporters, conformists, opponents, fame seekers, etc. that are actively using media to create images. In Iraqi Freedom operation some European countries were proclaiming U.S. illegal action against Iraq, because of pressure coming from their own Muslim minority, status of their own economy, home politics and vote fishing attempts or out of fear of creating unmanaged risks. Some extreme Muslim societies did use the opportunity to emphasize their confrontation with U.S. to gain more support among their followers.

One of the widest utilization of PSYOP has been Natzional-Socialist Regiment lead by Adolf Hitler. They had observed Socialist-Marxist movement and I WW parties and concluded that:
• Propaganda is means, thus judged with regard to its end.
• Propaganda is directed to masses to create first impressions.
“It [Propaganda] is a means and must therefore be judged with regard to its end. It must consequently take a form calculated to support the aim which it serves. It is also obvious that its aim can vary in importance from the standpoint of general need, and that the inner value of the propaganda will vary accordingly.”
“It [Propaganda] must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses. … The function of propaganda does not lie in the scientific training of the individual, but in calling the masses' attention to certain facts, processes, necessities, etc., whose significance is thus for the first time placed within their field of vision.”

2.3 Electronic Warfare

Electronic Warfare, EW is including every action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy usage of electromagnetic space. Electronic warfare may be divided to electronic countermeasures (ECM) that are tools to attack in electronic way (also called Electronic Attack, EA); electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM), that are tools to protect from electronic effects (also called Electronic Protection, EP) and electronic support measures (ESM). One of the first electronic warfare operations was conducted during Battle of Britain, where Luftwaffe was using radio beams to direct their night bombers over United Kingdom. British defence utilized various means of jamming and distortion to deceive incoming German bombers.

An example from 1990 operation Desert Storm in Persian Gulf. Iraq air defence system was depressed with following tactics using both EW and kinetic power in next picture:

Picture 14: Example of Electronic Warfare in operation Desert Storm 1990

• Wild Weasel platforms were used to jam Iraq ground based air defence (GBAD) radars, when fighters prevented any airborne radar usage. 
• Helicopters attacked with missiles advancing beneath radar coverage and destroying some of the jammed radar stations. This created caps in air surveillance system for others to fly through deeper into adversary air space.
• Fighter-attackers were mounted with radiation homing missiles (HARM) and supported by Wild Weasel escort jamming they hit a number of radar stations. Just before launching the missile, fighter-attacker did transmit particular signal to be received by enemy Ground Based Air Defence. 
• Later, when threat indicators of radar signals were identified aboard F/A, it only needed to send this particular signal and radar stations were shut down by their operators. This is a school book example of changing human behaviour in military environment.

In Russian military operations Electronic Warfare is being utilized widely starting from tactical level, where jamming adversary’s receivers is considered as normal fires as any artillery or air-to-ground support. Russian divisions are being supported by vast amount of electronic counter measure platforms both from land and air, which are able to paralyze all radio based command and control systems in the area of major strike. At strategic level Red Army has plans to utilize small nuclear warheads to create strategic electronic shock effect by high altitude electromagnetic pulse, (HEMP). This is done by detonating a small warhead above mid-stratosphere, where gamma rays are converted to electromagnetic radiation, which induces as fast high voltage and current burst in any metal conductors. Burst destroys modern digital electronics and integrated circuits. In an example burst detonated roughly 100 km high will give effective range of over 1 000 km radius. Electromagnetic wave hits area of effect within couple of milliseconds. Wave might have peak field of 50 kV/m, which generates over 5 000 volts burst in 10 cm long cord. Wave is faster and more powerful than lighting and it destroys any unprotected digital radio or wired IC in the area of effect.

2.4 Computer Network Operations

Computer Network Operations, CNO are comprised of computer network attacks, computer network defence, and related computing assets exploitation enabling operations also called cyber operations, computer attacks etc. These operations are using processors, applications and networks to attack or defend information assets or capabilities. Information Assurance (IA) measures are utilized in defensive computer network operations.

Autumn 1988 student Robert Morris typed few commands in to Cornell University campus computer, hit enter and went to dinner. He had created an experiment of how program would slowly copy itself from computer to computer around Arpanet. When he returned he found out that program had reproduced itself to totally overburden thousands of computers within Arpanet’s military, university and corporate society. This was the first network worm – Morris worm that contaminated large amount of computers within couple of hours.

During Desert Shield operation in autumn 1990 the U.S. led coalition force had wide x.25 network to connect all sites in the area of operation with IP-services. They also had virus detection programs running in networked computers. During operation Signals noticed that the fingerprint file they used to update their virus scanners did include some malevolent code.

1993 two immigration lawyers send their advertisement to all users of Usenet discussion groups. This was one of the first mass spams called Green Card Spam.  Accelerated with Internet, enabled by naïve people and driven by economics this phenomena fills average 70% of today’s email-systems of which over 60% is coming from China, USA, South Korea and Italy.

During 2002 – 2003 Iraq operation in Internet was utilized by many different parties of hackers (USA patriots, pro-Islamic groups, peace activists, fame seeking persons), that actively participated in computer network operation. Network attacks resulted having over 200 web pages tampered right after H –hour of military attack. Computing assets were exploited by several malevolent software like Lioten, Prune and Ganda.

Estonian “bronze soldier” crises on 2007 was defined by alleged Russian Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Estonian governmental Internet accesses and all sites of governmental services. This episode gives good view on the process, which defence has to manage in computer network defence operations:

• first every defender is trying individually to seek and solve the root cause for the malfunctioning services since they do not possess awareness of situation widely
• via national CERT collaboration wider understanding of sphere of the attack is created and counter-planning starts in co-operation between government, site administrators and network service providers
• unrest among citizens is increasing and politicians are heavily questioned by uninformed people and media that wants business benefits from this interest
• collective counter-counter measures are launched and they start limiting the effect of DDoS attacks. Global Computer Network Defence companies come to offer their services and surveillance information.
• unrest and speculation is still going on because individuals feeling of safety has been tampered and rumours are spreading in social media. Government uses lots of energy and time to explain situation to people and change their attitude created with first impression.
• feeling of insecurity remains with people although in practice all services are functioning normally = ADVERSARY HAS MET HIS GOALS IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LINES OF OPERATION

Estonian government learnt their lessons from this. NATO established their newest cyber defence centre in Estonia and government distributed their Internet access to many channels and addresses. Governmental service portals changed to cloud services that allowed them to be served via many different addresses and name servers.

During 2010’s an alleged U.S. and Israeli operation against Iranian nuclear program created malevolent software called “STUXNET”. It was injected through all security procedures and over “air cap” isolation finally penetrating to centrifuge controlling systems and accelerating them to their destruction. Early 2013 a single malevolent Platform as a Service (PAAS) –provider launched a DDoS-attack against core Internet operators causing the biggest overloading attack against Internet core switches this far.
From 1990’s computer network operation capability has been under heavy development as states have constructed their cyber defence and attack forces, advanced hackers provide vast variety of tools to more simple users to attack virtual targets. Next picture is giving an example of this development.

Picture 15: An example graph that shows how computer attack sophistication has increased while requirements for intruder knowledge has decreased

2.5 Command and Control warfare as a special application of Information Operations 

Command and Control warfare is a special kind of Information Operation that is targeting adversary’s line of command, C4I-systems, command posts and commanders thinking. Military structures have mostly been hierarchical and sometimes line of command may be very long. There have been commanders that have restricted vastly their subordinates freedom of operation due lack of trust or in fear of losing control. Centralised command and control without mission command or delegated authority is easy to take apart by eliminating the top part of C2 chain. USSR military advisors constructed centralized Air Defence system in Iraq during early 1990’s, which U.S. lead Allied forces targeted cutting cable lines and destroying command posts thus disintegrating whole system to useless components. Similarly U.S. lead alliance tried to decapitate Saddam Hussein in Iraq Freedom operation during their first strategic hits in order to remove the very Center of Gravity. Different command and control topologies and their vulnerability is presented in next picture.

Picture 16: Command and Control warfare targeting principles against different C2 structures
If command and control structure is following normal military hierarchy, then adversary is targeting it from top to bottom. This has been one of the strategies in ISAF operation, where special operation units and remotely piloted vehicles have been hitting against Taleban hierarchical command and control structure.

To counter this single point of failure in their command and control structure societies have adapted mission command methods, where subordinates are given only commanders intentions and authority to plan and execute their mission with their best understanding and effort. These delegated commanders do collaborate with each other to synchronize their efforts via modern C4I-systems. This was utilized very effectively by Napoleon with his Army Corps and in Wehrmacht of II WW, where Brigade commanders were independently executing missions and Allied Forces leadership was having trouble to meet their pace. Not until they were able to take down the communications between commanders, they were successful in disintegrating the C2 structure.

Al Qaida and some other insurgency groups have adopted an organization where small cells do operate distributed with no apparent command and control structure. This kind of structure requires first communications and signals intelligence to analyse who is talking with who and then targeting the nodes that are more active.

2.6 Deception

Deception is a base of any art of operation and tactics. Deception requires some facts at physical level but presents distorted or converted data at information level to give false understanding at cognitive level. Information operation is multiplying the effect of deception because modern information channels deliver information almost directly from source to potential receivers.

As Sun Tzu has said one has to know his opponent, understand the thinking of his opponent and attack the coalition, trust and plan of his opponent before engaging in armed conflict.  If one has insight his adversary’s personality and method of thinking, one might be able to amplify already set impressions with false information and in physical world execute operation in entirely different way.

Deception is effective if it is based on realistic operation plan, having some real troops and preparations in place and furthermost enforcing some presumption that adversary has already made. Human being has a tendency for being egocentric. Egocentric memory is a natural tendency to forget information that does not support the adopted line of thinking.  Egocentric myopia refers to thinking within an overly narrow point of view.  Egocentric righteousness is a tendency to feel superior based on the belief that one has actually figured out how the world works.  Egocentric blindness is the natural tendency not to notice facts and evidence that contradict ones believes or values. This is general psychological base for military deception since officers are trained to be exceptional confident in respect to both validity and correctness of their views.

2.7 Information operation examples from history

Information operation is not a new thing and when successful it is executed jointly with other courses of action and lines of operation. An example of successful joint operation is from WW II when Germany attacked against Allied Forces in Northern France.

• When comparing pure military force, there was no advantage for Germans but forces were almost equal in strength. No higher military officer with lessons from I WW could have estimated any success for attacker. See balance in next picture.

Picture 17: A simplified comparison between military structures of Allied and German sides before “Blitzkrieg” operation that break up allied British and French forces 1940.

• Allied high command had been in WW I and their experience was restricted to slow defensive battle. That impression was amplified by German Army Group B, which was making similar preparations than before the initial attack of Schlieffen plan in 1914. Within Allied lead there was few or none doubts that their right flank would be breached.
• Germans utilized their forces in combined armed way massing main battle tanks together with supported motorized infantry, very mobile reconnaissance units advancing on motorcycles and Stuka (Sturzkampfflugzeug)-dive bombers air-to-ground fire support. German forces and leaders learnt their lessons from operation in Poland, practised all year combined arms attack and kept the spirit high within soldiers and home front.
• Allied Force prepared for different kind of fighting. They kept their arms in regiments, centralised their hierarchical command, did not train much and troops had lots of free time, which resulted lack of co-operation between troops, low discipline in ranks and low initiative with midlevel leaders. 
• At same time European socialist movement did pro-national socialist propaganda, launched numerous strikes in French factories and NSDAP  utilized this groundwork further along Goebbels propaganda plans.
• In the end General Heinz Guderian executed a motorized flanking operation that reached Atlantic shores behind disintegrating Allied Army within 10 days. That was faster than any land operation before this. Army Group A slashed Allied lines of command, beat Brigadier Gaulle’s distributed tank troops, destroyed soldiers fighting spirit and disintegrated the whole force. German operation was swifter than anything Allied military planning was anticipating or prepared for and pace of incidents overloaded Allied Command and Control system. 

GERMAN UNCONVENTIONAL COMBINED ARMS OPERATION AT PHYSICAL LEVEL GAINED INFORMATION DOMINANCE OVER ALLIED FORCE AND SEIZED ALL CONTROLLED BEHAVIOUR DRIVING UNITS TO CHAOS.

Information asymmetry is one term that is defining information dominance. In 2003 operation against Iraq forces U.S. lead allied forces gained asymmetry with air based information technology as depicted in next picture.

Picture 18: An example of Allied information technology dominance from Iraq operation 2003

• Iraq Forces standard Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) was manufactured between 1950 – 1970 and had roughly 10 mm armour and 12.7 or 14.5 mm heavy machine gun with effective range approximately 500 m in good visible light conditions.
• A formation of Iraq APCs was detected by Unmanned Arial Vehicle, UAV flying at altitude of 10 km.
• Targets were identified and positioned with UAV flying 3 km above.
• Decision to engage were made hundreds kilometres away enabled by airborne network.
• A stand-off -warhead or Precision Guided Bomb was launched from 15 - 100 km away from air-borne platform and target was hit without practically no warning to crew in APC.

The space of information operations is wider and deeper than any other means of operation (Land, Air, Maritime). Information operation maybe waged along all lines of operation: military, political, economic and social. Information operation may be targeted against physical system, information asset or human being so all layers of target structure may be effected: physical, information and cognitive. Information operation may be launched not only towards adversary forces or people but also to change behaviour of allied, neutral or own forces, people or leaders. To be effective information attack needs to be observed, to pass over the threshold of human attention, create change in human attitude and finally change human behaviour.

To be continued ...