How Signals training should evolve to meet requirements of Digitized Battlefield and Post-Modern Society? Part A

This is the first part of a series of writings on Signals troop production, training and continuous performance improving in conscript army. This part includes a short introduction of current situation in Signals training of Finnish Defence Forces, a discussion on some challenges in Signals Unit production and a analyze of requirements coming from modern digitized area of Signals Operation. Further parts do propose some remedies and solutions to introduced challenges.

Introduction

Military operations have been evolving lately more enabled by information technology, puzzled by complexity of conflicts in post-modern era and waged amongst people  and information . Military training in other hand is perceived more as a discipline than creating competence. Military training has to prepare individuals and collectives to enter into harm's way and perform physically and mentally demanding tasks at the highest possible levels of proficiency. As commanders in Greece during Persian wars in 480 – 479 B.C. were focusing on team integrity of their phalanxes, history of war repeatedly tell tales of devastating losses after soldiers abandon their tasks, break and run under the pressure of combat. 

This paper defines one possible strategy to change military signals officers and soldiers training for better to meet the demands of post-modern military operations. Main focus of this paper is in training conscript signal soldiers but similar concepts may be utilized in transforming the training of regular signal corps also.

Current Situation in Training of Finnish Signal Corps

Training system

Signals training requirements are analysed from essential tasks of the fighting system of systems mission. Analysing process is systematically identifying what should be performed on the job, what should be instructed and how this instruction should be developed and conducted.  These instruction tasks are composed to courses for individuals and collectives and authorized centrally to be followed in all training units along with practical ways to measure the level of troops’ quality.

Individual soldiers, station teams and signals units are trained to meet same standard with similar methods throughout the force. Training is proceeding following the pace of average individual and team starting from individual skills up to fighting system of system capabilities usually with linearly increasing complexity as defined in fig.1.

Figure 1: Systematic training process of Signals skills

The owners of capabilities  are controlling the quality of individual and team competence with regular evaluation during field exercises. Results of these quality controls are fed back to training units and their instructors for immediate correction and for rewarding purposes. Further remarks and results are included into lessons identified and possible larger changes are included in the capability building plans for following years. This creates continuously evolving system that improves capabilities both by lean development  and with strategic investments. 

 

Conscript and reserve training

Current Signals conscripts and reserve units training in Finland is outlined in next figure.

Figure 2: Signals soldiers training as a conscript and in reserve

Within first eight weeks all conscripts overcome same basic individual combat skills training to be able to survive in modern battlefield. The actual signal’s skills training starts after basic training. Within nine weeks’ time the understanding and skills of individual signalist, team and squad level is instructed. This includes lectures, formal hands-on training and applied skills training with sub-systems and systems. 

Last nine weeks of conscript training is done mainly within the appropriate framework of fighting system of systems (i.e. in battalion task force or brigade composition) learning how to co-operate with other arms in typical terrain and weather conditions of area of operations. Only adversary effect is simulated since live fire exercises are included in this phase. After this intensive unit training session conscripts are send to reserve, where their signal skills, physical ability and understanding will evaporate exponentially unless refreshed by continuation training. 

Military training at battle technic level of Signals has a challenge in integrating crew discipline with automated individual skills in order to quickly capture situation and state of complex C4I system of systems. This requires in one hand extensive theoretical understanding of systems interrelations and behaviour in a given environment and in other hand tight integrity of one's crew functions together with individual automatic reactions, when operating devices in life threatening situations. This is best achieved when signals crew is facing together as a team gradually hardening and challenging situations, which together they are able to solve and further gain experience and understanding. This is called progressive drilling within simulated environment in order to exercise both automated responses and cognitive control under stress. The process of this progressive training is depicted in figure 3.

A signalist is first learning both operating skills by hands-on training and nature of signals phenomenon by theoretical lessons. Then these skills and understanding are utilized in frame and theme exercises to further hone skills and extend understanding of function as part of bigger system of systems. After that individual and team skills are utilized in more demanding environment of live exercises, where System of Systems understanding is extended and adversary’s countermeasures become familiar. At the end of conscript training session live fire exercises will crystallize the importance of co-operation of all links in fighting chain. Skills and understanding are amalgamated with real military business driver.

Figure 3: An example of progressive training method of signals soldiers in Finland

Both individual and squad skills should remain at feasible level about 15 years in reserve with only few days continuous training if none. Signals reserve should be able to restore their skills and understanding within 2 to 14 days of intensive training before being assigned to first operational tasks.

Currently there is unsolved problem between scarce field training days, almost non-existent continuation training and skills needed to operate fighting system of systems in complex crises situation. Loosing skills and constraints in training are challenge even to regular armed forces with years to train and several tours in operation .

 

Training of Commissioned Officers

Signals commissioned officers education and learning schedule in Finland is depicted in figure 4

Figure 4: Signals officers’ career from education and learning perspective.

After conscription training signal reserve officers may apply to Military College for bachelor studies and get temporary assignment as a signals instructors. 3 years of bachelor studies do give basic skills and understanding to be instructor at signals individual and team skill levels together with ability to be a war time commander of Signals Company and understand of battalion task force fighting system of systems.

After about 3 to 10 years as signals instructors, senior lieutenants and captains may apply to 2 years master studies to become qualified for peace time company commanders, apply tactics and military technology and become war time commander of Signals Battalion with understanding of brigade and above fighting system of systems.

After several years serving in different instructor, leader, analyst, staff officer and commander tasks signal officer is appointed to one year staff officer course in order to graduate as capable for staff officer duties at operational level. The best and most suitable officers are selected to continue at general staff officer course to become potential staff officers, commanders, developers and leaders of higher levels in defence organization.

Together 30 years of active service after graduating from bachelor level with 3-4 years of advanced education and after that about 10 years in reserve. It is questionable if signals officer is able to update himself enough to manage changing world. Especially when Information and Communications Technology is changed in three years cycles. There is rising demand to all instructors to renew their technical and tactical skills more often than current career education is supporting.

There is also problem with current approach in training. Curriculums and courses are defined as “singular, packaged interventions” as described by Brinkerhoff and Apking (2001) . Training is a session that students sit through and afterwards receive a certificate and new title that grant permission to behave differently. Unfortunately often in units new skills and understanding is not supported but replaced by legacy behaviour. Thus culture of Signals training is not easy to change. Next picture 5 is describing these typical errors.

Figure 5: Typical course based training errors that prohibit effective learning

Instruction approach is mechanical. Learning is matter of effort and repetition. Motivation is forcing and correction is only way to get things right. This ends up with students memorizing to exams and forgetting everything after that. There is no orientation, bigger picture or meaning since all subjects are reduced to small pieces that should be “learned” by “writing things in to memory” . 

After describing current Signals troops and officers training system and analysing their contemporary challenges, this paper moves to investigate challenges in general troop production and sustaining skills in reserve.

 

Challenges to Signals Unit Production from Educational, Learning and Forgetting perspective

Learning and forgetting

I hear and I forget. I see and I believe. I do and I understand. - Confucius 

These wise words of Confucius may be further extended to “I teach and I apply”. Only after teaching others one really gains the wisdom behind phenomena and is able to apply general rules more innovative way. This is one of the main reasons why reserve officers and under officers should be used as instructors of their troops.

In sustaining capability of reserve forces there is a problem of short conscript training time and long period of readiness with only brief moments to refresh skills. When one has to learn motoric skill, there is the need to do repetitions in variable conditions and with consideration to achieve a skill that can be repeated without focused intention. If number of repetitions falls short or learned thing does not make any sense to conscript, skill is forgotten quite fast. This is illustrated in figure 5. 

Figure 5: An example of human learning and forgetting if lesson is nonsense or repetitions are not considered

With reserve forces major mistake is to train conscripts without any sense and remorseless drill. These skills or understanding do not last long when out of action in reserve. If focused attention is lacking during training, conscripts take subject as nonsense and disciplinary action, there is no feedback after repetition or it is only negative or applied phase is lacking totally, there will be no lasting competence sustained during reserve time. Unfortunately conscript training is vulnerable to changes in instructor resources, training areas, live fire ranges and especially annual defence budgets. Often short term resource constraints are producing long term shortages in Signals capabilities.

A problem occurs, if there is not enough collaborative sessions within crew or not realistic environment and adversary effects exposure during theme and live exercises. Skills might be there, but understanding of larger system and real operational environment are not achieved.

There is a classic  method for learning and that means always learning while belonging to an improving society, extending understanding gradually by building over existing understanding, applying learnt skill in varied environment and reflecting feedback as group. This is explained in figure 6.

Figure 6: Using classical education principles to train conscripts and sustain their skills better while resting in reserve

When learning has social context and new things are explained with already learned issues, then forgetting is remarkably slower. Since everything new has to fall into the structure already in pupils mind, instruction needs to be cognitive oriented providing orientation, extension of existing understanding and making new things interesting. There is major challenge to instructors to provide learning environment to conscripts in a way that their competence sustains through reserve time. It is different than training of enlisted soldiers that will go directly operations to utilize their skills.

During the readiness phase in reserve, another problem occurs, if systems technology or adversary's countermeasures undergoes a major change. How to change both skills and competence of crew in reserve and readiness? Deep into crew’s social and individual’s motoric level behaviour is hard to get rid of and needs more time and repetition than when learned at first time. This means that all changes in technology should be done in balance with human competence, since every change does first lower readiness of reserve force it they are not trained.

There is a challenge in signals education at tactical level to integrate system of systems technical understanding with fighting understanding and further with understanding of adversary's possibilities together with understanding of human collectives behaviour in combat stress situations. Especially signal officers should be able to analyse situations from all these approaches. 

The end state of understanding and skills is perceived through extensive live field exercises or real operations, which are very expensive or mostly out of reach. Here simulation training, gaming and experimental learning has good opportunity to give strategic advantage over the skills of adversary's tactical level.

From individual skills to crew behaviour and performance – learner or curriculum centred training

There are military forces that have very specifically defined roles for individual experts in their force and they are being trained following a strict hierarchy. This restriction of not understanding “above one’s pay grade” has been questioned, when functional experts have met the complex situations for example in Afghanistan operation. In complex operation within non-clear area of operation a general understanding and agility in action has been more successful than keeping strict stove pipe roles and functions. The increased complexity in post-modern battle technical level is called as intertwined levels of war i.e. traditional technical, tactical, operational and strategic levels are mixed together when fighting among people.  These dimensions of challenge are illustrated in following figure.

Figure 7: An example of dimensions of challenge in training of Signals crews

The high degree of technology in Signals and extensive interaction with all other arms requires certain level of individual specialization but always in context of larger human collective and technical system. Thus Signals should maintain same standard of training over all parts of the fighting system of systems, but enable distributed crews to adapt to unfolding situations. Because Signals are considered to be the glue in fighting system of systems, it demands that their availability and reliability are at high level. To habituate crews to hard conditions and effect of adversary, Signals training should be executed in as real environment and against as live adversary as possible.  

Since signals tasks are executed by small crews distributed to nodes of large system of system, their collective training should be a mixture of very intense crew training with tight proximity and virtual collective training with other teams. This creates similar challenges as artillery has when they are training forward observer teams, signals teams, bearing calculation teams and cannon crews together as a system although geographically separated. Understanding other teams sometimes require to change roles. This is possible in system frame exercises, where distances between nodes are minimized. This helps to capture the understanding the interrelationships between different teams and subsystems and mature the processes within larger system of systems.

Interaction skills between teams and subsystems is hardest to achieve over distributed system of systems without extended exposal for variety of cases and scenarios. Each team may achieve up to 55 % better capability than any sole person but with non-functioning relationships stay as low as 26% of any single person’s capability.  Signals collective integrity within team members is most important. Thus signal soldiers should remain members of same team from beginning of special training until the end of their readiness period. Since time for conscript training is short, team integrity should be supported during the time in reserve.

 

Learning by listening or by doing - Trial and error

One of the strengths of classic Roman Army was ability to maintain fighting readiness all the time when marching, camping or training. This was achieved by progressive exercise, overweighed training weapons and demanding levels of measurement (like about 30 km march within 5 hours in full travel gear) . In signals lectures should be minimized when hands-on doing and teaching others should be the main method of learning. This aligns with human learning behaviour of less interested or less meaningful content depicted in next figure.

Figure 8: Average student retention rates by National Training Laboratories, USA 

For learning less meaningful skills, the best retention time for signals soldier in reserve is achieved when it is practiced by doing and under-officers are used as instructors of their teams. Challenge rises when signalist is required to understand the complex technology structure of C4ISR system of systems. How to capture this competence without spending hours in classroom trying to teach basic technology and physical phenomenon to soldiers?

Getting enough practical cases and solved problems under their belt, Signal soldiers are assigned to field exercises more often that some of their peers in other arms. Unfortunately large part of this time in field is spend providing available information and communications services to other troops. Thus repetition rates and variable conditions tend to remain too low.

Signals competence is mainly measured as on-the-job performance with whole C4ISR system of systems operating in as real environment as possible. Costs of measuring are high, because one must use third party judges and field exercises of a battalion task force to get genuine measures. This cost may be lowered by using troops own instructors and supervisors as judges. This though may end up with subjective results. There might not be field exercises big enough available and measurement may be restricted to performance of singular teams without interrelation with other parts of the fighting system. This gives wrong impression and feedback for both team members and their instructors of C4ISR system of systems total performance.

During field exercises the adversary countermeasures and overall combat stress are mostly simulated. Pyrotechnics is utilized for simulating effects of kinetic warheads, practice jamming is simulating adversary's electromagnetic countermeasures and red teams attacks are simulating cyber-attacks against C4ISR systems. Lack of simulating people often restricts these measures. There is an increasing concern that signal soldiers are not experience enough to face adversary's effects and still perform steadily and provide their services in support to other arms.

After defining new requirements to Signals troop production and sustaining skills in reserve, this paper takes a look to Signals Area of Operation.

Digitized area of Operation is challenging the Learning and Training of Signals Skills and Understanding

Military operations in digitized global area of operations have wider range of missions from support to home-land defence agencies through peacekeeping via counter-terrorism and stability operations ending with high-intensity conflict. Operations are full spectrum covering offence, defence and stability or civil support operations simultaneously.  Missions are almost always executed among people instead around people  and under all seeing eyes of digitally connected world. Missions include multiarms effect, effort of international partners, action synchronized with interagency bodies and joint awareness and fires.  Information and communications technology (ICT) has changed the productivity of post-modern industry and commerce. Now it is transforming military operations. System integration and pervasive information usage are changing combat technics, tactics and art of operations.  Digitalization is enabling many more stake holders to try to change the behaviour of people in the area of operation. Thus Signals own integrity and spirits are as vulnerable as is home front, neutrals, adversary and global opinion to “entities seeking to influence them through marketing and advertising at one end and coercion and loyalty at the other” as McKay and Tatham (2011) expresses it. 

Complexity of C4ISR -systems and integration in system of fighting systems

Information and communications technology is enabling to integrate fighting systems together and achieve integrated military force effect not seen this far. Military forces are now in the brink of the 5th generation fighting system.  Weapon platforms are integrated with other subsystems like intelligence systems, logistic systems, sapper systems, air defence systems and C4ISR systems. Of course there are soldiers, vehicles, leaders and their plans similarly as with the earlier generations of fighting systems. The 5th generation military system provides not only massing of effect by similar fighting platforms like main battle tanks, but exponentially increasing capability by networking together specialized subsystems.  The functions of modern military task force is based on integrated fighting system in which any of the sensors that sees a target can give tracking to the best weapon platform optimized according to situation. Machines and men are collaborating, sharing information and creating understanding, learning from past experiences and sustaining the asymmetric capability over the opponent.  The integrated 5th generation fighting system owes its capability mainly to programming and electronics. The hardware may even be a mixture of products from civilian, governmental and military shelves.

Signals is there in the midst of System of systems enabling the force integration by providing information services and maintaining ICT systems. If Signals fails, whole force will become disintegrated. This requires signalists to team up within their crew to achieve higher performance. Crews to cooperate over distributed systems and tackle complex changes in configuration. Signals awareness and mission command to enable multiple nodes to work together without latency created by single hub of control.

Development in information and communications technology

Information in Afghanistan mission network increases about 40 Exabytes a month. Currently all military knowledge becomes history within 3 years, but military education fails to fill the cap often enough. Leaders are pressed to learn continuously because once they cease adapting new things their subordinates will be first to notice and stop trusting to them. 

Networked information and communication technology is evolving continuously. COTS hardware and software are not normally supported but for 3 years. Countering malevolent software requires daily updates of fingerprint files. COTS software providers are publishing monthly patches to fix weaknesses in their products . Major integrated circuits (IC) are not manufactured longer than 18 months to keep up with their competitors and fulfilling Moore's law  of doubling the number of transistors in one IC.

With this pace of technical change in ICT systems of which one is described in the following picture, a signals team should be able to cope during intense operation, when everyone’s function is relying on services provided by them.

Figure 9: An example of ICT -cloud structure that is supporting multiarms mission in National Defence operation.

Capabilities of integrated force are enabled by military business processes that are pervasive through the whole body of force and extending over domain borders reaching to all support elements. Systems are managing both structured and unstructured information with different data models. Sessions are multi-tiered (n-Tier) where there are many sequential functions to support one session from terminal via communications to main access proxy. Then continuing to main presentation layer and being forwarded to processing level which retrieves data from multiple sources through network. Most of the hosts are running instances on either virtualized or other middleware layers. Basic In-Out System (BIOS) is adjusting middleware to Hardware levels.

All levels of layers are being updated and maintained with a different pace. Hardware may change every three years, BIOS once in every three years. Middleware is updated for example twice a year, operating system is patched every month. Application is updated every two months and changed every three years. When this normal maintenance is frozen during mission, the risk of being exposed to some high severity vulnerability  is increasing linearly.

Luckily new generations of soldiers are born with internet and mobile communications thus they are more computer-savvy than older generations but it still takes more than industrial way to teach simple repeatable actions to motoric memory level. With digitized environment one has to understand how system of systems works to be able to define root cause and isolate it without creating more harm.

Need to learn in operation and in reserve

In Irak General Stanley McChrystal found out that 2-3 person teams of adversary may become hyper-empowered with connections and digitized information. These networked teams cannot be overtaken in performance with linear and authoritative organizations. While maintaining operation Gen. McChrystal’s led Special Operations Forces went through a major transformation. They learnt new operational procedures and new ways to fight against insurgents. They become more flexible to counter improvised threats and change their modus operandi. In the end SOF was able to react to the pace of information age countermeasures changes like Improvised Explosive Devices development which was about 24 – 36 hours.  Much faster than tactical surprise of Soviet T-34 tanks during operation Barbarossa. 

Since patrols tasks are executed in intertwined structure of former separated layers of technics, tactics, operations and strategy, a mission command is only way to lead even a patrol. This requires major change to rank and specialization based training curriculum. In United States this is called as training as early to need. Chris Faris has defined early need as “an examination across the operational and strategic levels of war and control, not just operationally as applied in joint full spectrum conflict, but also in Title 10 force generation, training, management and budgeting aspects, and then appropriately applied based upon career progression pertinent to duties and responsibilities”.  Mission is not waiting soldiers to learn with age and courses, it needs skills and understanding before patrols are given a mission to accomplish. Unit training during operation becomes, not only possible by advanced C4ISR, but also required as mission complexity increases and pace of change accelerates.

As change of military understanding and ICT systems are changed within three years, soldier in reserve is forgetting drilled skills within couple of years, it is not possible to train reserve forces during short conscript training period (5-9 months) and then assume that skills and understanding is sustained for longer periods in reserve. This challenge is solved either having more often continuation exercises or practice to reserve troops, freezing technology in military system of systems and bear the consequences of obsolete technology or training troops for longer period before sending them to their first mission.

System of systems learning ability

As soldiers are constantly learning from operation and their adversary, should their technical systems be as agile in their reprogramming or reconfiguring. Otherwise tools become constraints to soldiers and they are easily abandoned. This requires new method of maintaining C4ISR systems by signal troops. Reprogrammable or software defined system of system can be educated to new procedures or understanding during operation, if Signals maintenance structure is enabling the following functions:

• All configurable items (sub-systems) are connected to a delivery system within reasonable window of upgrade. This is to maintain interoperability among sub-systems and to sustain all troops at same level of version. 
• Signals has a change management that is aware of assets, their need for update and operational situation to balance requirements for technical change with requirements for operational availability.
• Signals has test procedures and Alpha – Beta -test environments to verify each iteration in small world conditions and assure its interoperability.
• Signals has a structured way to develop capability of the system of systems with small iterations and not only by monolithic update procedures. 

If Signals is using software defined ICT infrastructure and applications and information management is programmed with semantic web technologies, integrated fighting system of systems may learn new things within 24 hours. This requires new level of maintenance skills from Signal troops. Signals should have a “learning management system” both for technical system and for soldiers and their leaders.

Signals area of operation and training from competence approach

Signal troops are operating and training in the same area of operation than other military troops. Some of them may be positioned further from adversary's geographical proximity but not able to evade adversary's kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Besides normal air-land-see dimensions, Signals is heavily involved with electromagnetic and cyber dimensions together with facing adversary's non-kinetic effects.

Signals soldiers have to operate in environment that requires understanding of following variables also depicted in figure 10:

Effect of weather

• Weather conditions have effect on electromagnetic wave propagation, life of battery, antenna construction, ability to be detected, operational security and behaviour of integrated circuits and displays.

Effect of vegetation and ground conductivity

• These effects change electromagnetic wave propagation and antenna construction. Vegetation provides either disguise or enable detection.

Other users of electromagnetic spectrum

• Other transceivers of electromagnetic waves cause interference by near site effective radiated power, modulation errors in phase or frequency, high powered microwaves, etc.

Propagation of electromagnetic waves through terrain and atmosphere

• Terrain and atmosphere do change the propagation of all forms of waves: direct wave, ground wave, tropospheric scattered wave, ionosphere wave and space reflected waves.

Behaviour of C4I system of system through all layers and nodes

• Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information System consists of multi-layered instances and nodes that are interacting with each other and with human beings thus system of systems functionality has many interfaces which may not be functioning correctly. 
• There are also technical functions in many layers as defined in ISO OSI layer model. 

Change of site locations, link peers and shareholders in network

• Signals system of systems itself has to move continuously to evade targeting and kinetic effect by adversary. 
• Signals has to move aligned with supportees to be able to provide required services on right time. 
• Users of Signals services are moving constantly from one connection point or cell to another and their requirements for applications and information services are changing according to situation and role.

Time to change encryption keys, position, to provide information, to provide support, to update, to supply, etc.

• symmetric key encryption should be changed since time of usage will increase probability to loose information to adversary; 
• signal operators should know adversary's satellite and airborne detection schedules to evade detection; 
• signal operators need to know emission control phases to turn-on or off their transmitters; 
• signals should know when to provide special information assets to users or when to optimize availability of their services; 
• signals should know when to update their applications to balance probability for enemy cyber attack and availability of their C4I systems.

Adversary's capabilities to effect with kinetic measures against C4I structure

• Signal soldier should understand the probabilities and conditions for adversary to be able to detect, locate, and destroy signals transceivers, stations or vehicles. 
• He should be able to counter these measures and shelter himself and equipment if necessary.

Adversary's measures to detect and intercept or jam electromagnetic functions

• Electromagnetic counter measures are widely used in electromagnetic dimension of operation. 
• Adversary's capabilities, technics and tactics should be known and understood as well as own capabilities and procedures to counter these countermeasures.

Adversary's measures to intercept and attack in cyber space

• In Signals areas of operation it is assumed that adversary has somewhat “man-in-the-middle” of Signals operated C4I-system. 
• Adversary should also be anticipated to capture nodes, information storages and system management connections to suppress, misuse or capture their content. 
• Adversary is capable to create malevolent software, inject those to C4I-systems and exploit system vulnerabilities to harm or prevent usage of information, applications or connections. 
• It is also assumed that adversary is capable to breach security domains and launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

Figure 10: Some variables in Signals area of operation

After analysing new requirements that are borne from human being himself, System of systems complexity, area of Signals operation and advanced adversary, this paper moves to define solutions to challenges introduced this far.