MILITARY HISTORY OF TACTICS FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS IV - WINNING WARS AMONGST PEOPLE WITH THE PEOPLE

This a fourth part in series of articles reflecting some ideas on history of military tactics. The series will consider the following viewpoints to tactical history:

1. Introduction to military history at tactical level
2. Generations of warfare
3. Tactical tenets and principles through the history
4. Winning wars amongst people with the people
5. Tactical level Command and Control in military history
6. Contemporary warfare
7. Future of combat reflected from the history

The aim of this series is to analyse the history and reflect some lessons from it for the junior officers preparing for today's conflicts. 

4. Winning Wars Amongst People with the People

4.1 People and warfare

Contemporary wars have been waged among People. There has not been a clear clash of Armed Forces without civilian or other parties effected from the military action. History recognises the following characteristics of wars amongst people: (Kiss, 2014)

Characteristics	Examples
Combat operations take place amongst people[1]	1.      Belligerents goal is to influence and change the peoples will 2.      Belligerents are hiding among the people and draw moral support, material, personnel, and intelligence[2] 3.      Belligerents tactics work only in presence of people[3] 4.      Broadcast and social media echo the physical action all over the world.[4]
The goals of the operations change	1.      Expeditionary mission to supress enemy action[5] 2.      Stabilization of situation and establish law and order 3.      Support local authorities to rebuild the society 4.      Monitor and keep the insurgents at bay
Conflicts tend to last a long time	1.      No one side has a definite dominance at all levels of conflict[6] 2.      Engagements with small resources do not lead into decisive outcomes[7] 3.      It takes a long time to rebuild a functioning society[8]
Preserving the forces and material becomes important	1.      Fighting will be extended and do not lead into clear end state[9] 2.      National defence budgets keep shrinking 3.      National public support will vanish with accumulated casualties
The belligerents are nonstate actors	Multi-national alliance or coalition Groups of nonstate belligerents[10]

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[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVZe4rQKcls

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9ZWS7JL7vg

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wOt2qrctA5Q

[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAlPhyJUIe4

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLXoG_ZbGng

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sEtYN70okug

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITBJExJ-heg

[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Gj0uO2MWcs

[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0N_qz20uo0

[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5d_lYk_M4Y

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4.2 Military unit as a social system

Military unit is composed from different social groups that share the visible signs of military culture (uniforms, ranks, salutes, ceremonies)  but may differ in less visible parts (teamwork, spirit, values, beliefs, and ethos). These groups constitute, for example, from similar ranks of individuals and there may be friction between them. The following table indicates some of the social relationships within a company. (Pipping, 2008)

	Officers	NCO	Soldiers
Officers	Rank and education are definite dividers between officers. Bound to oaths to show example of virtue, honour, patriotism, and subordination. (Swain, 2007) Course mates may feel more comradeship to each other’s.	Master of the work of war. Sometimes a junior that needs to be guided so no harm happens to Platoon.	Is always the “master” of the work of war. If an officer fears his superior, he is not perceived as a worthy leader. An officer should be easy to access, otherwise he is perceived as “other”.
NCOs	Subordinates, closer to men. Foremen of squads, crews, or vehicles. Sometimes brothers in arms.	Representatives of people. Sometimes not even wearing their badges of rank.	They need to share the load of duty even though they are foremen.
Soldiers	May treat orderlies either like brothers in arms or servants in work of war. More of the first if officers and soldiers are from same district or family. Nevertheless, officers remain responsible of the performance of their unit.	Feel to be closer to men than officers.	Ordinary guys. Division of labour was defined by man’s capabilities, but load needed to be fairly shared. “Ours or mine” control over possession is enforced. In privacy soldier may do anything they like if it does not affect the squad.

Living in same quarters and surviving the combat interdependently will create combat groups but the class differences will sustain.

Even though there are military organisations, the soldiers live in groups that determine their attitudes.

4.3 Power and its usage

“Changing individual and group behaviour before, during and after conflict is likely to become a pre-eminent factor in securing future success in an unpredictable world.” 

(Mackay & Tatham, 2011)

Power is wielded through three layers of social system: (Mattila, 2013)

1. The event takes place at physical level, e.g. improvised explosive device is detonated, and a patrol vehicle is destroyed with two dead and three wounded.
2. The information of this event spreads at information level, e.g. report is communicated through military line of command; rumours spread among troops; television broadcasts pictures of destroyed vehicle.
3. The human perception is created at cognitive level and behaviour is adjusted accordingly, e.g. Commander requests better armoured vehicles and counter-IED measures; troops become afraid of the place of incident; a mother begs her son not to return to operation.

Here is the big difference between governmental forces and insurgents: “For al Qaida, the main effort is information; for us, information is a supporting effort.” Here are some examples:

• In Iraq and Afghanistan centuries-old mechanisms for discussion and discourse – shuras, loya jirgas, honour codes (e.g., Pashtunwali) and traditions of story-telling multicast the information where technology is not available.
• Ex U.S. Marine uploads less than 2 minute video to YouTube 2008. The video has been viewed over 14 million times.  
• During the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, more than one tweet was posted every second during the attack. 
• Between 2005 and 2007, Al Qaeda’s strategist Ayman Zawahiri did quadrupled its video output seeking to confront both the near (Islamic Regimes) and far enemies (U.S.A). (Hoffman, 2007)
• 2007 Taliban published a video of suicide graduation ceremony deploying bombers to Western targets. The video acquired a wide audience in European and American cities as they were mentioned to be the targets.