Basics of Information Operations 2/4

This is second part of IO basics

2. ABOUT INFORMATION OPERATIONS AGAINST NETWORKED SYSTEMS

2.1 Information Operations generally

Information Operations, IO (earlier called as Information Warfare, C2 struggle, etc.) has many lines of effect and some say it is not to be parted from normal military operations or comprehensive approach –strategy.

Picture 9: A Classical model of means of Information Operations
Most classical IO lines of effect are physical means, electro-magnetic means, cyber or computer system means and psychological means. These means of effect are supported always by Intelligence, verification of targets, training and logistics. Post-modern space of operation does not see the clear line between peace and war but some agreement in International law. Information Operations are ongoing because they can be seen as a part of political, socio-economical or finance confrontation. In operations generally, there is always confrontation, conflict of interests and offensive and defensive stake holders.
The analyses of information operation may be from system engineering, political or socioeconomic science point of view. The following explanation is presenting IO from more system engineering point of view. The adversary in this context is simplified to have means of effect (electronic, kinetic, cyber, propaganda and psychological tools) and intention to utilize because of possible gaining value measured by some logical means. The target is depicted as a system of systems with lot of human elements interacting with information and communication tools. Defender is assumed to have some defensive or information assurance measures, being able to detect in coming attack, being able to actively effect on attack and having assets in reserve to be able to continue after attack. The attacker is planning a course of action following simple multiplication function where

Maximum output of attackers deeds = cost of having tool X cost to breach trough defence / value of the node destroyed
or
Maximum output = Vulnerability of target X cost to manoeuvre through defence X cost of available warhead

In the equation variants are normalized so that costs are minimized whereas value is maximized. This is the simplest method of modelling information operation conflict with quantitative tools.

In USA Defense one approach for Information Operations divides it in offensive and defensive parts as in general model as seen in next picture. Offensive operations do include besides classical means also special information operations, deception and Command&Control warfare means. Defensive part includes counter-propaganda, counter-intelligence and operations security.

Picture 10: Information Operation from U.S.A and Russian view
Russian approach for IO includes also High Frequency Weapons (HFW), Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons and Biological/Chemical weapons. The absence of Electronic Warfare may be explained with fact that Russian Army has integrated EW as normal fires effects of their more kinetic operations. Other aspect also is that IW weapons in Russian category are non-conventional and thus possibly planned to use in operation before any lethal weapons. When this categorization is integrated with Russian military doctrine in next picture, following conclusions may be drawn:

Picture 11: Offensive profile of Military Doctrine in Russia since 2000

• Russian Information Warfare means are well suited to utilize in creating favourable conditions for more conventional measures of force utilization
• Information Operations are joint with economical and psychological operations before actual conflict as a pure Clauzewitzian model of having military force as an extension to other means in order to achieve political goals.
• Strategic electronic shock effect in creating strategic surprise is most probably including many information operation arms.

Col Komov describes also information blocking, deception, information over-flow, threatening, provoking, manipulation of public opinion and pressuring as means or goals of information operation in Russian’s IO doctrine.

Western military society has two concepts of The Effect Based Operations and Comprehensive Approach. They have process model on Information Operations effect focusing to change targets behaviour as depicted in next picture. This model is applicable on both individuals and societies.

Picture 12: Effect Based Operations approach in using measures to effect Information layer in a system of systems structure

Both concepts have process approach, where adversary is modelled with three layer system of systems. Physical layer is material, infrastructural and corpus layer, where conventional arms kinetic effect is causing incidents and losses, that create information in sensor systems or human information management level. Information is being transferred to feelings and thoughts in human cognitive level. There it is recognized, labelled and compared to existing and memories – both feelings and logic. This understanding is creating change in behaviour of adversary’s force, society and political leadership.

Information and psychological means are targeted directly to information layer, where it is being processed by human or technical information systems. This non-lethal effect creates emotional-logical understanding at cognitive layer and targeted change in behaviour. A mixture of different avenues is being used, when small terrorist group executes relatively small missions at physical level, but publishes it in Internet. It might be amplified with feelings and timing by news channels, mobile phone and Internet at information layer to a degree, which creates stronger feelings of fear within greater audience. This is the case for example in Iraq, where Al Qaeda element are “hyper-empowered” by information channels and media. According General McChrystal :” Through posting grisly videos of their suicide bombings online, for example, they magnified their actions in the eyes of the world audience, drummed up recruits and donations from sympathetic spectators, and made themselves all the more terrifying to Iraqis.”

2.2 Psychological operations

Psychological Operations, PSYOP or Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are intentional operations to influence audiences emotions, motives, reasoning and behaviour by utilizing information and indicators via selected channels of media. PSYOP can encourage popular discontent with the opposition's leadership. As Sun Tzu has said, one has to know his opponent, understand the thinking of his opponent and attack the coalition, trust and plan of his opponent before engaging in armed conflict.  One can combine persuasion with a credible threat to degrade an adversary's ability to conduct or sustain military operations.
By lowering the adversary's morale and then its efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions by creating disaffection within their ranks, ultimately leading to surrender.

An example of strategic PSYOP is from 2002-2003 US – Iraq operation where President of U.S.A did utilize psychological tools himself trying to create favourable public opinion in USA, Globally and in some measures also within Iraq people. See quotes in next picture.

Picture 13: An example of PSYOP themes U.S. was executing before coalition attacked to Iraq in spring 2003

In PSYOP plan there is main themes that are repeated to create deeper feeling and intended perception. In confrontation between U.S. led Coalition and Iraq, the U.S side had major theme of “Saddam’s Regime being threat to rest free world” but behind that there were other Courses of Action like improving national integrity with 911, turning citizens focus outwards from domestic problems and in the end preserving access to oil resources. Iraq in the other hand emphasized themes of “Innocent, good governance and suffer caused by economical ban”. Behind that façade were attempts to sustain the regime and drive to be “a head” of Arab world.

With Internet and global media PSYOPs and former Propaganda have extended the area of operations and introduced many more stake holders like sponsors, supporters, conformists, opponents, fame seekers, etc. that are actively using media to create images. In Iraqi Freedom operation some European countries were proclaiming U.S. illegal action against Iraq, because of pressure coming from their own Muslim minority, status of their own economy, home politics and vote fishing attempts or out of fear of creating unmanaged risks. Some extreme Muslim societies did use the opportunity to emphasize their confrontation with U.S. to gain more support among their followers.

One of the widest utilization of PSYOP has been Natzional-Socialist Regiment lead by Adolf Hitler. They had observed Socialist-Marxist movement and I WW parties and concluded that:
• Propaganda is means, thus judged with regard to its end.
• Propaganda is directed to masses to create first impressions.
“It [Propaganda] is a means and must therefore be judged with regard to its end. It must consequently take a form calculated to support the aim which it serves. It is also obvious that its aim can vary in importance from the standpoint of general need, and that the inner value of the propaganda will vary accordingly.”
“It [Propaganda] must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses. … The function of propaganda does not lie in the scientific training of the individual, but in calling the masses' attention to certain facts, processes, necessities, etc., whose significance is thus for the first time placed within their field of vision.”

2.3 Electronic Warfare

Electronic Warfare, EW is including every action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy usage of electromagnetic space. Electronic warfare may be divided to electronic countermeasures (ECM) that are tools to attack in electronic way (also called Electronic Attack, EA); electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM), that are tools to protect from electronic effects (also called Electronic Protection, EP) and electronic support measures (ESM). One of the first electronic warfare operations was conducted during Battle of Britain, where Luftwaffe was using radio beams to direct their night bombers over United Kingdom. British defence utilized various means of jamming and distortion to deceive incoming German bombers.

An example from 1990 operation Desert Storm in Persian Gulf. Iraq air defence system was depressed with following tactics using both EW and kinetic power in next picture:

Picture 14: Example of Electronic Warfare in operation Desert Storm 1990

• Wild Weasel platforms were used to jam Iraq ground based air defence (GBAD) radars, when fighters prevented any airborne radar usage. 
• Helicopters attacked with missiles advancing beneath radar coverage and destroying some of the jammed radar stations. This created caps in air surveillance system for others to fly through deeper into adversary air space.
• Fighter-attackers were mounted with radiation homing missiles (HARM) and supported by Wild Weasel escort jamming they hit a number of radar stations. Just before launching the missile, fighter-attacker did transmit particular signal to be received by enemy Ground Based Air Defence. 
• Later, when threat indicators of radar signals were identified aboard F/A, it only needed to send this particular signal and radar stations were shut down by their operators. This is a school book example of changing human behaviour in military environment.

In Russian military operations Electronic Warfare is being utilized widely starting from tactical level, where jamming adversary’s receivers is considered as normal fires as any artillery or air-to-ground support. Russian divisions are being supported by vast amount of electronic counter measure platforms both from land and air, which are able to paralyze all radio based command and control systems in the area of major strike. At strategic level Red Army has plans to utilize small nuclear warheads to create strategic electronic shock effect by high altitude electromagnetic pulse, (HEMP). This is done by detonating a small warhead above mid-stratosphere, where gamma rays are converted to electromagnetic radiation, which induces as fast high voltage and current burst in any metal conductors. Burst destroys modern digital electronics and integrated circuits. In an example burst detonated roughly 100 km high will give effective range of over 1 000 km radius. Electromagnetic wave hits area of effect within couple of milliseconds. Wave might have peak field of 50 kV/m, which generates over 5 000 volts burst in 10 cm long cord. Wave is faster and more powerful than lighting and it destroys any unprotected digital radio or wired IC in the area of effect.

2.4 Computer Network Operations

Computer Network Operations, CNO are comprised of computer network attacks, computer network defence, and related computing assets exploitation enabling operations also called cyber operations, computer attacks etc. These operations are using processors, applications and networks to attack or defend information assets or capabilities. Information Assurance (IA) measures are utilized in defensive computer network operations.

Autumn 1988 student Robert Morris typed few commands in to Cornell University campus computer, hit enter and went to dinner. He had created an experiment of how program would slowly copy itself from computer to computer around Arpanet. When he returned he found out that program had reproduced itself to totally overburden thousands of computers within Arpanet’s military, university and corporate society. This was the first network worm – Morris worm that contaminated large amount of computers within couple of hours.

During Desert Shield operation in autumn 1990 the U.S. led coalition force had wide x.25 network to connect all sites in the area of operation with IP-services. They also had virus detection programs running in networked computers. During operation Signals noticed that the fingerprint file they used to update their virus scanners did include some malevolent code.

1993 two immigration lawyers send their advertisement to all users of Usenet discussion groups. This was one of the first mass spams called Green Card Spam.  Accelerated with Internet, enabled by naïve people and driven by economics this phenomena fills average 70% of today’s email-systems of which over 60% is coming from China, USA, South Korea and Italy.

During 2002 – 2003 Iraq operation in Internet was utilized by many different parties of hackers (USA patriots, pro-Islamic groups, peace activists, fame seeking persons), that actively participated in computer network operation. Network attacks resulted having over 200 web pages tampered right after H –hour of military attack. Computing assets were exploited by several malevolent software like Lioten, Prune and Ganda.

Estonian “bronze soldier” crises on 2007 was defined by alleged Russian Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Estonian governmental Internet accesses and all sites of governmental services. This episode gives good view on the process, which defence has to manage in computer network defence operations:

• first every defender is trying individually to seek and solve the root cause for the malfunctioning services since they do not possess awareness of situation widely
• via national CERT collaboration wider understanding of sphere of the attack is created and counter-planning starts in co-operation between government, site administrators and network service providers
• unrest among citizens is increasing and politicians are heavily questioned by uninformed people and media that wants business benefits from this interest
• collective counter-counter measures are launched and they start limiting the effect of DDoS attacks. Global Computer Network Defence companies come to offer their services and surveillance information.
• unrest and speculation is still going on because individuals feeling of safety has been tampered and rumours are spreading in social media. Government uses lots of energy and time to explain situation to people and change their attitude created with first impression.
• feeling of insecurity remains with people although in practice all services are functioning normally = ADVERSARY HAS MET HIS GOALS IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LINES OF OPERATION

Estonian government learnt their lessons from this. NATO established their newest cyber defence centre in Estonia and government distributed their Internet access to many channels and addresses. Governmental service portals changed to cloud services that allowed them to be served via many different addresses and name servers.

During 2010’s an alleged U.S. and Israeli operation against Iranian nuclear program created malevolent software called “STUXNET”. It was injected through all security procedures and over “air cap” isolation finally penetrating to centrifuge controlling systems and accelerating them to their destruction. Early 2013 a single malevolent Platform as a Service (PAAS) –provider launched a DDoS-attack against core Internet operators causing the biggest overloading attack against Internet core switches this far.
From 1990’s computer network operation capability has been under heavy development as states have constructed their cyber defence and attack forces, advanced hackers provide vast variety of tools to more simple users to attack virtual targets. Next picture is giving an example of this development.

Picture 15: An example graph that shows how computer attack sophistication has increased while requirements for intruder knowledge has decreased

2.5 Command and Control warfare as a special application of Information Operations 

Command and Control warfare is a special kind of Information Operation that is targeting adversary’s line of command, C4I-systems, command posts and commanders thinking. Military structures have mostly been hierarchical and sometimes line of command may be very long. There have been commanders that have restricted vastly their subordinates freedom of operation due lack of trust or in fear of losing control. Centralised command and control without mission command or delegated authority is easy to take apart by eliminating the top part of C2 chain. USSR military advisors constructed centralized Air Defence system in Iraq during early 1990’s, which U.S. lead Allied forces targeted cutting cable lines and destroying command posts thus disintegrating whole system to useless components. Similarly U.S. lead alliance tried to decapitate Saddam Hussein in Iraq Freedom operation during their first strategic hits in order to remove the very Center of Gravity. Different command and control topologies and their vulnerability is presented in next picture.

Picture 16: Command and Control warfare targeting principles against different C2 structures
If command and control structure is following normal military hierarchy, then adversary is targeting it from top to bottom. This has been one of the strategies in ISAF operation, where special operation units and remotely piloted vehicles have been hitting against Taleban hierarchical command and control structure.

To counter this single point of failure in their command and control structure societies have adapted mission command methods, where subordinates are given only commanders intentions and authority to plan and execute their mission with their best understanding and effort. These delegated commanders do collaborate with each other to synchronize their efforts via modern C4I-systems. This was utilized very effectively by Napoleon with his Army Corps and in Wehrmacht of II WW, where Brigade commanders were independently executing missions and Allied Forces leadership was having trouble to meet their pace. Not until they were able to take down the communications between commanders, they were successful in disintegrating the C2 structure.

Al Qaida and some other insurgency groups have adopted an organization where small cells do operate distributed with no apparent command and control structure. This kind of structure requires first communications and signals intelligence to analyse who is talking with who and then targeting the nodes that are more active.

2.6 Deception

Deception is a base of any art of operation and tactics. Deception requires some facts at physical level but presents distorted or converted data at information level to give false understanding at cognitive level. Information operation is multiplying the effect of deception because modern information channels deliver information almost directly from source to potential receivers.

As Sun Tzu has said one has to know his opponent, understand the thinking of his opponent and attack the coalition, trust and plan of his opponent before engaging in armed conflict.  If one has insight his adversary’s personality and method of thinking, one might be able to amplify already set impressions with false information and in physical world execute operation in entirely different way.

Deception is effective if it is based on realistic operation plan, having some real troops and preparations in place and furthermost enforcing some presumption that adversary has already made. Human being has a tendency for being egocentric. Egocentric memory is a natural tendency to forget information that does not support the adopted line of thinking.  Egocentric myopia refers to thinking within an overly narrow point of view.  Egocentric righteousness is a tendency to feel superior based on the belief that one has actually figured out how the world works.  Egocentric blindness is the natural tendency not to notice facts and evidence that contradict ones believes or values. This is general psychological base for military deception since officers are trained to be exceptional confident in respect to both validity and correctness of their views.

2.7 Information operation examples from history

Information operation is not a new thing and when successful it is executed jointly with other courses of action and lines of operation. An example of successful joint operation is from WW II when Germany attacked against Allied Forces in Northern France.

• When comparing pure military force, there was no advantage for Germans but forces were almost equal in strength. No higher military officer with lessons from I WW could have estimated any success for attacker. See balance in next picture.

Picture 17: A simplified comparison between military structures of Allied and German sides before “Blitzkrieg” operation that break up allied British and French forces 1940.

• Allied high command had been in WW I and their experience was restricted to slow defensive battle. That impression was amplified by German Army Group B, which was making similar preparations than before the initial attack of Schlieffen plan in 1914. Within Allied lead there was few or none doubts that their right flank would be breached.
• Germans utilized their forces in combined armed way massing main battle tanks together with supported motorized infantry, very mobile reconnaissance units advancing on motorcycles and Stuka (Sturzkampfflugzeug)-dive bombers air-to-ground fire support. German forces and leaders learnt their lessons from operation in Poland, practised all year combined arms attack and kept the spirit high within soldiers and home front.
• Allied Force prepared for different kind of fighting. They kept their arms in regiments, centralised their hierarchical command, did not train much and troops had lots of free time, which resulted lack of co-operation between troops, low discipline in ranks and low initiative with midlevel leaders. 
• At same time European socialist movement did pro-national socialist propaganda, launched numerous strikes in French factories and NSDAP  utilized this groundwork further along Goebbels propaganda plans.
• In the end General Heinz Guderian executed a motorized flanking operation that reached Atlantic shores behind disintegrating Allied Army within 10 days. That was faster than any land operation before this. Army Group A slashed Allied lines of command, beat Brigadier Gaulle’s distributed tank troops, destroyed soldiers fighting spirit and disintegrated the whole force. German operation was swifter than anything Allied military planning was anticipating or prepared for and pace of incidents overloaded Allied Command and Control system. 

GERMAN UNCONVENTIONAL COMBINED ARMS OPERATION AT PHYSICAL LEVEL GAINED INFORMATION DOMINANCE OVER ALLIED FORCE AND SEIZED ALL CONTROLLED BEHAVIOUR DRIVING UNITS TO CHAOS.

Information asymmetry is one term that is defining information dominance. In 2003 operation against Iraq forces U.S. lead allied forces gained asymmetry with air based information technology as depicted in next picture.

Picture 18: An example of Allied information technology dominance from Iraq operation 2003

• Iraq Forces standard Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) was manufactured between 1950 – 1970 and had roughly 10 mm armour and 12.7 or 14.5 mm heavy machine gun with effective range approximately 500 m in good visible light conditions.
• A formation of Iraq APCs was detected by Unmanned Arial Vehicle, UAV flying at altitude of 10 km.
• Targets were identified and positioned with UAV flying 3 km above.
• Decision to engage were made hundreds kilometres away enabled by airborne network.
• A stand-off -warhead or Precision Guided Bomb was launched from 15 - 100 km away from air-borne platform and target was hit without practically no warning to crew in APC.

The space of information operations is wider and deeper than any other means of operation (Land, Air, Maritime). Information operation maybe waged along all lines of operation: military, political, economic and social. Information operation may be targeted against physical system, information asset or human being so all layers of target structure may be effected: physical, information and cognitive. Information operation may be launched not only towards adversary forces or people but also to change behaviour of allied, neutral or own forces, people or leaders. To be effective information attack needs to be observed, to pass over the threshold of human attention, create change in human attitude and finally change human behaviour.

To be continued ...

Narratives of life - twenties

When I was in my twenties just out from Military College, I thought that being the best operator of all systems and example in everything were only things that was needed to be a leader in Signals. I hated every undefined feature in Signals procedures and spend hours to write how things should be done. I pressed my subordinates with both lengthy instructions and energetic behaviour. I competed with my peers and superiors in being most skillful, strong and strict young officer in the field of Signals business.

Up to a certain level everything went well. Conscripts followed my instructions, sometimes out of fear towards my temper and overarching skills and sometimes just to get things over with and return back to barracks. My peers did not like me because of constant competition and I did not gain any close friendship with them. My superiors either disliked me and turned their attention somewhere else or trusted me and gave freedom of operation.

I felt left alone with my role of being the best. Gradually I changed my behaviour to be more supportive towards my peers. I shared my work with them and helped them in their problems. I teamed up with some really good fellows to study together and we all were successfully passed in entry exams to General Staff College. I learned that sharing will enable collegial support and that will get you further than selfish hoarding of information and constant comparison of your skills and capabilities.

Later I realized that I had been risen to behave like that. The whole education system was driven by individual values and competition was constant as we were set in order of superiority every time in exams and tests. Only in conscript training some credit was gained by team, when we together were able to ski through dark forest, settle a camp and counter enemy attack just before sun rise. Even that was ruined, when excess holidays were given on basis of individual success in shooting, running or exams. Team sociology was educated in Military College only in theory when competition between cadets was constant and only sanctions would have been addressed in team basis. After graduation I was given a task to compose integrated teams out of heterogeneous conscripts in my responsibility. I did not have any practical experience on that but taking them out in the woods and giving them challenges that they together were able to overcome. My superior skills and using them to humiliate my conscripts or peers were only counterproductive.

Basics of Information Operations 1/4

This paper was originally prepared for presentation given in Oulu University IPICS Winter School 2005 and further amended and updated during autumn 2013. It is based purely on public sources and trying to define overall picture of post-modern Information Operations in intertwined and digitized world from writers own perspective.

First chapter describes how information is changing intertwining structure of people and machines globally thus making it more vulnerable for Information Operations measures.

Second chapter is defining main measures and avenues of approach that may be used in Information Operations.

Third chapter is describing Information Society as a target and measures of defence.

Fourth chapter is opening the confrontation of Information Age and defining different national defence concepts for their vulnerable information assets.

Trust of a human being in to one’s own understanding, trust between people and people’s trust to information and machines are main targets for Information Operations. Information technology is enabling a plethora of new ways to attack on that trust, whilst information and communications technology also enables more effective and efficient ways to project other means of force.

1. INFORMATION AND INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IS CHANCING INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN STATES

Interdependency between states and other societies is increasing when comparing pre II WW time and today. National borders and interstate interactions were clearly defined and governmentally controlled. In post-modern world of today all levels of state’s functions – culture, commerce, education and infrastructure – are intertwining across national and other domain borders.

Picture 1: International relations between states of pre II WW era

Pre II WW national culture was attacked by propaganda that was easily recognized in adversary radio transmissions or leaflets. This propaganda was easily countered by national broadcasts and official newspapers telling official facts. Today we face complex flow of information, news and multicolored content from different sources of entertainment, societies of network gaming, commercial adds, news media, social media and blogs delivered by many more channels than before. This wide stream of information changes our understanding and beliefs about events of the real world captured from many different sources. Citizens as human beings are as vulnerable as before to make up their mind with first impression, with correctly colored source (ethos) and with feelings (pathos) more than facts (logos). Thus adversary utilizing information channels to deliver first information that surpasses threshold of observation, disguising their transmission amongst trusted sources and enveloping their message with emotional appeal is very difficult to identify, counter or correct later with facts. It is not possible to shut nation’s borders from information although China and other more authoritarian states are trying.
The commerce was attacked with economical restrictions, trade wars, shutting harbours and hoisting tariffs during pre II WW time. Now states and cities are more connected to each other with economical and logistical networks. A loss in one market is immediately infecting other markets as well. Davidow (2011) is even claiming that information network is over-connecting processes and events and they over-react to changes. Supply shortage or production difficulties of key products is affecting all markets via Just-On-Time supply chains. Commercial transactions halt in one part of world is crippling the global economy and thus effecting everyone. Goods are being produced with greater volumes in fewer places so national independency from imported goods is rare if not  non-existent.

Picture 2: International relation between states of post-modern world

The education within state was attacked with infiltration of ideological teachers or seizing government bodies with collaborating political parties. Today education of Z generation especially in Europe and U.S. is increasingly supported by Internet and sometimes done only with self-learning. English as common language of all sciences is widespread and academic studies are written mostly in English thus academics in native speaking states have advantage over others. There is no powerful measures left to educate values or culture needed for integrity of nation in crises. Only language, history or religion remain usable in some countries, when supporting the will of a nation.

Infrastructure was more state defined in pre II WW times. Air lines, railroads, highways and partly also shipping companies were all or partly state owned. Energy was provided by state organizations and even some of the heavy industry was state controlled. Now all networks of transportation, energy and logistics are multivendor co-operation with international investments. Radio and television stations, newspapers and telecommunication are mostly privatized and internationally owned. Infrastructure is managed by information and applications running sometimes over Internet. If the state plans to close borders cutting those networks, the society will suffer major effects of shortage and cuts in very basics of normal living.

There are few basic features that keep this complex network running:

• flow of information supports the transparency between entities 
• flow of information and monetary transactions supports the trust between entities 
• flow of information and keeping contracts fills the caps of trust between entities.

If flow of information is interfered, everything else is lost with time.
Since states have recognized these vulnerabilities, they have included information and connectivity within their national defence doctrines. The Russian doctrine from 2000 is stating that foreign interference with information warfare methods is being considered as a declaration of war and might be countered by using nuclear armament.

Picture 3: National Security Concept of Russia since 2000

Russian art of operation has recognized the change as well in the following way:

• the effect of information warfare has increased with the emerge of global information space and its usage 
• the theory of information warfare is based on the laws of physics, interaction of and within societies, principals, means and tools, that enables one to gain information superiority over opponent 
• information war is waged both during peace and war 
• the increasing dependability on information in state affairs and every level of military action is enforcing information warfare to be an independent branch of operations 
• base for information warfare is created by psychological warfare, deception and operations security.

 

1.1 Information and ICT is chancing the intertwined structure between people, companies, public sector and global media

Citizens of information society are more relying on real time news of their family members and other interests. If flow of information is closed, citizens will become more afraid and vulnerable to misinformation. All basic functions of information society is using systems, networks and information to be able to execute their tasks. If those assets are interfered, government agencies functions are seized up and trust of citizens is lost. During 2007 certain parties made effort to create fear amongst people and pressure governments of Estonia and Finland (See April 2007 of Estonian Bronze statue crises) with following attack profile:

• Attack most used web pages in order to get public interest: broadcast company, most used chat –service, number and information service desk 
• Disable ebanking and ecommerce to affect people’s everyday business 
• Separate people from governmental bodies and their information channels to prevent information flow and spread propaganda with other means to mould people’s feelings, talks and spirit.

Picture 4: On-time information is more important to individual feeling of safety

As Internet is becoming more important for people to do business, socialize and educate themselves, the misbehaving bodies of criminals and other parties do find Internet a global venue to affect people and gain economical values. This creates professionally generated threats that haunts at personal level every day:

• malware like viruses, worms and trojan horses 
• spam of email, chat, advertisements, etc. 
• spyware that is injected in to users terminal and using man-in-the-middle tools sniffs user behaviour, identity information or critical transactions and forwards that information to be further misused 
• phishing and other means of social engineering that tries to get key information or monetary value out from ordinary users pretending query to be authorized (social engineering).

Picture 5: People are afraid of online malice by BSI study from early 2000


Enterprises, companies and other organizations are afraid of:

• their own employees to misuse their trust or unintentionally cause critical events (like in the famous event of one English Commercial Bank making bankruptcy because of one of its trusted employees failed in Asian brokerage markets) 
• their former employees that know critical information or still possesses access to company’s critical assets 
• other companies – rivals – to steal their inventions or valuable information 
• hackers and crackers with criminal intentions or just some people trying to gain fame by breaching company’s security measures
• foreign states, which intelligence gathering bodies are supporting their national enterprises with R&D information or bidding information to gain upper hand in commercial competition. 

Picture 6: What European companies are afraid of according to survey made within European Companies on 2000

Globalized information societies are very dependent on eFinance. Electronic transactions between banks, stock exchanges, business to business and retail customer to banks do carry a lot of financial value and for global economy safe and reliable electronic transaction service is one of the most critical assets. For example within U.S. electronic finance structure the following value transactions were happening in early 2000:

• During 2001 Fedwire executed 112 455 615 value transactions averaging $3,77 Million and transferring $1, 682 Trillion worth of financial value a day. 
• CHIPS, that is handling 95% of USD international payment, did transfer average $1,3 Trillion a day 
• SWIFT forwarded 1,27 Billion transactions on 2000, averaging 5 Million messages per day and $6 Trillion value per day.

As societies, people and business are becoming more dependent of Internet information, services and its structure, the technology itself is becoming more vulnerable. There has been almost exponential increase of reported vulnerabilities in information and communications technology during last decade. This is mostly due the nature of Internet being enormous system of systems without any controls and driven by consumer markets which is forcing to introduce more complex services with faster pace to fulfil different needs of a user (mainly social).

Picture 7: Information technology is increasingly valuable according CERT/CC reports on recognized vulnerabilities in IT on 2007
 

1.2 Trends of future

The human kind is undergoing a continuous migration within structures of economy, nationality, religion, values and interests of people. One example of this migration is depicted in following picture.

Picture 8: One scenario of changing post-modern world

The Global Environment is presenting restrictions, possibilities and misuses of human kind. There is a lack of rare raw material assets, current energy sources are emptying, climate is chancing and pollution is affecting people, global economy is changing while looking for more cost-effective production methods and optimizing the transportation costs of raw material and products, cultures and societies are changing when individual needs and behaviour is changing. Furthermore the pace of global change is accelerating. Many things are changing simultaneously and super-connected world may react drastically or unintentionally.

The division between small and large enterprises is increasing. Bigger global companies are getting bigger by creating economical and retail networks (for example Apple Inc. has leverage in popular culture) while smaller companies are even smaller but more specialized products. Every company faces more frequent change of markets or production structure than ever before thus life cycle of a company today is exponentially shorter than 100 years ago. Open market economy is dividing more effectively good products from not so good products fuelled by better information. Customers are changing their consuming habits faster fuelled by information intensive marketing.

The selfishness of states is retained even they are allied in one way or another. Interstates relations are effected by everyday politics powered by global and social media more than ever before. States consider continuous growth of GPD to be the best tool to ensure better living for their citizens thus they are facing harder competition between other states that are seeking growing as well. In one had states are allying to enforce their inner markets and be more powerful to defend their interests on material, energy and people. On the other hand some states are falling apart being “remains from imperialistic era”; being divided by economy, religion or society; being disintegrated because of weak leadership, economical structure, suffer of its citizens or by forces effecting from outside of country. Contemporary states may be “more together” on regional, resource or economy level giving away some of the state’s independency but gaining other possibilities for growth. People in other states may feel they can be more separately thus driving power to cities or metropolis.

Whatever the entity, some degree of alliance and networking is needed in order any society to exist in global pressure. Networking means that specialization becomes more effective, thus enforcing structural changes in each and every society striving for potentiality of Reed’s law. When networking and specialization creates more interdependency, a small event somewhere in network may have bigger effect when multiplied by connectivity and quick reactions. While number of participants in the network is increasing, cross-purposes area also increasing and possibility to implement a strong strategy is lessening.

With more networked societies and their surface of vulnerability more exposed, the tools used in confrontations are many more than before. This is defined in next picture.

Picture 9: Evolution of society and area of military operations

In agricultural society food was the primer for confrontation and massing people tool to project force. In industrial society material, energy and people were the primer for confrontation and massing systems and fire was tool to solve them. In information society services are the primer for confrontation and massing effects the tool to solve them. Interdependence, number of stake holders and avenues to effect have increased thus friction defined by Clausewitz in space of operation is more eminent and insight of a phenomenon more difficult to obtain.

1.3 Summary of new dependencies and exposed vulnerabilities

Global dependency of information and IC –technology is creating an attractive target for force projection and venue to change behaviour of people and societies:

• Information and networks are more important for western states to govern their assets and interests especially, when public sector will take further measures to rationalize governance functions and cut number of people currently employed in public sector
• People of westernized societies are more dependent on ICT and when being banned from Internet or being attacked with propaganda they will more probably change their behaviour
• Economy, Finance and logistics have networks that are imperative to all information transactions included in global commerce. Banning this ability or manipulating its content may have major effect on peoples and organizations behaviour. 
• As the use of ICT is spreading in both Private and Public sector and further with Internet and consumer electronics, the surface of its vulnerability is spreading. Next wave of network of machines and migration to semantic content in WWW will accelerate vulnerabilities, threats and effect in exponential way towards pervasive or ubiquitous computing. Extending use of ICT in healthcare will inevitable produce victims caused by security breech.

To Be Continued...

Maavoimien ohjelmoitavien suorituskykyjen integrointi ja yhteensopivuuden testaaminen Maavoimien taistelujärjestelmään

Maavoimien ohjelmoitavien suorituskykyjen integrointi ja yhteensopivuuden testaaminen

Maavoimien suorituskyvyt ovat kehittymässä keskinäisriippuvuuteen aselajien ja toimijoiden kesken. Yhteistoiminnan ja suorituskykyjen kehittymisen ydintä ovat ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan kehittyminen osaksi kaikkia aselajeja ja ulottuen komentoketjussa partiotasolle. Ohjelmoitavalla elektroniikalla mahdollistetaan muutos joukkojen ja suorituskykyjen tiedon ja toiminnallisuuksien yhdistämiseksi. Suorituskykyä tuotetaan lisää Maavoimille yhdistämällä tietoa ja toimintaa ylitse joukko- ja aselajitoimintojen. Kehittyvät toiminnallisuudet nostavat Maavoimien suorituskykyä merkittävästi ja mahdollistavat muun muassa Maavoimien taistelun 2015.

Maavoimat ovat tilanteessa, jossa Maavoimien sisäisiltä ja ulkoisilta toimijoilta suljettujen järjestelmien aika on ohi. Maavoimien taistelu 2015 edellyttää kehitettäviltä ja hankittavilta suorituskyvyiltä tuotannossa järjestelmien välistä saumatonta yhteistoimintaa. Ylläpidossa kyseiset suorituskyvyt tulee hallita ja valvoa jatkuva-aikaisesti sisäisten toiminnallisten sekä ulkoisten teollisen maailman teknisten muutosten tahdittamana. Ohjelmallisia suorituskykykomponentteja sisältävät suorituskyvyt sitovat Maavoimat toimimaan teollisuuden muutosten tahdissa, eikä suorituskykyjä voida perinteiseen tapaan jäädyttää suorituskyvyn elinkaaren ajaksi. Hallittavaksi muodostuvat muuttuvat elementit ovat ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan laitetekniset, ohjelmalliset tai toiminnalliset muutokset. Kaikkien muutostyyppien osalta edellytetään muutoksen vaikutusten tarkastelua ja hallintaa ennen tuotantoon siirtämistä.

Maavoimien ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ensivaiheen haasteita ovat sen hallitseminen teknisesti ja resurssillisesti suorituskykyjen osatekijöinä sekä kouluttaminen joukkotuotettaville ja kantahenkilöstölle. Näiden haasteiden hallinta edellyttää suorituskykyjen tuottamiseen ja ylläpitoon osallistuvien toimijoiden yhteistoimintaa verkostona. Johtamisjärjestelmien ylläpitämisen ja kehittämisen näkökulmasta uusina yhteistoimintaa edellyttävinä tekijöinä on hallittava ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan kehittäminen, hankinta, logistiikka ja ylläpito elinkaarihallinnassa. Hallinta edellyttää tilaus-toimitus -ajattelun edelleen kehittämistä palvelutuotannolla, josta Maavoimissa vastaa Maavoimien operatiivisen järjestelmäryhmän (MAAVOJK). Maavoimien huollon näkökulmasta on huolehdittava suorituskykyjen ylläpidon kustannustehokkuudesta ja erityisesti kustannusten hallinnasta sekä järjestelmien ja toimintatapojen kouluttamisesta joukkotuotettaville ja kantahenkilöstölle. Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan kehityksen ja ylläpidon haasteena ovat kustannusten hallitsematon nouseminen, materiaalihankinnan haasteet sekä osaamisen puutteesta johtuva suorituskyvyllinen romahtaminen tai tavoitteiden saavuttamattomuus.

　

Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan materiaalin ja immateriaalin testaaminen materiaalilogistiikassa

Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan hankintaan ja logistiseen toimittamiseen liittyy kaksi periaatteellista eroa perinteisiin suorituskykytekijöihin nähden. Ensimmäinen on ohjelmoitavien elektronisten komponenttien hankkiminen kehityksessä ja ylläpidossa yhteensopivuus tuotantoympäristöön varmistaen. Toinen on ohjelmallisen suorituskykytekijän toimittaminen materiaalin kanssa synkronoidusti tuotantoon. Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan hankinnassa tekniset vaatimusmäärittelyt eivät riitä takamaan ohjelmallista toimivuutta hankitussa raudassa. Toimivuuden varmistaminen edellyttää hallittua testaamista ja todentamista logistisen tilaaja-tuottaja -ketjun ulkopuolella, mutta osana prosessia Maavoimien referenssiympäristössä.

Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan kotiuttamisessa on tilaaja-tuottaja -ketjussa koordinoitava rautaan asennettavat ohjelmistot yhteistoiminnassa palvelutuottajan kanssa. Keskeistä on sopia vastuista suorituskykyjen tuottamiseksi tuotantoon rautana ja siihen asennettavana ja ylläpidettävänä ohjelmistona. Kokonaisuutta voidaan kutsua palveluhallinnaksi, jossa logistiikasta saadaan käyttöön sopivaa rautaa ja palvelutuotanto vastaa rautaan ja käyttöön sopivan ohjelmiston tuottamisesta sekä toimittamisesta sotilasjohtamisen tarpeiden mukaisesti. Pohjimmiltaan kyse on kahdesta rinnakkaisesta toimitusvuosta, materiaalinen ja ohjelmallinen vuo, jotka on synkronoitava jokaisessa solmukohdassa - kehitys, hankinta, toimitus, tuotanto, ylläpito. Synkronoinnin keskeisin osa on integrointi ja integrointitestaaminen referenssiympäristössä.

Maavoimien referenssiympäristö

Suorituskykyjen yhteensovittaminen ja kehityksen sekä tuotannon muodostaman verkoston yhteistoiminta ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan osalta mahdollistetaan tuotantoympäristöstä irrallaan olevassa Maavoimien referenssiympäristössä. Referenssinympäristössä todennetaan ja etsitään tuotantoon soveltuvat laite- ja ohjelmistokonfiguraatiot osana teknistä- ja käyttöhyväksyntäprosessia sekä tuetaan MAAVOJK:n tuotannon tapahtuma- ja ongelmahallintaprosesseja. Referenssitoiminnalla varmistetaan ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan hankinnan, logistiikan ja ylläpidon osaamisen nostaminen kantahenkilöstön keskuudessa - hankinta, ylläpito, koulutus.

Maavoimien referenssiympäristö on Puolustusvoimien uudistuksen myötä muodostuvan Puolustusvoimien logistiikkalaitoksen (PVLOGL) omistama laboratorioympäristö Riihimäellä. Ympäristön ylläpidosta ja operoinnista vastaa MILLOG Oy ja referenssiympäristön toimintaa ohjaavat MAAVEJOJÄOS ja MAAVOJK yhteistoiminnassa PVLOGL:n kanssa. Ympäristössä testataan mallinnettuja ja tuotteistettuja tuotteita. Ympäristö ei ole kehityksen kokeilutoiminnan alusta, vaan ympäristössä suoritetaan määrämuotoiset testit kehityksen tai ylläpidon muutosten sopivuuden testaamiseksi tuotannossa olevaa TSTOS:n johtamisjärjestelmä kokonaisuutta vasten. Suoritettavat testit liittyvät ensisijaisesti kehityksen ja ylläpidon tuote sekä ohjelmistotestaukseen sekä toissijaisesti tuotannon tapahtuma-/ ongelmahallinnan tukitoimintaan.

Kehityksen ja ylläpidon tuote- sekä ohjelmistotestauksella varmennetaan tuotantoon hankittavan raudan ja ohjelmistojen sekä ohjelmistojen päivitysten yhteensopivuus tuotannossa olevan ympäristön kanssa. Testaamalla voidaan todentaa tuotteen tai ohjelmiston, järjestelmän sisäinen ja järjestelmien välinen toiminta ideaalisissa olosuhteissa. Todentamisella pois suljetaan suurimmat ja suurin osa tuotantoon viennin haasteista. Testaaminen periaatteellisesti vastaa koeammuntaa johtamisjärjestelmällä. Koeampumalla varmistutaan raudan ja ohjelmistojen toimivuudesta, turvallisuudesta ja käytettävyydestä määriteltyjen käyttäjätapausten ja toiminnallisten kuvausten sekä suorituskykyvaatimusten mukaisesti. Referenssiympäristötestaaminen ei korvaa kenttätestaamista, vaan mahdollistaa tehokkaan ja turvallisen tavan siirtyä kenttä- ja pilottitesteihin. Referenssitestaaminen edustaa yhteensopivuuden ja toimivuuden todentamista kenttätestien toteuttamiseksi. Referenssitestien etuna on kustannustehokkuus, nopeus ja toistettavuus. Hallittu testaaminen tuottaa luotettavaa tietoa, joka on aikaisemman ymmärryksen ja tulosten kanssa vertailukelpoista.

Testitoiminta Maavoimien referenssiympäristössä

Maavoimien suorituskykyjen ylläpidon ja kehityksen ratkaisuiden ja tuotteiden testaaminen toteutetaan identtisillä prosesseilla, kuten tuotantoon siirto. Maavoimien referenssiympäristö on integrointipiste, josta eteenpäin kehityksen, ylläpidon ja eri aselajien ja toimijoiden ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan komponentit ja ohjelmistot yhdistyvät suorituskykyjen siirtämiseksi tuotantoon. Yhtäältä tapahtuma- ja ongelmahallinnassa referenssiympäristö on verkoston toimijoiden koolle kutsumispaikka tuotannossa ilmenneiden ja siellä ratkaisemattomien haasteiden ratkaisemiseksi. Tuotannon ja ylläpitotoimijoiden näkökulmasta ylläpito ja kehitys ovat yksi ja sama asia, mutta vain toimijat ovat erit. Referenssiympäristö tarjoaa yhteistoiminnalle fasiliteetit ja toimii integrointipisteenä. Muutosten hallitseminen ja todentaminen vaikutusten osalta suoritetaan testaamalla ne osana muutos- ja ylläpitoprosessia, jonka läpi kehityksen ja ylläpidon muutokset tarkastellaan ja siirretään tuotantokäyttöön. Testausprosessi on vaiheistettu siten, että prosessissa saavutetaan käyttöturvallisuus, luotettavuus, eheys ja normien mukaiset järjestelmähyväksynnät.

Kehityksen ja ylläpidon testaustarpeet jakautuvat kahteen osaan, rautaan ja ohjelmistoon, joista ensinnä käsitellään ohjelmistopäivitykset ja -muutokset. Maavoimien tekninen- ja käyttöhyväksymisnormien ja ohjeiden mukaisen tahtotilan toteuttaminen tuotannon aikana edellyttää ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan osalta, erityisten ohjelmistojen, hyväksyntä ja ylläpitomenetelmien tarkentamista. Tavoite hyväksyntätoiminnalla on varmistua käytettävien ja käyttöön tulevien suorituskykyjen teknisestä toiminnasta ja käyttöturvallisuudesta. Voimassa olevat hyväksyntäprosessit ovat laadittu perinteisten suorituskykytekijöiden hyväksymiseksi ja toimintaturvallisuuden takaamiseksi, joiden osalta muutokset tapahtuvat harvakseltaan. Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ohjelmistojen muutokset muodostuvat päivien ja viikkojen sykleissä tiheimmillään tarkoittaen sitä, että hyväksytyllä järjestelmällä ei käytännössä ehditä aloittaa kouluttamista ennen seuraavan muutoksen tulemista. Palvelutuotannon eli MAAVOJK:n tehtävänä on ylläpitää tuotannon aikainen hyväksyntäprosessi hallinnassa ja rekisteröitynä. Palvelutuotantoprosessi on legitimoitava edustamaan hyväksyntäprosessia ylläpidon ja hallinnan tuottamiseksi tuotannon aikana. Joukkotuotannon aikana tehdyt muutokset voidaan hyväksyä takautuvasti varsinaisessa hyväksyntäprosessissa joukkojen vaihtojen yhteydessä samalla, kun suoritetaan uusien suorituskykyjen käyttöönotot.

Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ohjelmistotestaaminen referenssiympäristössä vakioi järjestelmien käytön yhdenmukaistamalla käytössä olevat ja palvelutuotannon tukemat ohjelmistokonfiguraatiot. Referenssiympäristössä testatut ja edelleen MAAVOJK:n hyväksymät ohjelmistopaketit sekä niihin liittyvät ohjeet/ vast. jaetaan (MIRADORE) hallitusti Joukko-osastojen Operatiivisten järjestelmäryhmien (J-OS OJR) asennettavaksi ja käyttöönotettavaksi tuotannossa. Valvonnan, hallinnan ja ylläpidon tuottamisen edellytys on yhtenäinen toimintatapa ja järjestelmät. Määritetystä konfiguraatiosta poikkeaville järjestelmille ei anneta tukea tuotannossa.

Toisena kehityksen ja ylläpidon testaustarpeena on raudan muutosten testaaminen teollisen kehityksen tahdissa. Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan raudan muutokset tulee testata ja hallita teknisen kehityksen tahdissa referenssiympäristössä. Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan teollisuuden muutostahti teknisellä tasolla on 6-18 kuukauden välissä. Puolustusvoimien kilpailuttamien neljävuotisten puitesopimusten tekniset tuotteet tulee vähintään vuosittain testata referenssiympäristössä. Testaaminen tulee suorittaa merkittävien hankintojen valmisteluvaiheessa. Merkittäviä hankintoja tulevat olemaan ylläpidon vuosittaiset massahankinnat. Testaamisella varmistetaan puitesopimuksen mukaisen palveluluettelon tuotteista parhaiten käyttöön ja ympäristöön soveltuvat tuotteet ennen hankinnan suorittamista.

　

Ennakoiva testaustoiminta Maavoimien referenssiympäristössä tuottaa järjestelmien hallittavuuden suorituskyvyn ja resurssien suhteen

Suunnitelmallisuus ja johdonmukaisuus ovat Puolustusvoimien hyveitä. Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan lisääntyminen edellyttää suunnitelmallisuuden laajentamista yksittäisistä järjestelmistä järjestelmien välisiin kokonaisuuksiin. Maavoimien referenssiympäristössä on tavoitteena kuvata kaikkien aselajien järjestelmät osana Maavoimien taistelujärjestelmää siten, että aselajien järjestelmien kehityksen tai ylläpitotoimenpiteiden vaikutukset voidaan tarkastella järjestelmän sisäisten ja järjestelmien keskinäisen toimivuuden osalta. Suunnitelmallisuutta lisää laboratorio-olosuhteissa tehtävät toiminnallisuuksien testaukset. Testausten pohjalta voidaan todeta järjestelmien toimivuus. Kenttä- ja pilottitestauksessa ei tällöin tarvitse keskittyä järjestelmien toimimaan saattamiseen, vaan taistelutoiminnan ja ympäristön vaikutusten tarkasteluun. Johdonmukainen toiminta suunnitelmien ja vakioprosessien mukaisesti edesauttaa hallitsemaan hallitsemattomia elementtejä, kuten teollisuuden tekninen muuttuminen tai ennalta arvaamattomat muutokset.

Johdonmukaisuutta vaaditaan ylläpidon ja kehityksen hankkeiden ohjaukseen. Saamaan tarkoitukseen tulee käyttää samaa tuotetta samoilla perusteilla. Johdonmukaisuus tulee ulottaa aktiiviseen valmistautumiseen hankinnoissa siten, että ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan tuotteet testataan Maavoimien referenssiympäristössä ja tarjotaan tuotantoon soveltuvat tuotteet ja ohjelmistot palveluluettelolla hankkeiden ja ylläpidon tarpeisiin. Kehityshankkeiden uudet suorituskyvyt tulee kehittää osaksi palveluluetteloa ennen massatilausten aloittamista. Testaus- ja ylläpitoprosesseilla suorituskykyjen hallinta, valvonta ja tuki tuotannossa ja ylläpidossa. Kuvatusti toteutettu Maavoimien taistelujärjestelmä ei tarvitse eriytettyjä aselaji/ vast. kohdennettuja valvota, hallinta ja ylläpito järjestelyitä ja prosesseja.

A Change and military Organization

John P. Kotter: ”People change what they do less because they are given analysis that shifts their thinking, than because they are shown a truth that influences their feelings.”

Some experiences on leading the change in military environment

“This is not a way to fight – let´s go over this little marsh!”¹

For a human being, a change is always grossing the boundaries of one´s comfort zone. Going over the edge is an individual experience. There are persons, who feel the edge is a challenge and others to whom it is a blockade. The leader of change must acknowledge this difference. The leader should give right direction to those willing to start the journey and offer the others a firm hand of support over the abyss of fear and uncertainty.

Since feeling is always individual and right, leader of change must walk the talk. All leaders should walk amongst their troops, tell narratives of better future, listen to fears of their subordinates and help them to manage their threats. Leaders are to tell about change with stories from troops reality, create feelings with facts and urge to change their behaviour.

“I dare not – I haven´t had any training for that!”²

The end state may be either improving the current tactics or introducing new weapon systems, but individual and organizational skill and competence are always cornerstones in capturing new capability. Human competence does not develop linearly but in a spiral. The new concept needs experience gained by practice and understanding with feelings to get to the level of competence. After individual and collective acceptance, the new way of doing things will change professional behaviour. Sometimes existing proficiency may be sufficient, but individual feels, that there is a need for training, certification, and authorization, before talks turn to deeds.

Organisational competence includes culture, guides, and operational procedures. A change of those requires, that members of the organisation understand the deeper structures of their unit, create an aligned interpretation of new rules and change their behaviour, interaction, and values in synchrony. The change of organisational competence requires most members to adopt new behaviour and pull others with them. This calls leader to award any positive change visibly, and without hesitation rotate all those sub-leaders that are not capable of changing their unit.

“Company – Attention! Right – turn! Forward – March!”

Change is continuous within every organisation – either planned and executed or unnoticed but gradually accepted. When an organisation is producing its value in monopoly without competition or increased demands, it tends to get fat. Everyone wants to do meaningful work, functions and roles do get narrower by time, nobody wants to give up legacy tasks, and new jobs require additional personnel. Typical public-sector organisation builds up extra controls and excessive bureaucracy. A lot more administration is needed to avoid mistakes, to utilise public funding according to paragraphs and to do things right but not necessarily right things.

Public sector organisations should improve their cost-efficiency about 5-7% annually to be able to compensate increasing expenses and fixed budgets. Organisations in open markets, or otherwise in a competitive environment, should continuously improve their cost-efficiency and be ready to make disruptive changes as needed to have annual 10% return on investment.

“Go on – I am supporting! (And having a smoke behind this boulder).”³

When an organisation is utilising relations with other organisations for adding value, a change in one part of the value chain will project need of a move to other parts. Even other entities within the same space of operation may have to change because one intertwined stakeholder amongst them is changing. The fluent interaction between organisations requires trust in all relations. A change must take care the confidence of relations, the value of one´s brand and be aware, that adversaries are not able to utilise capability caps opening during disruptive changes. 

Armed Forces usually operates in the following field of interrelations:

1. Defence is a projection of the state´s values and culture
2. Defence is always in relation to adversaries’ military force and willingness to utilise it
3. Defence is always in conjunction with states politics, structure, economy and operation network.

A need for change may appear from all these directions, and a change coming from one direction may affect the other relations as well. A Change of Military Organisation must maintain a balance between these directions of interaction. Otherwise, Military may be regarded as alien, not fulfilling its duty or as unnecessary cost.

“Let´s change organization to gain savings!”⁴

The organisational structure is a tool to arrange tasks and assets so that results may be produced with optimal cost-efficiency. A change should start from assets, tasks or results and then the new production is organised with optimised way taking into consideration the space of operation, interfaces with other stakeholders and intentions of the adversary. A form of organisation and basis of procedures do affect how people feel the change.

Matrix organisation, driven either by process or project, is easy to rearrange when assets, tasks, results or environment are changing. When specialised teams in a matrix remain almost untouched, goals and interrelations may be altered quickly. Higher the matrix maturity, faster the change of organisation.

Functional line-staff -organisation faces challenges in changing its rigid power structure, siloed functions, and non-existent inter-relations. In the worst case, one may only enlarge existing functional organisation or cut off its main parts. Iterative improvement is often blocked by almost autonomous administrative functions, which have seceded from core operations a long time ago. Rigid administrative processes may eat over half of productive time and create a mass of culture in which change is the most challenging.

Different units within same force may not be equally prepared for change. Some of the units may be in a state of “paralysis,” where all energy is spent in defending achieved status. Some may be in a state of “boiling” when the unit has lots of energy to change, but there is no unanimity of direction or method of change. Some units are in a state of “friction,” where vision and mission are clear, but natural energy or courage is lacking because of previous bad experiences. Best among the units are in a state of “mission command,” where the unit is prepared to change, and personnel is willing to accomplish as soon as the new mission is communicated.

“Could you find this document? Yes, Where it may be? Most probably in Archives of War Museum!”⁵

The organisation consists, besides people, material, and facilities, also immaterial assets of production. These assets include documents, contracts, royalties, brands, traditions, and trust. If the organisation is focusing mainly on changing of structure, it will lose the organisational memory, when documents are sent to Archives and trusted relations between people, when people are being rotated to new tasks. Also, information and understanding are valued assets, in some cases even multipliers to other assets. Thus they must be managed throughout the change.

“Everything will be better after the change!”⁶

When the change is almost over, quick-wins have been achieved; the new organisation is manned, new tools are available, leaders of change are being rotated, then people began drifting back to old habits, to old interactions, to old familiar culture. The change has not been cemented into competency and roles of people, procedures of organisation or culture of cooperation. End state must be bind to every level of structure and interfaces between units. The best method to stick change is to introduce new metrics, that will reward continuously new behaviour and makes it meaningful even to improve it. Control of change must extend beyond first sight of chance. Existing personnel should continue to be trained and certified to a new way of working; recruitment should support new procedures and skills, bases of old culture (key advocates, triggers of old habits) are recognised and removed. Leaders must walk persistently amongst subordinates to promote new methods and listen to people’s fears and other feelings. Social pressure must keep last opponents at bay and on track of change. Achieved peers should be brought amongst troops to tell stories of success with a new concept.

Narratives of change

Because our post-modern society still learns from stories, there is the following story of three little Organisations and their big Change.

Once upon a time in the far far land, three little Organisations were living in their big house in peace and complacency. Surely there were times of tightness, but on average, everything was going smoothly. Then one day the Patron of three little Organisations said that from now on, there is not going to be an annual increase in their allowance, but the same amount must suffice for next five years. Life went on with three little Organisations although their big house got more crowded every year because every member sub-optimised their work and many good members were recruited. The something happened in surrounding environment. Everybody wanted more, prices increased, the weather was colder, firewood was scarce, and aliens invaded parts of their house. After tedious complaints and pleads, the Patron of three little Organisations consented a temporary rise to their allowance but required all three to change each to the smaller house within next three years. Each little Organisation made grand plans for change utilising their sharpest members and most expensive consultants. However, no implementation was accomplished, when their Patron came to them one day and declared change to commence. However, there were all preparations to be done, members to be gathered, change the route to be reconnoitre and transportation to be ordered. The Patron was adamant and on top of all said that their allowance is to decrease within next four years of total 10% and after changing their compensation would be 10% smaller annually than today. The three little Organisations were paralysed with fear. The patron gave them three routes to be used for their change to a new house: 

1. short route through plains, but very very windy. 
2. direct route, but many floating rivers on the way. 
3. long, dark and winding but without wind or rain.

The Change of Organisation

The First of the three little Organisations established a bright project crew to plan very precisely how all members of little Organisation should walk along short but windy road to the new house. Every member had time to start the journey and timetable to proceed by milestone and to reach the goal. Along the route, The First Little Organisation arranged guards to control change and keep everybody strictly on planned time. It happened that just in time members of the First Little Organisation marched in line over the starting point, run over the windy road to first control and the second, until they reached the new house. The wind was strong and some members weak, so they were blown off and lost. However, the change was executed precisely according to plan as it was measured with precision. The First Little Organisation settled in their new tiny house, which felt already quite tight. Members returned to their old routines and tried to substitute those who were lost on the way. Then came the day than Patron cut the allowance by 10%. There was not money enough for firewood, so the First Little Organisation ripped his new house of all burning ingredients gradually. One day it happened that big bad Adversary walked by the house, noticed ripped building and the Little Organisation within. Big bad Adversary blew the house down, and the First Little Organisation runs away.

The Change Organisation

The Second Little Organisation took the mission with diligence. A coalition of change was created along the advice by Kotter. Managers and leaders walked amongst members to explain the mission ahead. Nevertheless, members were not willing to change. They were better as is, the new place was told to be in dangerous condition, and furthermore, there is the rainy season, so they should wait for more information and better time to change. The Second Little Organisation was desperate. The patron did not yield up but threatened to lower the allowance even more. This made the Second Little Organisation angry. The change will be executed even it kills him. The Second Little Organisation organised change programs, change portfolios, change projects and change sub-projects in best practice way. Planning and plans filled the house, but members were informed only of decisions. Even the old Neighbours were invited to help in planning, but members were told to keep on living old way. There was nothing to worry because management will take care of things and tell members at the due time what is expected from them during the change. 

Because almost all time was spent in planning, there was not much time left for an actual change. With help from old Neighbours, the Second Little Organisation rotated leaders, left behind fattest or most reluctant members and started to march. Many were the obstacles on the way, a number of members were swept from the road by floats and even more turned back because of frustration and fear. Finally, the Second Little Organisation reached the new house, and a celebration was arranged. The New house was tiny, but since Organisation was smaller, everyone had room inside. It just happened that old “Doorkeepers” were not able to survive the change so nobody did know, how to close the new door and new neighbours were too busy to help. One day the Big bad Adversary happened to arrive in the area, noticed a tiny house with an open door and the Second Little Organisation inside. The Big bad Adversary blew the house down, and the Second Little Organisation runs away.

The Change

The Third Little Organisation did analyse the route, hardships on the way, size and position of the new house. The route was long and dark. The new house was tiny and allowance 10% smaller. The mission seemed unachievable. Reconnoitre patrol was sent to collect the experience of the route and new premises, members were categorised to those needed, those strong, those weak and those not needed. Patrol returned with some new neighbours. After analysing information, talking with new neighbours and planning with all members, The Third Little Organisation decided how to accomplish the change. The strong and fit members could start march as soon as possible. Those not needed but strong should also begin their journey, but with new neighbours, who promised to take them in their houses. Those needed but unfit started training to gain strength and lose weight. Both first units made the journey to a new village and began to create relations, learn new ways and settled into the new house. This was celebrated in both ends, and those remained in training got new motivation. Gradually, the Third Little Organisation sends units on the way as they become fit for the journey and the new tiny house. Finally, only those not needed and those unable to get fit remained in the old house. These members little Organisation left with his old neighbours supplied with gold coins. 

Finally, the Third Little Organisation was in a tiny new house surrounded by good new neighbours.  All members were busy doing new tasks, and they appear trained and united with their new neighbours. Even when Patron did cut down allowance, third little Organisation was able to loan some money to new neighbours for their house repairs. One day, the big bad Adversary happened to arrive in the area. Third Little Organisation noticed it, called neighbours to join and chased the big bad Adversary away. 

Main sources for this paper were:

John P. Kotter & Dan S. Cohen: The Heart of Change. Harvard Business School Press 2002

Pauli Juuti & Petri Virtanen: Organisaatiomuutos. Otava 2009 (only in Finnish)

Peter F. Drucker: Management Challenges for 21^st Century. 1999

This is a translation (19.06.2013) of the paper Juha Mattila prepared late 2011.

Remarks:

1 Detached from the movie: Unknown Soldier – Tuntematon sotilas by Edwin Laine

2 Heard from many functional experts that are shy to start behaving differently.

3 Heard and seen in infantry assault exercise

4 Primary goal and object of change in last three major changes of Finnish Defence Forces

5 Heard in aisles of one new organization after a change with non-existent immaterial management

6 Often heard in the talks of change managers, who have not succeed to create real change narratives

National security, cyber espionage and privacy

Current situation in the cyber space

There is more malevolent behaviour in the cyber space, we call Internet, than ever before:

• During so called Arab spring national telecommunications authorities did disconnect their citizens many times from international Internet and telecommunications services
• Kapersky Lab indicated 2012 that Russian systems are being attacked with “Red October” virus. President Putin ordered 15^th of January 2013 FSB to create a system that finds, prevents and destroys effects of cyber attacks directed towards Russian Federation.
• Internet service providers have just seen most the powerful distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack ordered by unorthodox service provider¹
• Mandiant report is claiming that China is very actively probing western networks and servers.²
• U.S. has started an information operation to have China to be labelled as most malevolent country in Internet
• U.S homeland is arguing over National Security Agency having access to citizens private information in Internet and major service providers customer information.³
• U.S. President has ordered to utilize existing and new cyber capabilities for Offensive Cyber Effects Operation (OCEO) in order to: “advance U.S. National objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely damaging”.⁴
• Check Point Software is reporting that 71 % of the malevolent sofware is coming from USA, 58% of botnet commands are coming from USA and most vulnerable products are coming from Apple, Microsoft and Mozilla.

Some media sources even say that these symptoms are a beginning of next confrontation like cold war between U.S.A and Soviet Union, but this time conflict is in the Internet⁵. Some organizations like Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) are telling that the freedom and private information of a citizen is in danger.⁶

Nothing new under the sun, but technology has been evolving

National security authorities have been spying their citizens while trying to identify foreign and domestic counter forces and criminals. Before Information and Telecommunications Technology break through, authorities in several countries were screening letters, censoring newspapers, restricting broadcasting licences and forbid public gatherings. Public opinion, information on events and images of events have been always targets of manipulation for both adversary and own authorities. Information is both an asset and vulnerability of national defence. When targeted information is stored or transmitted in analog or digital means, military espionage is called Signals Intelligence, SIGINT or Open Source Intelligence, OSINT, if executed by searching published information.

In USSR telephone network was being monitored constantly starting from Stalin´s era and academics were developing speech recognition applications to be able to identify speakers from distorted telephone discussions. ECHELON system was developed by USA first to monitor Soviet block countries telephone communications. With UKUSA agreement USA and UK authorities were able to bypass their existing legislation and spy each others citizens and trade information captured from calls. After “Cold War” era ECHELON was directed to monitor other communications, telefax and data connections. The system intercepted both satellite and land line communications. After the system was extended to Australia, New Zealand and Canada, it covered global communications hubs and was able to screen both civilian, governmental and military information that was transmitted without sufficient encryption.

As the volume of information increased, manual screening and content detection was replaced with automated information systems. Telefax, SMS and SMTP traffic specially was easy to tap with computers, categorised with key words and their combinations and further analysed using statistic tools. ECHELON and similar systems were improved with sophisticated technologies like datamining, speech recognition, business intelligence and automated translation. It is said that ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and then shiphoning out valuables using artificial intelligence aids to find key words.⁷ One of the most famous COTS products for this is MEMEX based Fusion Center IT provided by SAS. According to SAS it:

• provides a single platform that eliminates double-entry,
• provides a workflow from intake through vetting all the way to publishing intelligence products, while providing advanced search across all data sources.
• creates easy summary statistics on “requests for service” and other work
• is an end-to-end solution covering the entire intelligence lifecycle – from information collection to review, evaluation, development analysis and sharing
• is recognized for its pioneering, advanced search capabilities.
• has the strength of SAS predictive data analytics. ⁸

National Security Agency of USA (NSA) has created surveillance, capture and analyse system called PRISM. It is allegedly tapping directly on major US service operators (Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL and Apple) information on users and their service utilization. This information is more than metadata including for example email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, VOIP-calls, chats, file transfers and social networking details. Number of obtained communications is said to be increased in 2012 by 248% for Skype, 131% increase in requests for Facebook data and 63% for Google.⁹

This amount of information requires professional capacity and algorithms to process data. NSA is said to have BOUNDLESS INFORMANT -intelligence system¹⁰ that is utilizing high volume storages and “big data technology to query in the cloud to produce near real-time business intelligence”. System allegedly¹¹ can:

• collect almost 3 billion pieces of intelligence from US computer networks over a 30-day period
• collect 97 billion pieces of intelligence from computer networks worldwide
• answers to questions like:
• How many records are collected for an organizational unit or country?
• Are there any visible trends?
• What assets collect against a specific country? What type of collection?
• What is the field of view for a specific site? What type of collection?

These presented questions are not telling much of the systems real capabilities since they are more oriented on management of analysing process than actual intelligence questions, but even with 2-dimensional datamodel and fast processor one can fuse data very quickly. The problem is that this kind of automation can only answer questions of relations that programmers have been able to code into system.

Better level of analyse is easily achieved by utilizing modern business intelligence tools like IBM´s GOGNOS¹², which can analyse a structured datawarehouse or unstructured data with good metadata providing:

• Answers to business questions fast with guided report analysis, dashboards and navigable reports.
• Ability to track business developments.
• Reorganizing, reshaping and recalculating data enabling to identify the optimal solutions to business problems.
• Uncovering patterns in business and apply algorithms to business intelligence data to predict outcomes.

Virtual database and easy structuring of information is giving everyone ability to create understanding from large quantities of data without long programming or super computers.

3^rd generation web-technology is providing even more effective tools for intelligence. Semantic web allows to retrieve information from web and other systems overriding current problems of system and data model boundaries. Semantic structuring of data¹³ is giving authorities ability to create knowledge models for special needs and depict new relations and trends from existing public and private information. Semantic web, resource description framework (RDF) and advanced ontologies are being utilized today in retail business and intelligence agencies globally. All information, structured or unstructured, from Internet or Intranets, public or private sectors, content or communications header data may be categorised, attached with metadata and fused with different knowledge models to answer questions like:

• What has been subjects social network past 10 years and nature of each contact?
• What is current the cyber threat level of our state and what is the forecast for next weeks? Which groups are most hostile in their wording?
• When society is reaching a degree of unrest that uprising of crowd is to be happening?
• What is the possibility that subject will in future be manipulated to act against ones current society?

How national security is utilizing public and system information in cyber space

Screening citizens and their information has been normal task for national security authorities. The legislation of each nation is defining different procedures to be able to focus surveillance to a certain individual or society. Normally in Europe and U.S. there is first need to have a court order (i.e. proof of illegal activities is strong) and then communications operators are obliqued to give metadata of communications to authorities. This may be extended to recording actual content of communications.

In USA president Bush signed a U.S. Surveillance law in the aftermath of 911 event. That law allows NSA to target any customers of participating firms, who live outside the US, those Americans ,whose communications include people outside the US and it opens also a possibility to collect communications made entirely within the US. As it seems to be, NSA and US general attorney have been guided to collect information, when there is a reasonable suspicion that one of the parties was outside the country at the time of recording.

Sweden approved 2009 the law that Armed Foces signal intelligence (SIGINT) unit, Försvarets Radioanstalt (FRA), is authorised to monitor real-time all voice and data transmissions going over Swedish borders without any special orders by court. So all tele- and datacommunications coming, leaving or going through Swedish borders is being monitored.¹⁴

Russian part of Internet, Runet, has 70 million active Internet users – Internet use penetration is 57% in Russia. Social media has especially won clients from government controlled broadcasting companies. Thus Duma, Russian Parliament passed a law 2011, that established a single registry of domain names, sites and web pages that contain objectionable material. The Federal Service for the Protection of Consumers` Rights and Human Welfare, the Federal Drug control Service and the Federal Surveillance Service for Mass Media and Communications were empowered to blacklist sites without a court order.¹⁵

Russian SIGINT agency, FAPSI was established 1993 around parts of former KGB body. FAPSI is responsible for communications security and signals intelligence. FAPSI operates under the 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence and collects information pertaining to "political, economic, military, science and technology through use of electronic means." FAPSI has both the authority and capability to penetrate all government and private information services in Russia. It also has reportedly been successful in collecting intelligence on foreign business ventures, including confidential bank transactions. According to FAPSI General Director Colonel General Aleksandr Starovoytov, FAPSI is very valuable intelligence source:

"We are engaged in global electronic intelligence ... The main feature distinguishing our reports from those that come via the covert agent network of other special services is that ours is documented. We have access to a vast number of sources. We have a round-the-clock flow of decoded information which can produce fundamentally diverse viewpoints. "

With 500 million Internet users China is biggest network domain, greatest market with over CNY 900 Billion annual revenue and hosting worlds largest online community QQ with 583 million active accounts. China Telecom was the first Internet Service Provider and still has a monopoly of “local loop provider”. First legislation authorizing monitoring and filtering Internet was established on 2000. China build up the “Great Fire Wall” around 2009 to filter out overseas Internet services and monitor all datatransmission over Chinese borders. The Government is able to monitor websites, e-mail and keywords. Certain search words are blocked, e-mail with banned words is trashed and certain websites are blocked (for example western social media sites). Besides filtering action Chinese government is applying tens of thousands agents, who are patrolling on the Chinese Internet network. They scan communications and websites and order illegal sites to be shut down. They raid Internet cafes, monitor identified dissidents and infiltrate suspected activist groups.¹⁶

States belonging to European Union have signed human rights agreement and its 8 chapter allows individual privacy to be lowered in protecting national security only if policy is stated in national legislation, it is public and process is well defined. European Parliament has recommended that every member state should establish a parliamentary board to supervise its national intelligence agencies. On the other hand European Parliament is recognizing, that SIGNÌNT is being executed globally beyond any national legislation or control and thus recommending corporates and individuals to encrypt all important and sensitive information transmitted through telecommunications or Internet.¹⁷

Google reports that government requests for user data has risen 70 % since 2009. During 2012 most frequent requesters have been USA, India, France and Brazil. In USA about 68% of requests were under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act since they don´t typically involve judges.¹⁸

What does this mean to privacy

There is no global integrity for privacy of individuals or corporates within Internet or telecommunications services. Therefore everyone should understand that sending e-mail to known receiver, chatting with your friend or speaking on phone with definite individual is as public as sending same content on postcard with international postal service or post it into one´s blog.

Every search from web is being stored by search engine operator in order to be able to focus advertisements better to meet your needs. Every page you visit in Internet is being identified (at least country of origin, type of browser and operating system) and recorded by advertising or statistics operators. Every tweet, like or status update you make in social media is being stored in your profile. Your friends, ex-friends, relatives, total strangers, employers, sport clubs, church and community publish information related to you and your closest into Web. You don´t even have right to that material, since it is the property of some stranger, who had Google glasses and took photos of you in an awkward situation.

Today, this information is being utilized by SIGINT authorities, retail chains, news agencies, advertising companies and communities. They are able to use your basic information like name, age, hobby, address, telephone number, property or partnerships in companies and fuse these with all other data mined from Internet to create a personal profile. With this profile they are able to foretell things you may buy, deeds that you may fall into, day you may die in heart attack or just to fulfil the curiousness of some of their employees.

This information gathering is not only online in Internet, but is happening in real world and public places. A good example of this was Boston Marathon 2013 incident and authorities ability to scan through vast quantity of video material and to identify possible suspects within a couple of days.

References:

1 Prolexic Quarterly Global DDoS attack report, Q1 2013

2 Mandiant APT1: Exposing one of China´s Cyber Espionage Units

3 Guardian 8.6.2013: Barack Obama and Xi Jinping meet as cyber-scandals swirl http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/obama-xi-jinping-meet-cyberscandals

4 guardian.co.uk, Friday 7 June 2013 20.07: Obama tells intelligence chiefs to draw up cyber target list – full document text. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/07/obama-cyber-directive-full-text

5 Russia Today 25.2.2013: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxHUM-vPvHs

6 EFF: NSA spying on Americans. https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying

7 A non-authorized source: http://whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/ECHELON/echelon.html

8 SAS MEMEX home page, http://www.memex.com/industry/fusion-center

9 Guardian Friday 7 June 2013: NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others by Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data

10 Guardian Saturday 8 June 2013: Boundless Informant NSA data-mining tool – four key slides. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-data-mining-slides

11 Guardian Sunday 9 June 2013: Boundless Informant: the NSA´s secret tool to track global surveillance data. By Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining

12 IBM home page, GOGNOS sotfware. http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/cognos/solutions.html

13 Semantic Web home pages: http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Main_Page

14 FRA home page: http://www.fra.se/

15 Potomac Institute for Policy Studies: Squeezing internet freedom in the name of safety. 2012

16 Robin Garabedian: Internet in China: The Great Digital Wall 2010. http://www.slideshare.net/Robin.G/internet-in-china-the-great-digital-wall

17 European Parliament report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications 11 July 2001. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+XML+V0//en

18 Google Transparency Report. http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/?hl=en_US