Taistelujärjestelmän spiraalikehittäminen ja ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ylläpito mahdollistavat strategisen edun ja turvaavat taktisen ketteryyden

Taistelujärjestelmän spiraalikehittäminen ja ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ylläpito mahdollistavat strategisen edun ja turvaavat taktisen ketteryyden

KTM Harri Haavikko kehittää viestiaselajin toimintatapoja Maavoimien Esikunnassa

Eversti (evp) Juha Mattila toimii konsulttina yksityisellä sektorilla

Tässä kahden artikkelin sarjassa kirjoittajat käsittelevät taistelujärjestelmän kehittymistä yhdessä tekniikan ja taktiikan kanssa. Ensimmäisessä osassa kuvataan 5.sukupolven taistelujärjestelmän kompleksisuuden edellyttämää rakentamistavan muutosta ja toisessa osassa kuvataan 5.sukupolven ohjelmoitavaan elektroniikkaan perustuvan suorituskyvyn ylläpitotoiminnan muutosta.

OSA I: Ohjelmoitavaan elektroniikkaan perustuvan taistelujärjestelmän kokonaissuorituskyvyn kehittäminen

Taisteluosaston suorituskyvyn osatekijät (taisteluvälineet, ajoneuvot, sotilaat, materiaali, tukivälineet, tieto, johtajat, kokemus ja suunnitelmat) muodostavat yhteentoimivan taistelujärjestelmän, jonka komentajan tahto, johtajien aloitteellinen toiminta sekä esimerkki ja johtamisjärjestelmän tarjoamat tiedot pitävät tavoitteellisessa toiminnassa. Taistelujärjestelmän osana ohjelmoitava elektroniikka mahdollistaa uudistetun taistelun, joukko- ja välineresurssien joustavan hyödyntämisen sekä yhteensovittamisen muuttuvien suorituskykykerrosten (DOTMLPFII = doktriini, organisaatio ja toimintamallit, harjoittelu, materiaali, henkilöstö, johtaminen ja koulutus, tilat, informaatio ja yhteensopivuus) kesken.

Taistelujärjestelmän kompleksisuuden lyhyt historia ja kehittymisnäkymä

Kuvassa 1 esitetään karkeasti taistelujärjestelmän kompleksisuuden lisääntyminen sekä taistelutaktiikan ja elinjakson ylläpidon muutos.

Kuva 1: Esimerkki taistelujärjestelmän rakenteen muuttumisesta teknologian kehittyessä

1200 -luvun mongoliarmeijassa ratsukko muodosti yksittäisen asejärjestelmän, jossa hevonen tarjosi vastustajaa paremman liikkuvuuden, jousi pidemmän ulottuvuuden tulelle ja ihminen sensorin sekä kyvyn toimia osana suurempaa kokonaisuutta. Teollisen yhteiskunnan taistelujärjestelmien 1. sukupolvessa ryhmä muodosti aseen kanssa järjestelmän, kuten raskas konekivääriryhmä I MS:ssa. Aseet valmistettiin teollisesti massatuotantona ja ihmiset koulutettiin taisteluteknisesti käyttämään aseita ryhmänä.

2. sukupolvessa ase liitettiin lavettiin, jossa voitiin tehostaa toimintaa. Lavetti paransi järjestelmän liikettä, patruunatäydennystä ja tähtäystä koneistamalla osan manuaalisista tehtävistä. Panssarivaunun toimitti ensin yksi tehdas, mutta standardoinnin kehittyessä alihankkijat kykenivät valmistamaan vaunun osajärjestelmiä tai komponentteja.

Järjestelmälavetit liitettiin 3. sukupolvessa toisiinsa ihmisten ja viestijärjestelmien avulla, jolloin lavettijärjestelmät saivat tietoa toistensa tekemisistä. 1930-luvulla saksalaiset Guderianin vision mukaisesti yhdistivät panssarivaunut ja syöksypommittajat toisiinsa radioilla, jolloin laveteista muodostui suurempia järjestelmäkokonaisuuksia (yhtymiä ja panssariarmeijoita).

4. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmissä aselavettiin liitettiin myös sensoreita, jotka kytkettiin ammunnanhallintaan ja sitä kautta aseen toimintaan. Suuret aseteollisuusyritykset tai konsortiot kykenevät toimittamaan monimutkaisia integroituja asejärjestelmiä, jotka ovat pääosin automatisoituja ihmisen ollessa mukana tulitusprosessissa vain ratkaisevalla hetkellä.

5.sukupolven taistelujärjestelmässä usean eri valmistajan aselavetit, sensorijärjestelmät, huolto- ja tukijärjestelmät sekä sotilaat, ajoneuvot, johtajat ja heidän suunnitelmansa liitetään toisiinsa siten, että yhteinen operatiivinen sekä taktinen havainnointi, suunnittelu ja vaikuttaminen toimivat nopeammin ja joustavammin. Koneet ja ihmiset keskustelevat keskenään täydentäen informaatiota ymmärrykseksi ja käyttäen sitä edun saamiseksi vastustajasta. Tätä kutsutaan integroiduksi järjestelmien järjestelmäksi tai koneiden ja ihmisten verkoksi.

Tällaisen taistelujärjestelmän - uudistetun taistelun - rakentamiselle ja ylläpidolle on kaksi päävaihtoehtoa:

1. Yksi valmistaja rakentaa sensorit, johtamisjärjestelmän ja ammunnanhallinnan kaikkien asekomponenttien käyttöön.

2. Johtamisjärjestelmä rakennetaan ymmärtämään kaikkien valmistajien kieltä ja kaikki alijärjestelmät integroidaan johtamisjärjestelmään.

Miten Suomi voi rakentaa strategisen edun suurten massojen ja kalliin puolustusteknologian keskellä?

Suomessa rakenteilla olevaa 5. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmän suorituskykyä ei voi ostaa puolustusteollisuuden hyllystä eikä sitä voi rakentaa kerralla kuntoon. Taistelujärjestelmä käyttää olemassa olevia komponentteja (aseita, sensoreita, tietoja, osaamista), ottaa käyttöön uusia sotilas-, viranomais- että siviilikomponentteja, sopeutuu olemassa oleviin ja uusiin alijärjestelmiin ja on taisteluteknisellä tasolla koulutettavissa asevelvollisille. Johtamisjärjestelmä kyetään uudelleen opettamaan operaation aikana vuorokausissa ja järjestelmäsuorituskykyjen osalta elinkaarensa aikana puolivuosittain. 5. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmälle on luonteenomaista dynaaminen, verkostomainen toimintatapa ja jaettu ontologia sekä tiedon käyttö järjestelmävaikutuksen moninkertaistajana.

Kuvattua taistelujärjestelmää ei voida jäädyttää edellisten taistelujärjestelmäsukupolvien tapaan. Pelkkä olevan suorituskyvyn ylläpitäminen edellyttää muutosten tekemistä ohjelmistojen ja elektroniikkamateriaalien osalta. Uudistettu taistelujärjestelmä on kiinteä osa tukiverkoston muita järjestelmiä, joiden muutoksia ja kehitystä ei voida Maavoimien tahdolla ohjata. Toimivan järjestelmän ylläpitämiseksi ja tavoiteltavien suorituskykyjen saavuttamiseksi on Maavoimissa muututtava teollisen maailman mukana. Toisaalta Maavoimien organisaatiossa taistelujärjestelmän suorituskykyjen kehittäminen ja ylläpitäminen limittyvät matriisissa toisiinsa kaikissa järjestelmäarkkitehtuurin osa-alueissa (DOTMLPFII). Näiden ulkoisten ja sisäisten muutosten koordinointi hallitusti mahdollistaa 5. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmän kehittämisen ja ylläpitämisen.

Koordinointi mahdollistetaan yhtenäistämällä kehityksen ja ylläpidon prosessit siten, että kehitysohjelma käyttää olemassa olevaa taistelu- sekä ylläpitojärjestelmää. Prosesseja ohjataan suorituskyvyn käyttäjän tarpeiden mukaan yhdessä muiden yhteisvaikutteisten suorituskykyjen kanssa. Prosessi sisältää kaikki taistelujärjestelmän osien kehittämisen ja ylläpidon. Prosessi pienentää kerralla tehtäviä muutoksia, tiivistää muutosten toteuttamisen tahtia, mutta parantaa yhteentoimivuutta ja poistaa vikoja. Toimintamalli, organisaatiot ja prosessit toimivat lähes identtisesti normaali- ja poikkeusoloissa. Kehittämistä, joka toteutetaan limittäisillä pienillä askelilla kehityksestä kentälle ottaen opiksi joka askelella, kutsutaan spiraalikehittämiseksi.

Kuva 2: Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan tuotannon, ylläpidon ja kehittämisen dynaaminen malli

Kuvassa 2 on esitetty taistelujärjestelmän tuotannon, ylläpidon ja kehittämisen yhteenliittyminen niin, että samoilla prosesseilla kyetään optimoimaan tuotantokäytön käytettävyys, käytöstä tulevan palautteen mukainen kehitys sekä strategisten kehitystavoitteiden mukainen muutoksen hallinta.

Taistelujärjestelmästä rakennetaan kolme kehityksessä ja ylläpidossa tarvittavaa kokonaisuutta:

1.  Kentällä ja koulutuskäytössä oleva tuotantoversio.
2. Kenttätesteissä käytettävä prototyyppiversio, jota käytetään pilottijoukossa ja koordinoidaan kaikki DOTMLPFII -alueiden muutokset.
3. Järjestelmätesteissä ja ylläpidossa käytettävä referenssiversio, jota ylläpitävät Materiaalilaitos, kehitys- ja kunnossapito toimittajat sekä aselajikoulut.

Strateginen etu saavutetaan taistelujärjestelmän kehityksen ja ylläpidon toimintaprosessien hallinnalla, jossa ylläpitojärjestelmä luo perustan myös kehitykselle. Prosessien hallinta mahdollistaa ulkoisen maailman muutoksista ja sisäisestä kehityksestä aiheutuvien riskien ennakoimisen. Kehityksen notkeus ja ylläpidon tiheys luovat perustan ylivertaiselle taistelujärjestelmän kyvykkyydelle. Ohjelmoitavuuteen pohjautuva suorituskyky kykenee oppimaan lähes samassa tahdissa kuin ihminenkin, jolloin rauhanaikainen kokemusten soveltaminen voi jatkua myös poikkeusoloissa.

Miten spiraalikehityksen periaatetta on sovellettu tähän asti?

Uudistettavan maapuolustuksen ytimessä taisteluosaston taistelujärjestelmää kehitetään pienin askelin varmistaen koordinoidut muutokset tarvittavilla DOTMLPFII -alueilla, jotta suorituskyky on ylläpidettävissä, koulutettavissa ja muutettavissa myös tulevaisuudessa. Kuvassa 3 esitetään esimerkki siitä, miten maavoimien taistelujohtojärjestelmää on kehitetty osana taisteluosaston taistelujärjestelmää spiraalikehittämisen avulla edeten tutusta tuntemattomaan ja testien avulla oppien.

Kuva 3: Spiraalikehittämisen askelia maavoimissa vuosina 2009–2013 4. sukupolven (M05) 5. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmään (M18)

Muutoksen edellytys on henkilöstön osaamisen kehittäminen, organisaation toimintatapojen muutoksen jalkauttaminen sekä uuden suorituskyvyn käytettävyyden takaaminen ylläpito- ja tukirakenteella. Seuraavassa julkaisussa tarkastellaan syvemmin ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ylläpito- ja tukijärjestelmän toimintaa.

OSA II: Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikkaan perustuvan taistelujärjestelmän suorituskykyjen jatkuva kehittäminen, elinkaarihallinta ja ylläpito

Tässä artikkelisarjan toisessa osassa kirjoittajat käsittelevät 5. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmän ohjelmoitavaan elektroniikkaan perustuvan suorituskyvyn kunnossapitotoiminnan muutosta.

Miksi ylläpidosta tarvitsee puhua erikseen ohjelmoitavien suorituskykyjen kohdalla?

Ohjelmoitavaan elektroniikkaan perustuvien suorituskykyjen tukiorganisaatioiden ja käyttäjien näkökulmasta kehitys ja ylläpito näkyvät samana ilmiönä. Ylläpidon prosessit ja toimenpiteet on määritetty vakiomuotoisiksi ja ne tukevat niin kehityksen kuin tuotannon tarpeita. Kehityksen ja ylläpidon välinen ero ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan kohdalla on haastavaa havaita, ja on puhtaudessaan byrokraattisen hallinnon tuotetta. Konkreettisimmillaan kahtiajako näkyy, kun kehityksestä ovat vastanneet hankkeet ja ylläpidosta huollon toimijat tukenaan strategiset kumppanit. Heikoimmillaan näiden kahden toimijan intressit eivät ole kohdanneet ja kentälle tulevat tuotteet ovat olleet kauhu sekä ylläpidolle että käytölle. Ylläpidon ja kehityksen tulee henkilö-, prosessi- ja organisaatiotasolla limittyä, jotta suorituskyvyn kunkin hetkinen käytettävyys, toiminnan edellyttämä parantaminen ja strategian haluama kehitys voidaan optimoida.

Vanhat organisaatiokäytännöt ohjaavat kehityshankkeet toimimaan vesiputousmallin tapaisesti. Tämä on ollut aiempien kehityshankkeiden riskinhallinnan kannalta usein helpoin tapa saavuttaa osaoptimoidut vaatimukset. Haasteena on eriytyminen olevasta tuotantojärjestelmästä ja DOTMLPFII -kokonaisuudesta, joka on edellytys 5. taistelujärjestelmäsukupolven kehitykselle ja tuotannolle. Hankkeiden tuotteita on otettu tuotantokäyttöön ja ylläpitoon kentällä ilman hankkeiden tai projektien varsinaista panosta ylläpidon suunnitteluun, vaikka vastuu asian suunnittelemiseksi ja toteuttamiseksi on määritetty.

Kehitys ja ylläpito ovat kohdanneet kentällä, jolloin hankkeen rakentama ylläpito ja poikkeusoloihin tarkoitettu ylläpito eivät ole sopineet yhteen. Toimintamallina ylläpidon tuottamisessa on perinteisesti pidetty varaosien ja huoltotarpeiston hankkimista suorituskykyjen koko elinkaaren ajalle. Periaate on ollut 3. taistelujärjestelmäsukupolven kohdalla toimiva, mutta esimerkiksi 4. sukupolven immateriaalisia omaisuuseriä ei voida hankkia varastoon ja ne menettävät suorituskykyään ajan kuluessa. Uudistettu taistelu ja sen mukana tuleva 5. sukupolven taistelujärjestelmä pakottaa korjaamaan tilanteen. Kehityksen ja ylläpidon tulee toimia yhdessä ja ne ovat jatkuvia prosesseja. Projektijohtoinen suorituskykyjen rakentaminen voidaan kyseenalaistaa ja rakentaa linjaorganisaatioon kyky kehittää suorituskykyä jatkuvalla tahdilla säilyttäen etu mahdollisiin vastustajiin nähden.

Sovellukset ja muut ohjelmat ovat ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan tuoretuotteita. Ohjelmistomuutoksilla toteutetaan teknisten järjestelmien syvimmät suorituskykymuutokset. Ohjelmistomuutokset aiheuttavat kerrannaisvaikutuksia sekä alempiin että ylempiin järjestelmäkerroksiin. Osaamisen muutosten kerrannaisvaikutuksena voi olla että ylläpidon kustannukset nousevat liian korkeiksi. Ilmiötä voidaan havainnollistaa taulukon 1 vertailulla.

Rakenne- ja ylläpitovertailua	Rynnäkkökivääri, 762 RK	Taistelujohtojärjestelmä, TSTJJ
Käyttäjä	Asevelvollinen, joka ei pääsääntöisesti ole harrastanut ammuntaa	Asevelvollinen, joka pääsääntöisesti on käyttänyt sovelluksia
Käyttötapa	Taistelutekniikka	Taktiikka
Suorituskyvyn perusta	Teollisesti valmistettu ase 20-30 vuotta	Koodattu ohjelmisto 15-30 vuotta
Kuluvat osat	Piippu ja patruunat ammuttaessa	Päätelaitteet ja oheisohjelmat 2-5 vuodessa
Ylläpito	Standardit varaosat, jotka säilyvät varastossa	Ohjelmistopäivitykset, joita julkaistaan päivittäin, kuukausittain ja neljännesvuosittain

Taulukko 1: Esimerkkivertailu 2. ja 5.sukupolven järjestelmien kesken

Ohjelmoitavien suorituskykyjen kustannukset muodostuvat kolmesta tekijästä. Ensimmäinen on ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan materiaaliset ja immateriaaliset tarpeet. Toisena on ylläpitojärjestelmä eli ylläpito-organisaatio, järjestelmät ja verkostotuki. Kolmas kustannuskomponentti on eri alijärjestelmien suorituskykyjen yhteensovittamisesta syntyvät kustannuserät. Nykyisin on olemassa myös neljäs kustannustekijä, joka johtuu organisaation siilomaisesta toiminnasta. Suorituskykyjä hankitaan aselajikohtaisesti ilman teknistä yhteensovittamista, muiden DOTMLPFII -osatekijöiden muutostarvetta huomioon ottamatta tai ylläpitojärjestelmään sovittamatta. Tulevaisuudessa kustannusten tulisi muodostua lähinnä vain kahdesta ensimmäisestä tekijästä.

Ohjelmoitava elektroniikka ja sen tuleminen merkittävään rooliin perinteisen linjaorganisaation aselajikohtaisten rajojen rikkojana uudistetun taistelun myötä pakottaa Puolustusvoimat yhdistämään kehityksen ja ylläpidon prosessit. 5. sukupolven johtamisjärjestelmien rakentaminen lähtee organisaation sisällä liikkeelle matriisissa, joka sitoo mukaan käyttäjät, tuotannon ohjaajat, materiaalin ja aineettoman materiaalin kunnossapitäjät sekä kehittäjät kuvan 4 esittämänä toimintaketjuna.

KUVA 4 PUUTTUU

Kuva 4: Ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan kehittämis- ja kunnossapitoverkoston

toimintamalli

Materiaalisten sekä immateriaalisten järjestelmäkomponenttien ylläpito- ja kehitysketjun hallinta

Teollinen massatuotanto- ja kulutuselektroniikkamateriaali

Materiaalinen ohjelmoitavien suorituskykyjen ylläpito toteutetaan kolmella periaatteella. Ensimmäinen periaate on rakentaa hyllytuotteille (sekä siviili-, viranomais- että sotilastuotteet) massahankintarakenne. Periaatteen tarkoituksena on ylläpitää jatkuvaa hankintavalmiutta yllä puitesopimuksin ja tarkennetuin vuosisopimuksin. Toimintamalli poistaa värikkäät tuotevalikoimat ja selkeyttää materiaalihankintoja sekä järjestelmien ylläpitoa. Toimintamalli rajoittaa myös tuoteyksilöiden elinkaaren suunnittelematonta jatkamista, jolloin piilevät ylläpitokustannukset eivät kasva kohtuuttomasti ostokustannusten varjolla.

Toinen periaate on irrottaa ohjelmoitavien suorituskykyjen rakentaminen ja ylläpito laitetason tuotteista, joiden saatavuus, yhteensopivuus ja kirjo vaihtelevat merkittävästi kulutus- ja sotilaselektroniikan välillä. Hankintasopimuksia ei sidota tuotteisiin vaan laitetason suorituskykyihin. Valittu toimittaja hakee markkinoiden tuotekirjosta sopivan ratkaisun, testaa sen referenssiympäristössä ja tarvittaessa pilottiympäristössä ja toteuttaa ostotilausvalmiuden kattamaan vuosittaisen 4% laitehävikin, 20% uusimistarpeen sekä lisävarustustarpeet.

Kolmas periaate on ylläpidon porrastaminen materiaalihallinnassa kuvassa 5 esitetyllä tavalla. Materiaalin varastointiperiaatetta on muutettava siten, että kertahankittavan sotilasmateriaalin varastoinnin lisäksi MILLOG Oy kykenee hallitsemaan läpivirtausvarastointia kustannukset ja kriisiajan täydennystarvevaatimukset tasapainottaen. MILLOG pitää vaihtolaitevarastoinnin joukko-osastoissa käytettävyyden edellyttämällä tasolla. Hajautettuja varastoja täydennetään keskitetymmillä varastoilla, joista kyetään reagoimaan harjoituksiin tai valmiuden kohottamisen vaatimuksiin nopeasti. Näiden lisäksi materiaalia virtaa jatkuvasti täydennysketjun läpi lisäarvoa keräten. Lisäarvottomat logistiikkaketjut karsitaan pois ja merkittävä osa materiaalin saatavuudesta hallitaan maahantuojien sekä laitetoimittajien globaaleissa varastoissa. MILLOG:n ja sen päätoimittajien on kyettävä hallitsemaan omien varastojensa lisäksi myös toimitusketjussa oleva materiaali yhteensopivuusyksityiskohtien tarkkuudella. Laiteriippumattomuuden saavuttaminen edellyttää sekä arkkitehtuurilta että järjestelmärakenteilta uudenlaista kerroksellisuutta sekä käyttöjärjestelmän että käyttöliittymän suuntaan. Virtuaalinen alustarakenne ja HTML 5 mahdollistavat tavoitellun laiteriippuvuuden, mutta lisäävät monimutkaisuutta ohjelmistotasolla.

Kuva 5 ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan materiaalisten ja immateriaalisten osien

ylläpidon järjestäminen

Aineettoman materiaalin eli ohjelmistojen ja tiedon elinkaarihallinta

Aineettoman materiaalisen elinkaarihallinnan tavoitteena on käytettävyys maksimoiden säilyttää tasapaino tietoturvallisuus-, käyttötarve-, tuote- ja kehitysmuutosten ristitulessa. Tämä edellyttää horisontaalisten prosessien tehokasta toimintaa niin, että palvelutuotannon prosessit (Information Technology Service Management, ITSM) limittyvät riidattomasti logistiikan toimitusketjuhallinnan (Supply Chain Management) sekä sotilasjohtamisen linja-esikuntaprosessien (Command and Control, C²) kanssa. Kokonaisuutta voidaan kutsua palveluhallinnaksi. Palveluhallinnalla on kahden tason ”taistelujohtokeskuksia”. Joukoissa toimivat operatiiviset järjestelmäryhmät (OJR) sekä keskitetysti maavoimien kokonaisuutta ohjaava Operatiivinen järjestelmäkeskus (OJK). Keskukset ohjaavat ja valvovat matriisiprosessien toimintaa. Ensimmäinen tehtävä on muutoksen hallinta. Toinen tehtävä on tuotannossa olevien palveluiden valvonta ja käyttäjien tukeminen. Näissä tehtävissä tarvitaan sekä menneen, nykyisen että tulevaisuuden hallintaa kompleksissa järjestelmäverkostossa, jonka yksi osa voi olla kymmeniä vuosia vanha ja toinen muutaman tunnin takainen päivitys.

Kolmantena tehtävänä on pitää toimijaverkosto tietoisena tarpeista ja antaa lisäarvoa ketjussa tuottaville palveluille. Tuloksellisen toiminnan edellytyksenä on tuntea ja ylläpitää yhteys asiakkaaseen, toimittajiin sekä kehityksen ja ylläpidon toimijoihin näiden välissä. Yhdistämällä aika- ja toimintakenttäulottuvuus saadaan yksinkertaistetussakin tapauksessa 9-ulotteinen kuvaus taistelujärjestelmästä ja sen toimintaympäristössä vaikuttavista asioista. Järjestelmän ulottuvuuksia auttaa hallitsemaan arkkitehtuuri ja muutosdokumentaatio. Neljäntenä tehtävänä on osallistua arkkitehtuurityöhön ja ohjata arkkitehtuurilla verkoston muita toimijoita ylläpitämään ja kehittämään yhteensopivia suorituskyvyn osia taistelujärjestelmän kokonaisuuteen.

Aineettoman materiaalin ylläpito edellyttää kolmea välinettä: 1) taistelujärjestelmän referenssi- ja testiympäristöä, 2) muutoksen hallintaa sekä 3) sovellusten jakelujärjestelmää verkkovarastoitujen järjestelmäosien päivittämiseksi. Referenssi- ja testiympäristöt ovat samoja sekä ylläpidon että kehityksen tarpeille. Jokainen immateriaalimuutos testataan referenssiympäristössä teknisesti ja toiminnallisesti yleisimmillä käyttötapauksilla. Tarvittaessa testaus ulotetaan pilottiympäristöön, jossa kirjavampi käyttäjäjoukko kenttäolosuhteissa saattaa aiheuttaa ennakoimattomia tilanteita. Muutoksenhallinnassa varmistetaan muutososan yhteen toimivuus koko DOTMPLFII rakenteen läpi ja lopulta ajoitetaan käyttöönotto muutosriskit ja käyttökatkot minimoiden. Sovellusten jakelujärjestelmällä muuttuneet ohjelmat ja konfiguraatiotiedostot jaetaan nopeasti ja automatisoidusti kaikkiin verkkovarastoituihin konfiguraatioyksiköihin, jolloin varmistuu koko järjestelmäpopulaation toimivuus ja yhteensopivuus. Yksiköitä on jatkuvasti käytössä, joten päivitykselle määritetään muutosikkuna, jonka aikana laitteet automaattisesti päivittyvät käyttäjälle otollisena ajanhetkenä.

Maataistelujärjestelmän taktinen etu rakentuu järjestelmävaikutuksen ja oppivuuden varaan.

Taistelujärjestelmän toimintarakenteiden muuttaminen tiedolla ja ohjelmistoilla sellaiseksi, että eri sukupolvien ase- ja sensorijärjestelmät toimivat yhdessä siviili- ja viranomaiselektroniikalla täydennettyjen osien kanssa, mahdollistaa järjestelmän kokonaisvaikutuksen kohdistamisen maaleihin. Ohjelmoinnin nopeus ja sovellusten jakelujärjestelmä mahdollistavat koneiden oppimisen samaan tahtiin kuin ihmistenkin, jolloin taistelujärjestelmä voi muuttaa taistelutekniikkaansa tai taktiikkaansa operaation aikana. Tätä etua ei voi ostaa kaupan hyllystä, vaan se on rakennettava organisaation osaamiseksi ja mahdollistettava prosesseilla sekä arkkitehtuurilla.

Maataistelujärjestelmän strateginen etu rakentuu ohjelmoitavan elektroniikan ja sen ylläpitojärjestelmän varaan.

Taistelujärjestelmän normaaliaikainen ylläpito edellyttää päivittäistä, kuukausittaista ja puolivuosittaista muutosta sekä käyttäjäpalautteen, tekniikan että strategian edellyttämään suuntaan. Taistelujärjestelmän suorituskyvyn tärkein osa - ohjelma on uudelleen ohjelmoitavissa ja päivitettävissä suorituskyvyn elinjakson aikana useaan kertaan. Suorituskyky ei ole enää ostohetkeen jäädytetty tai suurten elinaikamuutosten (Mid Life Update) rajaama, vaan toteuttaa notkeasti niin jatkuvan kehittämisen periaatteita (Lean) kuin strategisen kehittämisen tarpeita. Tällä toteutuksella kirjavasta puolustus- ja siviilimateriaalista saadaan enemmän suorituskykyä koko elinjaksonsa ajan, eikä vaaranneta suorituskyvyn ylläpitoa hallitsemattomilla ylläpitokustannuksilla.

How to command and control the renewing land component of Finnish Defence Forces and how to support it with signals

How to command and control the renewing land component of Finnish Defence Forces and how to support it with signals

By Juha Mattila, Colonel (ret)

This article was published in Finnish Military Magazine (Sotilasaikakauslehti) December 2012

The Finnish Defence Forces is renewing its land operations by integrating a combat system of systems for battalion task force, improving capabilities to modify battlespace, developing better understanding of space of operation and ability to foresee possible events, enabling combat system to engage opponents combat system deeper within his formation, enabling reconnaissance and surveillance to keep closer contact with opponent and shortening time to restore fighting capability. This renewal includes all land component troops and restores their compatibility. The renewal requires to modify command and control procedures, to replace C4ISR system, to rethink signals tactics and to improve signals and C² training.

Battalion task force is executing its mission as a part of Finnish Homeland Defence under provincial leadership

A Battalion task force is operating decentralized either by company or by group of companies using simultaneously different battle procedures and troops distributed in battle space of several tens of squarekilometers. Battalion task force is being commanded and controlled with information and services provided by tactical Battle Management System, which integrates seamlessly units, weapons, sensors and logistics. Tactical battle management system is complemented by push-to-talk, collaboration and telephone voice services.

All organisations, that are supporting battalion task force, are connected either to tactical battle management system or provide information via integrated, joint C4ISR -system. Battalion may be reinforced with several additional units and can manage all supporting elements with joint C4ISR-services.

The commanding officer of battalion task force is able to extend his command and control to the level of subordinates subordinate, to supporters sub-provider and to other elements acting within his area of influence. The task force is able to analyse opponents goals, forces and weaknesses. This can be done, besides military lines of operation, also along lines of psychological and electro-magnetic operations.¹

Planning and foreseeing aims to limit opponents options for operation, to broaden the spectre of own possibilities and to gain surprise at operational level

To reach an end state within dynamic and complex space of operation, requires analytical tools to see own and opponents possibilities in interaction with other entities and environment. The most effective way to innovate with different views and alternatives is to include different experts in war gaming together with planning staff. Every stakeholder is represented in a role game, where all thinkable alternatives are being tested, decisive points are found and optimum courses of action are seasoned.² The best courses of action are further defined to draft plans amongst which the commanding officer is deciding the course that is to ordered to troops. The planning staff continues playing with other possibilities testing assumptions against unfolding situation and other options revealed during games. The executing staff starts to implement and control troops with operations order. Commanders decision is condensed to intent of operation and further communicated to entire network of co-operators to create alignment for combined effort and guide lines for unexpected situations.

The Common Operational Picture is delivered to every leader to enable understanding of current situation. If commanders are acting only on basis of a current situation, they will not be able to get ahead of events and will eventually lose initiative, tempo or balance³. Whereas leaders and staffs, who combine symptoms in current picture to scenarios of war gaming and in the light of this information re-analyse their assumptions and alternative plans, may be able to understand the bigger picture and therefore foresee possibilities and events and prepare troops to confront them. In the other hand, if commanders remain waiting for better information, clearer awareness or guidance from superiors, they may end up with major casualties⁴.

The commander of task force must create discontinuous events and surprise opponent by deviating his manoeuvres and combat methods. Success is being created with unforeseeable tactics⁵. When surprising force is being projected towards weak points of opponent´s combat system, it may destroy his confidence and trust for the very ground of his action. In this process it is important to control imagines and thoughts of opponent´s force.⁶ Sun Tzu advices to attack to the mind and plan of your opponent⁷ .

The commander in post-modern space of operation is not able to interact physically with every subordinate like Napoleon did riding through his troops during the night before attack. Neither is commander being seen everywhere amongst his troops or support chain like Alexander the Great was when he charged among the first soldiers. Commander is not a “slave” of his command post, but is able to disembark amongst his troops and still maintain understanding of overall situation, to keep contact with his staff, to control his support chain and to give a feeling of presence via virtual means.

At tactical level Commander must have courage to part complicated tasks and make them as simple as possible.⁸ Modern command and control system supports commander in his effort to co-ordinate subtasks, but allows subordinates also to adapt to the unfolding situation, if they have understood the commanders intent. A complex operational mission is executed with simple tactical level tasks and that requires all stakeholders to participate the planning process.⁹ When one has participated in the planning and war gaming, it is easier to understand commanders intent and to prepare for all possible scenarios at tactical level.

If you know your opponent and your own force, you can execute mission in the edge of chaos, where your opponent may not be able to reach.

When the force is employed through the whole battlespace, Common Operational Picture is enabling cohesion with supporting awareness of enemy, own forces and environment. Improved ability to reconnoitre and survey enables distributed force to keep contact to opponent and other stakeholders of battlespace. Information presented in COP is giving needed early-warning for troops and explains change of situation to support elements and reserve forces employed in the same area of interest.

COP is tailored to role and it is possible to subscribe on demand extending from infantry patrols to logistics patrols and present in their combat management terminals. The picture gives information also about accessibility of roads, weather forecasts, enemy reconnaissance, usage of fire and changes of terrain. The information is real time enough to provide awareness of physical and electro-magnetic events in the space of operations.

Renewed tactics necessitates that combat management system is able to support troops even when deployed amongst opponents formations. Communications system must tolerate losses, network must be reconfigurable to maintain connectivity and transportation of data must adapt to emission control restrictions using cable connections or different wireless waveforms. It is imperative to shape the space of operations beforehand, to build cable connections and to prepare ICT -infrastructure of the area.

Mission tactics of distributed troops is effective only if separate parts of combat system are able to synchronize their action with others. In some context this is called self-synchronization or swarming¹⁰, but examples of their time is to be found in II WW battles of the Suomussalmi 1940 and the Karelian Army attack with battalion task forces 1941.

The units and weapon systems of task force do align as system of systems effect when everyone understands the commanders intention similarly, all arms see their situation in relation to units they are supporting and everybody sees the time to target situation. The new awareness of battle space will enable to loose some boundaries and restrictions between troops. Instead it allow areas of interest and areas of effect to be created differently and change them as needed. Awareness also allows to execute supporting tasks with less preparation but without further friendly fire casualties. The battle system is able to react on unforeseeable events with self-synchronization while continuing the execution of own battle intent.

Swarming and deploying troops in distributed way is altering traditional methods of leadership and sustaining organizational integrity¹¹. Patrols and sections are not able to see or hear each other and platoon leader is not able to meet all his subordinates. Presence and leading by example is not possible in real world but in cyber world. Patrols are able to see each other as blue force signs in Battle Management System (BMS). This calls new tools to build integrity and troop spirit. Troops and sections can be brought together time to time, but the integrity of a platoon or company requires collaboration and trust building via BMS. This is done by introducing BMS to patrols early in the basic training, having platoons and companies real life exercises augmented with BMS simulation. Gradually this integrates real world and augmented reality in to seamless reality, hardens operational procedures and builds new integrity and “you don´t leave your buddy” spirit.

At the level of combat technique a distributed force is focusing timely its effect to weaknesses of opponents battle system and thus breaking his integrity, tempo or stability

Tactics is channelling opponent to vulnerable situation and combat technique is focusing system effect on weak nodes of his force. Distributed patrols infiltrate into opponents formations, recognise opponents weak points as targets and destroys them with multiarm effects: intelligent mines, intelligent explosives, indirect fire, electro-magnetic jamming, heavy direct fire and anti-tank weapons fire.

Attacking to singular or most accessible targets is not necessarily effective. Opponent must be seen as fighting system in which people, material, information, procedures, plan and spirit is joining as one entity. The kinetic and unkinetic effect must be focused to planned points of opponent´s fighting system in order to unstable its tempo and synchronization both physically and mentally¹². Leaders must recognize the time when opponent is in a brink of losing his control and engage reserve forces at that moment to unbalance his system. When opponent´s system starts to collapse, force must be utilized continuously not letting opponent to recover.¹³

In quest of asymmetry, it is beneficial to evade your opponents strengths or planned effects of his combat system. With light infantry against mechanized force, it is good to utilize terrain, weather and light conditions to infiltrate within the opponents formations to evade his heavy direct fire and to get closer to the weak points of his combat system. Light infantry can project multiarms combat power to opponents systems most critical nodes and disperse to be concentrated again engaging next wave of system targets.

There is no battle management or communications system that could substitute combat skills of a soldier. In stressful and fearful situations the amygdala of human brains takes control and it is driving action using reflex-like reactions and deep automated behaviour.¹⁴ To achieve the level of combat skills that can overcome fear and stress requires continuous training and numerous repetitions at individual level. To achieve that within patrol, squad and platoon with multiarms combat system requires even more repetitions to achieve trust and self assurance with complex system. As leaders have to be able to train their troops continuously, they themselves should improve tactical skills with more demanding war gaming executed with combat management systems.

The management of logistics network is aiming to maintain troops fighting capability and retain it as fast as possible simultaneously escaping opponents kinetic effect.

The logistics of distributed and mobile troops is possible only by establishing points of storage into the battle space. Light moving patrols are not able to carry all needed supplies with them. As battle space is being prepared with fortifications, minefields, explosive devices and communications cabling, the logistics is to prepare by establishing caches of material. This requires logistics to participate in operational planning and in war gaming of different scenarios. This is to foresee as much possible situations in order to anticipate needs of supplies when situation is evolving. Supply caches and their usability is being presented in Common Operational Picture.

There are no single key weapon systems in battalion task force, but many critical subsystems, that require special skills to repair. Specialized repair patrols are moving amongst troops and being able to repair most key subsystems. Those patrols have to move safely within battle space, to have warnings and information on enemy action, to be able to locate moving platform with malfunctioning system and to be able to repair severe problems in the battle space with possible teleconsultation. Most of the maintenance requirements has to be supplied with replacements and surplus batteries from supply caches.

The Battalion task force is not autonomous but requires support from network of logistics, fire and intelligence. This requires a chain of units, executing their special tasks within the intent of commander and trusting that each unit is doing its best to support troops in battle. The commander must be able to communicate his intent through to entire chain in understandable way and involve all necessary stakeholders in planning process. Even the supporting functions must be prepared for different scenarios and being able to react on unforeseeable events.¹⁵ The support network must be as transparent as possible to be able to run by trust and not only contracts and legal sanctions. The C4I system supporting supply chain management must be able to transfer messages and information from battle management systems to Enterprise Resource Planning systems of supporting organizations. The C4I system is to give access to joint and combined planning process for all required stake holders. The C4I system must also connect battle management systems and logistics mobile systems to provide seamless information of the situation in both systems.

Armed forces has been structured traditionally with weber-bureaucratic administration and hierarchical line-staff organization¹⁶. The post-modern armed forces has to move towards more process driven matrix-organization, that can be both hub of network and provider of support for clients. The transformation is enabled with C4I -system, but executed by changing procedures and culture of organization and by enabling people with new education and delegation of responsibility.

Battle Management System and Communications is being controlled from fighter to fire support and from patrol to commander with signal tactics

With renewal of land operations one is going for the system effect of distributed task force combat system of systems in deeper area of operations. BMS and Communications is the glue that contacts leaders, weapon systems, troops, sensors and logistics networks in to coherent combat system. The tactics of Signals begins at company level and ends at the level of last organization of supporting network. Signal tactics is including command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance including soldiers access to home front media services.

Signals must support troops with battle management system fighting in deep within opponents deployed troops, must stand heavy losses of equipment because of opponents strong air and electro-magnetic weaponry and must support distributed and moving troops. C4I-services has to be available starting from fighters and ending in the depth of support network. The command of Signals in not only deploying command posts or signal stations but also providing information and services. This recalls Information Technology Service Management skills as defined by library of ITIL¹⁷ but executed in military environment.

Targeting picture, Common Operational Picture, Fires and Logistics situation are the most important processes supported by C4I systems. Voice communications is more important at platoon level and battle management system is taking automated data processing out to leaders and patrols in the field.¹⁸ The most challenging situation for signals is to support troops with required services when emission control is denying all wireless transmissions or when opposing troops are attacking through signals network and trying to disconnect it to non-usable pieces.

Soldiers and leaders can learn from situations of battle space. Combat technique and tactics may be altered to be better suited for new requirements. Battle Management System is also able to learn in order to support users new queries. Signal tactics must understand, how to define the most favourable window for reprogramming of BMS, while otherwise maintain services as available and stable as possible.

Commanders will is not anymore the only thing to overcome friction of battle. C4I -system enables soldiers to understand commanders intent better, to self-synchronize without delay of command line and to see supporters efforts and maintain self-confidence through hardship. This is the capability that is enabled with next generation of tactical battle management system and communications.

References (Pardon the Finnish originals but sometimes they presents issues better than any English source): 

1 Juha Mattila: Maapuolustuksen uudistettu taistelutapa ja johtaminen. Viestimies 1/2011.

2 James W. Bryant: Strategic Development in a Large World. The International C2 Journal | Vol 5, No 1

3 John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.

4 The Red Army´s 44. Division was paralysed both at command level and troop level when attacking to Suomussalmi 1939-1940. Mika Kulju: Raatteen tie – talvisodan sankaritarina. Gummerus Juva 2011.

5 Emphasis is on the defeat and disruption of the enemy - by taking the initiative, and applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the times and places the enemy least expects - rather than attempting to seize and hold ground for its own sake. John A.Boyd: The Essence of Winning and Losing 1995.

6 Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.65

7 Sun Tzu: The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffin. Duncan Baird Publishers 2005. Ukrainian soldiers of 44. Division were panicked and left their positions after hearing some noises that sounded like Finnish soldiers skiing in dark forest – White Death -phenomen. Mika Kulju: Raatteen tie – talvisodan sankaritarina. Gummerus Juva 2011.

8 Jari Sarasvuo: Huomiotalous. Otava 2005. ISBN 951-20566-8

9 FM 5-0, The Operations Process. U.S. Armed Forces 2010: Understanding complex, ill-structured problems is essential to mitigating the effects of complexity on full spectrum operations. This understanding, achieved through collaborative dialog and analysis, facilitates learning and allows commanders to better appreciate numerous factors that influence and interact with operations.

10 Boyd, John R: The strategic game of ? and ?. A lecture from June 1989.

11 Mälkki, Juha. YEK 54: Tehtävätaktiikan olemus - Tehtävätaktiikan muodostuminen preussilais-saksalaisessa sotataidossa vuosina 1806–1945: ”Yksilön tuli osoittaa aloitteellisuutta sekä tarvittaessa rohkeutta toimia jopa annettujen käskyjen vastaisesti. Kurin rakentumisessa korostui näin ollen toimijalähtöisyys, itsemuodostettu kuri.”

12 ”the essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy […] That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial.” US Marines MCDP-1 chapter 4:The Conduct of War

13 Juha Mattila: Konfliktin ratkaisun johtaminen postmodernissa maailmassa. Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/2011.

14 Daniel Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0

15 Ref. Infantry Regiment 22 situation in summer 1944 with supply problems from depots of Viipuri area.

16 Pauli Juuti, Petri Virtanen: Organisaatiomuutos. Otava 2009. ISBN 978-951-1-23601-6

17 ITIL: Information Technology Infrastructure Library is the most widely accepted approach to IT service management in the world. ITIL provides a cohesive set of best practice, drawn from the public and private sectors internationally.

18 Juha Mattila: Urakan päätössanat. Viestimies 4/2012 s.   

PART II Confrontations, Conflicts and their Management in Postmodern era

still under editing

Original writing was published in Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/2011 http://www.upseeriliitto.fi/the_finnish_officers_union_in_english

4. Resolving conflicts with leadership and management in the post-modern world

Sun Tzu: The Book of Army Management says: 

"On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.”¹
“In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.”²

4.1 Political leadership

Political level is the source of power and decision. It is at the political level where decisions are made to wage a war or secede from it. At strategical level power is transformed to organizations, flows of assets and, as result, their effects. It is necessary for both political and strategical level to interact (continuous re-evaluation and collaboration) intensely during conflict since estimates at political level are foundations of strategy and changes at either level may effect to other.

The political leadership must understand consequences and end states of conflict in order to justify assets, casualties and outcomes to members of their own society and also to global public opinion. There are always such irregularities and uncertainties in conflicts, that presumed end state may not appear. GUANZI states that ”if you don´t understand the politics your enemy is practising, you are not able to struggle with him. If you don´t understand the nature of your enemy, you can´t anticipate his actions. If you don´t know the general of your enemy, you shall not attack first.”³

War is not an end by itself, but a tool i.e. a part of bigger ensemble. Clausewitz said war is using power to persuade opponent to bend on ones will. Mao said, when the development at political level seizes, war is to blast all obstacles and enable politics to proceed.⁴ WUZI says there are five reasons to mobilize one´s army:

• First is struggle for political status,
• second is achieving an advantage,
• third is extended confrontation with hostilities,
• fourth is anxiety within state and
• fifth is famine.⁵

In post-modern world the end state of an operation is not necessary defeat of the enemy, but attain peace, retain order or stabilize affairs.

There is a tendency with soldiers to think war is a meaning itself or defeating enemy is the end state, because war changes soldiers understanding of world, values and priorities⁶. To prevent military to wage their own war, the supreme commander of nation must have intense interaction with other stake holders of confrontation and keep the nations interest⁷ at first in his thinking.⁸ General Airo (Chief of Operations in Finland during most of the WW II) states, that Marshal Mannerheim was leading the war and he was leading operations in war zone. There are many political stake holders, dependencies and motivations in war, which the supreme commander must understand and consider.⁹

To become a political leader of democratic society generally happens through election. In the election of supreme commander, it is not necessarily advantage for candidate to stand out arguing on radical idealism or clash of classes. More secure lines might be emphasizing the common history of society, candidates own experiences of the nations history (president Mauno Koivisto in 1981 – 1982 campaign) or emphasizing the need to secure nations future (prime minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979 campaign). The human nature in the other hand is more prone to judge the face and appearance of the candidate in television debate, than the rationality of issues candidate is addressing.¹⁰

The leader of nation is to prepare society to hardship and sacrifices during the conflict and appear as a firm and trustworthy leader, who takes care of the society and its members. In the post-modern era, with plentitude of information competing to get attention of people, the challenge is to get message through this mass of information, to gross the threshold of attention, to deliver the message with logic dressed in stories and to appear as calm and trustworthy. All this when global media is telling different stories, people are tempted to follow other stories and potential opponent is attacking with information operations. The story has to be emotionally strong, understandable to average people and delivered with right pathos as for example George W. Bush, who spoke in Orlando 3 days before his re-election offering no facts but the story of new world, which was so perfect, logical, comprehensive and as such secured against all real world issues.¹¹

The leader of nation has to keep the whole political front as unanimous and stable as possible to prevent either the aggressors information operations, opinions from own society or global opinion will brake the integrity of political leadership thus braking one leg of the Clausewitzian power tripod: people – leadership – usable assets. For example in Lenin-Stalin era party leaders kept very strict party discipline to prevent dangerous dispersion. Other communist parties were using same “centralized democracy” -method as the Soviet Communist Party.¹²

One of the difficulties tasks for the supreme commander is to create a willingness for individual soldier to give one´s life in pursuit after more valuable goals of one´s society. That can be done by fear, higher moral or with offering a possibility gain rewards. Marshal Mannerheim appealed to the sacrifices of previous generation in his speech 1918 in the lines of: may the patriotic spirit of the freedom war rise to the heights, that everyone is competing, how to more support the nation in crises!¹³ Ernest Renan has stated that the core of an nation is in the things that its members share and in the things they have together forgotten.¹⁴ Napoleon used the strength of patriotism¹⁵ and emphasized that by introducing the signs of national bravery i.e. decorations. Promotion is another vehicle to encourage soldier to higher achievements. The state may also offer a possibility to gain better economical start and other rewards to its soldiers like donating property, trade rights, taxation rights or pensions. As for punishment there have been measures like fines, dismissing or lowering in rank. More serious penalties have been measures like execution of soldier (Stalin), execution of soldier and his family (Hitler)¹⁶ or execution of soldier, his family, kin and all his supporters (Rome on 200-400 centuries). In the post-modern society the political leadership must tap values, motives and moral issues that makes post-modern individual to sacrifice for society´s higher demands.

4.2 Strategic leadership

A strategic leader is drawing assets from society´s sources of superiority and using them with a recipient of success, whilst surpassing weaknesses and friction to accomplish the end state defined by political level.

At strategic level one analyses both own and opponents centres of gravity and weaknesses, as well as possible goals of opponent, alternative lines of operation and courses of action to achieve those goals. One plans, how to deny optional courses of action from opponents as much as possible and then how to counter remaining at operational level in order to reach desired end state with own assets. Resources are being allocated at strategic level commander of operation is delegated their use with necessary freedom of decision.

If strategic situation is more rational, less complex or more contained, it is possible to make a plan that anticipates opponents intentions, changes of environment and friction within own forces. When situation is managed with rational approach, there is only few changes in battle order and environment is stable, strategical leader may remain at management level. If there is a need to alter procedures, force structure or situation has strategic importance, leader must walk through his troops and subordinates to create a spirit of change, empower people with information and show example.(Napoleon ride through all his troop during the night before major attack. Wellesley stated that the presence of Napoleon at battlefield was worth of force of an additional division at least)¹⁷.

Usually in post-modern, multidimensional and open situation with several levels of interaction, there might be possible to define only general lines or intentions as a course of action to the end state¹⁸. It might be a denote of the will of commander, which efficiently communicated and in perceivable form, will establish an operational guideline for every level of interaction. I some situations even at the level of soldier, worker or salesman interaction with stakeholder, the effect may gain a nature of strategy. In those situations every person, who may face situation of interaction, should understand their doing in the frame created by the denote of commanders will.

A post-modern organization is relatively flat in hierarchy with many interaction interfaces at different directions (practically all coalition operations within last 20 years have been networked organizations (CJTF) with one nation as a hub). People at those interaction interfaces make changes with their behaviour and deeds. Strategy should be guiding every situation of influence. Strategy is best embraced, when it is a part of organizational culture and individual values, thus being resilient against feelings of stress, fear or harsh conditions.

Confrontations, where situations, stakeholders, rules of engagement and relationships are varying swiftly, call for agility and sensitivity of strategy. Agile strategy needs still foresight, but foreseeing is difficult because of the amount of variables and their relations¹⁹. Strategic scenarios include more decisive points where future may take another path. Technically dominant may not necessarily win²⁰, but the one who can change the behaviour of opponent, neutrals or other stakeholders within space of operation. YI ZHOU SHU says that one can attack to a state in six different situations: 1. when one has parted rulers from ministers, 2. when one has dispel all suspicions of attack, 3. when one has outmanoeuvred opponent to position with few alternatives, 4. when one has supported opponent in weakness, 5. when one has increased opponents decay of spirit, power or government or 6. when one has consumed and engaged opponents force and will.²¹

There is a need for strategic insight together with foresight. In order to create strategic insight one has to collect information, analyse it and process understanding to be able to understand opponent´s intentions as situations folds. Strategic insight helps to maintain initiative and competitiveness over other stake holders. Information must be obtained from different levels and domains to utilize innovations or observations to be able to alter strategy. The process of strategy should be open to external influences. It should have many interfaces for interaction and information exchange with outside stake holders.²² Strategist should foster contacts with different factors to obtain information of weak signals or breaking innovations. This strategy network is difficult to build because human being tends to gravitate with colleagues, to confer anything else but strategical issues or to emphasize information that support existing plans or beliefs.²³

A Strategic leader creates an intention on how to proceed to end state. This intention, delivered with effective communications, will simultaneously influence on people to be protected, people within protective force, people who are neutral and people who are on the opposing side. Implementation of strategy requires people to step out from their areas of comfort. Effective strategy will always disturb legacy, create roiling within organization and might start argumentation both inside and outside of area of operation, which again adds pressure on decision makers.²⁴

4.3 Operational leadership

The results of every institution exists only outside of its boundaries. Operational leadership exists only for outcome of the institution. For the first thing operational leader must define is the outcome of ones task and secondly organize available assets to gain the results. Operational leadership is enabling organization to deliver its outcome and ad value among stake holders outside of its organization.²⁵

The changes in space of operation cannot be controlled, but one might try to remain ahead of them or to be agile enough to cease the initiative and gain a critical mass for effect on time of opportunity. A Commander, who is change oriented, sees them as possibilities, seeks them actively, finds alternative courses of action and implements them effectively both inside and outside of his organization. This ability requires features as follows²⁶:

1. Operational procedures and understanding to be able to surf the first wave of opportunity
2. Organized methods at all levels and interfaces of the organization to seek changes that open possibilities.
3. Cultural, procedural and leadership readiness to be able to execute changes faster than opponent both inside and outside of organization.
4. A balance between changes and continuity within organization to keep it in the edge but not sliding into chaos.

The commander of operation must not act before he understands entirety of the space of operation and has foresight of possible future scenarios. In every case commander must know his own organization, both strengths and weaknesses. Commander must not forget either the space where operation is to be put into practise, the nature of opposing society, the forces opponent may be able to yield nor the personalities of opposing commanders. Besides above mentioned general information commander requires specific information on decisive points, where his assumptions may be challenged and new possibilities may be opened.

The size of the space of operation, amount of events and complexity of their interrelations has increased to a level, that no man alone can master all information or unfolding opportunities. Alexander the Great was great tactician, but when leading his troops to strike the weakest point of opponents formation by personal example, he lost his capability to see other changes of battlefield. Hitler tried to understand situation and command his generals far from behind the lines and lost opportunities because the delays of his communications. The Duke of Wellington riding endlessly amongst his troops, General Grant using telegraphing and General Guderian using radios were able, besides creating the awareness of entirety, to collect information directly from battlefield, to change their operations accordingly and see the results of their decisions as events unfolded. Understanding based on good information is key to operational success. Often organizations, forcing information to follow deep hierarchical structure, have failed to gain understanding of situation or to project their force with effect.

Commander of operation possesses firm basic information about the space of operations to be able to understand situation, to have insight of interrelations and to have foresight possible scenarios of future. The picture of current operations provides information to follow if chosen scenario and course of action are still realizable. If commander is mislead to follow only current picture and act upon that understanding, he will lose the foresight, revert to reactive agent and miss the initiative. In the other hand, if commander is not able to make decision upon his insight, foresight and intuition, he will lose as well.²⁷

A successful deception at operative level requires a comprehensive process, that calls both social, political and economical measures to effect through physical, information and cognitive layers to be able to distract opponent´s understanding from real world. If conflict escalates the effect of these measures is reinforced with other soft power²⁸ components and surprising usage of hard power that may rise fog over events and support indecisiveness on opposing side. Operational leadership must create non-linearity of operations, discrete chain of events, anomalies to expected situations and different approaches to best practice methods. A success follows commander, who executes unorthodox operation to direct his force in unforeseeable way to gain effect in the weakness of the opponent. In this process the control over beliefs of men is important.

One must be able to divert opinions and beliefs of opposing side from the real world and create a story that is perfect, self-evident, comprehensive and evades all criticism.²⁹ To gain ground for this kind of story, one must foremost destroy all other structures of trust between opponents forces, society´s and government´s interaction³⁰. When one is attacking, the target is the opponent´s unity of will. When one is defending, he defends his force´s, people´s and leaders willingness to fight, to face hardship and to be adamant.³¹

In order to be able to project right combination of force on time and in sufficient amount to achieve results, it is mandatory to delegate authority as low as possible. This is to tailor each projection of force according to situation, stakeholders and their interrelations. For example in a quest to separate local population from guerillas one tries to find exact needs of population and full fill them with tailored combination of force in each village to gain trust and social stability.³² A comprehensive operation³³ surfaces the profound problem – everybody wants to have power over all other silos, but no one wants to be a subordinate.

4.4 Tactical leadership

At tactical level methods for direct impact are: fire, movement, protection, use of reserve forces, keeping contact, utilization of gained success, continuous activity, purchases and sales, interactions and deeds that improve your brand (or ethos). These methods are used with varying tempo, direction and target to be able to utilize the indirect effects in conjunction to direct. When one is advancing there is no withdrawal. But when forced to withdraw, one executes sudden attack. One must be active and maintain the initiative. When opponent is forcing you to react, then gain initiative in other level or direction of struggle. One must be swift in execution, but when friction slows you down, one must gain speed in other areas of impact.³⁴

At tactical level one can achieve a skill of sensing the event or feeling of the battlefield. The tactical leader must understand his opponents organization, procedures, strengths and weaknesses. Leader must observe constantly his opponents spirits, formations, qualities, weaknesses, strengths, opening possibilities and possible intentions. When tactical leader senses his opponents forces battle technics, changes of tempo and timing of execution, he attacks in abrupt way, time or combination of force. Opponent must be attacked, when he himself is preparing to attack or when he is not prepared to counter the attack. ³⁵

When situation feels complicated or one cannot understand his opponent intentions, it is better to pretend to be attacking, but execute it with restricted force. When opponent reacts, his intentions and forces may be revealed and one can utilize unfolding possibilities. Destabilize your opponent with danger, surprise or ailment. Attack without warning at target and on time your opponent is not able to foresee. When you sense that your opponent is indecisive, use the moment, seize initiative and strike him.³⁶

Tactical leader must possess courage to partition a given task and to make complicated tasks simple. Simple task is fast to learn, execute, improve – and discard when time comes.³⁷ During Finnish Winter War 1939 in Suomussalmi and other battles a tactic called pincer attack was used. The advance of opposing force was stopped at advantageous position for defence using only small amount of infantry but very effective indirect fire. The majority of forces were directed flanking opponents advancing column, using the advantage of terrain familiarity. Fire attacks were launched from sides of enemy with timely and locally superior force. Tempo of battle was changed and initiative was captured from opponent, who reacted retaining to defend in isolated pockets. The initiative was maintained by fighting deep amongst opposing forces and preventing isolated troops to get into contact with each other. Those pockets were later managed one by one not able to support each others with their superior direct fire weapon systems. This tactic was called also as “motti”-tactics.³⁸

4.5 Leadership of battle technical level

At battle technical level both individuals, troops and weapon systems are trained to be able to act according subconscious habit, motoric memory or preset programming. In stressful situations and times of fear a part in human brains, amygdala, takes control and it prefers automatic habits or reactions like reflex.³⁹ To be able to behave effectively under stress requires both individuals and troops to exercise as part of bigger battle system, obtain skill level of automation and to be able to sense cues⁴⁰ of enemy action and execute ones task routinely with conjunction of indirect methods. In this context the following principles of battle technique are from a famous samurai and multi gifted person Miyamoto Musashi. He developed the art of battle while winning over 60 duels between ages 13 – 29 years and defined his understanding at 60 years old.⁴¹

While using direct impact one must possess the skill to use his force (weapon) in all its efficiency and variation. Mushasi says that is not worth to die keeping other sword in scabbard and when griping the weapon, one must focus to strike opponent. Mushashi emphasises the concentration of will and power to strike. He warns to became too familiar with one type of weapon, movement or method. If opponent studies your habits, preferences or dislikes, he might use those against you. So even at technical level one has to seem to be unpredictable.

Musashi emphasises training of battle technique to gain level of subconscious habit and reflex. Musashi says that in battle you have to move like you move normally, whether that be fast or slow or with short or long steps. This is adhered in many sports activities specially team sports where proximity helps click with other people⁴² and training movements to deep habit level gives team edge over other teams in competition⁴³.

One has to maintain contact with opponent either by fight or reconnoitre to observe how opponent is reacting, to seek open possibilities and to gain understanding of his behaviour. Musashi says that every time you defy the strike of your opponent, you must use the same movement to harm him.

At battle technical level one must utilize direct impact accompanied with indirect methods for multiplied effect. To be able to do so, a leader must understand his opponents force, feel battle rhythm and strike against centres of opponents spiritual and physical stability. To find those centres, one must align with opponent. Think like he thinks to understand his avenues of approach, his restrictions, his possibilities and spirit of will. Human mind has tendency to imagine opponent as powerful and unbeatable and thus manoeuvre too slowly into contact. If one thinks opponent is formidable, he has already lost in spirit (at cognitive level) and will face loss at physical level as well. If one thinks opponent is as strong as his own forces with similar methods of fighting, then he has to abandon his normal routines and strike with surprising method to multiply direct impact with indirect effect.

Everything can be changed, when the normal rhythm of fighting is disturbed. You have to feel that moment in order to utilize it. A sudden thrust of force or strike by reserve unit may start collapse like an avalanche. When collapse starts one must keep pressure on opponent not to let him recover.

If opponent possess better ability of far ranging fire, one has to penetrate into opponent´s formation in order to deny that capability. While penetrating into opponent´s formation and clinging into his troops one has to maintain ability to strike using strengths like in Suomussalmi operation. Denying opponents strengths and striking into his weaknesses has been called asymmetric fighting. It includes indirect effects of fear, unawareness of situation or physical hardness.

4.6 Management of organization

Managing is typical and necessary task in every organization.

Organization is a tool to help people and machines to work together for better productivity.

Productive organization allows people and machines work together safely, enhances collaboration between people to create innovation, allows people to participate in decision making concerning their own tasks and fulfils specific needs of men. In every organization there is one person, who has the final decision and responsibility. He may also expect others to follow his decisions. Besides this one mandatory position, the other parts of organizations structure are various and parallel. There may be line, matrix, composite, department, branch, service, project, process, supply chain, network or consortium type of organizations. Because organization product is measured outside of its boundaries, every interface to client, subcontractor or other stake holder is important. Every interaction with outside makes the individual at the interface a leader, who “commands” other parts of organization to provide services and “controls” the delivery of the service measuring also feed back from customer. Organization learns from every transaction or interaction taking place through any interface along its structure.⁴⁴

People must know and understand the structure of organization and its procedures to be able to work effectively as a part of bigger system. The levels of hierarchy must be kept as minimal as possible to maintain agility, to keep communication lines shorter and to foster visibility through the structure. In post-modern world individual must be able to work within multidimensional organization. Especially in knowledge work one may be a part of a team for one task, whilst doing same time admin tasks for line organization, browsing report from latest project meeting, chatting to solve a problem given to one´s adviser group and waiting a call from customer. His line manager may be a co-operation partner in consortium, key account manager of a supply chain or mentor to strategy team.

People, experts or knowledge workers are no commanded but mentored and piloted towards more productive and fruitful results

Both skilful and knowledgeable people are organized in roles in which they add value to organization´s products. With their roles people understand responsibilities and expectations of their task. Human has a tendency to judge other people by the roles he has experience of i.e. stereotyping. Organization is not functioning if people misunderstand roles of other people or due lack of communication create false expectations. Human has also a tendency to fulfil expectations of the role(halo effect). Normally human also takes responsibility and even grows to meet the size of trust. Besides job descriptions, quota and task lists, the role one is working in is affected by one´s reputation or ethos. When people are interacting in organizational roles, the outcome is affected by pathos. Pathos is being communicated mostly with body language, which is the reason for some to avoid collaboration with technical means.⁴⁵

The best results comes out from a team, group or patrol constituted people with different skill sets and knowledge. People who know themselves and each others. Each person has particular personality and temperament. If the team understands these differences and combines them, they will get better outcome from each interaction with stake holders. The leader of organization starts building his structures and processes by building up small core teams, teaming them with needed additional competence, opening processes to have teams work together towards common goals, maintaining teams cohesion and interfaces by increasing self-conscious. When the team reaches the end of its life cycle, members can be used as cores for new teams or as mentors of other teams.

The outcome of every organization is only outside of its structure⁴⁶

The leadership area of influence is not any more defined by political, juridical or organizational bounds. A leader must influence to every individual, group or system within the space of operations and through all lines of support. A leader extends his will, intent and self-assurance through all processes, courses of action and chain of supply to have this complex system working towards unified objectives.⁴⁷ Taking care of ones subordinates is not enough, because in post-modern conflicts no organization is independent, but supported by multitude of other units and facilities. A good leader is taking care also of those organizations and specially of the process interfaces between organizations to have the whole network to work towards defined end state.⁴⁸

One can rarely master changes, but always try to be ahead of them

Tomorrow cannot be created, if yesterday is not abandoned. A leader must free organizational assets from tasks that don´t add value, are weak in revenue or which opponent has faced already twice. These assets leader should invest to create something new. Everything organization is doing either inside or outside, should be improved systematically (Kaizen⁴⁹ principle) or else organization will gain ineffective mass into its structure and interfaces. Particularly public sector organizations tend to evolve into thin functional silos and cover every process with excess layers of administration. Organization, that concentrates only solving current problems or uses always the familiar method or denies that environment and stake holders are changing, is not able to seize initiative or gain results.⁵⁰

4.7 How to lead individuals, groups or societies and maintain their trust

Organizations, that are planned to act in conflicts or in hard conditions, should build up esprit de corps - a spirit of integrity and self-confidence, which is created by sharing hardnesses, winning challenges or succeeding in overcoming fearful situations. A Chinese tradition says: officers do not sit, if troops are not able to sit also and officers do not eat before troops. Proximity creates trust. Frost and heat carves individuals to troops that may be able to face fear and death of battlefield with coherent esprit de corps.⁵¹

A human being is the strongest but same time the weakest link of defence system. To be able to make hard decisions, project force or stand hard times depends on human hearts and minds. All humans must be treated with respect and just in the whole space of operations, whether people belonged in defended societies, own military units, neutral societies or opponents units. The justness and authority support troops spirit to face death. People will follow eagerly and leave their areas of comfort, if they have someone they trust to lead them.⁵² WEILIAOZI says that when a leader is awarding as clear as sun in the sky, when a leader is trustworthy like four seasons, when a leader is adamant in his orders like battle axe, the army with all soldiers and officers will follow putting their life into stake.⁵³

At the moment, when the profound motives of leader is being questioned, everything he does becomes unreliable. ⁵⁴

Without confidence and trust there is no open society, because policing everyone is impossible. There is no global economy, because trust lowers tolls, opens commerce and creates transactions across borders. There is no shared communications, electricity distribution network, loans or just on time deliveries.⁵⁵

Trust between people is founded with prolonged interaction, but it can be lost in one day. According to David Halperns study 24% of USA citizens trusts to each others, South-Americans and Africans only 23% whereas 68% of Scandinavians trust their fellow citizen. Trust is a value of social system and it can support long chains of supply. In the subscriber – provider -network trust is more efficient when it is based on co-operation rather than contracted sanctions. If society lacks trust, one can maintain organization only with authoritarian leadership and tight controlled hierarchical line organization.

Man assesses himself according his intentions and others according their behaviour

The most effective method to build network of trust is to behave as agreed both to oneself and to others. Trust building is a process, where personality and competence both count. The favourable components of personality are morale, honesty, base of motivation and intentions towards other people. The favourable components of competence are skills, knowledge, performance, learnability and track record. With these features and shared experiences of successes a trust can be built to last opponent´s endeavours to brake alliances with disinformation and harshness.⁵⁶ On the basis of trusted relations a feeling of safety is being build. A human activity at cognitive level requires feeling of safety from both superiors and colleagues. Security supports concentration, when individual is stressed, urges to seek alternatives, takes risks or faces new challenges. A leader should be able to build a feeling of safety and positive support amongst his subordinates.⁵⁷

Every organization tends to get fat in favourable times. Organizations tend to augment administration, controls and sanctions, because they bring feeling of safety, feeling of risk management and administrators want to do their job well. In the other hand overly grown administration methods implicates lack of trust, clear procedures or safety in organization - sometimes even immature culture.⁵⁸ In some organizations – especially public safety organizations – controls and administration gradually tend to gain value on itself. In deeply functional organization silos sometime forget supporting the core business thus increasing marginal costs, gnawing motivation of people or immobilizing organization. The signs of high-class trust in organization are as follows:

• information is shared openly,
• mistakes are tolerated,
• risk taking is adhered as a method of learning,
• culture supports innovation and discrete opinions,
• people are loyal to colleagues on leave,
• people are talking openly and direct,
• interaction is filled with real world matters and facts,
• after official meetings there are less unofficial gatherings and finally
• organization is transparent to employees.⁵⁹

Post-modern confrontations and their conflicts requires different leadership and managerial skills at each level of management. Conflicts may have changed to fighting amongst people and leadership is still working with people, amongst them and in front of them. The complexity of operation requires understanding and decision making at every level of interaction with stake-holders, neutrals or opponents. Very few people can handle the big picture alone. A team of leaders should be created reinforced with various experts as situation requires in order to analyse, understand, foresee and execute operation with success. Organizations that are co-operating along supply chain are different in their culture and maturity, thus a leader must project his vision and will over the borders of organizations. Leader must become a coach that gets different players to function as a team.

References:

1 The english translation by Lionel Giles first published in 1910. Online http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar.php#sthash.SbkjdsJv.dpuf

2 The english translation by Lionel Giles first published in 1910. Online http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar.php#sthash.SbkjdsJv.dpuf

3Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.83 translated into English by Juha Mattila

4Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.28 translated into English be Juha Mattila

5Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.95 translated into English by Juha Mattila

6As commander of air operation Tommy Franks in II operation of Persian Gulf 2003 emphasized the end state of quick operational success in expense of longer term political goals. To General Franks massing systems and men was key to the victory. Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä.

7Clausewitz: ”Että kuninkaan ja hallituksen kunnia käy yksiin kansan kunnian kanssa ja on sen hyvinvoinnin ainoa turva. Että kansa joka urheasti taistelee vapautensa puolesta on voittamaton. Että vapauden tuhoutuminenkin verisen ja kunniakkaan taistelun myötä varmistaa kansan uudelleensynnyn. Se on elämän siemen, josta jonakin päivänä itää uusi vankasti juurtunut puu.” Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä

8John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.

9Martti Turtola; A.F. Airo - Taipumaton kenraali. Otava 1979 ISBN -10:951-1-19918-8 s.168

10Todorov, A et al: Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict Election Outcomes. Science vol. 308 10.6.2005

11Arno Gruen: Tahdon maailman ilman sotaa. Otava 2008 ISBN 978-952-01-0104-6

12Jukka Seppinen: Neuvostotiedustelu Suomessa 1917 – 1991 Strategia ja toiminta. Gummerus 2006 s.193

13Martti Turtola: AF Airo – Taipumaton kenraali. Translated into english by Juha Mattila

14Daniel Chirot, Clark McCauley: Miksei tapeta niitä kaikkia? Poliittisen joukkomurhan logiikka ja ehkäisy. Suom. Perti Stenman. Like 2008. ISBN 978-952-01-0064-3

15Scanhorst ranskalaisesta sotilaasta 1795 jälkeen: ”He uskoivat, että vain he olivat valistuneita, älykkäitä, vapaita ja onnekkaita ja että kaikki muut kansat olivat takaperoisia, nautamaisen typeriä ja huono-onnisia. He uskoivat, etteivät he taistelleet vain oman tulevan olemassa olonsa ja kohtalonsa, vaan myös koko ihmiskunnan puolesta.” Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä

16John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.

17John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.

18Pauli Juuti, Mikko Luoma: Strateginen johtaminen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23639-9 s.37

19Yves Doz, Mikko Kosonen: Fast Strategy. Wharton School publishing 2008

20Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007

21Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.85

22Richard P. Rumelt: Good Strategy Bad Strategy. Profile Books Ltd London 2012

23Lev Trotski said whilst building up the Red Army: ”We have to resist all attempts to build absolute Revolutionary strategy, that would be based on our limited experiences of three years Civil War. During this time units were fighting in special conditions not necessarily like faced in National Defence. “ Hew Strachan: Clausewitzin sodankäynnistä.

24Jari Sarasvuo: Huomiotalous. Otava 2005 ISBN 951-1-20566-8

25Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000

26Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000

27John Keegan: The Mask of Command - A Study of Generalship.

28Joseph S. Nye Jr: Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership. A Seminar at Harvard Kennedy School 2006

29Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.65

30This is to apart the integrity of Clausewitzian tripod which is most often the center of gravity.

31Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.115

32General Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force. Vintage 2008 ISBN 978-0-307-27811-1

33Nato´s Chicago Summit Declaration 2012: ”Our operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach. In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and reconstruction is ongoing.”

34Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.149

35Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007

36Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007

37Jari Sarasvuo: huomiotalous. Otava 2005. ISBN 951-20566-8

38Y.A. Järvinen: Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka Talvisodassa. WSOY 1948 s.193

39Daniel Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0

40Charles Duhigg: The Power of Habit. Randon House Books. London 2013

41Miyamoto Musashi: Go rin no sho. Maa, vesi, tuuli ja tyhjyys. Suom. Samppa Lahdenperä. 7.painos Otava 2007

42Ori Brafman & Rom Brafman: CLICK The forces behind how we fully engage with people, work, and everything we do. 2010 Crown Publishing Group. When people click, there are five accelerators – ingredients – factors that are involved: Vulnerability, proximity, resonance, similarity and a safe place

43Charles Duhigg: The Power of Habit. Randon House Books. London 2013.

44Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 22

45Charles Handy: Understanding Organizations. Penguin Books 1999 s. 76

46Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 49

47Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 49

48Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 54

49Kaizen is a system of continuous improvement in quality, technology, processes, company culture, productivity, safety and leadership by Steve Hudgik

50Peter F. Drucker: Johtamisen haasteet. WSOY 2000 s. 89

51Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.201

52Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.203

53Matti Nojonen: Jymäyttämisen taito. Strategiaoppeja muinaisesta Kiinasta. Gaudeamus 2009 s.225

54Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8. Fused from the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi.

55Thomas L. Friedman: The World is Flat. The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century. Penguin Books 2006

56Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8

57Daniel Coleman: Sosiaalinen äly. Suom. Laura Jänisniemi, Auri Paajanen. Otava 2009 ISBN 978-951-1-23968-0

58Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8

59Stephen M.R. Covey, Rebecca R. Merril: The Speed of Trust. Simon&Shuster, NY 2006 ISBN 978-1-84739-271-8